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Abstract 
The thesis describes Britain's disputes over fishery limits and territorial waters, 1948- 
64. Norway, Iceland, the Soviet Union and Denmark (on behalf of Greenland and the 
Faroe Islands) extended national jurisdiction on the oceans. Britain protested against 
every move, even despatching the Royal Navy to the disputed waters off Iceland, the 
main antagonist. Yet, on every occasion Britain had to admit defeat. In analytical terms, 
the thesis is partly a case study on foreign policy decision-making, the nature of power 
in international relations, and the relative decline of Britain after the Second World 
War. It also sets the quarrels over territorial waters in the context of the Cold War. 
The central conclusion is that Britain was too slow to recognise changes in the 
composition of power in international relations after the Second World War. British 
policy-makers overestimated their capability to enforce on other states their 
interpretation of the law of the sea. Their miscalculations were influenced by five 
considerations: power (the existence of stronger naval forces than the Nordic 
opponents), pressure (from the British trawling industry), precedence (the danger that 
retreat in one place would weaken the British stand elsewhere), principle (adherence to 
international law as it had been developing when Britain was a stronger power), and 
prestige (the belief that Britain was still strong enough to have her way on the high 
seas). Furthen-nore, departmental differences in Whitehall often slowed down the 
process of decision-making and ensured that the views of those officials who best 
realised the actual extent of British capabilities did not prevail. And finally, the 
frustrating obstinacy of a newly independent nation like Iceland contributed to the 
conflicts. 
The thesis is based on primary sources from public and private archives in 
Britain, Iceland, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Norway, the United States and 
Russia. Numerous interviews were also conducted. 
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Preface 
I began work on this thesis in the autumn of 1998 and there are a number of individuals 
and institutions which I must thank for their assistance. Th6r Whitehead at the 
University of Iceland supported my application for doctoral study in Britain and has 
always been a great mentor, in the truest sense of that word. I am indebted to the British 
Council for the Chevening Scholarship which enabled me to begin my postgraduate 
studies at St Antony's College in Oxford. Anne Deighton was my supervisor and I 
sincerely thank her for her support and friendship, during and after my year in Oxford. 
In early 1999, the refusal of Oxford University to take the formal step of 
forwarding my application for an Overseas Research Studentship (ORS) looked set to 
end this study rather abruptly. However, it proved to be a blessing in disguise. Queen 
Mary and Westfield College (as Queen Mary was then called) offered a ftill, three-year 
scholarship which, incidentally, was then replaced in part by the ORS. I will always be 
grateftil for this show of faith by the college. James Ellison became my supervisor and 
deserves deep thanks for his constant encouragement, excellent guidance and goodwill. 
At Queen Mary, I must also thank Peter Hennessy for his interest in the work and 
indeed all the other staff at the history department. I should also thank my fellow 
students, both at Queen Mary and St Antony's, for tolerating the fishy jokes all this 
time. The same goes for my Icelandic friends. 
In Iceland, I thank the staff at the National Archives and the Archives of the 
Central Bank of Iceland, and all those who gave access to documents in their custody. I 
am also grateful to Gudmundur Kjxrnested, Mdr Elisson and Gunnar G. Schram, three 
fon-ner 'cod warriors' who have been of great help throughout my studies. Furthermore, 
I am grateful to J6nas Kniýtsson for translating a Latin quote and to Gudmundur J6nsson 
and J6n Th. Th6r, two Icelandic historians who read the thesis in its final stages and 
made valuable comments. I also thank J6n for introducing me to NAFHA, the North 
Atlantic Fishing History Association, and providing me with an opportunity to present 
papers at its conferences. 
Many thanks are due to all those who offered funding and assistance in 
connection with my research journeys. The Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies 
gave a grant for research in Oslo. I am indebted to Rolf Tamnes, its director, to Halvor 
Egge at the Parliamentary Archives, and to Inga Badi-Massoud at the Foreign Ministry 
Archives for overseeing the declassification of files for me. The Central Research Fund 
of the University of London and the Letterstedtska Foreningen provided funding for 
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research in Copenhagen. At the Danish National Archives, Marianne Elisabeth Reimer 
handled my declassification requests. I thank her and all the other staff at the archives. I 
am also grateful to my good friend Rasmus Mariager, a fellow PhD student of history, 
and his partner, Bina Byron, who provided me with a place to stay in Copenhagen. 
The Central Research Fund financed one research visit to the United States. My 
appreciation goes to Icelandic Ambassador J6n Baldvin Hannibalsson and Bryndis 
Schram who allowed me to stay at their residence in Washington, DC, when I was 
working in the US National Archives. Their hospitality was great-after all, how many 
research students have enjoyed the luxury of being chauffeur-driven to the archives? I 
was also able to present a paper on my research at the US Naval War College in 
Newport, Rhode Island. For this privilege, I am much indebted to John Hattendorf. 
Furthermore, my gratitude goes to Barbara Constable and other staff at the Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. During a second visit to the United States in 
the summer of 2003, in connection with prospective research on the 'cod wars' of the 
1970s, I managed to find valuable material for the thesis at the Naval Historical Center 
in Washington, DC. Mike Walker was extremely helpful there. Luckily, the 
accommodation was again at the Ambassador's residence and Ambassador Helgi 
. 
ýgfistsson and Heba J6nasd6ttir were extremely hospitable. I also visited the Division 
of Rare and Manuscript Collections at Cornell University Library where Patrick J. 
Stevens was of great help. 
In Canada, Marcel Barriault located the relevant sources at the National 
Archives and handled my declassification requests. Hugh and Allison Reid were 
wonderful hosts. A two-month stipend from DAAD, the German Academic Exchange 
Service, allowed me to work on the thesis at the German Maritime Museum in 
Bremerhaven and conduct extensive research at the Federal Foreign Office Archives in 
Berlin and the Federal Archives in Koblenz. Ingo Heidbrink was not only my supervisor 
and host in Bremerhaven but has been a good friend since we met at a NAFHA 
conference in Qaqartoq in Greenland. I must also thank the staff in Berlin and Koblenz 
for their expert assistance, especially Knud Piening at the Foreign Office Archvies. As 
for the NATO archives in Brussels, I am grateful to Vala Gardarsd6ttir and Audun 
Helgason who allowed me to stay at their house. As for the sources from Moscow, I 
thank N. P. Mozzhukhina, Head of the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian 
Federation, for locating and declassifying the pertinent sources. My deep appreciation 
goes to R6sa Magnýisd6ttir, a fellow PhD student who took valuable time from her own 
research in Moscow and photocopied the documents for me. 
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In Britain, the Public Record Office was at times a second home from home and 
I thank all the staff there, in particular Howard Davies for assistance with declassified 
documents. In that regard, I am also indebted to Martin Longden and Penny Prior at the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Tessa Stirling at the Cabinet Office. 
Furthermore, my thanks go to archivists at the various other archives which I used, as 
well as to those trustees who gave me permission to use documents in their care. 
Coldwater Seafood Ltd. provided a grant for a visit to Humberside, for which I am very 
grateftil. I also thank the retired trawlermen there who shared their 'cod war' 
recollections with me, in particular George 'Cockle' Mussell in Cleethorpes. The same 
goes for David 'Curly' Robinson in Fleetwood, a former trawlerman and yet another 
friend gained through the research. Peter Pooley, formerly at the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Capt. Peter Hore and Andy Newton, two members of 
the Royal Navy who saw 'action' off Iceland in the 1970s, have also been helpful and 
kind. For offering a venue for the presentation of papers on the research, I am grateful to 
the organisers of the 8 th New Researchers in Maritime History Conference at the 
University of Greenwich, and the 70th Anglo-American Conference of Historians at the 
Institute of Historical Research. I owe a debt of gratitude to many others and apologise 
for not naming them all here. In particular, I ought to have mentioned all those who 
were willing to share their 'cod war' recollections with me, either through interviews or 
correspondence. I only wish that I could have made even more use of that material in 
the thesis. 
My deepest appreciation goes to my family. My mother, Margr6t Thorlacius, 
and brothers, J6hannes and Patrekur, have always been most supportive. My interest in 
history I owe to my late father, J6hannes Swmundsson. My daughter Rut has always 
been a source of joy and inspiration, if only by asking maddeningly simple questions 
like why people couldn't just share the fish, or how someone can spend so many years 
writing one essay. Finally, it has been said that the postgraduate student in Britain is 
often 'a lonely, forlorn soul, uncertain of what he is doing or whom he is trying to 
please'. ' Eliza rescued me from that fate, at least the part on the forlorn loneliness. 
Thanks to her, it has beenfun. 
Gardabac, Iceland, July 25,2003 
Gudni Thorlacius J6hannesson 
David Lodge, Changing Places. A Tale of Two Campuses (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), 16. 
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Note on spelling 
In line with general practice, the Icelandic P is replaced by 'th' in the text, and the 
Icelandic/Faroese 6 with V. Icelandic/Faroese accentuation is kept, for instance ei and 
6. The Danish/Faroese o is also used, as well as the Nordic m. 
In direct quotations, the spelling of Nordic names has been standardised and the 
local spelling always used (Olafur always 61afur, for instance). Place names are put in 
the local language where they are identical or nearly identical to the English (Reykjavik 
and T6rshavn and not Reykjavik or Thorshavn) but when the difference is greater, the 
English version is used (i. e. Copenhagen but not Kobenhavn). The use of upper and 
lower case has also been standardised (e. g. goverm-nent always in lower case). 
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Introduction 
Parameters and Purposes 
This thesis is about Britain's disputes over fishery limits and territorial waters in the 
North Atlantic and the Barents Sea from 1948 to 1964. Britain lost all the conflicts, for 
behind them lay deep miscalculations, most fatefully on the 'national interest' and 
power in international relations during the Cold War. As one of the diplomats involved 
later asserted, the British side was just 'bloody stupid'. ' But the opponents' 
intransigence did not help either and the Icelanders, the main antagonists, were deemed 
to be a 'notoriously inflexible people [who] take an almost masochistic pleasure in the 
2 role of David against Goliath'. A struggle of the stubborn was almost inevitable. 
The British trawlermen determine the geographical boundaries of the research, 
sailing as they did to the rich fishing banks off North Norway, the Kola-peninsula, the 
Faroe Islands and around Iceland, the centre of gravity in the thesis. 3 As for the time 
frame, 1948 is a logical starting point. The Norwegians then began to arrest British 
trawlers on the 'high seas' and the Icelandic authorities took the first step on their long 
journey to the promised land of wider fishing limits. Most of the subsequent action took 
place between 1952 and 1960 but the story concludes in 1964 when Britain herself 
followed the course which she had so strenously opposed just a few years before. 
The research has two aims. First, it is an empirical effort. A story will be told 
which has not been described in detail before. 4 And it is an important tale. In late 1952, 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden could not but lament, for instance, that the dispute 
1 Sir Andrew Gilchrist, Britain's Ambassador to Iceland in 1956-59. Morgunbladid, 12.11.1978. 
2 Public Record Office, London [henceforward PRO]: F0371/111535/NLI351/165, Ward minute, 
10.11.1954. 
3 Apart from the Faroese waters, which were called 'middle water', all the fishing grounds were 'distant 
water'. 
4 No archive-based research of these conflicts in toto exists. For surveys of the Icelandic aspect, see J6n 
Th. Thor, British Trawlers and Iceland 1919-1976 (Esbjerg: Fiskeri- og Sofartsmuseet, 1995), Andrew 
Gilchrist, Cod Wars and How to Lose Them (Edinburgh: Q Press, 1978), and Hannes J6nsson, Friends in 
Conflict. The Anglo-Icelandic Cod Wars and the Law of the Sea (London: Hurst, 1982). For an overview 
of the Anglo-Norwegian conflicts, see Carl A. Fleischer, Fiskerigrensen, folkeretten og den okonomiske 
sone (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1977), and Brit Floistad, 'Hovedlinjene i utformingen av norsk 
sjogrensepolitikk etter 1945', (BA thesis, University of Oslo, 1982). For the Dano-Faroese aspect, see 
Erlendur Patursson, Fiskivinna og Fiskivinnumcil 1940-1970 1 (T6rshavn: Foroya Fiskimannafelag, 1979). 
For a brief summary of the Soviet aspect, see William E. Butler, The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973). For British distant-water trawlincy, see Robb Robinson, 
Trawling. The Rise and Fall of the British Trawl Fisheiý, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1996). 
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Figure L Britain's distant and middle water trawling grounds in the North Atlantic. 
with the Icelanders was 'one of the most complicated international tangles which it has 
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ever been my, not privilege, but misfortune, to have to deal with'. Furthermore, the 
conflicts in question fit well with the greater theme of Britain's international position 
and the 'loss of Empire'. They involve, in a sense, the 'loss of the seas', a subject which 
has received surprisingly little attention. 6 Britain was a great maritime power. In little 
over a decade after 1948, however, she suffered almost continuous defeats in disputes 
about fishing limits and territorial waters, an avowed vital interest. This happened not 
only against a mighty opponent like the Soviet Union but also when Britain faced far 
weaker states like Norway or Iceland-and as incredible as it might have sounded only 
a few years before, the Faroe Islands, a microscopic colony of a few souls with almost 
no visible powers of persuasion. 
The second aim of the thesis is analytical. Various generalisations and theories 
will be used to understand 'what the events mean'. 7 Thus, the thesis is partly a case 
5 Hansard, Vol. 509, cols. 4-5, oral answers, 8.12.1952. The ongoing disputes with Iceland received more 
attention in Britain than relations with other Nordic states. Juhana Aunesluoma, 'Britain, Sweden and the 
Cold War, 1945-54', (DPhiI thesis, University of Oxford, 1998), 15-16. And in 1958, the most eventful 
year in the period under examination, the Cabinet discussed fishing limits and/or the law of the sea in 21 
of 88 meetings. See PRO: CAB128/32. 
6 For a recent critique on this lack of attention, see Ralph Harrington, "'The Mighty Hood": Navy, 
Empire, War at Sea and the British National Imagination', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 3 8, 
No. 2,2003,171-173. 
7 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990), 1. Also Thomas W. Smith, History and International Relations (London: 
Routledge, 1999), 179-190. Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, 'International History and International Relations 
theory: a dialogue beyond the Cold War', International Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 4,2000,741-754. Rolf 
Tamnes, 'Forskningen om den kalde krigen - status og fremtid', Historisk Tidsskrift (Norway), Vol. 72, 
No. 4,1993,502-503. Ngaire Woods, 'The Uses of Theory in the Study of International Relations', in 
Ngaire Woods (ed. ), Explaining International Relations Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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study, involving broader issues and concepts that have been closely examined and are 
continually debated. The two most prominent themes are foreign policy decision- 
making and the nature of power in international relations, but light will also be shed on 
issues like the development of the law of the sea, Anglo-American relations and the 
decline of British influence in the twentieth century. 
Historical Background 
The disputes under discussion can be traced to the end of the nineteenth century when 
British steam trawlers began fishing in waters around Iceland and the Faroe Islands, and 
slightly later off North Norway and the Kola-peninsula in Russia. The local fishermen, 
still using small boats with line and nets, strongly resented the competition for when the 
trawl was drawn along the seabed, other gear could be wrecked and the grounds 
depleted. 8 The trawlermen refuted all accusations of overfishing, however, and a 
number of British fishing ports flourished, most notably Grimsby and Hull, but also 
Fleetwood and Aberdeen. 9 
Economic interests clashed in the North Atlantic and friction was bound to 
emerge. Moreover, the conflicts involved the law of the sea, an ancient and fluctuating 
concept. 10 By the seventeenth century, two conflicting theories on maritime sovereignty 
had evolved: Mare Clausum, whereby states could claim for themselves sections of the 
oceans, and Mare Liberum, the freedom of the high seas. A seafaring state like England 
obviously favoured the latter doctrine which gradually took hold. Simultaneously, the 
notion of territorial waters emerged, a belt of sea closest to shore which belonged to the 
coastal state. In the nineteenth century, Britain argued that the width of this area should 
be three nautical miles and in 1882, all states but one lying on the North Sea accepted 
that principle in those waters. ' 1 Only the Kingdom of Sweden and Norway continued to 
1996), 1,11. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts. An Introduction to Theory and 
History (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), xiii-xiv, 5-8. 
8 For the origins of British trawling off Iceland, see J6n Th. Th6r, 'The Beginnings of British-Steam 
Trawling in Icelandic Waters', Mariner's Mirror, Vol. 74, No. 3,1988,267-272. For Norway, see Jan L. 
Backer, 'Trdlersaken', in Kdre Fasting (ed. ), LqfqCisket. Sm6drift eller storbruk i nyeformer (Trondheim: 
F. Bruns bokhandels forlag, 1946), 171-198. For the Faroe Islands, see Henry Montagu Villiers, 'Konsul i 
Foroyum', unpublished memoirs, translated to the Faroese and edited by Hans Jacob Debes. In possession 
of J6n Th. Th6r, Reykjavik. Also 'The Cod War of 1893-1899' 
<http: //grimsbywebfind. com/sites/Fishing/cod_war of 1893. htm>, accessed 15.3.2002. 
9 Robinson, Trawling, 97-114. 
10 A good overview is Sayre Swarztrauber, The Three-Mile Limit of Territorial Seas (Annapolis, 
Maryland: US Naval Institute, 1972). For a summary, see R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the 
Sea (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2 nd ed., 1988), 59-68. 
" One nautical mile is 1852 metres. In legal terms, the term territorial sea is favoured instead of territorial 
waters but the main players in this thesis usually used the latter terni. Hence, it will also be utilised here. 
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water mark. 
maintain the historic Scandinavian claim to four miles. 12 In 1901, the principle of 
narrow national jurisdiction was further fortified when Britain and Denmark signed a 
treaty on the three-mile rule around the Danish dependencies of Iceland and the Faroe 
Islands. 13 In London, this limit had become a vital national interest, 'a principle on 
which we might be prepared to go to war with the strongest power in the world', as 
Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey said in 1911.14 In the early 1920s, Danish inquiries 
about the possible extension of Icelandic and Faroese territorial waters were turned 
down, ' 5 and Bolshevik intentions to maintain a 12-mile limit in the Barents Sea which 
Tsarist Russia had declared before the war suffered similar fate. In 1930, Britain and the 
Soviet Union signed a treaty on fishing up to three miles in wide areas off the Kola- 
peninsula, although they did not formally accept their respective views on territorial 
waters. 16 
The application of the three-mile limit was never widespread enough, still, to 
become an undisputed rule of law. Britain had her way de facto with Moscow, yet the 
Barents Sea agreement was an uneasy compromise. The Icelanders and the Faroe 
12 Mnsson, Friends, 34-35. 
13 Th6r, British Trawlers, 45-50. 
14 PRO: MAF41/674, Grey to Findlay, 26.6.1911. 
15 Pdtur J. Thorsteinsson, Utanrikisthj6nusta islands og utanrikisincil I (Reykjava: Hid islenska 
b6kmenntafdlag, 1992), 114-115. 
16 Butler, Soviet Union, 90-95. 
Figure M. The three-mile limit of territorial waters around kelandfrom 1901, measuredfrom the low- 
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Islanders came to resent the Anglo-Danish treaty of 1901, as they realised that the three- 
mile limit was neither wide enough nor sufficiently guarded to protect the fishing 
grounds. 17 And while the Norwegians (who gained independence from Sweden in 1905) 
did not enforce assiduously the four-mile limit, they never renounced their legal claim 
to it. 18 Britain and Norway reached a temporary modus vivendi but when an 
international conference to codify the law of the sea was convened at The Hague in 
1930, it became fully clear that an agreement on the width of territorial waters was 
impossible. Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland advocated the 'Scandinavian' four- 
mile limit and many Mediterranean and South-American states either suggested six 
miles of territorial waters or three miles with another three for fishing regulation and 
other limited rights for the coastal state. 19 Then, in 1935, the Norwegians issued a new 
Royal Decree on the four-mile limit, a move which Britain protested so strongly that 
they backed down, while reserving their legal rights. A compromise limit, the 'Red 
Line', came into being but the matter was unresolved in 193 9.20 
The law of the sea was this ambiguous at the end of the Second World War 
when, in the words of British experts, American action caused 'enormous damage' to 
the principle of the freedom of the high seas. 21 With the Truman Declarations of 1945, 
the United States, spurred on by strategic and economic considerations, claimed 
jurisdiction over all resources on its continental shelf which in some areas stretched 
hundreds of miles from shore. The right to regulate fisheries was also reserved. Despite 
American assertions about the continued validity of the three-mile limit in all other 
respects, some states in the Western Hemisphere were quick to interpret the 
Declarations as they pleased, declaring territorial waters or exclusive fishery jurisdiction 
of up to 200 miles. 22 
Such, in short, was the situation of the law of the sea in 1948 and four 
underlying themes emerge from this survey. First, it is clear that no undisputed rule 
existed on the width of territorial waters. Second, the law of the sea had been in 
17 J6nsson, Friends, 37-38,50-51. 
18 For the Anglo-Norwegian conflict over territorial waters in the first half of the twentieth century, see 
Floistad, 'Hovedlinjene', 42-53. Also Olav Riste, Norway's Foreign Relations-A History (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 2001), 124-126. 
'9 Swarztrauber, Three-Mile Limit, 32-40. 
20 PRO: MAF41/694, Dobson minute, 23.2.1939. Jan P. Jansen and Per Chr. Blichfeldt, Havets voktere. 
Historien om K, vstvakten (Oslo: Schibsted, 1998), 65. 
21 PRO: F0371/105740/GWI/82, Fitzmaurice minute, 14.8.1953. Also National Archives and Records 
Administration, College Park, Maryland [henceforward NARA]: RG59/811.0145/6-1845, Wright to 
Dooman, 18.6.1945. 
22 Swarztrauber, Three-Afile Limit, 155-169. Also Charles Selak, Jr., 'Recent Developments in High Seas 
Fisheries Jurisdiction under the Presidential Proclamation of 1945'_4merican Journal ofInternational 
Lam, [henceforward AJIL], Vol. 44, No. 4,1950,670-68 1. 
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constant flux and would continue to develop. Third, Britain viewed the three-mile limit 
of territorial waters as a vital 'national interest', a term which will be discussed below. 
Fourth, the law of the sea had only been changed and enforced through power and 
pressure. 'It was primarily the might of the British Navy', as one observer argued, 
that made British views on the law of the sea right'. 23 
The Maritime Disputes and Power in International Relations 
The historical background highlights that this research is a fine case study of power. 
Fundamentally, power is ability-or as Thucydides pointed out in his classic statement 
in the history of the Peloponnesian War: 'The strong do what they have the power to do 
and the weak accept what they have to accept'. 24 In the academic terminology of 
international relations studies, this wisdom is often rephrased by calling power, to take a 
typical example, 'the factors that enable one actor to manipulate another actor's 
behaviour against its preferences'. 25 It follows that power is always relative and intricate 
but the core issues to consider are still simple: what makes one state strong and another 
weak, how do or should states attain their ends, and what are or should those ends be? 
Traditionally, two main rival schools of thought in the discipline of international 
relations have attempted to answer such questions; realism on the one hand and 
idealism on the other. 26 Both are relevant for the study of the maritime conflicts in the 
North Atlantic, 27 and the prelude to these disputes up to the Second World War would 
indeed seem to support the validity of realism for an understanding of conflict 
resolution in international relations. To continue simplifying complex matters for the 
sake of coherence, realism may be summed up in the German word Realpolitik, extolled 
23 J6nsson, Friends, 34. For an understanding of how British supremacy was based on naval strength, the 
best volume is still Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall ofBritish Naval Mastery (London: Fontana, 3 rd ed., 
1991). 
24 See Nye, Understanding, 19. 
25 Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics. Trend and Transformation (New York: 
World Publishers, 7th ed., 1999), 27. 
26 For that basic dichotomy, see Kegley and Wittkopf, World Politics, 23, and Stefano Guzzini, Realism 
in International Relations and International Political Economy (London: Routledge, 199 8), 16. No 
attempt can or should be made here to delve deeper into the numerous schools of thought on power in the 
discipline of international relations. It must also be mentioned that the theories which are used and 
discussed in this thesis are inherently vague, fluctuating and subject to numerous interpretations, 
exceptions and caveats, or as the famous theorist Ole R. Holsti wrote: '[T]he diplomatic historian who 
ventures into neighbouring disciplines with expectations of finding broad agreement on key concepts that 
are linked together in well established theories, and solidly buttressed by empirical evidence, is likely to 
be somewhat disappointed'. Ole R. Holsti, 'Theories of Crisis Decision Making', in Paul Gordon Lauren 
(ed. ), Diplomacy. New Approaches in History, Theoi-v, and Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 
104. 
27 The conflicts are often referred, to as 'fishing disputes' which can at times be misleading, since they 
involved more fundamental issues than regional fishing rights. The words 'maritime' and 'fishing' will be 
used interchangeably in the thesis. 
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by Bismarck near the end of the nineteenth century and defined by Henry Kissinger 
some hundred years later as 'foreign policy based on calculations of power and the 
national interest'. 28 Realists maintain that conflicts between states are inevitable, that 
statesmen should put moral principles below the pursuit of national interests, and that 
military capabilities are the decisive factors in the everlasting struggle between states. 29 
Although wars and armies are prominent in this understanding of world politics, other 
means, less drastic, are also at hand. 'Gunboat diplomacy' is one of these subtler 
weapons in the realist annoury. The term originates from the mid-nineteenth century, 
the heyday of Empire when Lord Palmerston shaped British foreign policy and used 
gunboats to demonstrate British might . 
30 Later the term was widened and in James 
Cable's authoritative definition, 'gunboat diplomacy' is 
... the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in 
order to secure advantage or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an 
international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the 
jurisdiction of their own state. 31 
This policy was applied in the North Atlantic to realise Britain's will in maritime 
matters. In the run-up to the treaties on territorial waters with Denmark in 1901 and the 
Soviet Union in 1930, it was not the force of the argument that caused decision-makers 
in Copenhagen and Moscow to adopt the British view. In 1896-97, a Royal Navy 
training flotilla twice visited Reykjavik. It was at least partly a flag-showing exercise 
and contributed significantly to the agreement a few years later. 32 Similarly, the 
Bolshevik government intended to enforce the Tsarist 12-mile limit in the Barents Sea 
and only backed down because British warships were sent to the scene. 33 Pressure might 
also have been used off Norway. Had Oslo tried to enforce the historical four-mile limit, 
as the Royal Decree of 1935 declared, British gunboats would possibly have protected 
British trawlers from arrest by Norwegian coast guard vessels. 34 
28 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 137. 
29 For the classic work on realism see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Strugglefor 
Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 3 rd ed., 1961). 
30 Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 177- 
179. 
31 James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1991. Political Applications ofLimited Naval Force 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 3 rd ed., 1994). 14. Also Ken Booth, Natles and Foreign Policy (New York: 
Holmes and Meier, 1977), 16-19. 
32 Gisli AgOst Gunnlaugsson, 'Fiskveidideila islendinga og Breta 1896 og 1897', Saga, Vol. 18,1980,82- 
83. 
33 Butler, Soviet Union, 90-95. PRO: MAF41/707, MAF minute, 4.7.1928. 
34 PRO: F0371/17222/N8587/71/30, Seal to Collier, 29.11.1933, F0371/19440/N868/62/30, Moss- 
Blundell to Collier, 20.2.1935, and F0371/19442/N4763/62/30, interdepartmental meeting, 14.9.1935. 
Also Riste, Norwqv's Foreign Relations, 126. 
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After the Second World War, calls for naval pressure in the North Atlantic could 
also be heard. They went unheeded until the outbreak of the 'cod war' with Iceland in 
1958 when such a policy was finally implemented and proved unsuccessful. A realist 
explanation and understanding of the maritime disputes in this period would thus seem 
implausible, unlike the seemingly greater congruence between theory and events before 
the war. To recapitulate, if military power decides disputes where morality succumbs to 
expediency, then why was 'gunboat diplomacy' not implemented from the onset in 
1948 and why did it fail in the end? 
A censure of realism is no novelty in itself for as the critics have contended, it 
does not necessarily conform to reality. 35 The more or less opposite theory in 
international relations, the idealist approach, might therefore fit the facts better. 
Idealists, also called moralists or liberals, maintain that the realist calculation of 
capabilities does not matter most in world politics, but rather the 'pattern of underlying 
national preferences', meaning public opinion and other societal ideas, ideals of 
democracy and justice, and various institutional constraints. 36 Britain's relative 
forbearance in the maritime disputes after the Second World War would then best be 
understood by reference to an altruistic respect for the adversary's views. But why the 
change, then? Why did Britain give in with an apparently enlightened magnanimity on 
matters which were vigorously defended before? Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's 
theory of 'complex interdependence' will be useful to comprehend the change, as it 
emphasises how military resources or other expressions of force diminished in the new 
era of international relations after the Second World War. 37 Hence, the tentative theory 
is put forward here, to be tested against the run of events, that post-war decision-makers 
in Britain got so disoriented in the fresh environment surrounding them that they 
vacillated unwillingly between a reliance on predominantly idealist and realist 
approaches to the problems facing them in the North Atlantic. 
If so, the 'national interest' was responsible for much of the confusion. It is 'a 
38 
singularly vague concept', Joseph Frankel once claimed . The most obvious 
disadvantage is that states may have many goals and concepts which contradict each 
other. The theory will thus be examined as well that the interests of Britain had become 
35 For a recent critique, see e. g. Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
36 For a surnmarisation, see Andrew Moravcsik, The Choicefor Europe. Social Purpose and State Power 
ftom Messina to Maastricht (London: UCL Press, 1999), 497. 
37 Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977). 
38 Joseph Frankel, The National Interest (London: Macmillan, 1970), 15. For a recent summary, see H. W. 
Brands, 'The Idea of the National Interest', Diplomatic History, Vol. 23, No. 2,1999,2' 3 9-26 1. 
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so complicated--or interdependent, to refer to Keohane and Nye's notion-that a 
stubborn insistence on the defence of the three-mile limit ignored other and newer 
aspects that were even more important. Besides, the question could even be raised 
whether the struggle against the tide in the North Atlantic was not just another example 
of Britain's troubled transition towards a reduced role in the world. 
The Maritime Disputes and Foreign Policy Decision-Making 
It has been said that in the first decades after the Second World War, the makers of 
British foreign policy were primarily 'pragmatic', unbound by ideology and always 
adaptable. 39 But it has also been said that they were nostalgic and obsessed with 
prestige, unable to absorb Britain's relative decline. 40 The maritime disputes in the 
North Atlantic must be examined against this background of pragmatism versus 
misapprehension, and it may be asserted right away that proper pragmatists do not 
pursue policies that fail. Moreover, since the 1970s at least, students of foreign policy 
have challenged the image of rational actors making rational decisions in a rational 
environment. 41 'The lens of policy-making is not made of clear glass', Anne Deighton 
has written, 'but it is a lens clouded with personal, career, tactical, cultural and 
psychological considerations'. 42 'Group-think' also comes to the fore, or the 
individuals' tendency to submerge doubts and disagreements for fear of challenging the 
conventional view. 43 Likewise, any analysis of foreign policy is 'deeply inadequate', as 
Cyril Buffett and Beatrice Heuser put it, if 'metaphysical dimensions of each culture, its 
39 For the diplomats' view, see Sir Charles Webster, The Art and Practice ofDiplomacy (London: Chatto 
and Windus, 1961), 14, and Lord Strang, The Diplomatic Career (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1962), 110-113. For a consenting view by historians, see Joseph Frankel, British Foreign Policy, 1945- 
1973 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 3,112-113,329, and John W. Young, Britain and the 
World in the Twentieth Century (London: Arnold, 1997), 228. 
40 As David Reynolds and Peter Hennessy have summarised, the examination of 'decline' has been 
almost an 'obsession' in Britain's post-war period. David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled., British Policy 
and World Power in the Twentieth Century (London: Longman, 199 1), 1, and Peter Hennessy, Whitehall 
(London: Secker and Warburg, 1989), 2. Also Richard English and Michael Kenny (eds), Rethinking 
British Decline (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000). 
41 For a summary, see John A. Vasquez, The Power ofPower Politics. From Classical Realism to 
Neotraditionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 156-157,164. Also Michael Clarke 
and Brian White (eds), Understanding Foreign Policy. The Foreign Policy Systems Approach (Aldershot: 
Edward Elgar, 1989). 
42 Anne Deighton, 'British Foreign Policy-Making: the Macmillan Years', in Wolfram Kaiser and Gillian 
Staerck (eds), British Foreign Policy, 1955-64. Contracting Options (London: Macmillan, 2000), 11-12. 
For the classic work-, see Irving L. Janis, Groupthink. Psychological Studies ofPolicy Decisions and 
Fiascoes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2 nd ed., 1982). For a summary, see Christopher Hill, 'A 
theoretical introduction', in William Wallace and W. E. Paterson (eds), Foreign policy making in Western 
Europe. A comparative approach (Famborough: Saxon House, 197 8), 14-17. 
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subjective views of the past and its beliefs about the present are not taken into 
consideration'. 44 
These considerations will help to explain why one decision was preferred over 
another in the maritime disputes. But an inquiry must similarly be made into how 
decisions were made. The main steps in the process of reaching decisions are clear: the 
problem at hand is defined, objectives which might constitute a solution are set and a 
strategy for action is then constructed. In practice, however, the course is rarely this 
simple. 45 Furthen-nore, conflicts may be prolonged and during the maritime disputes, the 
decision-makers in London repeatedly had to address the same or similar issues. No 
matter how strong the hold of original ideas, did they not learn some lessons over time? 
Theories of representation and re-representation in decision-making will prove useful to 
understand how and why Britain's original position developed--or did not develop, as 
the empirical evidence may show. 46 
An examination of how is necessarily connected with the question of who. Who 
exactly were the 'decision-makers'? Just like the 'national interest' was not as simple as 
some of its protagonists supposed, so is this entity more diverse than many students of 
foreign policy used to believe. The prevalent view today holds that 'Innenpolitik is in'. 47 
The body of decision-makers is then greatly widened to include public opinion, 
interested politicians and pressure groups, like the trawling industry during the disputes 
in the North Atlantic. Naturally, the influence from these quarters is open to 
interpretation. For instance, were the trawler owners and crews a 'powerful political 
lobby', as has been asserted, or was it true that they 'scarcely knew their way around 
Whitehall , ? 48 Various sections within the bureaucracy may also get involved, and with 
complexity often comes confusion, disagreement and procrastination. In his short stint 
as Foreign Secretary in 195 1, Herbert Morrison famously declared that '[floreign policy 
44 Cyril Buffett and Beatrice Heuser, 'Conclusions: Historical Myths and the Denial of Change', in Cyril 
Buffett and Beatrice Heuser (eds), Haunted by History. Alwhs in International Relations (Oxford: 
Berghahn Books, 1998), 274. 
45 Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System 
Structure (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 361-369. 
46 See Robert S. Billings and Charles F. Hermann, 'Problem Identification in Sequential Decision 
Making: The Re-representation of Problems', in Donald A. Sylvan and James F. Voss (eds), Problem 
Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 53- 
79. 
47 Fareed Zakaria, 'Realism and Domestic Politics. A Review Essay', International Security, Vol. 17, No. 
1,1992,177,198. Also James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier. Exploring Governance 
in a Turbulent World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 3-6. 
48 For the former reference, see J6nsson, Friends, 91. For the latter, see Morris Davis, 'Hannes J6nsson, 
Friends in Conflict: The Anglo-Icelandic Cod War and the Law of the Sea' (book review), American 
Politcal Science Review. Vol. 78, No. 2,1984,563. One of the best studies of the relationship between 
domestic politics and foreign policy-making in Britain is still William Wallace, The Foreign Policy 
Process in Britain (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976). 
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would be OK except for the bloody foreigners', 49 but during the maritime conflicts the 
diplomats in the Foreign Office might well have bemoaned that the making of foreign 
policy would be fine if it were not for their fellow countrymen. An interesting theory 
can therefore be broached: was the mechanism itself to blame for churning out the 
wrong decisions, or no decisions at all? Would the 'experts' in the Foreign Office 
perhaps have forced through the rational conclusion of concessions in the North 
Atlantic some time sooner, if they had not lost out in the 'battle of Whitehall' ? 50 
Sources and Structure 
A rich variety of material will be used to explain and understand the whole story. The 
thesis is primarily based on research in public and private archives in Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Norway, Germany, Russia, the United States, and of course mainly in Britain 
and Iceland .51 Along with 
interviews and a variety of secondary sources, the material in 
these repositories provides an opportunity to write a truly international history, rich in 
contrasts and comparisons. 
The thesis is divided into four chronological sections: 1948-52,1952-56,1956- 
60 and 1960-64. Section One begins with an analysis of the new political and strategic 
background in the North Atlantic after the Second World War. The Nordic states, 
aiming to increase the control of their adjacent waters, seemed willing to use, or even 
abuse, the constraints of alliance on Britain. This was first apparent in Norway where 
the authorities decided to enforce fully the old four-mile limit and British decision- 
makers felt, for a variety of reasons, that they had to contest this 'encroachment' on the 
oceans. Although they were at times tempted to threaten the use of 'gunboat 
diplomacy', the case was ultimately referred to The International Court of Justice at The 
Hague. As for Iceland, meanwhile, the idealistic or moral aspect of Britain's 'national 
interest' clearly influenced decision-making in London. The Icelanders would be helped 
to expand their fishing industry because otherwise they would 'starve'. This attitude, 
part strategic but altruistic as well, proved weightier than simple support for the wishes 
of the British trawlennen and owners. Finally, the chapter discusses interdepartmental 
debates in Whitehall; the reluctance to admit that Britain's capabilities had diminished 
and that her interests should thus be redefined. 
49 Quoted in John Dickie, 'Special'No More. Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1994), 66. 
50 A title of a chapter on departmental differences in the making of foreign policy. James Barber, Who 
Makes British Foreign Policy? (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1976), 47-65. 
51 See bibliography for details. A fair amount of files in the national archives of Canada, Denmark, 
Norway, Russia and Britain was specifically declassified at the author's request. 
23 
Section Two continues in London and scrutinises the continued failure of the 
decision-making body to respond to changes in the law of the sea, most notably the loss 
before the International Court in the dispute with Norway. This maladjustment became 
clear when Britain refused to accept the extension of Iceland's fishing limits on 
'Norwegian' lines. The idealistic concern for Iceland's interest was replaced by 
Realpolitik. Fon-nation of British foreign policy was effectively surrendered to the 
trawler owners and skippers in Hull and Grimsby who calculated that a ban on the 
landings of Icelandic catches in Britain would force the rulers in Reykjavik to back 
down. Qualified success in negotiations with Moscow over fishing in the Barents Sea 
and with Copenhagen because of Faroese waters increased hopes that Britain could have 
her way in maritime matters. But the tide was obviously turning. Surrender was 
inevitable in the struggle against the Icelanders, supremely committed and cunningly 
aware of their power in the new strategic envirom-nent. The chapter concludes as it 
began, by a survey of adverse currents on the international scene which British 
politicians and officials still refused to accept. 
Section Three is about the climax of the disputes. The United Nations convened 
two international conferences to codify the width of fishing limits and territorial waters, 
at Geneva in 1958 and 1960. Both failed, in part because traditional 'three-milers' like 
Britain were reluctant to accept change, refusing on the former occasion what they were 
ready to accept the second time around, when it was too late. A similar sequence of 
events characterised the 'cod war' with Iceland, by far the most serious dispute in the 
period. The authorities in Reykjavik, having declared a 12-mile fishing limit after the 
UN conference in 1958, did not help by showing the utmost intransigence which 
facilitated the critical temptation in London to use 'gunboat diplomacy' instead of 
accepting the inevitable. Royal Navy warships sailed north to protect British trawlers 
within the new line and clashes with Icelandic coast guard vessels occurred. A wave of 
fury swept Iceland, the country's presence in NATO was put at risk and that was 
definitely not in Britain's perceived 'national interest'. Neither, however, did a retreat 
look appealing, especially because a withdrawal off Iceland would weaken the 
resistance elsewhere in the North Atlantic, as well as the general principle of narrow 
territorial waters. A qualified victory around the Faroe Islands also fed the wishful 
thinking that the Icelanders might prove as amenable. So, for the time being, Britain 
stuck to her guns. 
Section Four is about surrender. Notwithstanding the inconclusive outcome at 
Geneva in 1960, the three-mile rule was undeniably dead and a 12-mile limit of some 
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kind offered the least injurious concession for Britain. Defeat was first admitted off 
Norway, then Iceland and the Soviet Union, and as before, the rulers in London could 
hold out the longest against the minuscule Faroe Islanders. The section concludes with 
Britain's own extension of fishing limits in 1964. Thus ended the age-long defence of 
the three-mile rule which had. culminated in a series of last ditch battles in the North 
Atlantic for the previous decade and a half. 
Thirty years later, an anonymous records reviewer in the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office wondered whether one particular overview of Britain's policy could safely be put 
in the public domain, as it 'sets out some contradictions and inconsistencies in the UK 
position on territorial waters & fishing limits'. 52 That was an understatement. The die- 
hard attitude was unwise, ultimately self-damaging and far from pragmatic. Fortunately, 
however, the paper was released, along with other similar sources. The reason was, as 
the relevant department at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office pointed out, that 'intl. 
law has moved on'. 53 But if only that sagacious conclusion had been reached sooner, 
when it really mattered! Here is what happened instead. 
52 PRO: F0371/176335/GW2/251, reviewer note, 10.5.1994. The worry was that the paper 'could still 
conceivably be used to the UK's disadvantage in ... future negotiations or 
litigation'. 
53 PRO: F0371/176335/GW2/257, FCO note, 18.7.1994. 
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1. Britain at Sea. Defence of the National Interest 
in a New Environment, 1948-52 
1.1. The Acquisition of Vital Allies. An Alliance to Preserve 
National Interests, 1948-49 
Britain's quest for a continued global role after the Second World War greatly 
influenced the formation of the Atlantic Alliance, which in turn affected the outcome of 
the maritime disputes with Norway, Denmark and Iceland. On the whole, British policy- 
makers felt that the calamities of the immediate post-war period did not constitute a 
permanent change in world affairs. Britain was still a 'great power', Foreign Secretary 
Ernest Bevin declared in 1947.1 'Old Palmerston', the creator of 'gunboat diplomacy', 
was Bevin's favourite statesman and indeed one critic on the left remarked that the 
Foreign Secretary was but Lord Palmerston wearing a cloth cap. 2 Still, Bevin was more 
shrewd than unrealistic. When the United States offered large-scale economic aid to 
Europe that same year, he was quick to seize the opportunity. His enthusiastic support 
for the Marshall Plan, as the project became known, was part of his strategy that Britain 
3 should have a place alongside the United States in the 'Big Power league'. The 
methods and means would be different, but the end the same as before: protection and 
advancement of British interests and prestige. Precisely the same accounted for the 
formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, where Bevin played a large role 
which has been well researched. 4 That can also be said about the Nordic states, 
involvement in the process. 5 It is the apparent congruence of national interests between 
Britain and those Nordic neighbours who chose to participate in the alliance which 
needs to be emphasised here. 
' See Laurence Martin and John Garnett, British Foreign Policy. Challenges and Choicesfor the 21" 
Century. Chatham House Papers (London: R11A, 1997), 1. Also Robert Holland, The Pursuit of 
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the Second World War (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993), 3 1. 
3 Dickie, 'Special'No More, 54-55. 
4 E. g. Ritchie Ovendale (ed. ), The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments 1945-1951 
(Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984), Michael Dockrill and John W. Young (eds), British 
Foreign Policy, 1945-56 (London: Macmillan, 1989), Anne Deighton, The Impossible Peace. Britain, the 
Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold lVar (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), and Anne 
Deighton (ed. ), Britain and the First Cold War (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990). 
5 The most detailed work is still Geir Lundestad, America, Scandinavia and the Cold War (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1980). Also Rolf Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High 
North (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 199 1). For a summary, see Jussi M. Hanhimdki, Scandinavia and the 
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By the end of 1947, friction between East and West had turned into bitter animosity. 
The Cold War had clearly begun. On December 17, Bevin told representatives of the 
United States, Canada and France that civilisation would only be saved from Soviet 
destruction if the nations of Western Europe joined hands, backed by North America. 
The Foreign Secretary had further aims as well, however. In a Cabinet memorandum at 
the beginning of 1948, he concluded that Britain could use the turn of events to her own 
advantage: 
Provided we can organise a Western European system ... backed by the power 
and resources of the Commonwealth and of the Americas, it should be possible 
to develop our own power and influence to equal that of the United States of 
America and the USSR. We have the material resources in the Colonial Empire, 
if we develop them, and by giving a spiritual lead now we should be able to 
carry out our task in a way which will show clearly that we are not subservient 
to the United States of America or to the Soviet Union. 6 
This was linked to Britain's 'third way', a means to preserve prestige and the national 
interest, with which Bevin and the Foreign Office had toyed since the clear deterioration 
in relations with Moscow after the war. Britain would use the power of the United 
States to preserve her own place in the world. 7 The Cold War, therefore, was 'almost a 
blessing' for all those intent on preserving Britain's role as a world power. 8 In a way, 
Lord Ismay's well-known dictum on the formation of NATO might be amended by 
saying that the alliance was founded to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, the 
Gen-nans down-and Britain up. 
On January 22,1948, Bevin famously announced his vision of a Western 
military union, initially with France and the Benelux countries. An involvement in such 
an enterprise would involve a dramatic turn from long-standing traditions of 
disengagement and some ministers were certainly inclined to view the national interest 
in more conservative terms. 9 After all, as Palmerston had famously declared, Britain had 
ýno eternal allies and ... no perpetual enemies'. 
' 0 In the privacy of a Cabinet paper, the 
Foreign Secretary had therefore emphasised the advantages of alliance for Britain's 
6 PRO: CAB 129/23, CP(48)6, Bevin memorandum, 4.1.1948. Also Blackwell, Clinging, 25. 
7 On the 'third way', see John Kent, 'Bevin's Imperialism and the Idea of Euro-Africa, 1945-49', in 
Dockrill and Young, British Foreign Policy, 47-76. Also Stuart Croft, The End of Superpower: British 
Foreign Office Conceptions of a Changing World, 1945-51 (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), 70-108. 
8 C. J. Bartlett, British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), 90-91. 
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9 See Ritchie Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
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prestige and world influence but the plan was clearly contradictory: backward and 
nostalgic in its aim for greatness, novel and pragmatic in its means. From the start, this 
tension made total success highly unlikely. 
The Nordic states quickly became involved in Britain's alliance building. The Second 
World War had demonstrated that they were no longer on the periphery in European 
conflicts. Finland fought bitter wars with the Soviet Union; Germany occupied 
Dem-nark and Norway; and Iceland grudgingly accepted a British occupation of the 
island which was then replaced-more to the liking of the Icelanders-with American 
military presence. Britain also occupied the Faroe Islands and only Sweden preserved 
her formal neutrality. In the first years after the war, geopolitics determined that the 
Finns had to accept Soviet limitations on their freedom of action. The other Nordic 
nations opted for strict nonalignment or, if the need were to arise, a regional alliance to 
fend off potential aggressors. " Thus, they did not go out of their way to applaud 
Bevin's words in January 1948 about the need for Western unity. 12 
But then came the watershed. At the end of February 1948, the communists in 
Czechoslovakia abused their considerable popularity in the country and usurped power. 
News of the coup hastened the signature of a defensive alliance, the Brussels Pact, 
between Britain, France and the Benelux countries, and the repercussions from Prague 
were as clear in the Nordic states, in relatively close proximity to the Soviet Union. 13 
Greatest was the anxiety in Oslo where it was rumoured that Stalin would soon ask the 
Norwegians to sign a defence treaty with the Soviet Union. 14 On March 8, Foreign 
Minister Halvard Lange told Laurence Collier, Britain's Ambassador in Oslo, and his 
American colleague, Charles Ulrick Bay, that the Norwegians would never bow to 
Moscow's demands. He also insisted, however, that Norway could not resist such a 
powerful opponent alone. If the worst came to the worst he wanted to know what help 
" E. g. Knut E. Eriksen, 'Norge i det vestlige samarbeid', in Trond Bergh and Helge 0. Pharo (eds), Vekst 
og velstand. Norsk politisk historie 1945-1965 (Oslo, 3 rd ed., 1991), 197-199, Geir Lundestad, 'The 
Evolution of Norwegian Security Policy: Alliance with the West and Reassurance in the East', 
Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 17, No. 2,1992,227-229, and NikolaJ Petersen, Denmark and 
NATO 1949-1987 (Oslo: ITS, 1987), 7-10. 
12 Lundestad, America, 200-201. PRO: F0371/71449/NI630/637/63, Collier to FO, 12.2.1948. 
F0371/71450/N1981/637/63, Jerrarn to Hankey, 17.2.1948. F0371/71450/N2460/637/63, Randall to 
Collier, 25.2.1948. 
13 Hanhimaki, Scandinavia, 26-33. 
14 Maxim Korobochkin, 'Soviet Polices toward Finland and Norway, 1947-1953', unpublished paper 
presented to the conference, 'The Nordic States and the Cold War', of CWIHP, London School of 
Economics and Political Science, and University of Iceland, Reykjavik, 24. -27.6.1998. Also PRO: 
DEFE5/1 0, COS memorandum, 23.3.1948. 
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was to be expected from Britain and the United States. 15 The Czech take-over had 
therefore shocked the Norwegian authorities and secured their support for Bevin's idea 
of Western defence co-operation. 16 In the words of Rolf Tamnes, 'the Norwegians 
17 joined the British "conspiracy" to nail the Americans to the defence of Europe'. The 
United States, Britain and Canada began secret talks on an Atlantic Pact, on the lines 
that Bevin envisaged. 
The crisis in early 1948 soon eased. We now know, furthermore, that Stalin had 
no master plan to first conquer Prague and then Oslo or other weak spots within reach. 18 
Hence, the drive for an Atlantic military alliance was not only based partly on 
undisclosed motives in the case of Britain, but also to some extent on unfounded fear on 
all sides in the West. Moreover, headstrong realists could still argue in a Palmerstonian 
manner that alliances should primarily be made on the basis of gains and losses in 
military terms. In 1948, the British Chiefs of Staff maintained that Britain's security 
would not be enhanced by a pact with Scandinavia. In April, for instance, only a few 
weeks after the coup in Czechoslovakia, they did not include the region in a category of 
countries where communist domination would place the safety of the Commonwealth 
'in mortal danger'. 19 The strategic view only applied to one section of the whole scene, 
however. Apart from short moments of high tension, such as the Prague coup or the 
imposition of the Berlin blockade in the summer of 1948, the primary fear was not 
about military aggression. Communism, it was strongly believed, fed on instability, 
discord and confusion. Norway's membership of the Western alliance had become, as 
the Foreign Office told the demurring Chiefs of Staff, 'part of the "Cold War" and her 
non-association in it might well be represented as a Russian diplomatic victory'. 20 
In 1948, the need for 'the stepping-stone countries' influenced the final shape of the 
emerging Atlantic Pact as well. The United States insisted that a transatlantic alliance 
would be inconceivable without the inclusion of Iceland, Greenland (a Danish colony) 
15 Foreign Relations of the United States [henceforward FRUS] 1948 111 (Washington, DC: United States 
Goverm-nent Printing Office, 1974), 46-48, British aide-m6moire, 11.3.1948. 
16 NARA: RG263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Murphy Collection on International 
Communism 1917-195 8. Norway, Box 14 1, '4201 Norway 1948'. US Military Attach6, Oslo, to MILID, 
Washington, 2.3.1948. 
17 Tamnes, United States, 4 1. Eriksen, 'Norge', 203-204. 
18 Voj tech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity. The Stalin Years (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), 191-198. Also Vladislav Zubok, 'Stalin's Plans and Russian Archives', Diplomatic History, 
Vol. 21, No. 2,1997,295-296. 
19 PRO: DEFE6/5, JP(48)8, JPS report, 2.2.1948. DEFE5/10, COS(48)89(0), COS memorandum, 
15.4.1948. CAB 158/5, JIC(48)118, JIC report, 4.11.1948. 
20 PRO: DEFE4/19, COS(49)2 I" meeting, 9.2.1949. Also DEFE5/8, COS(48)128, Hankey to COS, 
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and the Azores, which belonged to Portugal .21 As 
for Iceland, the coalition government 
of the Conservative Party, the centrist Progressive Party, and the Social Democrats, 
would only contemplate membership if Norway and Denmark joined as well. Thus, 
there was added reason to work for the inclusion of those Scandinavian states. 22 
The value of Iceland could not be underestimated. For American strategists in 
the late 1940s, the island was both a vital defensive link and a site for an atomic 
counteroffensive by medium range bombers if British bases were destroyed in a Soviet 
attack. 23 The United States was therefore prepared to wage war over Iceland, and 
although a Communist take-over on the island was considered unlikely, it could easily 
have been done. The pro-Moscow Socialist Unity Party in Iceland polled up to 20% of 
votes in elections, 24 and without an-ned forces, Iceland was easy prey. 25 In the summer 
of 1948, Western-minded politicians in Reykjavik had experienced their own disquiet 
when a large Soviet herring fleet appeared off the island's coast. Some of them even 
feared that an invasion could be in the offing, akin to the Nazi surprise attacks on 
Denmark and Norway in 1940.26 The majority of Icelanders were reaching the 
conclusion that neutrality would never be respected in a future war and Bjarni 
Benediktsson, the Conservative Foreign Minister, proved instrumental in aligning 
Iceland with the West. The Socialists strongly disliked this man of 'iron Will,, 27 as did 
others of a loud minority in Iceland who felt strongly that the new republic which only 
gained independence from Denmark in 1944 should not take sides in the Cold War. 
Benediktsson worked for securing military guarantees from Britain and the United 
21 Lawrence Kaplan, The United States and NATO. The Formative Years (Lexington, Kentucky: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 108-109, Escott Reid, Time ofFear and Hope. The Making of the 
North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 195-197, and Tamnes, United 
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22 Valur Ingimundarson, The Strugglefor Western Integration. Iceland, the United States, and NATO 
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23 Valur Ingimundarson, 'The Illogic of Passivity: The Role of Iceland in NATO and US Strategic 
Thinking, 1945-1965', unpublished paper presented to the conference, 'The Nordic States and the Cold 
War', of CWIHP, London School of Economics and Political Science, and University of Iceland, 
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usage. See e. g. Ingimundarson, Struggle, 25. 
25 For the American perceptions of this threat, see Ingimundarson, Struggle, 15-37. Whitehead, Ally, 33- 
39. For the British view, see PRO: CAB 159/4, JIC(48), 140th meeting, 16.12.1948. CAB 159/5, JIC(49), 
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States, and these arrived in the shape of an invitation to join the Atlantic Pact in 
December 1948. Having ascertained Norwegian and Danish accession, the government 
in Reykjavik also joined up. 28 
With the foundation of NATO in April 1949, the ultimate national interests of 
Britain, Norway, Denmark, Iceland and other member-states were united. Communist 
subversion or attack on one state would be considered an attack on all of them. On the 
other hand, Bevin's scheme for Britain's greatness failed. Instead, NATO became, as 
one commentator put it, the 'visible political symbol of Pax Americana' in Europe. 29 
And more to the main theme of the thesis, British decision-makers felt that their Nordic 
allies proved at least sometimes annoyingly insensitive to the responsibilities which 
accompanied membership in a union. 'Old Palmerston' would have found it difficult to 
operate in an alliance with a superpower on the one hand and materially weaker yet 
strong-minded partners on the other. 
28 Whitehead, All 
, 1,, 
35-39. For a comparative study of a small state, strategically important but reliant on 
stronger powers for its security, see Eliza Reid, 'The Place of Belgium in Anglo-French Relations, 1934- 
36' (MSt thesis, University of Oxford, 1999). 
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1.2. 'Surprise and Dismay. Norwegian Encroachment on British 
Interests, 1948-49 
The Anglo-Norwegian dispute over territorial waters in 1948-51 was the most serious 
conflict between the two states after the Second World War to the present day. 30 It was 
an aberration, as relations between the two countries were highly close and cordial. 31 
But quarrels between friends can be quite delicate and the timing of the dispute made it 
especially troublesome. When the Cold War was intensifying and the Western world 
was moving hesitantly towards unity, the last thing needed was an altercation in the 
allied camp. Although statesmen in London and Oslo did not worry too much about the 
maritime dispute, preoccupied as they were with the formation of the Atlantic Pact, they 
could never divorce completely these conflicting interests of security and sea. 
In the winter of 1947-48, British trawlers reappeared off the coast of North Norway. 
The local fishermen immediately grew resentful and their politicians condemned the 
'trawler plague'. 32 In a closed session on June 26, Norway's parliament, the Storting, 
resolved that the Royal Decree of 1935, the 'Blue Line' of a four-mile limit, would be 
fully enforced. 33 Not only was that line a mile wider than Britain was willing to 
recognise but the low-water mark principle was also ignored. Instead, the limit was 
drawn from baselines, the longest 44 miles long, across fjords and between the 
innumerable islands of the Norwegian coast, the 'skjaergaard' . 
34 In mid-September, 
when the winter season was nearer, Halvard Lange informed Ambassador Collier that 
the coast guard service was to prevent all trawling inside the 'Blue Line'. 35 This was 
bad news for Britain, and it would be contested. Collier was promptly instructed to 
express in Oslo 'our surprise and dismay at the Norwegian decision to apply without 
warning a measure which is known to be utterly unacceptable to His Majesty's 
30 Arve Rollag, 'A Special Relationship? Norge og Storbritannia 1949-1960', (13A thesis, University of 
Oslo, 2000), 54. For other overviews of the dispute, see Floistad, 'Hovedlinjene', 54-64, Knut Einar 
Eriksen and Helge 0. Pharo, Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949-1965. Norsk utenrikspolitikks 
historie V (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 1997), 353-359, Jens Evensen, 'The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries 
Case and its Legal Consequences', AJIL, Vol. 46,1952,609-63 )0, and C. H. M. Waldock, 'The Anglo- 
Norwegian Fisheries Case', British Yearbook ofInternational Law, Vol. 28,1951,114-17 1. 
On the closeness of Anglo-Norwegian ties in the first decade after the Second World War, see Mats 
Berdal, The United States, Norway and the Cold War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 59. 
32 Stortingstidende 1948 (Oslo: Centraltrykkeriet, 1949), debates 29.5.1948,1258-1265. 
33 Parliamentary Archives, Oslo [henceforward SA]: closed parliamentary session, 26.6,1948. 
34 The low-water mark is the division between land and sea at low tide. On baselines, see Churchill and 
Lowe, Law, 26-50. 
35 PRO: F0371/71488/N 10065/128/30, Collier to FO, 16.9.1948. 
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Figure III. Territorial waters off North Norway. Shaded areas show the difference between the 
baseline-measured 'Blue Line'from 1935 and three milesfrom the low-water mark. 
Government'. The Royal Navy would have to protect British trawlers and ugly incidents 
could take place. Instead, Britain suggested fresh negotiations or referral to the 
International Court of Justice at The Hague. The compromise 'Red Line' from the 
1930s should be in force until the dispute had been settled. 36 
The message from London was simple: if Norway did not back down, 'gunboat 
diplomacy' would be applied. Apparently, the threat was credible and a few months 
later, Norway's Fisheries Minister Jens Bull recalled Sir Edward Grey's pledge that 
Britain would go to war to defend the three-mile limit. 37 But the anomaly over the use 
of force was of course enormous and in London, Ambassador Per Preben Prebensen 
complained that in this day and age, the British response was outrageous. 38 The first line 
of defence in the maritime dispute, which was conveyed to the Norwegians in late 
September 1948, was probably meant to shock the transgressor into retreat-politely 
but firrnly. The threat was in order because it would not have to be carried out. 
In practical tenns, the necessary strength was still at hand. Before the Second 
World War, a vessel from the Royal Navy Fishery Protection Squadron had frequently 
36 PRO: F0371/71488/N10569/128/30, interdepartmental meeting, 24.9.1948, and 
F03 71/71488/N 10065/128/30, FO to Oslo, 25.9.1948. 
37 SA: joint meeting of foreign affairs committee and maritime and fishing committee, 2.2.1949. 
38 National Archives, Oslo [henceforward RA-NOR]: I 100 1/31.6.5/111, Prebensen to Oslo, 19.11.1948. 
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accompanied the trawling fleet to the Norwegian grounds and the Barents Sea. Medical 
and technical assistance was provided, as well as help in establishing a trawler's 
position when the home authorities made charges for poaching. 39 A larger and more 
assertive mission could well be imagined. The first reaction in London also fitted well 
with Foreign Office memories of the 1930s. In that period, the Norwegian problem was 
mostly handled by Collier, an aspiring young man in the service. 40 Now that the conflict 
had flared up again he was to argue, as Ambassador in Oslo, that before the war this 
stubborn people had only been 'Induced to see reason' when the appearance of a 
warship 'made them believe that we meant business'. 41 The new situation was entirely 
different but the Ambassador felt himself in the environment of the 1930s, suggesting 
the same old solutions. 
Furthermore, in 1948 the rationale for action remained impressive. Throughout 
the dispute, British policy-makers would not accede to Norway's 'Blue Line' for five 
closely connected reasons which time and again will appear in this thesis: pressure, 
prestige, principle, precedence and power. The pressure came from the British distant- 
water trawling industry. 42 While fisheries only accounted for less than 1% of Britain's 
gross national product, trawling was of great importance in Hull and Grimsby, the two 
largest fishing ports in the world at the time, and to a lesser extent in Fleetwood and 
Aberdeen. 43 The civil servants in Whitehall consulted the industry, primarily the trawler 
owners, and found them united against any concessions. 44 And they were 'very tough 
people', as the Foreign Office told Norwegian diplomats, half-apologetically. 45 Britain's 
prestige was involved as well. How could a maritime power tolerate a clear 
infringement of its perceived fundamental interests on the oceans? In this sense, the 
Anglo-Norwegian dispute involved the wider cultivation of Britain's greatness which 
influenced general decision-making in London. 46 Closely connected to the concern for 
prestige was the good principle of narrow territorial waters. The Admiralty pointed out 
that wide limits could impede or exclude access to vital outposts of the British Empire 
and that enemy states would abuse waters under the jurisdiction of neutral stateS. 47 
39 PRO: ADMI/27623, SOFP Captain Mackay report, 7.4.1948. 
40 E. g. PRO: F0371/19442/N4340/62/30, Collier minute, 6.9.1935. 
41 PRO: F0371/77463/N6076/1351/30, Collier to Hankey, 28.6.1949. 
42 In this thesis, the 'trawling industry' is often a shorthand for the various groups which were involved 
with distant water trawling: trawler owners, skippers and crews, and fish merchants and longshoremen. 
43 J6nsson, Friends, 7, and Robinson, Trawling, 2. 
44 PRO: F0371/77459/N419/1351/30, FO note, 5.1.1949. 
45 RA-NOR: I 100 1/31.6.5. /Ill, Prebensen to Oslo, 19.11.1948. 
46 For a discussion of prestige and maritime policy, see Booth, Navies, 50-53. Also Harrington, -The 
Mighty Hood"', 171-185. 
47 PRO: F0371/71503/N 12881/2058/30, Donaldson to Vallat, 22.11.1948. 
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Britain was still prepared to recognise Norway's historic title to a four-mile zone but 
only if the limit was drawn from the low-water mark, not baselines. 48 Here the problem 
of precedence entered the frame because a settlement with Norway would affect 
decisions in Reykjavik. The authorities there clearly wanted to extend fishery limits, 
they followed the Anglo-Norwegian dispute closely, and the fishing grounds off Iceland 
were much more important for the British industry than Norwegian waters. 49 Finally, 
the sheer existence of greater power did have a bearing on British decision-making. 
Whereas it is often said that with power comes responsibility, it also contains the 
temptation to wield it. 50 To compare, Margaret Thatcher wrote on the decision to 
employ naval power to recapture the Falkland Islands from Argentinean forces in 1982 
that 'effective diplomacy would have been impossible without the despatch of the task 
force. As Frederick the Great once remarked, "diplomacy without arms is like music 
without instruments"'. 51 In short, the main question is not whether Britain could have 
conceded defeat in the dispute with Norway, but rather why she did not safeguard more 
forcefully her almost sacred rights on 'the high seas'. 
Britain might have had solid reasons to defend the right to fish for cod off the coast of 
North Norway. Even so, there were serious strategic flaws in conveying warnings about 
the possible despatch of warships. Sir Eric Beckett, the influential Legal Adviser at the 
Foreign Office, warned that Britain could be severely criticised on the international 
scene and a possible case prejudiced at The Hague. 52 And then there was the strategic 
aspect. Both Beckett and Robin Hankey, Head of Northern Department in the Foreign 
Office, underlined the political disadvantages of violent clashes in the disputed waters 
when Britain was working for Norway's inclusion in the Atlantic Pact. 53 At least 
initially, therefore, the strong words were not followed by resolute action and in late 
November the first British trawler was arrested inside the wide 'Blue Line'. 54 More 
would most likely follow. London protested but Oslo had called the bluff. 
Norwegian indifference to British warnings meant that tactics had to be 
reconsidered in London, and now at the highest levels. Like Beckett and Hankey, Ernest 
48 PRO: F0371/71488/NI0569/128/30, interdepartmental meeting, 24.9.1948. 
49 For Icelandic interest in the dispute, see Thi-URN: 1996-13/63-1 15. D. 001.1, Reykjavik to London and 
Oslo, 5.1.195 1. 
50 See Habeeb, Power, 3. 
51 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, special overseas ed., 1995), 
191. 
52 On Beckett, see Etherington- Smith to author, 20.10.2000. 
53 PRO: F0371/71488NIO065/128/30, Beckett and Hankey minutes, 24.9.1948. 
54 PRO: F03 71/71503/N 12791/2058/30, Collier to FO, 30.11.1948. 
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Bevin worried about the consequences of intransigence in the dispute on the preferred 
inclusion of Norway in the Atlantic Pact. 55 In late 1948, an escalation of the conflict by 
sending warships to the fishing grounds was not even considered. There would still 
have to be a compromise, though, and already on November 15, the Cabinet resolved 
that a judgement by the International Court of Justice seemed to offer the best 
solution. 56 Both Beckett and Francis Vallat, assistant Legal Adviser in the Foreign 
Office, were confident of a reasonably favourable verdict. True, Britain would have to 
accept Norway's historic claim to a four-mile zone (it would not even be contested) but 
57 the use of the baseline method would probably be rejected. British faith in victory at 
The Hague was enhanced further by signs that Norwegian diplomats agreed with that 
prediction. 58 Foreign Minister Lange even seemed displeased that the affair had started 
at all in the first place and, using much the same words as British officials, he claimed 
to be 'most anxious to avoid Anglo-Norwegian friction over such matters in view of the 
present European situation'. 59 
To some extent, therefore, the dispute was not only between Britain and 
Norway, but also between Lange and Norwegian diplomats on the one hand, prepared to 
back down for the sake of Western unity, and on the other single-minded politicians in 
Oslo and their clients in the high north who feared for their interests. The Foreign 
Minister, however, was not oblivious to the anxieties of the local fishermen. He simply 
turned his domestic weakness into strength by calculating that London would realise the 
futility of further pressure for concessions. This tactic was tried and tested in diplomacy. 
It was for instance used in the negotiations on the Atlantic Pact which were going on at 
the same time. 'There is the tough guy waiting in the back room', one of the 
participiants described its use, 'and this "person" can be the Senate, Cabinet, 
Parliament, etcetera'. 60 
On December 20-21,1948, Anglo-Norwegian talks about the fishing limits took 
place in London and apparently, the 'tough guys' were present as well. Fisheries 
Minister Bull emphasised the supreme importance of fisheries for North Norway and 
the Storting's attitude whereas the British side pointed out that the trawling industry 
55 Bevin's three Cabinet memoranda all emphasise that aspect. PRO: CAB 129/30, CP(48)257, Bevin 
memorandum, 8.11.1948. CAB129/32, CP(49)9, Bevin memorandum, 19.1.1949. CAB129/35, 
CP(49)140, Bevin memorandum, 22.6.1949. 
56 PRO: CAB 128/13, CC(48), 48h meeting, 15.11.1948. 
57 PRO: F0371/71488/N10569/128/30, interdepartmental meeting, 24.9.1948, 
F0371/71503/NI2881/2058/30, Vallat to Donaldson, 2.12.1948. 
58 PRO: F0371/71488/N 12035/128/30, FO to Oslo, 19.11.1948. 
59 PRO: F0371/71503/N 12791/2058/30, Collier to FO, 30.11.1948. 
60 Reid, Thne of Fear, 58-59. 
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were 'extremely vocal'. Moreover, Hankey encouraged the Norwegians to regard the 
dispute 'not just as an isolated matter entirely by itself but really on a larger 
background': 
Here we are in a desperate situation in Europe really with our whole civilisation 
in many ways at stake. We are all mixed up with the Marshall Plan. We have 
been talking about an Atlantic Pact, which three years ago would have seemed 
to most people quite out of the question, solely on account of the situation in 
which we find ourselves in. I hope very much that, when this matter is 
considered by your Parliament, you will consider the larger aspects just as much 
as the local ones. 61 
Foreign Minister Lange would have agreed with Hankey. Bull, on the other hand, would 
not limit Norway's freedom of manoeuvre by such linkage. In any case, the Norwegians 
felt that if unity was vital, it would befit Britain to back down. 62 Surprisingly, the two 
sides still managed to agree on a platform for further negotiations. 63 On January 10-14, 
enlarged delegations met in London. Again, against the odds they succeeded in 
hammering out a joint proposal. The 'Yellow Line' came into being, roughly the 'Blue 
Line' of 1935, with some dents to satisfy British interests. 64 Only days later, the British 
Cabinet accepted the proposed modus vivendi, subject to the industry's blessing, for 
although a provisional deal was appreciated, it was not considered worth the possible 
wrath of the fishermen. 65 To everyone's great surprise in London, the industry accepted 
the 'Yellow Line', not only for the time being but as a permanent settlement, arguing 
that Britain's defence of the three-mile rule would be helped by a custom-made solution 
for North Norway which would not be applicable elsewhere. 66 Then it was only left to 
the Storting to bless the agreement. The Norwegians had come to London with 
instructions from the government not to give way and only offer at the last resort the 
most minimum concessions, bearing in mind that all agreements would have to gain 
67 parliamentary approval. The delegation felt they had done well and called strongly for 
acceptance of the 'Yellow Line', if only temporarily. 68 This last hurdle, however, 
proved to be insurmountable. 
61 PRO: F03 71/71488/N 13813/128/30, meetings on Norwegian fishing limits, 20. -21.12.1948. 
62 RA-NOR: I 100 1/31.6.5/111, delegation report, 17.1.1949. 
63 PRO: F0371/71488/N 13813/128/30, FO to Oslo, 24.12.1948. 
64 R-A-NOR: 11001/31.6.5/111, delegation report, 17.1.1949. PRO: F0371/77460/N582/1351/30, meetings 
on Norwegian fishing limits, 10. -14.1.1949. 65 PRO: CAB21/2762, Brook minute, 15.1.1949. CAB 128/15, CC(49), 3 Td meeting, 17.1.1949. 
66 PRO: F0371/77460/N487/1351/30, MAF note, 17.1.1949, and Dobson to Etherington-Smith, 
17.1.1949. 
67 Rollag, 'A Special Relationship', 57. 
69 RA-NOR: I 100 1/31.6.5/111, delegation report, 17.1.1949. 
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In Oslo, Ambassador Collier felt that Britain was far too lenient towards Norway. In 
late January 1949, he requested formal permission to tell Lange straight out that unless 
the status quo from the interwar period were established, British warships would get 
involved and 'arrests will be made when possible'. 69 The Norwegians would back 
down, Collier's argument went, if they saw that further aggression on their part would 
be met in kind and in the Foreign Office, Robin Hankey was at least sometimes caught 
in two minds. He underlined that an escalation of the conflict would make it harder to 
solve and that caution was vital when the Norwegians were edging towards accession to 
the Atlantic Pact. 70 At the same time, he agreed that the arrests of British trawlers were 
'intolerable' and he definitely did not wish to be considered an 'appeaser', a dirty word 
in the Foreign Office in those days. 71 But ultimately the prospective Alliance, the new 
national interest, mattered more. 
Meanwhile, the proposed settlement from the London talks was debated in Oslo. 
72 On February 1, the government accepted it as a temporary modus vivendi. Parliament 
was in less conciliatory mood, however-or 'quite mad' on fishing issues as the 
Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry told Collier. 73 The naval authorities also 
argued that the proposed 'Yellow Line' would be practically unobservable and that if it 
were accepted, 'Norway would have capitulated of her own Will,. 74 No swift conclusion 
was reached and in early May, a Norwegian gunboat used gunfire to arrest the first 
trawler since January, the Lord Nuffield. The rather heavy-handed seizure led Bevin to 
warn Lange that it might be necessary to revise instructions to the British Fishery 
Protection vessels. 75 The fishing industry demanded naval protection and an Admiralty 
official remarked that 'we really cannot sit idly by while foreign gunboats fire on our 
fishermen' 
. 
76 In the House of Commons, MPs on the opposition benches, a Vice- 
Admiral included, loudly protested the incident and demanded protection for British 
ships on the high seas. 77 Yet the diplomats at the Foreign Office kept their cool, led by 
69 PRO: F0371/77460/N669/1351/30, Collier to Oslo, 21.1.1949. 
70 PRO: F0371/77459/N320/1351/30, Hankey to Collier, 11.1.1949. 
71 PRO: F0371/77459/N28/1351/30, Hankey minute, 6.1.1949. Also Deighton, Impossible Peace, 227- 
229. 
72 RA-NOR: Cabinet minutes, 1.2.1949. 
73 PRO: F0371/77461/N901/1351/30, Collier to FO, 27.1.1949. 
74 RA-NOR: II 002/31.6.5. /IV, Storheill to Ministry of Defence, Oslo, 10.2.1949. 
75 PRO: F0371/77462/N4125/1351/30, Bevin to Crowe, 6.5.1949. 
76 PRO: F0371/77462/N4375/1351/30, Dodds to Figg, 14.5.1949. Also MAF209/176, Armstrong to Figg, 
18.5.1949. 
77 Hansard, Vol. 465, cols. 2098-2101,1.6.1949, and Times, 2.6.1949. 
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the authoritative Legal Adviser Beckett with his arguments on the virtues of restraint 
due to the preferred referral to the International Court. 78 
Back in Oslo, Lange continued to argue that the 'Yellow Line' was an 
acceptable compromise. 79 Time ran out for him, however. On July 14,1949, the 
Storting formally rejected that compromise, offering instead 'lenient enforcement' in 
the disputed waters between the 'Blue Line' and the 'Red Line', for the sake of friendly 
relations with Britain. 80 This vague suggestion was quickly rejected in London, unless 
leniency meant fishing as before. 81 When subsequent attempts to reach an agreement 
with Norway on joint submission to The Hague failed, Britain did so unilaterally, 
82 
requesting the International Court to rule on the validity of Norway's baseline method. 
The Court would deliver its verdict in due course. 83 Since the Norwegians continued to 
maintain the validity of the 'Blue Line', British trawlers risked arrest and heavy fines 
for fishing inside it, and Britain made do with diplomatic protests when they were 
caught. In late 1949, four trawlers were charged with poaching and the industry again 
demanded naval protection or retaliation by an embargo on Norwegian imports. 84 
Nothing was done, however. Britain had rested her case, so to speak. 
The course of the Anglo-Norwegian dispute over fishing rights off North Norway in 
1948-49 is a small example of the 'intemationalisation' of Britain's national interest in 
the new world order which was emerging after the Second World War. On the one 
hand, British policy-makers would not give in to Norwegian demands on the widening 
of the fishing limit, as they felt the quintuple effects of power, pressure, prestige, 
principle and precedence. On the other hand, however, Norway was a friendly state and 
a valued asset for the Atlantic Pact. And the threats of naval force were 'pure bluff, as 
Charles Hambro, the charismatic leader of the country's right-wing opposition party and 
the most ardent defender of its maritime rights, concluded. 85 
The strategic aspect also helped to preclude American participation in the 
dispute. In the autumn of 1949, Sir Eric Beckett, keen to isolate Norway and bolster the 
78 F0371/77462/N4375/1351/30, Etherington-Smith minute, 23.5.1949. 
79 RA-NOR: Cabinet minutes, 14.6.1949. 
80 'Innstilling fra den forsterkede utenriks- og konstitusjonskomit6 angdende forhandlinger med England 
orn Norges fiskerigrense'. Storting report no. 15,1949. 
81 PRO: CAB128/16, CC(49), 46th meeting, 18.7.1949. RA-NOR: 11002/31.6.5/V, British aide-memoire, 
19.7.1949. 
82 Rollag, 'A Special Relationship', 61-62. 
83 See section 1.5,58-59. 
84 PRO: F0371/77465/N9954/1351/30, BTF to Lacy, 14.11.1949. 
85 RA-NOR: 11002/31.6.10/1, Hambro speech in Storting territorial waters committee, 16.9.1949. Also 
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British argument, invited the United States to become a party to the case at The 
Hague. 86 Such maritime solidarity seemed perfectly logical: notwithstanding the 
Truman Declarations, the United States upheld the three-mile limit of territorial waters 
and did not recognise the baseline method of delimitation. Thus, the British cause was 
viewed with sympathy in Washington but Beckett's offer was still politely declined. 
First, it was clear that American fishing interests were not at stake and secondly, the 
detrimental impression might be created that two great maritime powers were 'lining up 
against a less powerful member of the family of nations'. 87 This was not the time for 
such tactics. Hence, the Anglo-Norwegian dispute demonstrated the disadvantage of 
more limited options which unavoidably followed unity. In 1948, Clement Attlee had 
indeed observed that when nations enter an alliance, they lose to a certain extent 'their 
absolute power to do as they Will,. 88 This disadvantage has always been underlined in 
the realist theory of international relations, with a vanguard like Morgenthau warning 
that strong states should 'never allow a weak ally to make decisions for you': 
They lose their freedom of action by identifying their own national interests 
completely with those of the weak ally. Secure in the support of its powerful 
friend, the weak ally can choose the objectives and methods of its foreign policy 
to suit itself. The powerful nation then finds that it must support interests not its 
own ... 
89 
In early 1950, a year after NATO had come into being, a Norwegian observer of the 
maritime dispute rightly remarked that a century before it might undoubtedly have led 
to 'some show of force'. 90 But now the amalgamation of Britain's and Norway's main 
national interest, the defence of the state against the common enemy in the Cold War, 
meant that London would not risk collision for a lesser cause, despite tough words at the 
beginning. Thus, Norway benefited from the new situation and played on Britain's 
forbearance. A plausible preliminary assumption would then be, firstly, that the 
widening of the British national interest by membership in an alliance was making it 
more difficult to defend all aspects of it; and secondly, that if a traditional national 
interest was to be defended, it could only be done by traditional means. 
86 NARA: RG59/857.0145/10-2049, Willis to Acheson, 20.10.1949. 
87 NARA: RG59/857.0145/12-2049, Washington to London, 2.12.1949. 
88 C. M. Woodhouse, British Foreign Policy Since the Second Iforld War (London: Hutchinson, 196 1), 
93. 
89 Morgenthau, Politics, 565. A] so Kegley and Wittkopf, World Politics, 464-466, and Roger V. 
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1.3. 'One of UsT Iceland Between Moscow, Washington, 
Whitehall and Humberside, 1948-51 
The origins of Britain's dispute with Iceland over fishing limits after the Second World 
War were in some ways similar to the turn of events in the Norwegian case. The locals 
resented British trawling and the risk of overfishing. To make matters even worse, at 
least potentially, the Icelandic grounds were more important to the British trawling 
industry than the waters off Norway, and fish was Iceland's overwhelming source of 
foreign income, accounting for over 90% of the country's exports. 91 Furthermore, 
strategic considerations got more entangled with fish in Iceland than in Norway so, in 
short, the stakes were much higher 'up Iceland way'. 92 
In late 1944, the 'Innovation regime' (a coalition of the Conservative Party, the Social 
Democratic Party and the pro-Moscow Socialist Unity Party) was formed in Iceland. It 
aimed to extend the fishery limits and considered the three-mile treaty from 1901 to be a 
relic from the country's colonial past. Two years later, a scientific advisory body, the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, recommended that the rich 
breeding grounds in Faxa-Bay be closed to all trawling for 15 years. In the same year, 
disputes over foreign policy led to the downfall of the 'Innovation regime' and after a 
prolonged crisis, a new coalition of all parties except the Socialists was formed in 
Reykjavik. During its tenure, on April 5 1948, Iceland's Parliament, the Althing, 
unanimously promulgated the so-called Conservation Law on the right to regulate 
fisheries above Iceland's continental shelf, stretching dozens of miles out to sea. 93 
In the next two years, there followed a series of limited measures to implement 
the parliamentary will. A cautious policy was partly applied because the Icelanders 
sincerely wanted to reach an amicable settlement, and partly because they calculated 
that a unilateral extension at one swoop would not work. 94 To begin with, the Icelandic 
authorities wanted to convene a conference to discuss a temporary cessation of trawling 
in Faxa-Bay. The gathering was to be held in August 1949 but had to be cancelled at the 
last minute as Britain declared that preservation measures outside national Jurisdiction 
would not be accepted. 95 
91 Th6r, British Trawlers, 256. 
92 A common expression by the trawlermen. Robinson interview, 5.5.200 1. 
93 For a summary, see Olafsson, Saga, 22-54. 
94 Hans G. Andersen, Greinargerd um Landhelgismdlid (Reykjavik: Gutenberg, 1948), 53-62. National 
Archives, Copenhagen [henceforward RA-DEN]: 63. D. 22. a/B, Brun to Copenhagen, 30.3.1948. 
95 PRO: NIAF41/1318, Dunn minute, 26.7.1949. J6nsson, Friends, 51-52. 
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This was a short-sighted view. The proposed conference was a fine example of a 
missed chance to shape events. An international agreement on the temporary closure of 
the breeding grounds would not necessarily have prejudiced Britain's stand on territorial 
waters and it might have demonstrated Britain's willingness to tackle actively the 
danger of overfishing. 96 Denmark, for instance, was prepared to accept the experiment, 
while underlining that it would not affect her adherence to the three-mile limit. 97 And 
far from killing the issue, the British attitude only increased the Icelanders' conviction 
that the way forward was through unilateral action. 98 In October 1949, they went one 
step further and denounced the 1901 treaty with two years' notice, as stipulated in its 
terms, thereby removing a legal stumbling block to an extension and hoping to reach an 
agreement on widened limits in the meantime. In April 1950, the fishing limits off the 
north coast of Iceland were extended to four miles, drawn the 'Norwegian way' from 
baselines across fjords and bays. Trawling was banned inside the new limit, both by 
Icelanders and foreigners, with the exception that the 1901 treaty would apply to British 
subjects until its expiry in October 1951.99 
While the Icelandic scheme obviously contradicted British interests, there was relative 
ease in Whitehall as long as nothing actually changed. 'We can only continue to wait', a 
member of the Foreign Office wrote after the denunciation of the 1901 treaty, 100 and 
when John Dee Greenway, the Minister in Reykjavik, apologised for the shortness of 
his annual report for 1950, the year of the extension off the north coast, a colleague was 
quick to forgive him by noting that 'nothing much happens in Iceland'. 101 This was in 
line with the 'pragmatic' streak in British foreign policy which preferred reaction to pre- 
emptive planning. From 1948, however, the Icelanders were following a relatively well 
thought-out action plan and Britain suffered from the lack of a counterstrategy. Almost 
all concerned in London knew that the Icelanders would not give up in their quest for 
extended fishing limits. It was also clear, firstly, that it would be undesirable and 
perhaps useless to try to force them to do so, and secondly, that Britain could not accept 
Icelandic aims. Yet, little if anything was done about this dilemma. 
96 The view that the three-mile limit would not be endangered was indeed expressed at the Foreign Office. 
See PRO: F0371/71480/NI3243/4877/27, Davidson minute, 14.12.1948. 
97 RA-DEN: 63.13.20, Fishing Ministry to Foreign Ministry, 15.7.1949, and Foreign Ministry to Fishing 
Ministry, 18.7.1949. 
98 Parliamentary Archives, Reykjavflý [henceforward ALTH]: Foreign Affairs Committee, 4h meeting, 
13.4.1950. 
99 J6nsson, Friends, 54-58. 
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The great strains on personnel in the Foreign Office contributed to this tendency 
to wait for events rather than influence them. Officials had little time to reflect on the 
future, not to mention when only the isolated Iceland was concerned. 102 Besides, on the 
relatively rare occasions when Icelandic matters were considered, the British side 
simply could not find a reason for a change in the status quo. 103 The principle of the 
narrowest territorial waters and fishing limits was naturally just as important for Britain 
around Iceland as it was off the coast of Norway, and the perceived danger of 
precedence was also alike, if only because an acceptance of Icelandic intentions might 
impair the British case against Norway. 104 Moreover, the trawling industry maintained 
that any deviation from the three-mile limit would virtually put an end to British 
trawling off Iceland. 105 In 1946-50, around one quarter of all catches in distant waters 
came from those grounds so the consequences, if true, would be very painful. 106 
Simultaneously, the trawling industry intensified its protests against landings of 
iced fish from foreign trawlers in Hull and Grimsby. The Icelanders were most active, 
undeterred by a 10% levy on their catches and flag discrimination which meant that they 
often had to wait in port until all British vessels had been unloaded. 107 On Humberside, 
the owners and crews disliked this competition which could drive down prices on the 
market. Repeatedly, therefore, they called for drastic reductions or a complete ban on 
the import of foreign caught fish. 108 And they could not but draw the logical conclusion 
that access to British markets should be used as a lever in the effort to resist Iceland's 
moves for wider fishing limits. In September 1948, when the Althing had passed the 
Conservation Law, the trawler owners declared that in case of actual extensions off 
Iceland they expected the British government 'to take the strongest possible action', 
either by providing naval protection or by banning all landings of fish from Icelandic 
trawlers in British ports. 109 By 195 1, when the three-mile treaty from 1901 was about to 
expire, their attitude had only hardened, so much so that if and when the Icelanders put 
102 On this in general, see Ivone Kirkpatrick, Inner Circle (London: Macmillan, 1959), 259. Also R. G. S. 
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their words on fishing limits into deeds, the industry threatened to impose such a ban 
itself, regardless of the government's opinion. 110 
In London, officials advised the industry that, for strategic reasons, the 
application of the Royal Navy could be 'dismissed completely'. "' As for the idea of a 
ban on Icelandic landings, however, opinions diverged. The Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries (MAF) was willing to consider such pressure, should the Icelanders prove to 
be immune to diplomatic persuasion: 'In the last resort, it may be necessary-in spite of 
all the arguments against it-to stop Icelandic imports for a time, until Iceland agrees to 
act more reasonably'. 112 The Foreign Office agreed that a ban of this kind would 
obviously be a powerful weapon in dealings with the Icelanders. On the other hand, it 
would probably go against undertakings towards abolition of trade barriers which 
Britain had accepted in the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), 
established in connection with the Marshall Plan in 1948.1 13 The Ministry of Food was 
also against all impediments on foreign imports and the Board of Trade noted that a ban 
would run counter to a trade treaty with Iceland. ' 14 And most importantly, Britain's 
welfare involved much more than the wishes of purely British subjects and activities. 
The altruistic dimension of the 'national interest' came to the fore, as did the restraints 
of alliance. In the words of one official in Whitehall in 1948, Iceland had become 'one 
of us'. 115 
A ban on Icelandic landings would definitely hurt. Having been one of Europe's poorest 
nation's before the Second World War, the Icelanders amassed comparatively great 
wealth during the hostilities through the sale of fish to the Allies and services to their 
occupation forces. The 'Innovation regime' of 1944-47 decided to build freezing plants, 
processing factories and fishing vessels, including 30 trawlers in Britain. The increased 
catch would be sold abroad and the British market was by far the largest, receiving 
around third of all Icelandic exports in 1946-50.116 The expansion was much too quick 
and ambitious, however. The fast money which the Icelanders collected during the war 
disappeared even quicker than it arrived, through inflation, wage rises, public desire for 
110 PRO: MAF209/250, MAF note, 11.5.1951. 
111 PRO: NIAF209/250, MAF note, 11.5.195 1. MAF209/753, MAF note, 19.11.195 1. 
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consumer goods, a faulty exchange rate and a fair number of misguided investments. 117 
'Iceland is just about bankrupt', a Board of Trade official noted in the middle of 
1947.118 A year later, R. W. B. Clarke wrote at the Treasury (admittedly in an off-the-cuff 
manner) that a permanent solution to the country's economic problems might have to 
entail a currency union, 'i. e. the inclusion of Iceland in the British Empire'. 119 Then, 
however, Cold War came and saved the Icelanders. 
Membership of NATO had not obliterated the perceived danger of communist 
ascendancy in Iceland and in matters of fishing and economy, pro-Western politicians in 
Reykjavik could play the 'communist card', both from sincere conviction that 
destitution would only benefit the Soviets, but also by cunningly emphasising the 
West's self-interest in aiding the Icelanders. When pressing for increased access to 
British markets and an end to discrimination in the ports, Fisheries Minister blafur 
Thors, the influential and charismatic chairman of the Conservative Party, pointedly let 
Ernest Bevin know that 'if United Kingdom action with regard to Icelandic fish were 
now to lead to heavy unemployment among Iceland fishermen and fish processors this 
would lend great force to Communist criticism'. 120 In the summer of 195 1, when 
Iceland had been a member of NATO for two years and had just accepted the 
reinstatement of American troops on the island (due to the Korean War and heightened 
tension in the world), Legal Adviser Beckett summed up the situation: 
I have always understood that the refusal to allow Iceland to sell her fish in the 
United Kingdom is a very powerful stick against Iceland, but HMG would have 
to consider seriously whether to use it, because it might cause such ill-feeling in 
Iceland that the Icelanders would become obstinate and almost be driven into the 
Soviet camp instead of into the camp of the North Atlantic Treaty. ' 21 
Geopolitics ensured that British inaction was secure, at least until the necessary 
reconsideration of policy if and when Icelandic plans for wider fishing limits were in 
fact enforced. The realist admonition against alliances, which was mentioned in 
connection with the Anglo-Norwegian dispute, is even more valid here. By way of a 
vital common interest, the small ally tied the hands of the strong state. 
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In May 1951, when American soldiers reappeared on Icelandic soil, Sharman Wright, 
one of the Bank of England officials who dealt with Iceland, wrote that from now on her 
inhabitants would not rely on Britain for protection, as they had usually done for the last 
couple of centuries, but rather they would live in *the shadow of the Superfortress'. 122 
Naturally, the shift also showed in economic terms. In 1948-53, the Icelanders received 
proportionally a bigger share of American Marshall aid than any other nation. 123 
The concern for the well-being of the Icelandic nation had to affect the 
American position on the moves for wider fishing limits. It may be recalled that, despite 
the Truman Declarations of 1945, the United States was a convinced 'three-miler" and 
in 1948 and 1949, Wilbert Chapman, assistant to the Under-Secretary in Charge of 
Fisheries and Wildlife, cautioned the Icelanders against unilateral extensions. 124 The 
warnings were low-key, however, and clearly ineffective as Iceland went ahead with the 
partial extension off the north coast in 1950. Somewhat predictably, the State 
Department, on Chapman's advice, asked Edward Lawson, the American Minister in 
Reykjavik, to register formal objections to the move. ' 25 While compliance was 
considered a foregone conclusion, 126 the influence of a sympathetic envoy now became 
clear. Having listened to Lawson's deliverance of a protest note, Foreign Minister 
Benediktsson expressed dismay over such incomprehension of Icelandic politics, since 
this intimidation would only cause an outcry and directly benefit the Socialists. Lawson 
had to follow his instructions but then 'suspended' the note, as he wholeheartedly 
agreed with Benediktsson's estimate. 127 Washington concurred, after a similar appeal 
from the Icelandic Minister, Thor Thors. 128 
It is clear that American 'appeasement' encouraged the Icelanders. But what 
would have happened if the United States had firmly opposed them? Would they, reliant 
as they were on Western goodwill, have taken on an alliance of the world's greatest 
maritime powers? British officials did try to impress the Americans that pressure from 
Washington would help to 'convince the Icelanders of the unreasonableness of their 
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new regulations'. 129 Such coercion, however, would have been useful as propaganda for 
the Socialists. Therefore, the story of how the United States decided not to protest 
Icelandic moves for wider fishing limits in 1948-51 demonstrates again the increased 
power which new strategic realities offered the rulers in Reykjavik. The time had still 
not arrived when officials in Washington grumbled that the Icelanders were 
'blackmailing' the United States but this conclusion would be reached, as will be 
seen. 130 And while Britain was unhappy about the American weakness on the three-mile 
limit, a contradictory policy which damaged the aim of keeping the Icelanders within 
bounds also emanated from Whitehall itself. In effect, the British were feeding the hand 
that bit them. 
In early 1948, the Icelanders were in such dire straits that they had to seek loans in 
London to buy oil and other commodities to run the fishing fleet. Their plight was 
obvious and one of the British officials involved felt that Iceland should be treated as 'a 
test case' for European co-operation and modernisation: 'It is impossible to allow 
130,000 people to starve'. 131 Moreover, in October, half a year after the Althing's 
promulgation on the Conservation Law in direct contravention of British maritime 
interests, the government in Reykjavik signed contracts to build ten new trawlers in 
Britain. Credit was offered in the City and the necessary underwriting by British 
authorities was confirmed in July 1949. The government of Iceland became the first 
foreign regime to receive a British loan after the Second World War. 132 Debates about 
this assistance highlight the differences between the moralist and the realist approaches 
to the advancement of national interests. In the House of Commons, the Conservative 
William Shepherd pointed out that while the Icelanders would clearly want to sell their 
catch from their new vessels on Humberside, British trawlers could supply all the fish 
that was needed for domestic consumption. 'I should have thought', Economic 
Secretary Douglas Jay replied, 'that the modernisation of the fishing fleet of a country 
which is a member both of the sterling area and of OEEC was a very desirable object'. 
Shepherd shot back, however: 'Would not the hon. Gentleman also think that the 
preservation of the livelihood of our own people was equally important? ' 133 
129 PRO: F0371/94656/NLI351/24, FO to Washington, 3.9.1951. 
130 See section 3.1,134. 
131 PRO: T236/2040, Treasury minute, 7.8.1948. Also BTI 1/2898, Overseas Negotiations Committee 
meeting, 8.2.1949. 
13 2 Financial Times, 8.7.1949. 
133 Hansard, Vol. 467, col. 2658,28.7.1949. The following summer, a similar argument erupted between 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps, and Robert Boothby who criticised the policy of 
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Arguably, the case for caring first for the people of Britain could be strengthened 
further. P. D. H. Dunn, Fisheries Secretary at MAF, repeatedly mentioned his anger over 
alleged Icelandic cowardice in the spring of 1941 when the authorities in Reykjavik 
declared-after Gennan bombing of a trawler bound for Britain-that no more fish 
would be sent from Iceland, and that they were only persuaded to continue fishing for 
the common cause because of the high prices which London had to offer. 134 ý Assistance 
given to people who act in such a manner is assistance wasted', wrote Dunn. 'They are 
wholly unreliable as friends and there is no end to their greed'. 135 The Icelanders, for 
their part, felt that for Dunn, 'Britain and her intentions were the only unshakeable 
objects in the whole wide world'. 136 They also argued that they had done their fair share 
for the allied war effort, having lost proportionally as many lives as the United States, 
one in five trawlers and almost half of the merchant fleet. 137 Indeed, one of the bankers 
in London who favoured the award of the trawler loan to Iceland, emphasised that the 
Icelanders had been important allies during the war and Britain invariably wanted to 
'help young states, constructing an independent existence'. 138 
In other words, the Icelanders had to be treated as friends, as 'one of us'. Not 
only should they be helped to build trawlers which would compete with the British 
industry on Humberside, but some of their products would also be purchased at 
whatever cost. In February 1949, a trade delegation from Reykjavik began negotiations 
in London with the Ministry of Food over the sale of frozen fish, herring meal and 
herring oil. The Icelanders wanted prices above world-market rates, much higher than 
the British negotiating team was prepared to accept. ' 39 They were 'hinting darkly at 
sales of fish to Russia, however, and back in Iceland the Socialists could, to use the 
words of one British official, 'use our supposedly heartless behaviour as an argument 
against the view that the interests of Iceland are inseparably bound up with those of the 
UK'. 140 Late in the day, the leader of the Icelandic delegation even threatened to resign 
and report to his Ministers who were in Washington to discuss the formation of the 
Atlantic Alliance. 'The implication may be', as Robin Hankey was told, 'that these 
Ministers will tell the Americans that they cannot join the Pact while the UK is 
using 'British money in order to smash the British fishing industry'. Hansard, Vol. 475, col. 1000, 
16.5.1950. 
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disrupting their whole economy by driving hard bargains over frozen fish'. ' 4' Thus, the 
Foreign Office stressed the importance of 'political factors' throughout the negotiations 
and in the end Ernest Bevin himself intervened, saying that he could not 'sanction 
endangering the Atlantic Pact for the sake of a few hundred thousand pounds'. 142 In 
April 1949, the Icelanders secured a favourable contract with Britain. 143 
British policy-or rather non-policy-towards the Icelandic programme for an 
extension of fishing and fishing jurisdiction in 1948-1951 was uncoordinated and 
contradictory. On the one hand, the wishes for wider limits were rejected but on the 
other the Icelanders were helped to modemise their fishing industry which would have 
to be accompanied by increased sales to Britain and control over the fishing grounds. 
Never did a thorough discussion take place on an 'Iceland policy'. Only rarely did 
British officials acknowledge the desirability of one, 144 and then the contrasting views 
of the various departments appeared. The Foreign Office leaned on one side or the other 
but mostly preferred to let events take their course. Ideally, things should just stay as 
they were. 
The upshot-an economic benevolence towards Iceland-was more Realpolitik 
than philanthropy. The apparent amalgamation of the supreme national interests of 
Britain and Iceland explained the offer of trawler loans and other economic assistance. 
It may be futile to wonder much about the might-have-beens of history, but had there 
been no Cold War, the Icelanders would certainly not have found themselves in such a 
good bargaining position. To compare, in the 1930s, when their economic difficulties 
were even worse, they received noticeably less sympathy in London. In 1934, a 
diplomat on a fact-finding mission to Iceland advised against all loans for construction 
in the country and three years later, when the coast guard had been fairly forthright in 
charging British trawlers with illegal fishing, Laurence Collier wrote in the Northern 
Department that 'the Icelandic govt. do not deserve any help from us. 145 Even as late as 
at the end of the Second World War, when the hostility between East and West had not 
erupted, the British Minister in Reykjavik informed the American Legation there that 
the Foreign Office had decided not to have its policy towards Iceland governed by the 
141 PRO: F0371/77428/N2687/1151/27, Davidson minute, 19.3.1949. 
142 BEA: OV35/8, Siepmann note, 4.3.1949. PRO: F0371/77428/N2515/1151/27, Jackling minute, 
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49 
'Russian bogey'. Although the Icelanders had managed to sell fish to Britain at high 
prices during the war, this would be bound to change. In the future they would be 
'regarded in the nature of a competitor ... and certain economic dislocation might 
result'. 146 But then came the Cold War, ostensibly saving Iceland from poverty and 
powerlessness. 
The rise of the country's welfare in the definition of Britain's 'national interest' 
was of course in direct opposition to the more narrow interest of the trawler owners, 
skippers and mates on Humberside. They had to accept the construction of Icelandic 
fishing vessels with active aid from Britain. But they would not stay silent if-to add 
insult to injury-they were driven off their traditional grounds in the waters off 
Iceland. 147 In Grimsby and Hull, geopolitics did not matter as much as fishing, and 
events were to show that this order of priority was to a surprising degree allowed to 
determine British policy. Before that episode, however, Britain faced a more traditional 
test of strength elsewhere on the 'high seas'. 
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1.4. Might Makes Right. Impotence off the Soviet Coast, 1948-51 
In theory, the application of 'gunboat diplomacy" to protect the national interest of 
narrow territorial waters was always possible off Norway and Iceland. The situation was 
entirely different, however, in another disputed part of the oceans where trawling and 
the traditional three-mile limit also came under threat in the late 1940s. In the Barents 
Sea off the Kola-peninsula in the Soviet Union, Britain found herself in the unfamiliar 
position of utter impotence. 
Before the Second World War, British trawlers worked the fishing grounds in the 
Barents Sea all year round, catching high quality plaice in particular. Although the 
Anglo-Soviet agreement of 1930 ought to have secured satisfactory access to the fishing 
grounds up to three miles from land, 148 Soviet leaders had not renounced their claim to a 
12-mile limit and after the war it was not entirely clear if they still considered the pre- 
war treaty valid. 149 Some areas outside three miles were closed for military practises, in 
direct contravention of British views, and the Soviet authorities could easily arrest and 
confiscate trawlers on the pretence of illegal fishing. In the era of heightened tension 
between East and West in the summer of 1948, the British trawler owners became so 
concerned that they might lose their vessels through such injustice that they decided to 
refrain temporarily from fishing in the Barents Sea. 150 
Before the owners took this decision, they called for compensation from the 
government in case of Soviet molestation, or 'a display of naval force' in the Barents 
Sea. 15 1 Financial guarantees were always discarded in London but, apparently, naval 
presence was not out of the question. It was undesirable, wrote Robin Hankey in the 
Foreign Office, that 'we should refrain from showing the flag in a part of the high seas 
where we have a perfect right to go out of fear of incidents which the Russians might 
create'. 1 52 Furthermore, informants on the trawlers produced useful intelligence, taking 
photographs of Soviet warships and noting their movements. 153 Nonetheless, the 
reasons for inaction outweighed the advantages of resolution. Confrontation between 
148 See introduction, 15. 
149 PRO: MAF209/937, Lacy minute, 26.4.1951. 
150 Times, 30.7.1948. PRO: MAF209/35, SOFP minute, 26.8.1948. 
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Soviet warships and Royal Navy Fishery Protection vessels could only lead to 
immediate British surrender or escalation with unforeseen consequences. 154 That would 
be a high and irrational price to pay for plaice off the Soviet coast, and while a more 
important world-wide principle of territorial waters was involved, it would certainly be 
defended better by alleviation than intensification. 
Temporarily, the problem seemed to disappear. The trawler owners felt it safe to 
resume fishing and the winter of 1948-49 passed without incident. Still, the grey area 
between three miles and 12 remained uncertain and in the spring of 1949, T. S. Leach, 
the Chief Inspector of Fisheries, observed that if British trawlers wanted to avoid the 
risk of arrest, they should stay outside the 12-mile limit. Informally, the Foreign Office 
seconded this opinion, for although Britain had every right to fish close to the shore in 
many areas, in line with the 1930 treaty, the hostility and unpredictability of the Soviet 
authorities would have to be taken into account. 155 Moreover, incidents would establish 
British impotence in the area, thus undermining the doctrine of the three-mile limit. In 
other words, the Foreign Office and MAF wanted British trawlers to stay outside 12 
miles and thus avoid arrests which would demonstrate the actual situation. Then they 
could claim that the absence of incidents confirmed Britain's non-recognition of the 
Soviet claim for 12-mile territorial waters! 156 Accordingly, the trawler owners were 
warned about the dangers of fishing inside the Soviet limit and did not like what they 
heard. They did not instruct their skippers to stay out, quoting the 1930 treaty and 
Britain's longstanding commitment to the three-mile limit. 157 Thus, Whitehall's 
paradoxical policy was never likely to last, depending as it did on compliance both from 
impetuous trawlermen and the Soviet authorities, suspicious of British activities in the 
Barents Sea. 158 
In May 1950, matters came to a head. The trawler Etruria was arrested near the mouth 
of the White Sea and fined for poaching. The incident raised strong emotions in Britain. 
In Parliament, Anthony Eden deplored Moscow's 'extremely high-handed action' and a 
backbencher even enquired whether 'this armed boarding of one of our vessels' did not 
call for NATO intervention! 159 In September, another trawler was arrested and the 
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155 PRO: NIAF209/35, Leach minutes, 11.5.1949 and 22.6.1949. 
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following month a third one was caught. The policy of no losses through no contest was 
in serious jeopardy. The Fishery Protection vessel HMS Mariner sailed north with clear 
instructions; not to protect British trawlers in the disputed waters but to make sure that 
they did not fish there for the time being. 160 Still, yet another trawler was apprehended 
in November. 
The setbacks of repeated arrests made more difficult the search for fish-and 
also intelligence for that matter. Even so, after the spate of arrests in late 1950, the 
fishery officials in Whitehall argued that instead of warning the trawler owners about 
the dangers of entering Soviet no-go areas outside three miles, they should secretly be 
ordered to stay away from them. Otherwise, the right to fish in some areas, in line with 
the 1930 treaty, might be lost. The Foreign Office, on the other hand, was more aware 
that a directive of this kind would contradict the British policy of narrow territorial 
waters and as one of its officials noted, 'this might be used against us in the Norwegian 
fisheries case at The Hague and in other international disputes'. 16 1 The danger of an 
adverse precedent existed. But what could be done? The only option was a continuance 
of keeping out instead of being kicked out, hoping that the retreat would go unnoticed. 
Yet the doctrine of the freedom of the high seas was to be undermined still 
further. In the spring of 1951, the Soviet Union ordered Britain's fishery protection 
vessels to stay completely outside its '12-mile territorial waters'. 162 Again, the Fisheries 
Department felt that Soviet demands should be met, so as not to jeopardise the benefits 
of the 1930 treaty. The Foreign Office concurred, 'based on reasons of pure 
expediency'. 163 Pragmatism, however, could conflict with prestige and principle. The 
Admiralty was unwilling to admit complete surrender in the Barents Sea and rejected 
the suggestion from the Fisheries Department and Northern Department that the Royal 
Navy's fishery protection vessels should under no circumstances cross the Soviet 12- 
mile limit. The compromise which all the departments agreed upon read that 'normally' 
the ships should only venture inside in case of damage or wreck of British trawlers but 
not in order to intervene in the process of arrest by Soviet warships. 164 From 1951, the 
Navy's vessels rarely went to the Barents Sea and almost always stayed obligingly 
outside the 12-mile limit. 165 It is unclear why Moscow did not go one step further and 
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denounce the 1930 treaty. That action was to be taken in 1953 but then reversed and 
British officials suggested that a willingness to keep relations with the West on minor 
matters as friendly as possible explained Soviet goodwill. 166 The same factor was 
probably at work a few years before. 
Might made right in the Barents Sea. Up there, the world was working according to the 
realist theory on strength in international relations. The Soviet adversary was a hostile 
world power, not a weak ally, and Britain could not but accept Moscow's infringements 
on her traditional interests. So rather than showing enlightened pragmatism in a liberal 
manner, as was arguably the case in the dispute with Norway, and aiding Iceland's 
fishing industry while worrying little about her ambitions about territorial waters, in the 
Soviet case British policy-makers were simply faced with circumstances beyond their 
control. What would have happened if the roles had been reversed? The application of 
4gunboat diplomacy' in the 1920s was remembered on Humberside where an old hand 
recalled the arrival of the Royal Navy off the Kola-peninsula during a rather recent, yet 
bygone era: 
Those were the days when Britain was really a great power and Russia was 
comparatively weak. ... One 
day, up steamed a British gunboat. She made a 
quick survey, then put down three buoys exactly three miles off the Russian 
shore. 'That', the captain of the gunboat told the interested trawler skippers who 
were watching the operation, 'is the international line that Britain recognises. 
Don't go inside it but you can fish outside it as much as you like'. The skippers 
were only too glad to get on with their fishing while the gunboat cruised idly 
around, like an old hen guarding her chicks. 167 
When it came to the crunch after the Second World War it did not take a trial of strength 
to establish the new relations of power. The Soviet infringement on British maritime 
interests was not even debated at Cabinet level in London; the realities of the situation 
were abundantly clear. It could be argued that the slight to the principle of narrow 
territorial waters was rather limited, and that Britain's position was defended by legal 
reservations. Furthermore, the fishing at stake was comparatively minor. On the other 
hand, references to principle and universally accepted limits seemed flimsy when the 
real state of affairs was entirely different in some parts of the seas. In the following 
years, the Icelanders were to use this argument repeatedly-and effectively. Overall, 
therefore, the outlook appeared to be rather bleak. The accumulation of disputes or 
166 See section 2.6,105-106. 
167 Grimsby Evening Telegraph, 12.4.195 1. 
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impending disputes with such diverse states as Norway, Iceland and the Soviet Union, 
as well as other detrimental developments, led to some necessary reflections in 
Whitehall about Britain's policy on territorial waters and the high seas. For it seemed 
that almost everywhere the British were fishing in troubled waters. 
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1.5. In 'Cloud Cuckoo Land'and at The Hague: The Great 
Maritime Power Revisited, 1949-52 
Was it no longer vital for Britain's national interest to stem the tide for wider claims on 
the high seas? Was it perhaps impossible in any case to resist the growing current? At 
the end of the 1940s, these questions had been forced on officials in Whitehall and they 
had mainly tried to find immediate responses to external actions. It was logical, 
however, that a deeper debate on Britain's underlying assumptions should arise. In late 
1949, Legal Adviser Sir Eric Beckett initiated this soul-searching, and immediately 
invoked what was called 'a first class row' between the Foreign Office and the 
Admiralty. 168 
Beckett was painfully blunt. He found Britain, at the Admiralty's behest, guilty of a far 
too rigid adherence to the three-mile limit. Even worse, British decision-makers had 
foolishly thought that their wishes would almost automatically come true: 
This policy ... 
led to what was practically a belief that international law can be 
made for the whole world by a series of British protests of which in fact other 
countries took remarkably little notice. ... It can, I think, only be described as 
cloud cuckoo land... But, and this is really my whole point, to save the 
maximum we have got all the time to examine the details and tactics with the 
greatest care and the greatest sense of reality, and the fact that something has in 
the past formed recent ... Admiralty policy cannot weigh very heavily in the 
conclusions which we reach as to what it is best to do now. We are all agreed as 
to our object and that is to save as much as we can. 169 
It could be argued that the Foreign Office was in closer touch with the reality of 
Britain's diminished influence than the Admiralty, steeped in the traditions of 
supremacy on the high seas. Tough replies to Beckett's reproaches certainly indicated 
that the scions of Drake and Nelson foresaw further naval conflicts where navigation on 
the high seas must not be impeded by excessive national jurisdiction. 170 Moreover, the 
Palmerstonian 'gunboat diplomacy' was definitely not considered obsolete in Whitehall. 
When, in 1949, the notoriously conservative Chiefs of Staff discussed a note on 'Naval 
Assistance in Support of Foreign and Colonial Policy', the Admiralty could point to the 
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need to show the flag in the Far East, at the Gulf of Aqaba and in British Honduras. 171 
This traditional emphasis on naval pre-eminence was outdated and illogical. 172 At the 
time, the miscalculation meant that the sea-lanes across the North-Atlantic, in the 
Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the China Sea and indeed almost everywhere, were 
deemed to be of 'vital interest' to Britain. 173 Furthermore, any deviation from the three- 
mile limit could impede access to 'vital' outposts like Gibraltar, Singapore and Hong 
Kong. Not only could navigation be at stake but flying as well, because in territorial 
waters the airspace above was also under national jurisdiction. ' 74 Thus, all 
encroachments on the freedom of the high seas had to be resisted, and why should that 
not be possible? Nigel J. Abercrombie, Head of Military Branch, probably caught best 
the prevalent mood in the Admiralty by writing that 'although the United Kingdom can 
perhaps no longer describe itself as the foremost maritime power of the world, we have, 
even now, the second largest navy'. 175 It must be stressed, nonetheless, that in their 
defence of the three-mile limit, the officials of the naval department were not in a 
belligerent mood. They never recommended the use of force to defend it in the outside 
world, as was perhaps best demonstrated when the Royal Navy obeyed orders from 
Moscow and dared not enter the 12-mile territorial waters of the Soviet Union. Thus, 
this particular battle for the freedom of the high seas was only waged in Whitehall. The 
Admiralty was tough on the abstract principle but soft on its actual protection. 
The acquisition of allies was as vital in the bureaucratic struggle as in real wars. 
The Ministry of Transport and the Fisheries Department sided with the Admiralty while 
the Foreign Office found few supporters in Whitehall. 176 Outside assistance could shift 
the balance, however. Professor Humphrey Waldock, an expert on international law 
who was on the British team in the Anglo-Norwegian dispute at The Hague, stressed 
that the position of the United States was paramount. 177 If the Americans would side 
with Britain, these two maritime powers could probably hold the line for a while. If not, 
the British mission would be much harder. At the end of March 1950, Whitehall 
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therefore agreed to seek informal discussions with the United States on the various 
aspects of territorial waters. 
Both the staunchest defenders of the three-mile limit and the proponents of concessions 
had some reason to believe that support for their views could be sought in Washington. 
The American attitude on territorial waters in the first decades after the Second World 
War was ambiguous. True, for over 150 years the United States had argued that 
territorial waters should not be wider than three miles and the principle of the freedom 
of the high seas was still of 'vital importance to the United States'. 178 On the other hand, 
the Truman Declarations of 1945 had, to recapitulate, encouraged various Latin 
American states to increase their maritime jurisdiction and the United States had not 
been prepared to protest Iceland's moves to extend her fishing limits. 179 Domestic 
interests in some states could also influence American action. For years, the federal 
government and the states of Texas, Louisiana and California had been involved in 
litigation over ownership of the seabed off their coasts, extending beyond the three-mile 
limit, and the issue remained unresolved by the end of 1951. On the east coast of the 
United States, fishermen wanted to have Canadian competitors pushed out of fishing 
grounds on the traditional 'high seas' and the same could be said on the west coast and 
in Alaska. 180 Hence, in late 1950, Professor Waldock estimated that the United States 
was slowly but surely moving in the wrong direction from the traditional British point 
of view. 181 Admiralty officials also admitted that time was not on Britain's side-, 'that 
there is something approaching a virtual certainty that sooner or later we shall lose the 
182 
three-mile limit of territorial waters if our policy remains completely unchanged' . 
A worrying lack of solidarity was also evident in other quarters. Scottish inshore 
fishermen had long resented foreign trawling up to the three-mile line in the Moray 
Firth and the Minches, and regularly called for the extension of the limit in these 
waters. 183 On close scrutiny, the British view on the law of the sea was not even 
respected within all territories under His Majesty's jurisdiction. During the proceedings 
at The Hague, the Norwegian team stated that off Honduras and Fiji, for instance, the 
178 FRUS 1950 1,889, Chapman memorandum, 29.5.1950. 
179 See introduction, 16, and section 1.3,45. 
180 Swarztrauber, Three-Mile Limit, 155-162. 
181 PRO: ADM 1/25859, interdepartmental meeting, 21.12.1950. 
182 PRO: ADM 1/25859, minute by Deputy Secretary [name illegible], 19.1.195 1. Also Hanna minute, 
16.1.1951. 
183 PRO: F0371/77465iN9683/1351/30, Macdonald to Alexander, 28.10.1949, and Glasgow Herald, 
19.12.1951 (leading article). 
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British authorities had used baselines to delimit territorial waters, 184 and the colonial 
governments of Bermuda and the Bahamas caused some anxiety in London by insisting 
on the regulation of fisheries far beyond a three-mile limit. 185 Likewise, some 
Commonwealth countries did not share the British view on territorial waters. In early 
1949, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent declared that with Newfoundland about to enter 
the Canadian confederation, the Gulf of St. Lawrence should come under national 
jurisdiction. Its entrance was over a hundred miles wide so the claim, as Legal Adviser 
Beckett was to point out, ran 'completely contrary to the doctrine which we [are] trying 
to establish in the Anglo-Norwegian fisheries case'. 186 Similarly, the Australian 
authorities claimed the right to control fishing beyond the three-mile limit, although 
they could be persuaded to postpone such legislation until the International Court had 
delivered its judgement in the Norwegian dispute. 187 Finally, in 1949 the United Nations 
General Assembly accepted Iceland's proposal that the International Law Commission 
should debate the width of territorial waters. 188 Britain had resisted the motion, arguing 
that the three-mile rule was well established in international law, and while the outcome 
of the Commission's study was of course uncertain, the Assembly's decision seemed to 
undermine the British view on the law of the sea. 189 
The tide was turning. On December 18,1951, the true shock came when the 
International Court of Justice delivered its ruling in the Anglo-Norwegian dispute, 
wholly in favour of Oslo. The judges sanctioned the use of baselines and stated that the 
coastal population's dependency on fisheries was one of the factors which determined 
their decision. 190 As Sir Eric Beckett immediately lamented, it was the worst possible 
outcome, fraught with adverse consequences. 191 A couple of months before, when the 
1901 treaty on three-miles off Iceland was due to expire, Britain had persuaded a 
reluctant government in Reykjavik to postpone further steps on fishing limits until a 
184 PRO: C0323/1926/1, Jones to Roberts-Wray, 12.8.1950. 
185 PRO: C0323/1926/1, Hood to Griffiths, 21.10.1950, and C0537/6686, Bahaman government to 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28.10.1950. 
186 PRO: F0371/94683/NN1351/10, Burrows to FO, 14.3.1951. Also F0371/94694/NN1351/131, 
Johnson minute, 1.6.1951. 
187 PRO: F0371/99801/GWI/2, McEwen to Garnett, 12.12.1951. 
118 Yearbook of the United Nations 1948-49 (New York: United Nations Department of Public 
Information, 1949), 951-952. 
189 The Commission's chairman, Prof. Manley Hudson, was a known supporter of increased rights for the 
coastal state. SSi-DOP: Andersen to Thor Thors, 11.8.1949. Also J6nsson, Friends, 55-57, and PRO: 
D035/3352, UN delegation to FO, 20.10.1949. 
190 For a detailed discussion on the ruling, see Waldock, 'Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case', and Evensen, 
'Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case'. 
191 PRO: F0371/94694/NN 1351/128, Nicholls to FO, 18.12.195 1. 
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judgement was reached at The Hague. 192 Now the Icelanders could be expected to sail 
in the wake of the Norwegians. Britain's confidence in the International Court had 
obviously been misplaced. In the privacy of a Foreign Office minute. Beckett 
condemned it for sheer incompetence and emphasised the need to deprive the Latin 
American states of one of their four seats. Instead, a more 'reliable'judge from Western 
Europe should be chosen. 193 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that Britain would have been wiser to 
cut her losses and accept outright the Royal Decree of 1935 or strive more arduously for 
a bilateral deal which the Norwegians could accept, and hope that either way the 
principle of three-mile limits from the low-water mark would not be too unden-nined. It 
has been shown, however, that the five restrictions of power, pressure, prestige, 
precedence and principle excluded such surrender. On the other hand, it has also been 
demonstrated how difficult it would have been-in a drastically new environment-to 
defend forcefully the traditional national interest of narrow territorial waters. 
Furthermore, all but a few British decision-makers lacked the inward will to be as tough 
as befitted a great power defending a supposedly vital interest. Little could be done 
about the Soviet Union but what kind of great power aided the development of another 
state like Iceland, however small, when she was intent on infringing Britain's avowed 
vital interest? And what kind of great power was prepared to allow another state, 
Norway, to ignore that interest and then simply put it in the hands of the International 
Court? When the proceedings at The Hague were over many Norwegians called the 
British 'good losers', 194 and Ambassador Collier's successor, Sir Michael Wright, even 
seemed to take an almost masochistic pride in this successful demonstration of British 
magnanimity, emphasising the general feeling in Oslo that 'no country but Britain 
would have shown such a high standard of conduct, especially in the face of a final and 
severe disappointment'. 195 
Britain was too civil. Around this time Arnold Toynbee suggested that the 
British people had become 'prematurely humanised' in their approach to foreign affairs 
and other scholars later elaborated on the idea. Sometimes they provoked grossly, with 
A. J. P. Taylor describing Munich and appeasement as 'a triumph of all that was best and 
192 PRO: F0371/94657/NLI 351/39, Benediktsson to Greenway, 8.9.1951. 
193 PRO: F0371/100657/NN 1151/13, Beckett memorandum, 14.2.1952. For a similar view, see 
LC02/5783, Dobson note, 8.5.1952. 
194 PRO: ADM 1/24625, Fishery Protection Periodical Report, 1.12. -1951-1.4.1952,20.4.1952. 
195 PRO: F0371/100664/NN 1351/2, Wright to Eden, 2.1.1952. For this British trait in general, see 
Marcus Collins, *The fall of the English gentleman: the national character in decline, c. 1918-1970', 
Historical Research. Vol. 75, No. 187,2002,93-94. 
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enlightened in British life'. Others, like F. S. Northedge and Paul Kennedy, were more 
balanced and emphasised an intrinsic faith in compromise and reasoned argument. 196 
The British approach to infringements on the national interest of narrow territorial 
waters in the first years after the Second World War partly supports this view. The 
rejection of 'gunboat diplomacy' is not only explained by realistic restraints, but also by 
an idealistic tepidity and nobleness, a will to solve disputes peacefully and take the 
opponent's opinion into consideration. Realpolitik, after all, is not an English word. 
Still, all the external arguments for compromise and forbearance which were outside 
Britain's power must be kept in mind as well. Although Realpolitik may have an alien 
ring, 'gunboat diplomacy' is intrinsically English. It must be asked if the will of 
restraint did not stem more or less from the inability to act more forcefully. While the 
issue was almost infinitely smaller, a comparison can be made with the British position 
in India after the war, as Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Dalton described it: 'If you 
are in a place where you are not wanted and where you have not got the force to squash 
those who don't want you, the only thing is to get out'. 197 Magnaniminity can be 
another word for enfeeblement. 
The same may apply even when superior power was at hand but went unused. 
Rather than a pure sign of civility, such composure can at least partly be the result of 
miscalculations. Britain had certainly not set out to be the 'good loser' at The Hague, 
and an interesting counterfactual. can be contemplated: what would have happened if the 
decision-makers in London had been better judges of current trends in maritime affairs? 
Would they then have been prepared to put defence of this supposedly vital aspect of 
Britain's national interest, narrow territorial waters, in the hands of the International 
Court? It will be seen that fear of another loss certainly influenced the British decision 
not to refer the consequent conflict with Iceland to The Hague, even if the 
circumstances were very similar. 198 In short, while one loss had gracefully been 
endured, an endless retreat was intolerable. In the next few years, Britain did manage to 
196 For a summary of these views, see Bartlett, British Foreign Policy, 42-43. Also Patrick Finney, 'The 
Romance of Decline: The Historiography of Appeasement and British National Identy', Electronic 
Journal ofInternational History, <http: //www. ihr. sas. ac. uk/publications/ejihartl. html>, section 16, 
accessed 10.1.0 1. A popular theory seems to exist still in England that 'fairness' is, in the words of 
Conservative politician Ann Widdecombe, 'something quintessentially British', or, as Labour Minister 
Michael Wills had it, that the 'core of our national identity' is 'fairness, a sense of fair play'. See 
Independent on Sunday, 4.11.200 1. 
197 See Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 3 84. For a contemporary comparison, see Robert Kagan's observation 
that, compared to the United States, Europe has a 'greater tolerance for threats today' because of its 
greater difficulty in countering them. Thus, there exist 'differing psychologies of power and weakness'. 
Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New Iforld Order (New York, Alfred 
A. Knopf, 2003), 3 1. 
198 For an appreciation of the similarities, see PRO: F0371/94683/NN 1351/24, Beckett minute, 5.6.195 1. 
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secure a satisfactory settlement on fishing limits off the Faroe Islands and an uneasy 
compromise in the Barents Sea. However, the importance, and indeed the wisdom, of 
these 'victories' could be doubted. Furthermore, British rulers were to find out in the 
Icelandic case that while they would not be the 'good loser' again, the only other option 
also led to defeat, just by a route much worse: Britain became the bad loser, avoiding 
unpleasant decisions on international law, surrendering the formation of foreign policy 
to an inflexible pressure group, risking greater interests for smaller, upsetting her most 
important ally and forfeiting any chance of cutting her losses through controlled 
concessions. 
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11. Procrastination. Redefinition of the National 
Interest Postponed, 1952-1956 
2.1. Indecision-Making in Whitehall. Departmental Infighting 
and the Law of the Sea, 1952-54 
Soon enough the shock waves from The Hague reached British shores. An important 
decision had to be made: how should Britain react to the new realities on the law of the 
sea? Unsurprisingly, interdepartmental infighting ensued where foresight and realism 
clashed with backwardness and wishful thinking. When the decision finally emerged it 
was long overdue, largely irrelevant, and entirely incorrect. Thus, the in-built failure of 
the decision-making process in London was well demonstrated. Indeed, a study of the 
making is more meaningful here than a focus on the end result. A similar sequence of 
events was to be repeated over and over, and as Graham Allison wrote in Essence of 
Decision, the classic work on decision-making: 'We should ask not what goals account 
for a nation's choice of an action, but rather what factors determine an outcome'. ' 
The departmental conflict took place on two fronts. At the beginning of 1952, an 
informal territorial waters committee was established in Whitehall, with representatives 
from the Foreign Office, the Admiralty, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, the 
Ministry of Transport and the Scottish Office. Other departments sometimes joined in as 
well. This group was to prepare a Cabinet paper on the pros and cons of baselines, with 
recommendations on future PoliCy. 2 At ministerial level, meanwhile, the standing Home 
Affairs Committee occasionally discussed the matter. 3 
The battle lines were fairly clear. The Scottish Office, with an eye on the 
interests of inshore fishermen in Scotland, wanted to use baselines to incorporate the 
Moray Firth, the Firth of Clyde and the Minches into Britain's territorial waters. 4 The 
Colonial Office also calculated that, on balance, overseas territories would benefit from 
the adoption of this method. 5 Similarly, the Ministry of Fuel and Power felt that since 
oil rights on the seabed were in some cases limited to the boundaries of territorial 
waters, British companies would overall gain from its application, for instance in the 
1 Graham Allison, Essence ofDecision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1971), 255. 
2 PRO: F0371/99804/GWI/34, interdepartmental conunittee meetings, 12.2.1952 and 14.2.1952. 
3 PRO: CAB21/2762, Padmore minute, 17.4.1952. 
4 PRO: F0371/99801/GWI/10, SHD note, January 1952. 
5 PRO: F0371/99807/GWI/85, CO note, 8.5.1952. 
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Persian Gulf .6 And the Foreign Office came 
firmly down in favour of baselines. In the 
last resort, wrote Assistant Legal Adviser D. H. N. Johnson in March 1952, the principle 
of narrow territorial waters depended 'on the existence of naval powers with (a) the will 
and (b) the power to enforce them'. Up to 1914, Britain had possessed both but much 
had changed since then and Johnson pointed out that 'a trend away from the narrow 
limits is inevitable, as the small powers and the middle powers, one after another, see 
they can "get away with it"'. 7 The Foreign Office view was not based on what Britain 
wanted, therefore, but rather on what she could hope to achieve in the wider world. For 
of what use would a denial of baselines be if it only applied to British lands? 
Within Whitehall, however, the defenders of the narrowest limits were by no 
means convinced that the struggle against baselines was lost. The Fisheries Department 
complained-rather ironically in light of that department's biased defence of the 
trawling industry's well-being-that the Scottish Office were advancing 'a case on 
8 behalf of local interests ... that 
has to be weighed against wider national interests'. The 
Admiralty also emphasised that Britain needed narrow territorial waters around the 
world, as did Transport officials, concerned with the Merchant Navy and indignant that 
the proposed baseline to close the Moray Firth would stretch over 70 miles, much 
longer than the most extensive lines off Norway. 9 Furthennore, they lambasted the 
diplomats for an unnecessary exaggeration of Britain's ebb on the high seas: 
It is true that no Foreign Secretary could say today, as Sir Edward Grey did, that 
we should go to war for the sake of the three-mile limit. But even the Foreign 
Office, in their most dejected frame of mind, would admit that the narrowing of 
territorial waters limits is still a major objective of foreign policy. 10 
By the summer of 1952, it was obvious that a joint Cabinet paper could neither be 
produced at departmental level nor in the Home Affairs Committee. 11 The problem 
would have to be sorted out at the highest levels. 
On July 29, the Cabinet discussed the delimitation of territorial waters. Anthony Eden 
recommended that baselines be used for Britain and her overseas territories, explaining 
that after the ruling at The Hague, 'reasonable' lines of this kind could not really be 
6 PRO: POVVE33/1974, Nuttall minute, 24.3.1952. F0371/99807/GWI/73, Anustrong minute, 28.3.1952. 
7 PRO: F0371/99807/GWI/78, Johnson minute, 29.3.1952. 
8 PRO: F03 71/99805/GW 1/56, Johns to Saner, 10.3.1952. 
9 PRO: MT59/2976, Guttery note, 6.3.1952. F0371/99804/GWI/43, Hanna to Saner, 28.2.1952. 
10 PRO: MT59/2976, Morris minute, 12.6.1952. 
" PRO: F0371/99810/GWI/131, Lloyd to Eden, 28.7.1952, and PREMI 1/2314, Brook minute, 
23.7.1952. 
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challenged. 12 Even so, the opposition to change was powerful. J. P. L. Thomas, First 
Lord of the Admiralty, and Alan Lennox-Boyd, the Minister of Transport, insisted that 
the Foreign Secretary's proposal went completely against the naval, merchant and 
fishing interests of Britain. 13 The naval aspect appeared to dominate the discussion and 
the debate was not based as much on the stark facts of 1952 as the obsolete observations 
of the past. Overnight, the ministers had not become experts on developments in the law 
of the sea or the effects of a particular ruling at The Hague half a year before. They 
knew for a fact, however, that Britain had always relied on the freedom of the high seas. 
Nobody was as well versed in that history as the Prime Minister himself. As a young 
man, Winston Churchill had spoken of Britain's need to hold 'unquestioned command 
of the sea'. ' 4 At the Cabinet meeting in the summer of 1952, he most likely contributed 
significantly to the general conclusion that 'it was to the advantage of a great maritime 
power to keep free of territorial control as large an area as possible of the sea and of the 
air above it'. Before a final decision on baselines, however, the Cabinet invited the 
Minister of Defence to oversee a further examination of the naval implications, and the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretaries were to ascertain the attitudes of 
Commonwealth countries and the United States. 15 Thus, the Foreign Office had not 
suffered a complete defeat. Then again, Field Marshal Lord Alexander at Defence and 
the Marquess of Salisbury at the Commonwealth Relations Office were as conservative 
as they came. ' 6 
A 'hard-line' response on the naval aspect looked particularly predictable. In 
September, the Chiefs of Staff ratified a report by the Joint Planning Staff on the 
arguments against baselines. 17 In peacetime the most significant disadvantage was 
deemed to lie in the loss of opportunities to observe foreign shorelines, for instance 
through submarine and warship surveillance, and undoubtedly also by civilian vessels 
like the trawlers in the Barents Sea. 18 Moreover, the Chiefs foresaw increased difficulty 
12 PRO: CAB 129/53, C(52)247, Eden memorandum, 21.7.1952. 
13 PRO: CAB 129/54, C(52)255, Leathers, Thomas and Lennox-Boyd joint memorandum, 22.7.1952. 
14 See Martin Gilbert, Churchill. A Life (London: Pimlico, 2000 (1" ed., 1991)), 67. Also Young, Britain 
and the World, 148. 
15 PRO: CAB 128/25, CC(52), 74th meeting, 29.7.1952. 
16 For Alexander, see Correlli Barnett, The Verdict ofPeace. Britain Between her Yesterday and the 
Future (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2001), 84-89. For Salisbury, see Anthony Sampson, Anatomy ofBritain 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1962), 79-82. 
17 PRO: DEFE6/21, JP(52)95(S)T of R, Joint Planning Staff note, COS Committee, 5.8.1952. Also 
JP(5 2)9 5 (Final), Joint Planning Staff report, 22.8.1952. DEFE4/56,124h meeting, COS Committee, 
1.9.1952. 
18 PRO: DEFE5/4 1, COS(52)487, report, approved by COS, 1.9.1952. There is no mention of trawlers in 
this partially sanitised document. However, recently declassified FO files, including a copy of the 
sanitised report, contain a discussion of the 1930 agreement with the Soviet Union on fishing in the 
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in carrying out 'our tasks as a maritime power' which apparently referred to traditional 
'gunboat diplomacy' around the world. 19 The detriment of baselines was said to be even 
greater in times of war. During both world wars, the Germans had abused neutral 
territorial waters and Churchill had been outraged in 1939-40 when Neville 
Chamberlain's Cabinet refused for a long time to lay mines in the fjord off Narvik 
because it would violate the rights of neutral Norway. 20 In 1952, the Chiefs estimated 
that Britain was 'sure to be more hampered than her opponents by any extension of 
neutral rights both because she is among the most law-abiding nations and because of 
her exceptional dependence on the exercise of sea power'. Other possible consequences 
of baselines which had earlier worried naval thinkers in London, such as the closure of 
strategic sounds or impeded access to bases like Singapore and Hong Kong, could 
easily have been added. Thus, the conclusion was reached that baselines should not be 
adopted by Britain and rejected elsewhere. 21 Presumably, the Chiefs of Staff were not 
suggesting, still, that the ruling by the International Court in the Anglo-Norwegian 
dispute should be ignored. If they had their way, it would rather be a singular exception. 
Or maybe the military men had simply not considered the Court's relevance at all. And 
of course, the main conclusion was only that baselines should be opposed but not how, 
specifically, that should be done. 
The Foreign Office was not pleased, dismissing the naval objections as mostly 
theoretical (like the examples of wartime drawbacks) or based on the assumption that 
the three-mile rule and the low-water mark were almost universally accepted methods of 
delimiting territorial waters. That was plainly wrong, as was the implicit premise that 
other states would look to Britain for precedence on these issues. 'The Admiralty are 
quite silly about this question', Selwyn Lloyd, Minister of State in the Foreign Office, 
correctly concluded . 
22 Despite the guidance from The Hague, the naval department- 
and indeed the whole military leadership--was still lost in 'cloud cuckoo land'. 
Thus were the supposedly strategic detriments of baselines established. There remained, 
however, the survey of opinion abroad. Although the Cabinet had decided to focus on 
the United States and the Commonwealth, developments elsewhere would 
Barents Sea which makes clear that surveillance in those waters was mentioned in the sanitised blank. See 
F0371/99812/GW 1/146, Alexander to Eden, 10.9.1952, and undated FO note. 
19 PRO: DEFE5/4 1, COS(52)487, report, approved by COS, 1.9.1952. 
20 PRO: ADM 116/2176, Admiralty memorandum, 21.12.1922. Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm. 
The Second World War 1, (London: Cassell, 1948), 430-468. 
21 PRO: DEFE5/4 1, COS(52)487, report, approved by COS, 1.9.1952. Also CAB21/2762, Jacob to 
Alexander, 9.9.1952. ADMI/273-330, brief for First Sea Lord, 26.9.1952. 
22 F0371/99812/GWI/146, Armstrong minute, 18.9.1952, and Lloyd minute, 19.9.1952. 
66 
understandably be taken into account as well, and comments would not necessarily 
centre on baselines as such, but rather the whole width of territorial waters. 
The outlook was bleak. In 1952, Chile, Ecuador and Peru issued the so-called 
Santiago Declaration, expressing their right to a 200-mile limit, 23 and both Canada and 
Australia passed legislation on wider national jurisdiction. 24 Perhaps the most influential 
developments took place in the International Law Commission. Having begun to study 
the width of territorial waters in 1950, it was quickly clear that it would not suggest the 
retention of the three-mile limit. By early 1953, J. P. A. Franýois, the eminent jurist and 
the Commission's rapporteur, had apparently reached the conclusion that not even a 
concession of six miles would do, for some states would never settle for anything less 
than twelve miles, measured from baselines where needed. 25 So, what should Britain 
do? In a rare departure from the preference for reactive 'pragmatism', the Foreign 
Office tried to impress on other departments the advantages of supporting a regulated 
retreat to six miles over a reftisal to budge an inch which would simply be ignored. 26 If 
such a progressive policy had been followed, Britain's belated acceptance of the 
inevitable extensions would have been smoother, possibly saving her from an infamous 
, cod war' with Iceland later in the decade and repeated failures at international 
conferences on the law of the sea. But as before, Whitehall did not fancy pre-emptive 
action. Best of all, decided the majority in the interdepartmental committee on territorial 
waters, would be to forestall for as long as possible a detrimental decision in the 
International Law Commission. 27 
Unfortunately, Britain could also find support for the status quo in the United 
States. Notwithstanding some ongoing complications between coastal states and the 
federal authorities, the United States still appeared set to defend the principle of narrow 
territorial waters. 28 John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State in Dwight Eisenhower's 
new administration, quickly learned that both the State and Defence Departments saw 
strategic advantages in narrow territorial waters. 29 Later in the year, Eisenhower also 
assured Senators from states with deep-sea fishing interests that the United States would 
23 J6nsson, Friends, 116. 
24 M. W. Mouton, The Continental Shelf (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), 103,321-322. 
25 PRO: F0371/105736/GWI/I 8, Peck to Shawyer, 20.3.1953. Also Mouton, Continental Shelf, 183-249. 
26 PRO: F0371/105735/GWI/9, FO memorandum, 11.2.1953. 
27 PRO: F0371/105736/GWI/12, interdepartmental meeting, 17.2.1953. Also F0371/105739/GWI/76, 
minutes, 30.6.1953. 
28 In May 1953, the boundaries of US coastal states were confined by law to three miles from the low- 
water mark, while giving the southern 'Gulf States' (Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and 
Florida), the option to establish claims to wider limits in the courts. Swarztrauber, Three-Mile Limit, 238. 
29 Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas [henceforward DDE]: John Foster Dulles 
Papers. Telephone Conversations Series. Box I Jan-April 1953 (4). 'Telephone conversation with Mr 
Phleger', 12.2-1953. 
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'assert the rights of its nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas outside of the 
three-mile limit'. 30 Even so, the Americans were not determined to defend that 
principle, come what may. In the spring of 1953, for instance, British diplomats in 
Quito heard that the United States appeared willing to accept local demands about 
jurisdiction over tuna fishing deep off the coast of Ecuador. 31 
Thus, the American position on territorial waters remained ambiguous. This 
uncertainty was evident in the talks with British officials which the Cabinet had called 
for in July 1952. Delayed by the presidential election campaign and the regime change 
in Washington, they only took place the following summer. The two sides, led by the 
new Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, and Assistant Legal 
Adviser to the Department of State, Raymund Yingling, agreed that while narrow 
territorial waters were advantageous, the inevitable tendency was for wider limits. 32 On 
the whole, the lawyers at the Foreign Office were delighted and felt that more pressure 
33 could be brought to bear on all the traditionalists in Whitehall. But when would it be 
applied? When would Britain, with or without the United States, start preparing an 
initiative of, say, a six-mile concession? That was where boldness waned and caution 
crept in. During the discussions in Washington, both parties agreed that it would be 'bad 
tactics' at present to unden-nine the three-mile limit by suggestions about possible 
extensions. 34 Furthermore, in the higher echelons of the Foreign Office the obvious 
demise of the three-mile rule was minimised and Anglo-American capabilities to 
control the situation were exaggerated. 'This is a case where traditional British policy 
and US strategic interests coincide', wrote Sir Pierson Dixon, the Deputy Under- 
Secretary of State. 35 Likewise, Anthony Eden, who of course recommended the 
adoption of baselines in 1952, had changed his mind, presumably because he now 
realised better that an established British interest was at stake. In October 1953 he 
encouraged the Cabinet to maintain 'our traditional policy, the principle of freedom of 
the high seas, so vital to a great naval and maritime power'. 36 
'0 DDE, Central Files, Official File. Box 624 '122-1. Fishing Industry (1)', Senators Daniel, Holland and 
Saltonstall to Eisenhower, 6.8.1953, and Eisenhower to these Senators (individual letters), 30.10.1953. 
31 PRO: F0371/105632/G4/32, Clark to Eden, 15.4.1953. 
32 Six meetings took place between July 31 and August 10. See FRUS 1952-1954 1, part 2,1685-1695, 
record of discussions. 
33 PRO: F0371/105740/GWI/82, Johnson minute, 13.8.1953, and Fitzmaurice minute, 14.8.1953. 
34 FRUS 1952-1954 1, Part 2,1690, record of discussions. 
35 PRO: F0371/105741/GWI/97, Dixon minute, 2.10.1953. 
36 PRO: CAB129/63, C(53)277, Eden memorandum, 15.10,1953. 
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On December 14,1953, Britain at last declared her position on the implications of the 
ruling in the Anglo-Norwegian dispute. While baselines would be of some advantage to 
local inshore fishermen, especially in Scotland, the government declared that 'wider 
considerations, arising out of the naval, mercantile and deep-sea fishery position of this 
country', must take precedence. Britain would neither adopt baselines nor accept them 
anywhere but off North Norway. 37 The conclusion was flawed, ultimately creating more 
problems than it solved. Yet, the process of indecision-making was at least complete. It 
had taken London one year and 362 days, a far too long time, to decide not to react to 
the ruling at The Hague. And both the process and the product are best explained by 
infighting in Whitehall, not the external environment. In other words, the episode may 
be seen as a small case study to support the 'bureaucratic view' on decision-making 
which does not see foreign policy as primarily a result of external politics but of internal 
political pressures and conflicts. 38 During the departmental struggle, moreover, the most 
knowledgeable officials (in particular the legal advisers) were simply outdone, 
especially when the matter moved to higher places in the hierarchy where ill-informed 
statesmen reached ill-informed conclusions. It even seems appropriate to refer to 
Correlli Barnett's scornful assertion that British rulers at the time, whether Cabinet 
Ministers or Chiefs of Staff, were pathetically restrained by 'historical habit and world- 
power hallucination'. 39 
The deficiency of the final decision on baselines was immediately established. 
In fact, it will be seen that in late 1953, when Britain was involved in negotiations with 
Denmark over the use of that method around the Faroe Islands, the Foreign Office went 
so far as to reassure the Danes that the parliamentary declaration would have 'no effect 
whatsoever' on the talks ! 40 It will also be seen that the Icelanders made utmost use of 
the Hague precedent. In short, the British government was to find out that it was one 
thing to declare what Britain wished, quite another actually to enforce that will. 
37 Hansard, Lloyd statement, 14.12.1953, cols. 36-37. 
38 For the most famous exposition, see Allison, Essence. For a summary, see Vasques, Po-pver of Power 
Politics, 160. 
39 Barnett, Verdict, 90. 
40 RA-DEN: 55. DAN. 32/1, Reventlow to Copenhagen, 8.12.1953. He was told of the proposed 
declaration beforehand. Also section 2.5,99-103. 
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2.2. The Surrender of Foreign Policy to Hull and Grimsby. 'Re- 
representation'Y Realpolitik and the Beginnings of the Four-Mile 
Dispute with Iceland, 1952 
it is now time to move again from the more abstract arena of international law to the 
actual problems facing Britain in the North Atlantic. Whereas London needed nearly 
two years to declare its position on the judgement at The Hague, it could be said that the 
rulers in Reykjavik made up their mind in something like two hours. When news of the 
result on December 18,1951, reached Iceland later that same day, Foreign Minister 
Bjami Benediktsson immediately suggested to John Dee Greenway, the British 
Minister, that conversations be held 'to dispose of our differences'. 41 Talks took place: 
they proved useless. Iceland extended her limits and Britain protested. It was Norway 
all over again. But whereas that story had ended in failure at The Hague, this time the 
final battle would not be fought in a distinguished courtroom but rather in the docks on 
Humberside. The statesmen and officials in London decided to wash their hands of the 
affair, with a mixture of craftiness, miscalculations, exasperation and the experience of 
earlier defeat in their minds. 
The International Court's blessing of Norwegian baselines greatly gratified the 
Icelanders. After all, the 1951 ruling emphasised the geographical and socio-economic 
situation in North Norway which applied just as well to Iceland. 'I think we all realise 
how poor a legal case we have', S. J. Whitwell admitted in Northern Department, and 
42 the interdepartmental committee on territorial waters accepted this assessment . Was it 
all lost, then? The Fisheries Secretary, H. J. Johns, argued that Britain should not 
concede the legal argument too soon, but 'make every point we possibly can in our own 
favour even to the extent of a little exaggeration if necessary'. 43 In other words, since 
the legal ground was weak, a different battlefield should be sought. And Humberside 
was then an obvious choice, for the trawling industry's threat to prevent the Icelanders 
from landing fish there was well known. In Whitehall, the territorial waters committee 
was convinced that '[flrom the political and economic standpoints ... we do hold a few 
41 PRO: F0371/94658/NL1351/61, Greenway to FO, 19.12.1951. 
42 PRO: F0371/100628/NLI351/10, Whitwell minute, 21.1.1952, and F0371/100628/NLI351/4, 
interdepartmental meeting, 3.1.1952. 
43 PRO: NIAF209/1047, Johns to Whitwell, 21.1.1952 
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cards'. 44 Right after the ruling at The Hague, the forthcoming debate with the Icelanders 
had therefore been moved from the realm of international law to Realpolitik. This shift 
was obvious at the first round of talks, on January 25. Paul Mason, an Under-Secretary 
in the Foreign Office, led a team of British officials while the Icelandic delegation was 
grander, headed by 01afur Thors, still Fisheries Minister and chairman of the 
Conservative Party. Thors was accompanied by Hans G. Andersen, who remained the 
goverm-nent's chief adviser on the law of the sea, and the new Minister to Britain, Agnar 
KI. J6nsson. Aware of its apparent strengths and weaknesses, the British side did not 
focus on the alleged universality of the narrow three-mile rule, but instead it repeatedly 
alluded to the troublesome trawlermen in the fishing ports, or 'the tough guy waiting in 
the back room', as the bargaining tactic of threats by a third party has been described. 45 
The only concession that could be made was an ad hoc preservation line off the north 
coast of Iceland and across Faxa-Bay. 46 
Britain's offer was far from the baseline-drawn four-mile limit which the 
Icelanders were after, and they were not that impressed by the political and economic 
'cards' in front of them. For a number of connected reasons they calculated that Britain 
was either bluffing or that her call could be trumped. Akin to the five 'p's' behind 
British policy, the Icelandic determinants can be called the six 'c's': code of law, Cold 
War, cynicism, conservation, commitment, and compassion. First, the Icelanders 
remained convinced about their strong legal case. 47 Second, by refraining from lodging 
an official protest the year before, the United States had already indicated that for 
strategic reasons it would not put pressure on Iceland. Third, the constant reluctance to 
listen to Icelandic wishes in the preceding years had reduced British credibility. A 
cynical Hans G. Andersen felt that the other side only wanted to stall and ultimately 
reject all changes in Icelandic fishing liMitS. 48 Fourth, the Icelandic government would 
have been flatly condemned at home, had it not followed the precedent which was set 
by the ruling at The Hague. The commitment was supreme and action on fishing limits 
to stem the danger of overfishing was often compared to the declaration of 
independence in 1944.49 It was the 'second battle for sovereignty', as one Icelandic 
44 PRO: F0371/100628/NL1351/4, interdepartmental meeting, 3.1.1952. Also MAF209/1032, Aglen to 
Armstrong, 5.1.1952. 
45 See section 1.2,35. 
46 PRO: F0371/100628/NLI351/12, record of meeting in FO, 25.1.1952. Also Beckett minute, 29.1.1952, 
and Matthias Johannessen, 61afur Thors 11 (Reykjavik: Almenna b6kaf6lagid, 1981), 163-168. 
47 PRO: F0371/100628/NLI351/12, record of meeting, 25.1.1952. 
48 UD: 31.11/60/111, Heiberg to Oslo, 24.11.1952. 
49 Gunnar M. Magn6ss, Landhelgisb6kin (Reykjavik: Setberg, 1959), 58-62. For signs of overfishing after 
the Second World War, see Th6r, 'Extension', 38-39. 
71 
historian has put it, 50 and there could be no question of having foreigners reap the 
rewards of conservation measures. The Icelanders claimed that the fish belonged to the 
local population alone, just like Britain owned the coal in Wales and the Midlands. 51 
Fifth, the Icelanders simply did not believe that the British government would 
encourage or allow the trawling industry to use economic pressure against a Western 
ally. Compassion would override that temptation. 52 
Finally, on this particular occasion Thors, Andersen and J6nsson left London 
angry and offended, not only because what had been said but also because U'ho they had 
met, or had not met. 01afur Thors was a proud man, and a strong nationalist. 53 He came 
to Britain as three-time Prime Minister of a sovereign state which was a member of the 
United Nations and an ally in NATO. For Thors, it was an insult to himself and Iceland 
that no Minister met him and soon British officials began to hear how unhappy he was 
about his 'cold reception' in London where he had only seen 'junior officials'. 54 After 
this initial encounter, therefore, Iceland's determination was intensified, not tempered. 
Neither side backed down in London and a couple of diplomatic rendezvous in February 
were equally inconclusive. 55 On March 19,1952, the Icelandic government announced a 
regulation on the extension of fishing limits to four miles around the country, drawn 
from baselines between the outermost headlands and islands. It was to come into effect 
on May 15.56 Again, the Foreign Office estimated that Iceland's legal case was strong. 
Furthermore, not only foreigners were barred from trawling inside the new limit, but 
also Icelanders, and this strengthened the scientific rationale. However, British officials 
felt that the important baseline across Faxa-Bay was excessive, as it stretched for 78 
miles, much longer than the longest line off North Norway. In the south, moreover, it 
was not drawn from the mainland but a small rock well off the coast. 57 
50 Gunnar Karlsson, Iceland's I 100 Years. History of a Marginal Society (London: Hurst, 2000), 2. 
" Morgunbladid, 26.9.1952. 
52 See Johannessen, 61afur Thors 11,167. 
53 Valur Ingimundarson, i eldlinu kalda stridsins (Reykjavik: Vaka-Helgafell, 1996), 25-26. 
54 PRO: F0371/100628/NLI 351/19, Hohler minute, 16.2.1952, F0371/10063 I/NLI351/70, Etherington- 
Smith minute, 6.5.1952. Also unpublished autobiography of Agnar KI. J6nsson. In possession of his 
family, Reykjavik [henceforward J6nsson manuscript]. 
55 Thi-URN: 1996-B/63-2/15. D. 00 1.2, J6nsson to Reykjavik, 14.2.1952. PRO: 
F0371/100629/NLI351/30, Lloyd minute, 11.3.1952. 
56 Thorsteinsson, Utanrikisthj6nusta 1,411-412. 
57 PRO: F0371/100629/NLI351/31, Whitwell minute, 19.3.1952. F0371/100629/NLI351/34, Hohler 
minute, 26.3.1952. It was also argued that Iceland's historic title to a four-mile limit was nowhere as 
strong as in the Norwegian case. The Icelanders, however, could point to historic claims of limits up to 48 
miles. Andersen, Greinargerd, 49-52. Gunnlaugur Th6rdarson, Evibrot (Reykjavik: Setberg, 1990), 109- 
133. 
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Figure IV The four-mile baseline-measured fishing limit from 1952 Broad line across Faxa-Bay 
indicates a possible headland-to-headland baseline. 
The Icelanders themselves looked likely to acknowledge that the Faxa-Bay line 
was debatable. In January, Andersen had showed the American Char& d'Affaires in 
Reykjavik a map with possible closures of the bay, ranging from a moderate 
headland. to-headland line to the outermost headland-to-islet line which was ultimately 
used. 58 In February, three legal experts who the Icelanders consulted abroad warned 
that even if an extension of Iceland's fishing limits was both justified and 
understandable, in places the proposed baselines seemed 'daring'; a weighty word when 
used by jurists . 
59 And at the end of 1952, Olafur Thors said that the government had 
initially faced a choice between very wide demands which could then be modified and a 
just line which would not be negotiated. At this stage, he insisted that the latter course 
had been chosen. 60 Possibly, however, the Icelanders had in fact gone for the first 
flexible alternative but then decided to stick to it, because of Britain's rigid response 
and apparent indifference to their wishes. 
Hurt pride and indignation may not be rational. But they can still be strong 
motives. Unarguably, emotional intransigence in Reykjavik contributed to the impasse 
which was to last, as will be seen, until late 1956. Although the fishing grounds which 
58 NARA: RG59/740B. 022/1-115 1, Morris to Washington, 11.1.1952. 
59 SSi-DOP: undated report by P6tur Sigurdsson, hydrographer and later head of the Icelandic coast guard 
service. 
60 Johannessen, 61afur Thors 11,198. 
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fell inside the new limit by the use of the long baseline were important, a compromise 
on a more modest way to close the gulf could perhaps have been hammered out. 
According to Greenway, Foreign Minister Bjarni Benediktsson did indicate that he 
would like to make such a change but feared a hostile reaction from the public. 61 
Iceland's attitude thus strengthens the contention that it is of course not enough to focus 
on British attitudes to understand British policies. Obstinacy on one side furnished 
similar feelings on the other side and after a couple of years of stalemate, Harry Hohler, 
head of Northern Department, would grumble that the Icelanders had from the onset 
wanted 'unconditional surrender', a clear hallmark of 'bad diplomacy because of the 
bitterness which it leaves behind'. 62 
Even so, experienced negotiators must reckon with pride, ambitions and 
emotions on the other side of the table. British diplomats liked to think that they 
enjoyed a reputation for skilfulness, fairness and an 'adeptness through compromise'. 63 
In this case, the legal rights and sensitivities of a newly independent people-'the 
stubborn and uncompromising Icelander' as the Foreign Office had it-were especially 
recognisable. 64 Yet, they were not taken sufficiently into account. An alternative history 
may therefore be suggested: what would have happened if British decision-makers had 
admitted the new legal circumstances, withstood the temptation to allude to the tough 
trawlermen, and negotiated from weakness? What if, instead of having him linger in a 
London hotel, Eden or even Churchill had invited the eminent 01afur Thors to the 
House of Commons and recognised Iceland's reliance on the riches of the seas, but 
pleaded for moderation in disagreements between faithful friends? The Icelanders 
would have proved to be more amiable, diplomacy would have succeeded and British 
magnanimity prevailed, in the same spirit which made Britain accept defeat in the 
Norwegian dispute. In the words of Andrew Gilchrist, as Minister in Reykjavik near the 
end of a futile policy of coercion in late 1956, a 'humiliating defeat' was not to be 
dreaded, for 'surely the humiliation lies in the regrettable but total failure of our big 
65 
stick, not in the acknowledgement of failure in a gentlemanly way'. 
61 PRO: 170371/100630ýNLI351/59, Greenway to FO, 2.5.1952. 
62 PRO: F0371/111534/NLI351/155, Hohler minute, 15.11.1954. 
63 Donald Bishop, The Administration ofBritish Foreign Relations (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
1961), 269, and Webster, Art, 2,14. 
64 PRO: F0371/106089/NI054/1, draft memorandum, undated but received in registry 18.12.1953. in a 
lucid tale of the hidden lessons in a language, there is no proper word for 'diplomacy' in Icelandic and 
neither does the noun 'loser' exist. On the other hand, there are over thirty synonyms for 'battle' and 
roughly the same number of expressions to denote the act of conquering. And J6nsson and Hohler were 
also to have a quite fruitless argument on the precise meaning of the word 'discussion'! 
F0371/100637/NLI351/252, Hohler minute, 1.12.1952. 
65 PRO: F0371/122523/NLI 351/203, Gilchrist to FO, 2.10.1956. 
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A description of the 'big stick' comes later, but acumen on these lines was impossible at 
the start of the dispute in 1952 because of a number of characteristics in British 
decision-making. It is a truism in modem research on foreign policy, but domestic 
66 factors were clearly influential. The trawling industry condemned the proposed 
extension of Iceland's fishing limits and claimed that it would have disastrous effects. 67 
In this sense, the conflict will be better understood if it is measured against the larger 
issue of British pressure politics and European integration in the 1950s and early 1960s. 
The National Farmers' Union then proclaimed that 'what is good for agriculture is good 
for the nation'. It enjoyed an 'exceptionally close' relationship with the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries and had considerable influence on European policy in 
London. 68 The similarities with the British Trawler Federation during the conflict with 
Iceland are obvious. 
The deep-rooted preference for the supposedly pragmatic policies of reaction 
also contributed to the British misapprehension. The danger here was, as Frankel has 
pointed out, that 'the decision-maker yields initiative to others and accepts the timing 
and conditions chosen by them without being able to make adequate preparations'. 69 
During the dispute, members of the Foreign Office would admit that they were 
4constantly being overtaken by events'. 70 Likewise, the resistance to change was linked 
with wishful thinking, a prevalent trend in British foreign policy in the first decades 
after the Second World War. 71 In February 1952, for instance, as rumours reached 
London that the Icelandic regulations about extended limits would soon be issued in 
Reykjavik, the interdepartmental committee on territorial waters instructed John Dee 
72 Greenway to do what he could to have it 'held up altogether' . He might as well 
have 
been asked to tell the Icelanders to go back under Danish rule. 
The smallness and isolation of Iceland also exacerbated the dangers of 
misjudgement. In late 1953, when fresh hints were still appearing about Thors's 
resentment of having only met some minnows in London the year before, Hohler 
minuted that the complaints were 'really quite intolerable': 'While Iceland is a 
66 See also introduction, 2 1. 
67 Hull Daily Mail, 20.3.1952. 
68 Robert J. Lieber, British Politics and European Unity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 
48-53. Also N. Piers Ludlow, 'British agriculture and the Brussels negotiations', in George Wilkes (ed. ), 
Britain's failure to enter the European Communiry 1961-63. The enlargement negotiations and crises in 
European, Atlantic and Commonwealth relations (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 108-119. 
69 Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy. An Analysis of Decision Making (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1963), 196-197. 
70 PRO: F0371/106345/NLI352/41, Mason to Jarrett, 6.2.1953. 
71 Peter Mangold, Success and Failure in British Foreign Policy. Evaluating the Record, 1900-2000 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 9-10,38,45,85,105,120. 
72 PRO: F0371/99804/GWI/34, interdepartmental meetings, 12. and 14.2.1952. 
75 
sovereign state, it is sometimes useful to remember that the total population is less than 
that of Hendon'. 73 This tendency to push aside an apparently minor nuisance like a 
dispute over fish with a tiny nation made matters worse. Disagreements grew and were 
that much harder to solve once they had to be tackled. In a way, the Minister in 
Reykjavik manifested the neglect himself. Iceland was Greenway's last assignment 
during a peripheral career in the Diplomatic Service. A self-confessed 'eccentric', his 
love of fishing saw him frequent the country's plentiful rivers and the last thing he 
wanted was a disruption to that happy state of semi-retirement. 74 In Reykjavik, both the 
Icelanders and foreign diplomats could only wonder why Britain kept such an obviously 
'weak' man there. 75 Finally, the inattention to Iceland was partly caused by Britain's 
4overstretch' after the Second World War. 76 There simply were too many issues to 
consider. In January 1952, Anthony Eden did not refrain from seeing Olafur Thors 
because he did not want to meet him but because he had countless other issues to worry 
77 about. To sum up, in the eyes of the 'pragmatists' in London, an emerging dispute 
with a tiny island, mostly over fish and only with potentially damaging consequences, 
was not really a problem. 
Conceivably, the tranquillity could last for a while. In summer, when fish prices fell, the 
Icelanders did not sail with catches to Humberside so there was no immediate danger of 
a furious industry demanding or imposing a ban on such sales. And although the 
government was loath to admit it openly, the Fishery Protection vessel on station off 
Iceland was ordered not to use force or threats to resist an arrest of a trawler within the 
proposed four-mile limit. 78 At this stage, Britain had no desire to risk a shooting match 
with an Icelandic gunboat. On May 2, however, an official protest was lodged against 
the looming extension. Ten days later, the Icelandic government formally rejected that 
move, citing as before the clear right and need for action. 79 On May 15, the baseline- 
73 PRO: F0371/106351/NL1352/204, Hohler minute, 20.10.1953. 
74 John Dee Greenway, Fish, Fowl and Foreign Lands (London: Faber and Faber, 1950). Also Gilchrist, 
Cod Wars, 3, and Etherington-Smith to author, 20.10.2000. 
75 NARA: RG263, CIA Records. Murphy Collection on International Communism 1917-1958. Iceland, 
Box 126. '4201 Iceland 1948', Trimble Memorandum, 4.8.1948. UD: 31.11/60/111, Heiberg minute, 
22.11.1952. 
76 Vital, Making, 94-96. Mangold, Success, 123. 
77 A telling comparison is that Eden's autobiography contains nearly hundred pages about the period 
1951-54, without a single mention of Iceland. Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle. The Memoirs of Sir Anthony 
Eden (London: Cassell, 1960), 13-106. Thors's biographer, however, devotes fifty pages to the fishing 
dispute. Johannessen, 61afur Thors 11,157-207. 
78 PRO: ADM 1/28914, 'Fishery Protection Charge Document No. F, 8.5.1952. HM Ships would still 
inform the Icelandic authorities that the British government would protest such arrest and demand 
compensation. 
79 J6nsson, Friends, 60-61. 
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measured four-mile limit took effect. Another protest note on June 18 was not even 
answered by Iceland and already in July, the first British trawler was arrested for fishing 
inside the new line. The trawlermen were enraged. 80 
Fresh thinking was clearly needed in Whitehall. 'Re-representation' of problems is a 
known concept in political science. As Robert Billings and Charles Hermann contend, 
ýmost foreign policy problems continue over an extended period of time and ... policy- 
makers often find themselves returning again and again to the task of coping with an 
issue they have addressed before'. 81 The history of the Anglo-Icelandic 'four-mile 
dispute' is a good case study of such repeated revision. It could be argued that from the 
talks in January to the summer of 1952, British decision-makers moved from Stage One 
in the process of 'Problem Identification'-the gap between 'How things are' and 'How 
things should be'-to Stage Nine, a 'New Occasion for Decision'. 
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80 Robinson, Trawling, 228-229. 
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A mong Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure (Princeton: Princeton University 
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Already established courses for action would be revisited, but with the added 
knowledge that the Icelanders could not simply be talked into making a compromise. 
Solution through the International Court of Justice also stayed out of favour, for fear of 
the likely loss there. 82 Seemingly, the remaining alternatives were then rather simple: 
more pressure or mere surrender. In other words, London could either 'stick with it' and 
'turn the situation around', in line with the 'Escalation of Commitment' theory in the 
academic literature, or follow the 'Control' theory which expects 'corrective action in 
83 response to negative feedback' . 
Escalation could involve an appeal for support from other states, the application 
of naval force (as Britain had indeed threatened at the start of the Norwegian dispute 
four years earlier) or the ever-present possibility of economic sanctions. In the summer 
and autumn of 1952, all these options were discussed, and discounted. First, the United 
States again decided not to protest the new Icelandic fishing limit, even though the State 
Department emphasised that the reticence was 'completely at odds with known US 
policy'. 84 But American defence needs and the strength of the Icelandic left continued to 
aid the authorities in Reykjavik. Neither did the Canadians wish to side with Britain 
against Iceland, concerned as they were with their own interest in the use of baselines. 85 
Similarly, the Danes recognised that their Faroese subjects would gain from the 
application of that method. 86 The attitude in Oslo was more ambivalent. Fishermen from 
the herring ports in the south were hit by the extension and some Norwegian diplomats 
cynically whispered that hopefully the Icelanders could be made to retreat. Forinal 
objections were out of the question, however. 87 West-German trawlers would also lose 
some valuable grounds but as officials in Bonn readily admitted, they were not in a 
position to throw their weight around in the North Atlantic. 88 In the end, only France, 
Belgium and the Netherlands delivered notes of protest. They fished little off Iceland, 
however, and representations from these states would not move the Icelanders. 89 
82 PRO: F0371/100631/NL1351/74, Hohler minute, 9.5.1952. 
83 Charles F. Hermann, Robert S. Billings and Robert Litchfield, 'Escalation or modification: Responding 
to negative feedback in sequential decision-making', 
<http: //bush. tamu. edu/pubman/papers/1999/Hermann99. pdf>, accessed 21.3.2002. 
84 NARA: RG59/320.22/11-2853, Dulles to Reykjavik, 28.11.1953. Also RG59/740B. 022/5-252, State to 
Reykjavik, 19.6.1952. 
85 National Archives of Canada, Ottawa [henceforward NA-CAN]: RG25/8352/10600-E-40- 1.1, 
Secretary of State to London High Commissioner, 13.6.1952. 
86 RA-DEN: 55. ISLAND. 1/11, Brun minute, 6.5.1952. 
87 UD: 31.11/60/Ill, Colban minute, 27.5.1952. PRO: F0371/100632/NLI351/101, Oslo to FO, 3.6.1952. 
88 Federal Archives, Koblenz [henceforward BA]. BML: B 116/73 22 1, Meseck minute, 21.7.1952. 
B 116/13052, Meseck to Olafsson, 24.7.1952. 
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What about the Royal Navy? On May 15, when the new fishing limits took 
effect off Iceland, the National Joint Industrial Council, a committee with 
representatives from trawler owners, skippers and mates, recalled the flag-showing 
presence of British warships in the Barents Sea in the 1920s and urged the government 
to take such action now. 90 The idea was hardly discussed in London, and certainly not 
liked. T. S. Leach, Chief Inspector of Fisheries, could not but comment that the days of 
Nelson and Drake were past, and Iceland was of course a NATO ally. 91 The same 
deterrent appeared to aid the Icelanders in the economic field. On the whole, the 
trawling industry favoured a ban on all landings of fish from Icelandic trawlers to force 
a revision of the new limits, but as Harry Hohler wrote, such sanctions would be 
inexpedient in view of 'world opinion', Iceland's strategic importance, commitments on 
trade discrimination and the need for full supplies of fish in Britain. 92 From Reykjavik, 
Greenway also urged the government to declare that they 'most strongly disapprove of 
what is in effect blackmail by trawling interests'. 93 Then again, the continued, almost 
schizophrenic, combination of a liberal dislike towards economic sanctions and the 
shrewd acknowledgement of their possible potential was still present. The dichotomy 
was well embodied in Richard Faber, a junior member of the Foreign Office who found 
the industry's calls for a landing ban 'most unhelpful' but objected as well to 
Greenway's choice of words, saying that the 'blackmail' might just as well be called 
'legitimate retaliation'. 94 
The fluctuation fits well with Richard Little's overall conclusion about 'an inherent 
tension' in British foreign policy, or an underlying ambivalence 'which precipitates 
ambiguity'. 95 The Icelandic four-mile dispute was of course small in the larger scheme 
of things, at most a paragraph in the history of Britain's uneasy readjustment in the 
post-war world. Yet, it is a good demonstration of the greater dilemma: while 
reassertion of British power was fraught with dangers and disadvantages, the prospect 
of retreat was equally unappealing. The trawling industry would have been livid, had 
the government put great pressure on them to accept the new limit, and both Anthony 
90 PRO: MAF209/68, NJIC minutes, 15.5.1952. 
91 PRO: MAF209/1465, Leach to Williams, 11.7.1952. 
92 PRO: F0371/10063 I/NLI 351/74, Hohler minute, 9.5.1952. Also F0371/100632/NLI351/84, 
interdepartmental meeting note, 17.5.1952. 
93 PRO: F0371/100633/NLI 351/133, Greenway to FO, 22.8.1952. 
94 PRO: F0371/100633/NLI351/133, Faber minute, 25.8.1952. 
95 Richard Little, 'The Study of British Foreign Policy', in Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian White 
(eds), British Foreign Poli(ýv. Tradition, Change and Transforniation (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 
257-258. 
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Eden and Anthony Nutting, Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, worried that the 
public and Parliament would criticise the government for failing to defend, an important 
British interest'. 96 Furthermore, Britain would always have to consider what could be 
done to 'prevent the infection spreading to the Faroes and Greenland', as Faber 
minuted, a concern which was to grow in the following years. 97 And the Admiralty 
specifically underlined that an acceptance of Iceland's baselines or four-mile limit 
would create 'a most dangerous precedent'. 98 
In short, all these considerations prevented acquiescence. In early September 
1952, Harry Hohler sounded defiant, if annoyed. 'The plain truth of the matter', he 
insisted, 'is that the Icelanders have got themselves into a mess by rushing ahead with 
the introduction of their regulations ... It 
is up to them to find a way out'. 99 In Billings 
and Hermann's theoretical scheme, the 're-representation' of the Icelandic problem was 
therefore complete. Stage Ten had been reached, 'Follow-on Choice', with five 
possibilities: 
A) Continue present course. 
B) Maintain same basic course, but make adjustments. 
C) Change course, but not the problem representation. 
D) Re-represent the problem. 
100 E) Reconsider fundamental goals. 
As it happened, the British government adopted none of these options. Rather it took a 
course which could be called 'detachment' or maybe, with an eye to Hohler's 
exasperating conclusion, the 'Not-My-Problem' alternative. Still, it was not just borne 
out of frustration. It was also a weapon; a fulfilment of the warnings which had been 
given ever since 01afur Thors visited Britain in January 1952. Late that year, the 
fort-nation of British policy on Iceland was effectively moved from London to 
Humberside. Indirectly, Britain was going to use power because it was there. At the 
Foreign Office, Sir Pierson Dixon admitted that the new world of increased 
interdependence, both in strategic and diplomatic terms, constrained Britain's freedom 
of manoeuvre: 'This is part of the price we have to pay for our fidelity to the principles 
of international co-operation under the tN Charter and our partnership with Iceland in 
96 PRO: CAB129/56, C(52)357, Eden memorandum, 23.10.1952. F0371/100633/NLI351/118, FO 
minute, 18.6.1952. 
97 PRO: F03 71/10063 O/NL 13 51/66, Faber minute, 7.5.1952. 
98 PRO: F0371/100634/NLI351/177, Shawyer to Hohler, 24.10.1952. 
99 PRO: F0371/100633/NLI351/145, Hohler minute, 24.9.1952. 
100 Billings and Hermann, 'Problem Identification', 57. 
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the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation'. 101 But as Dixon continued, there were limits to 
liberalism and neighbourly friendship: 
On the other hand I do not think that we need be restrained by tenderness for 
Icelandic feelings from allowing the natural indignation of British trawling 
interests to vent itself through ordinary channels. Nor need the fact that Iceland 
is a member of NATO affect us overmuch. After all, in the spirit of NATO 
partnership, the Icelanders ought to have proceeded less brusquely, and 
consulted us more fully, about their regulations before they were introduced. 
Both Eden and Permanent Secretary Sir William Strang agreed, and as Assistant Legal 
Adviser Johnson concluded, '[s]o long as it does not get out of control, a little 
retaliatory action by our trawler owners may be about the best way of getting the 
Icelanders to see reason'. ' 02 H. A. Siepmann, who handled Icelandic affairs at the Bank 
of England, would write how 'disagreeable' it was to think that Britain's unwillingness 
'to take up the case, as they did with Norway, is due to Iceland's being so small and so 
very vulnerable'. 103 But it was true. The 'big stick' was held aloft-or as political 
scientists have described attempts by strong states to coerce smaller countries: 'Big fish 
104 eat little fish'. 
101 PRO: F0371/100633/NLI351/138, Dixon minute, 9.9.1952. 
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2.3. The Big Stick. The Pros and Cons of Economic Coercion, 
1952-53 
The premise behind retaliation against Iceland was simple. It has been seen that most 
trawler owners were unhappy about competition in the British fishing ports, and since 
they controlled all landing gear in Grimsby and Hull, the main market for the 
Icelanders, and also in Fleetwood and Aberdeen, these necessities could be withheld. 
And should Icelandic trawlers still manage to land their catches, the owners could 
boycott the fishmongers who bought fish from them. It was not 'gunboat diplomacy' 
but still an action of the coercive kind, crude and almost certainly illegal. 'Trawler 
diplomacy' it could perhaps be called, and the aim was clear: 'Quite obviously', said the 
banker Siepmann after a few months of pressure, 'we have got the Icelanders cold (and 
can have them stone dead before very long)'. 105 
On October 2,1952, when Iceland's trawlers should have been sailing with full holds to 
Britain after the summer lull, the owners in Grimsby and Hull declared that they would 
deny them all landing facilities until the government in Reykjavik had given a 
'satisfactory answer' to British objections over the new fishing limit. 106 This ban took 
immediate effect. For the next few weeks, there were sporadic talks at official level and 
between Icelandic and British owners, but they all proved fruitless. The main message 
from Humberside was that Iceland must discuss a revision of the four-mile limit, and 
the main message from London was that the Icelanders needed to seek an agreement 
with the industry, not Her Majesty's Government. 107 
The detached 'Not-My-Problem' approach was definitely not leading to a swift 
solution. And on balance it was of course more resignation than strategy. '[W]e must 
have a policy on this subject', Anthony Eden observed after the imposition of the 
landing ban. 'We have been too long without one'. 108 A few days later, an 
interdepartmental meeting was convened in Whitehall. John Dee Greenway was invited 
and for all his indolence in Reykjavik, he always reached the right conclusion that the 
Icelanders would not quickly succumb to economic pressure, even if it was obviously 
105 BEA: OV35/9, Siepmarm minute, 22.1.1953. 
106 PRO: MAF209/68, NJIC minutes, 2.10.1952. For an overview of the landing ban, see Sigurdsson, 
S6kn, 204-284, and J6n Th. Th6r, 'The Extension of Iceland's Fishing Limits in 1952 and the British 
Reaction', Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 17, No. 1,1992,25-43. 
107 Thi-URN: 1996-B/63-3 15. D. 001.4, J6nsson to Reykjavik, 29.10.1952. PRO: MAF209/748, 
Armstrong minute, 3.10.1952. F0371/100635NLI351/188, FO minute, 31.10.1952. 
F0371/100636/NLI351/214, Hohler minute, 18.11.1952. 
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hurting them. The *first prerequisite' for a solution, said Greci1xvay, was to have tile 
sanctions removed. lie probably underestimated the domestic rainifications in Britain 
and he may also have suffered from *Iocalitis', the tendency of some diplonlats to 
syrnpathise overmuch with the views of their host country. I OQ At anv rate, the dozen 
other officials present totally ignored his advice and decided that the way out lay in Z-- 
having the trawling industry tell the Icelanders what 4ininirnuill concessions' were 
needed before the removal of the ban. 110 It is in Eact tempting to view the October 
meeting in particular, and Whitehall discussions on Iceland in general, as a symptom of 
'groupthink'-the established concept in decision-making theory Which is used to 
describe a group's thinking 'when the members' strivings for unanimity override their 
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action'. H] Admittedly, 
Ministers and officials often argued about \vhat to do but they all agreed that tile new 
Icelandic regulations could not be accepted. The *group' that was Whitehall disregarded 
negative input and had no place for radical or nonconformist thinking. Dissidents t-- 
objected at their own risk and undeterred by the prevalent mood in London, Greenway 
thought about ways to evade the ban. Ile suggested that the Icelandic trawlers sail to tn 
Billingsgate. lie also wanted to go to Humberside and 'educate' the trawlernicii about 
the rightfulness of Iceland's case. 112 Harry 11ohler, who had complained about the 
Minister's inclIcctiveness during spring, was now lamenting his new *unnecessary 
enthusiasm'. 113 - I'lle hapless Grcenway was sidelined and could only resort to marking 
Foreign Officc telegrams about the British stand with such expressions as 'pooh! " 
ýwhy? ' and '!!! "' 4 
Meanwhile, the detached disposition continued to prevail in London, despite 
Eden's calls l'or a 'policy'. A briel'Cabinct discussion on October 28 mainly reaffirmed 
the desire that the 'fishing interests ol'both countries meet for discussions". I Is But that 
approach was anathema to the government in Iceland which naturally sought to move 
the struggle to the legal arena. 11 - jarin 
Benediktsson angrily told Greenway that the 
matter 'was not lor British trixN,, Icr owners to discuss. ... This Nvas a dispute about 
""' Martin Mayer, 7lic Diplomats (New York: Doubleday, 1983), 18. 
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international law'. 116 Aware of this attitude, the Cabinet had admittedly suggested as 
well that the dispute be discussed at the Overfishing Commission, the international 
committee on fishery conservation. 117 In early November, the Icelandic government 
stated its willingness to do so, while maintaining the present fishing limit. Anthony 
Nutting, who bore the brunt of talking with the Icelanders, confirmed that this pledge 
would satisfy the British authorities. On November 12, he informed the House of 
Commons that an agreement had been reached with Reykjavik, only to find out the day 
after that the trawler owners and the skippers would not back down., 18 Undeniably, 
ultimate decision-making in the conflict had moved to Humberside and, faced with 
deadlock, the Icelandic owners tried to test the ban. On November 19, after complex 
preparation by their agent, a trawler landed her catch in Grimsby. The Trawler Officer 
Guilds in Grimsby and Hull immediately went on strike, however, and declared that 
their members would not sail unless they received guarantees that no more Icelandic 
vessels would be allowed to sell their catches. The Fish Merchant Associations in the 
two ports, fearing loss of revenue and facing pressure from the trawler owners, 
concurred, as did their colleagues in Fleetwood and Aberdeen. The strike was promptly 
called off. ' 19 
The Icelanders were in for a harsh 
winter. They had miscalculated, 
placed too much trust in British 
tolerance and found it improbable 
that the stakes would be raised to 
this level. They were certainly 
shocked. When Benediktsson 
rejected the suggestions about 
negotiations between trawler 
owners over fishing limits, he also 
insisted that 'short of a declaration 
of war by Great Britain he could 
conceive no more unfriendly act 
IT 
71 -14 
Figure VL 'Grimbarians on guard for vessels from 
Iceland'. The BTF and the Grimsby Trawler Officer 
Guild on the lookoutfor Icelandic trawlers, holding the 
British 'Lion'on leash. 
116 Thi-URN: 1996-B/63-3 15. D. 001.4, Benediktsson memorandum, 6.11.1952. 
117 PRO: CAB 129/56, C(52)357, Eden memorandum, 23.10.1952. CAB 128/25, CC(52), 90 th meeting, 
28.10.1952. 
118 PRO: F03 71/10063 5/N L 13 51/2 10, Nutting to Eden, 13.11.195 2. 
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than that Her Majesty's Government should stand by while such a ban was imposed". 
While neither he nor other Icelandic spokesmen would show British officials any signs 
of weakness, Hans G. Andersen confessed to the Norwepan Minister in Reykja\ýik that 
the government was deeply pessimistic about the prospects. 121 After all, in the first nine 
months of 1952, over 80% of iced fish exports frorn Iceland went to Britain. 12, The 
econornic weapon seerned to be working, therefore. But was it perhaps too po%verlul? 
The landing ban's legality was at best dubious. The trawler owners were within their 
right when they rejected the use of their equipment. On the other hand, the block 
pressure from thern and the Trawler Officer Guilds, which forced the inercharits to 
refuse fish from the Icelanders, was out of bounds. In Grimsby. solicitors said so to the 
owners and advised thern to disguise the coercion by clanning that thcy \vere 
threatening to boycott the fishmongers 'on a personal basis'. 123 Yet, the distinction ", as 
hardly visible. Officials at the Board offrade and the Foreign Office concluded that the 
sanctions probably contravened Britain's treaty obligations and domestic laws oil 
'criminal conspiracy'. 124 
The strategic damage might also be severe, or so it could be claimed. In early 
December, Olal'ur Thors was again in London and now that the prospective dispute had 
turned into a crisis, he easily managed to ineet Anthony Eden. The Icelander's message 
was simple: 11' the landing ban continued, Communist claims about British perfidy 
would gain ground and Western co-operation could severely suffer. T-den was a bit 
shaken', Thors later said. 125 That, of' course. was the intention and a few days bel'ore, 
more regular Iccland-watchers in the Foreign 0171ice had wryly described rurnours about 
a Communist take-over in the country as a clumsy attempt to 'make our flesh creep'. ' 20 
Even so, there was just cause lor concern. While Eden realised that the landing ban 
would not lead to an outright ImIsch, the Western wisdom at the time was that 
Communists were patient and cunning. particularly benefiting from economic 
instability. Moreover, American unease could always be detected. Thors went ftorn 
London to Paris, delivered a fiery speech at the OEEC about the landing ban and then 
120 PRO: FO')71/100635/N1,135 1 /195, Greenway to FO, 6.11.1952. 
121 UD: 31.11/60/111, Rysst to Fore ign Mini stry, 24.11.1952. 
122 BEA: OV35/9, Sieprnann minute, 22.1.1953. On the darnage of the ban, see also Sturla Nisson, 'Edli 
vidskiptahafta og afleidingar theirra', in Einar Benediktsson (ed. ), tý)pli4ýl'Ei, i-(jl)itsaiiil'illi7iI iSlandS 
(Reykjavik: Althj6dajnýlastofinun Islands, 1994), 151-154. 
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raised the matter at a ministerial meeting in the North Atlantic Council. The agitation 
did not bring immediate results but General Alfred Gruenther, Supreme Commander of 
NATO forces in Europe, still told Eden at a dinner party that he 'must do something 
about this'. 127 
Another facet of the national interest also appeared. The Icelanders hinted at 
retaliation by banning British imports. Although they were relatively insignificant, a 
number of finris could be hit. 128 A noteworthy example was Burton's Gold Medal 
Biscuits in Blackpool. Its managers, anxious about possible repercussions from the 
landing ban, persuaded their constituency MP to seek assurances in the Foreign Office 
that 'their interests as exporters of biscuits to Iceland are not being disregarded'. 129 
Auxiliary commerce in the fishing ports could also suffer, as the Icelandic trawlermen 
bought repair supplies and luxury goods to import or smuggle back home-and taxi 
drivers, restaurateurs and publicans would miss good customers. 130 
Furthermore, catches off Iceland in July, August and September 1952 were 
actually higher than in the corresponding period the previous year. The devastation, 
which the industry had gloomily forecast, had clearly not come about and the good 
catches had 'wrecked' the industry's case, it was murmured in the Foreign Office. 131 
The economic motives behind the sanctions were exposed and Kenneth Younger, the 
Labour MP for Grimsby and no friend of the Conservative-voting owners, felt that they 
were, 'as usual ... playing their own game to the exclusion of every other interest'. 
132 
This had to be an objectionable aspect of the 'detachment' approach. The trawling 
industry was partly fighting for a goal which actually harmed the government's aims, 
and the consumers of cod, haddock and halibut came to have a say in the definition of 
Britain's 'national interest'. In Parliament, Bessie Braddock, Younger's colleague on 
the opposition benches, demanded immediate action so the 'housewives of this country 
may obtain the fish'. Barbara Castle spoke in similar vein and calls were even made 
about requisitioning trawlers or sending troops to the docks. 133 The Ministry of Food, 
primarily interested in adequate food supplies, did observe that the authorities could 
127 Johannessen, 61afur Thors 11,198. Also NARA: RG59/740B. 022/10-2152, Lawson to Washington, 
21.10.1952, and Ketill Sigurj6nsson, 'Skjblin i F16rens', in Einar Benediktsson (ed. ), Upphaf 
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step in and buy Icelandic catches. They also had the power, in dire circumstances, 'to 
direct persons to specified services or to remain in specified C111ployInent,. 134 ,, hLIS, tile 
fear of *fish fai-nine', as the Dui1j, Hel-ald cried at one stage, worked apainst the 
industry. 135 And if that was not worrying enough, the ban still Just did not look likely to 
produce the desired result. In London in December, Thors reassured both Iden and 
Whitehall officials that the Icelanders would never yield to pressure. t'Or they were 
completely united and possessed both the law and *moral right' on their side. 30 
What could be done, then? The disadvantages of 'detachincrit'-strategic, economic, 
moral, legal and effectual-were increasingly visible. Yet another re-representation of' 
the problem would have to take place and at the end of 1952, a new policy began to be 
emerge. On December 18, the Cabinet was served with the most important lacts oil the 
latest developments, as seen from the Foreign Office, and invited to make a decision. ' 37 
It took a series of mcctings up to the spring of next year to reach a conclusion. '-' 
Mostly, the sarne ground was repeatedly covered and, unsurprisingly, the debate was 
convoluted. options divided and the final outcome ambivalent, in tile finest tradition of 
British indecision-makiiig oil territorial waters after the Second World War. 
While Ministcrs acknowledged all the detriments of the landing ban, they were 
still impressed with its ostensible benefits. For one thing, it would deter tile Faroe 
Islanders and others froin tbilowing Iceland's example. 139 Government pressure to lift 
the ban would also have been sharply condemned on Humberside and direct 
intervention, as Braddock and Castle had mentioned in Parliament, was onlv 
conceivable it' a 'national emergency' of some kind was imminent. 140 Besides, the 
declared inability to remove the sanctions was part of the government's approach. just 
like the Icelanders used the strength ofthe 'Communists' to explain their own lack of 
manoeuvre. But the Cabinet was not ready to escalate the conflict either and Thornas 
Dugdale, Minister ol'Agriculture and Fisheris, deerned 'unthinkable' the employment of 
1 334 PRO: MAI-'-)09/749, undated minute, from late November 1952. Also undated Ministrý, of Food 
minute from sarne period. 
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the Royal Navy in the disputed waters. 141 A referral of the whole dispute to the 
International Court was also dismissed because Britain would almost certainly lose on 
both the four-mile extension and the use of baselines. 142 Yet Ministers could not 
consciously pretend that a simple prolongation of the dispute would make all well and 
good. 143 After much deliberation in the Foreign Office, a solution of sorts was 
discovered: a referral to The Hague of only the dubious Faxa-Bay delimitation. 144 On 
January 14,1953, the Cabinet accepted this compromise, 145 and in mid-February the 
Icelanders did so as well, but on condition that the ban be lifted when agreement had 
been reached on the exact terms of the submission. In the meantime, the new limit 
would apply unchanged, as had been the case in the Norwegian dispute. 146 
The trawlermen, however, would only revoke the ban if the Icelanders were 
prepared to modify the four-mile limit. This Catch-22 proved insoluble and the 
summary by E. A. Hitchman, the Permanent Secretary at MAF, was frank but fair: 
'Ministers will therefore have to admit that a reference to an International Tribunal 
which they themselves regard as desirable and proper is being frustrated by a 
combination of private vested interests in this country'. 147 Although Eden joined 
Dugdale at a heated meeting with owners, trawler officers and merchants on March 25, 
the determination was unchanged. The ban was their 'trump card', said one of the 
skipper representatives, and it should not be wasted on a mere modification of the Faxa- 
Bay line alone. 148 In a way, the trawlermen were also saying that the stalemate was not 
their problem. '[T]his was a matter that could only be settled at government level', said 
a general meeting of the Grimsby trawler engineers in April. 149 And that was that, apart 
from another half-hearted decision to involve the Overfishing Commission which was 
bound to fail. 150 In effect, Britain's stand was decided on Humberside and when 
Parliament discussed the state of the dispute again in mid-May 1953, the Labour MP 
George Brown revelled in the government's dilemma: 
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Is it not absolutely intolerable that since the government proposed reference to 
the International Court, and since the Icelandic government were prepared to 
accept the proposal if the status quo were restored, Her Majesty's Government 
have merely said that since the trawler owners will not accept it, we can do no 
more? 151 
The criticism was justified. To all intents and purposes, the British government had 
capitulated before this fine kettle of fish. A few days earlier, on May 11, Selwyn Lloyd 
told the Cabinet that a 'complete impasse' had been reached, producing the conclusion 
that 'no further initiative' would be taken. 152 
This proved an easy course to observe. The decision-makers in London did not 
welcome the state of the dispute but neither did they feel that they should back down for 
the sake of a solution. Although the 'Not-My-Problem' approach had been 
unsuccessful, it was not replaced by an active strategy. The decision to do nothing now 
was mainly a wistful rejection of realities which could perhaps be called the 'Make-It- 
Go-Away' approach. Essentially, the difference between that line and the preceding 
'Not-My-Problem' view was very superficial because the determinants of British 
policy, which had been evident at the beginnings of the dispute in January 1952, were 
more or less intact. 
To begin with, the importance of domestic politics in the formation of foreign 
policy had been reinforced. The last word was always on Humberside, not in London. 
Likewise, wishful thinking continued and it is indeed astonishing to note that not once 
in the voluminous governi-nent files on the dispute in 1952 and early 1953 does a high- 
placed official or Minister suggest that Britain should accept the new limits off Iceland 
with good grace and order the industry in no uncertain terms to call off a disputable 
boycott. Only Greenway demurred and in January 1953 he was replaced. His successor, 
James Thyne Henderson, had clearly been briefed about the need to stand up to the 
Icelanders. In his first interview with Foreign Minister Benediktsson, he denied that a 
landing 'ban' was in force in Britain. The merchants had simply decided not to buy fish 
which was caught by Icelanders and their taste would only change if the rulers in 
Reykjavik were reasonable. 153 This was a 'a stiff character', they concluded and 
151 Hansard, Vol. 515, cols. 2079-2080,20.5.1953. 
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Henderson's lecture was well received in London. 154 The messenger was bringing the 
'right' news. Yet, the new, enthusiastic Minister quickly came to deplore that the 
authorities in London were so inactive in the dispute, expressing the hope that if 'we 
could be a jump ahead of events for once instead of several jumps behind, we might 
wheedle [the Icelanders] into a right direction'. 155 
The main difference between British decision-making, pre-ban and post-ban, 
probably lay in the increased attention to the dispute. Then again, it could be argued that 
ignorance still prevailed but that it was just exercised at higher levels. The Icelanders 
succeeded in seeing Anthony Eden but found him quite unfamiliar with some basic facts 
of the conflict, 156 and during the Cabinet debates, Churchill demonstrated his 
conservative thinking by discounting the strategic dangers of sanctions. He more or less 
declared that for the British people, who had for centuries relied on the outside world 
for their maintenance, unrestrained access to distant fishing grounds mattered more than 
Iceland's presence in the Atlantic Alliance. 157 Engagement at the highest levels did not 
do much good, therefore. Furthermore, despite all the negative aspects of the coercion 
on Humberside, no crisis occurred. Between the two evils of ban or no ban, the former 
was more tolerable because it was the existing state of affairs and as observers of 
foreign policy have remarked, 'the reappraisal of general principles occurs only in the 
face of great pressure'. 158 
And surely even the 'stubborn and uncompromising' Icelanders might soon give 
in? Commitment is valuable, yet it does not suffice if the obstacles are insurmountable. 
At the start of 1953, officials in Reykjavik claimed that 'the ban causes us considerable 
159 difficulties but these are not catastrophical' . Instead of 
fish being iced for Britain, the 
catches were frozen, dried or salted, and new outlets were sought (by a stroke of luck, a 
gap had opened in the Italian stockfish market). 160 In the long run, however, the 
Icelandic claims about alternative markets were, in the words of Siepmann at the Bank 
of England, 'for the most part bluff-or merely whistling to keep their courage up'. 161 
In the spring of 1953, the trawling industry, the real hub of British power, was equally 
154 Foss interview, 5.9.2002. PRO: MAF209/750, Dugdale minute, 20.2.1953. 
F0371/106346/NLI352/63, Mason, Hohler, Strang and Nutting minutes, 2. -3.3.1953. 
155 PRO: F0371/106350/NLI352/159, Henderson to FO, 27.6.1953. 
156 Thi-URN: 1996-B/63-3 15. D. 00 1.3, J6nsson to Reykjavik, 11.10.1952. 
157 PRO: PREMI 1/1328, JR. C. minute, 16.12.1952. MAF209/750, Wall Minute, 17.12.1952. 
158 Michael Brenner, quoted in JeffTey Pickering, Britain's Withdrawalftom East ofSuez. The Politics of 
Entrenchment (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), 3 8. 
159 SSi-IBRD: Eiriksson to Stevenson, 3.1.1953. 
160 J6nsson, Friends, 62. 
16 1 BEA: OV35/9, Siepmarm minute, 22.1.1953 
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convinced that the coercion would work in the end. 162 And it is true that the Icclaiiders 
would have been subdued-if they had stood alone. But the trawlernien were no match 
for the outsiders who now rushed to Iceland's rescue: the Tockney inillioriairc", the 
Kremlin and 'Uncle Sam'. 
162 PRO: MAF209/750. Wall minute, 12.33.195 3. 
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2.4. Any Port in a Storm. The Failure of Economic Coercion, 
1953-54 
During attempts at prolonged coercion, the side under pressure must rely mostly on two 
factors: lasting commitment and credible alternatives. 163 They often complement each 
other. The determination to withstand the pressure may be so strong that otherwise 
objectionable ways out are accepted; any port in a storm as the saying goes. And the 
relief which comes with the detection of escape routes increases the commitment. By 
the summer of 1953, after almost a year of the landing ban, the Icelanders remained as 
firm as ever. At this stage, however, no false courage was involved. The reliance on the 
British market was rapidly vanishing, thanks to Iceland's sundry saviours. 
The first one came out of the blue. For a while, the infamous 'cockney millionaire' 
George Dawson came to play a prominent role in Anglo-Icelandic relations. Having 
begun his business life as a scrap merchant, he was jailed for fraud in the late 193 Os but 
amassed a great fortune after the war by suspicious trading in surplus army goods. 164 In 
early 1953, Dawson, detecting a way to make a healthy profit, sensationally offered to 
buy Icelandic catches and get the fish to the needy 'housewife', either through 
established merchants or on his own. In Reykjavik, the authorities liked the idea of 
outwitting the owners and the trawlermen. Still, they were wary of Dawson's reputation. 
The Icelandic trawler owners were therefore allowed to decide themselves if they 
wanted to strike a partnership with him. On May 10, after lengthy negotiations, an 
agreement was signed. During the traditional summer break, Dawson bought processing 
facilities in Grimsby and prepared for landings by autumn. 165 
This initiative got a mixed response in London. While it is true, for instance, that 
Thomas Dugdale had earlier tried to persuade the industry to lift the ban, he now 
revealed how half-hearted those efforts had been, mentioning the real 'danger' that the 
embargo might be circumvented. 166 On Humberside, the first landings for Dawson were 
repeatedly postponed because of disagreements between him and the Icelandic trawler 
owners about financial guarantees. 167 Finally, on October 14, the trawler Ing6ýfur 
163 David Vital, The Inequality ofStates. A Study of the Small Power in International Relations (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1967), 99. 
164 Dail 
'v 
Mail, 9.3.1953. PRO: F0371/106347/NLI352/93, Hohler minute, 20.3.1953. J82/108/3, 
Dawson defence at Old Bailey trial, 10.3.1959. 
165 Thi-URN: 1996-B/63-3/15. D. 00 1.5, BenedMsson memorandum, 17.3.1953. Sigurdsson, S6k? 7,224- 
240. 
166 PRO: F0371/106347/NLI352/84, FO minute, 13.3.1953. 
167 Sigurdsson, S6kn, 240-245. 
92 
Arnarson brought her catch to Grimsby, under police guard on the docks. 168 Six other 
landings took place before the end of the year but by then the flaws iii Dawson's plail 
had caught up with him. He was unhappy about the terms with tile Icelanders. The 
owners blacklisted merchants who bought fish through him, '()) and it turned out that lie 
could neither process nor distribute the catches effectively himself. The Icelanders 
ceased to sail when he defaulted on payments. Bitter lawsuits ensued but (icor, (-, e Z- 
Dawson disappeared from the main stage, after less than a year in this fishy business. ' 70 
His downfall was of course welcomed on Humberside, while the detached observers in 
Whitehall did not really care. Given the choice, the Foreign Oft-ice would havc liked the 
effort to succeed whereas Fisheries Secretary Wall estimated that the British position 
had been strengthened by Dawson's failure. But the net result was that tile Situation 
remained unchanged. 17 1 For Iceland, however, that outcome spelt no disaster. As one 
way out had been shut, others had appeared. 
In 1946, the 'Innovation regime', having embarked on the great expansion of freezing 
plants all over Iceland, needed new markets for frozen fish. The British did not need to 
increase their purchases and the Americans were hesitant. Instead, the Soviet I Inion 
stepped in and reached a favourable agreement with the Icelanders. Political 
considerations obviously influericed Soviet thinking. Pro-Moscow Socialists were in 
power in Reykjavik and Iceland was still unaligned. By 1948, however. the Icelandic 
comrades were in opposition and Marshall-money was about to transform the cconon-ly. 
Soviet- Icelandic commerce vanished again. 172 
Much had changed again five years later. Overall, the Soviet Union seerned 
willing to increase economic ties with the West, especially after Stalin's death in March 
1953. The following month, Soviet officials attended a meeting of the Econornic 
Commission for F, urope, a United Nations organisation which had been arranged to 
promote trade between Fast and West. Cold war suspicions ruled out a sionificant 
change in international commerce but the Soviets proved very interested in talks about 
resumed links with Iceland, even if 'capitalistic monopolies' predominated in the 
168 PRO: MAF209/1243, District Inspector report, 15.10.1953. 
169 GFVOA: Council meeting, 15.10.1953. 
Sigurdsson, S(4n, 246-253. Duiýv ExIn-ess, 11.12.1953. 
BA-BML: B 116/13306, Schlan-e-Sch6ningen to Bonn, 29.10.1953. PRO: Zý - 
FO'171/106353/NL]352/296, Statham minute, 15.12.1953. MAF209/1475, Wall minute. 16.12.1953. 
172 Thorsteinsson, Ulanrikisil? i6mista 1,463-473. 
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economy. 173 Further negotiations took place in the summer and in August, an extensive 
barter agreement was signed in Moscow. The Icelanders traded frozen fish and herring 
for oil, primarily, but also various industrial and agricultural products. 174 For Iceland, 
the blessing of the deal was obvious. Even if it remained desirable to sail with iced fish 
to Humberside, the reliance on the British market was greatly diminished. 
The new dimension to the conflict could not but cause concern in London, if 
only because the treaty hurt economically. Shell and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
had enjoyed a share of the petroleum market in Iceland and in the summer of 1953, 
representatives from these fin-ns alerted officials from the Ministry of Fuel of Power 
about the Icelandic talks in Moscow. The conclusion was quickly reached that the 
landing ban was to blame for this unfortunate development. 175 Iceland's oil 
consumption was of course insignificant but all losses hurt in the long run and Harry 
Hohler warned Wall at the Fisheries Department that the action in the fishing ports was 
beginning to 'damage seriously other British interests'. 176 And the threat now was about 
more than Burton's Biscuits in Blackpool. 
Weightier, still, were the strategic ramifications. Although the trade pact with 
Iceland made some economic sense in Moscow (spiced herring became extremely 
popular, for instance), political considerations were paramount, just like they had been 
in the first years after the war. The Soviet leadership aimed to increase support for the 
Icelandic Socialists and drive a wedge between Iceland and the Atlantic Alliance. 177 The 
'peaceful Soviets', as Henderson told Hohler in November, had rescued the Icelanders 
from British coercion and accumulated a large share of Iceland's foreign trade. 178 The 
analysis was 'depressingly plausible', it was noted in the Foreign Office. 179 At the same 
time in Reykjavik, the envoy Igor Sysoev reported to Moscow that the trade agreement 
'should increase both the popularity of the Soviet Union and negative feelings over the 
173 Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Archive [henceforward AVPRF]: 96/10/73-90, Sysoev to 
Moscow, 23.3.1953. Thorsteinsson, Utanrikisthj6nusta 1,486-490. SSi-DbP: Asgeirsson memoranda, 
8.4.1953 and 14.5.1953. 
174 Thorsteinsson, Utanrikisthj6nusta 1,490-491. 
175 PRO: F0371/106341/NLI 1338/1, Gummer to Statham, 26.6.1953. F0371/106341/NLI 1338/3, FO 
note, 10.7.1953. 
176 PRO: NIAF209/1476, Hohler to Wall, 15.8.1953. 
177 J6n blafsson, Kxrufilagar (Reykjavik: Md1 og merming, 1999), 165-166,169,172. Olafsson 
researched Soviet documents in Moscow and his conclusions are undoubtedly sounder than those of 
Icelandic officials who were involved in the Soviet negotiations. They have downplayed the political 
aspect and argued that business reasons mattered most in Moscow. See Thorsteinsson, Utanrikisthj6nusta 
1,490, and blafsson, Saga, 87. Also GAstaf Adolf Skfilason, 'Vidskipti Islands og Sovdtrfkjanna. P61itiskt 
ferli? ' (BA thesis, University of Iceland, 1992), 26-28. 
178 PRO: F0371/106341/NLI 1338/8, Henderson to Hohler, 27.11.1953. 
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American occupation'. 180 The following summer, Soviet goods were visible everywhere 
on the island, as foreign j ournalists chillingly reported from the 'Cold War front': 
Iceland, vital link in the NATO chain of defence, with the largest United States 
air base in the North Atlantic, ... 
has entered into closer economic relations with 
Russia than any country this side of the Iron Curtain. In Reykjavik I saw more 
Hammers and Sickles than Stars and Stripes, more Russian diplomats than 
British. 181 
The mood of the time must be kept in mind: the anxiety, uncertainty and fear over 
Soviet intentions. In the minds of strategists in Washington, military facilities in Iceland 
remained vital and the reappearance of American troops in 1951 had demonstrated that 
the authorities in Reykjavik agreed on the need to take part in Western defences. The 
base in Keflavik also provided much wanted currency and employment. Yet the 
Icelandic public never liked the foreign presence and by late 1953, American officials 
expressed considerable worries about the steadily deteriorating attitude towards the 
United States and NATO. 182 And that is where the third 'saviour' of Iceland stepped in. 
The Soviet agreement was not least important, as an Icelandic fisheries official later put 
it, 'to tease the Americans'. ' 83 
I he Red Flags are fl5dng- near a vita 
NA TO base 
Moscow woos 
ICELANDERS 
And droPs hint aboUt HISTORY OF nW 
US airfield DISPUTE In 3larell. 1952, Iceland dropped the three-nAlc boundary of terri. 
torial waters and a4epted a four. 
lie Uralt frout wint, tAl point, Effect of fish ban by " in May of tile ý. me year tile ISHUS11 Alreign Office PrOtegtefi, pointing out Malt the regulatlon4 
%vould excluil,. Britilh fishIng HuR and Grimsby %e"els from large arms where they had been accu&tonjed to fLsh f, r more than haM a centUrv. From our special correspondent, HAROLD CHAMPION, Iceland refused to recoWsider 
just b4ck from Icet4nd t" e new regUIRtiOns, and in June 
Britlit- In . ne- V-t, -. -A 
Figure VII. A chilling reporiftom the Cold Warfront, 1954. 
180 AVPRF: 96/10/29, Sysoev to Moscow, 16.12.1953. 
18 1 Harold Champion, 'Moscow woos Icelanders', Yorkshire Post, 23.7.1954. Also T. F. Thompson, 
'Iceland is part of the Cold War front now', Daily Mail, 27.8.1954. 
182 NARA: RG59, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs, Political-Military 
Numeric Files, 1953-62, Box 1, Merchant to Raynor, 25.11.1953. Also Ingimundarson, Struggle, 32-45. 
183 Elisson interview, 8.7.2002. 
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In Washington, the prevailing view on Iceland and fish was simple: the Icelanders 
would have to be accommodated, not alienated. The mollification had been obvious in 
1950 and 1952 when the United States stayed silent on the extensions of Iceland's 
fishing limit. Similarly, ever since the end of the war the New England fishing industry 
had been calling for restrictions or increased duty on imported fish, including all 
products from Iceland. Within the administration, the Treasury agreed but the State 
Department pointed out that such action would have a devastating effect on Icelandic 
efforts to increase sales to the United States. 184 The Department of the Navy concurred, 
using the persuasive argument at the height of the cold war that an import duty would 
undoubtedly increase the economic dependence of Iceland on Soviet-Satellite trade to 
the further detriment of the United States position in Iceland'. 185 Predictably, strategic 
considerations counted for more than local interests. The Icelanders continued to enjoy 
generous access to the American market and by the mid 1950s the fishermen of New 
England had grown so displeased that President Eisenhower confessed how he 
'wouldn't dare show himself in Gloucester. 186 
The Icelanders continued to receive favourable loans from the United States and 
international organisations like the International Bank and the IBRD, for instance 
towards the construction of power plants. 187 They also wanted to build a cement factory, 
too big to make economic sense and completely state-owned, which went against 
Western wishes. The authorities in Reykjavik let it be known, however, that Moscow 
was willing to provide all the necessary credit. Behind the scenes, Socialist leaders in 
Iceland had indeed outlined ambitious plans about Soviet support for industrialisation in 
the country. 188 So, a cement loan also came from Washington. The business flaws were 
acknowledged but '[p]olitical aspects were ... considered paramount'. 
189 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the American administration disliked the landing ban 
in Britain. In June 1954, Hans G. Andersen had stated, in private of course, that if the 
Icelanders for some reason desperately needed the market in Britain again, they would 
either expect pressure from the OEEC and NATO to lift the ban or the public might 
184 See Fridrik PAIsson, 'Hugleiding um dtflutning islendinga d sjdvarafurdurn d 20. old', in 
Afniculiskvedja til Hcisk6la islands (Akureyri: H61ar, 2003), 199-200. 
185 Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC [henceforward NHC]: Politico-Military Division, Box 209. 
Series XXVIII. Iceland. Economic, Thomas to Wilson, 18.5.1955. 
186 Gloucester being one of the biggest fishing ports in Massachusetts. DDE: Ann Whitman File, NSC 
Series, Box 8,323 d meeting, 16.5.1957. 
187 See Ingimundarson, Struggle, 38-45. 
188 AVPRF: 96/10/9, Pushkin memorandum, 15.10.1953. 
189 SSi-IBRD: Paterson memoranda, 11.12.1954 and 21.6.1955. 
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demand a withdrawal from these organisations. 190 The threat was not tangible but in 
Washington a risk of this kind could hardly be accepted. The following month, a report 
for the National Security Council warned that the Icelandic economy depended 
increasingly on the Soviet Union and the landing ban was causing many Icelanders to 
question the value of Western co-operation. 191 On 22 July, when the Council discussed 
the problem, President Eisenhower, having already repelled the calls for tariffs on fish 
from Iceland, asked why the United States did not 'buy up the entire export of Icelandic 
fish and give it to some country ... which needed proteins? ' 
192 This breathtaking idea 
was never seriously considered, mostly because of the precedent it could set, but the 
United States did persuade the Spanish and Italian authorities to increase fish purchases 
from Iceland. 193 More importantly, however, Britain was repeatedly asked to have the 
ban removed. American officials did admit that the good principle of narrow territorial 
waters needed to be defended, but the present orientation of the Icelandic economy was 
regretful and 'every effort should be made to change that situation'. 194 
Thus, by 1954 the correlation of power in the dispute had drastically changed. Having 
wrestled themselves out of the trawlerinen's stranglehold, with help from the world's 
superpowers, the authorities in Reykjavik no longer worried overmuch about the ban. 195 
Although it may appear inappropriate to use theories on war to understand the 
development of a milder conflict, they do fit the facts. 'In wars', Richard Ned Lebow 
has argued, 'states gain new information about the "true" power and resolve both of 
themselves and their adversaries, and their expected utility of war changes in response'. 
A state that learns that it is stronger 'makes an upward revision in its war aims'. 196 
Iceland's increased strength certainly made the rulers in Reykjavik less inclined to 
190 NARA: RG59/740B. 022/6-454, Reykjavik to Washington, 4.6.1954. For discussions on the landing 
ban within the OEEC in 1953-54, see Siguij6nsson, 'Skj6lin', 78-80. 
191 DDE, White House Office, OSANSA, Records, 1952-61, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 
12, 'NSC 5426 - Policy Toward Iceland' 12.7.1954. 192 DDE: Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 5,207'h meeting, 22.7.1954. 
193 FRUS 1952-1954 IV, 1543, 'Progress Report NSC 5426', 7.12.1954. 
194 NARA: RG59/740B. 022/10-2354, Aide-Memoire, 18.11.1954. Also PRO: 
F0371/11153 I/NL 1351/67, Matthews minute, 20.8.1954. F0371/111533/NLI351/120, Beeley to Hohler, 
29.10.1954. 
195 Apart from the sales of fish products to the Soviet Union and the United States, the Icelanders found 
new markets in West Africa and Latin America, and almost doubled their sale of salted fish to the 
Mediterranean. Olafsson, Saga, 83-86. J6nsson, Friends, 62-63. 
196 Richard Ned Lebow, 'The Beginning and End of War' (review article), The International Historl, 
Review, Vol. 23, No. 2,2001,371. 
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succumb to economic coercion, and as another theory has it, 'the threat of sanctions 
without accompanying incentives is an incomplete diplomatic strategy'. 197 
Meanwhile, the Soviets were playing on fissures in NATO and the United States 
wanted Britain to give in. Still, the reproaches from Washington were fairly modest and 
the problem was, like the American Char& d'Affaires pointed out in Reykjavik, that the 
British side felt no 'real stimulus' to reach an agreement. 198 No crisis had occurred; 
Britain could continue to 'muddle through'. Furthermore, the wearied officials in 
Whitehall could only face so much fish at one time. In the mid- I 950s, they had to focus 
for a while on the Faroe Islands and the Soviet Union, two opponents who-for entirely 
contrasting reasons-proved much easier to handle than the 'stubborn and 
uncompromising' Icelanders. In that sense, the change must have been welcome and 
inevitably the hope rose as well that the good example of friendly negotiations would be 
noticed in Iceland. For if a tolerable compromise could be reached with the Faroese, 
then maybe the Icelanders could be brought in line? 
197 Michael Graham Fry, 'Decline, Sanctions, and the Suez Crisis, 1956-1957', Diplomatic History 
(feature review), Vol. 17, No. 2,1993,328. 
198 NARA: RG59/740B. 022/9-854, Dillon to Washington, 8.9.1954. 
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2.5. A False Analogy. Diversion off Danish Dependencies, 1952- 
55 
On March 19,1952, the same day when Iceland announced her new regulations on a 
base-line measured four-mile fishing limit, the local assembly in the Danish-ruled Faroe 
Islands, the Lagting, unanimously declared the wish that a similar rule be established 
there-199 In May, officials in Copenhagen indicated that they would like to extend limits 
off Greenland, another Danish dependency. 200 This was bad news for the trawlermen 
and Britain's protection of the narrow three-mile rule. All over the North Atlantic, the 
seas seemed to be closing in. 
The Faroe Islands, a cluster of tiny islands some 200 miles north of Scotland, were 
inhabited by around 33,000 souls who relied on fish and fish products for 95-99% of 
their exports. 20 1 An economic boom during and after the Second World War had been 
based on increased sales abroad, especially in Britain, but dark clouds were on the 
horizon. 'Much of the post-war expansion has been without a sound economic basis', a 
Bank of England official pointed out in early 1952.202 Although the Faroe Islands were 
not seen to be of strategic importance in the first years after the war, they greatly 
increased in value in the 1950s and American officials occasionally expressed concern 
about a 'possible Soviet interest in gaining a foothold there'. 203 At the same time, the 
British trawling industry wanted to maintain certain damaging restrictions on Faroese 
landings in Aberdeen and Grimsby, their main markets. 204 In addition, the three-mile 
treaty from 1901 applied to the Faroes as well as Iceland, but waters around the islands 
showed signs of overfishing and scientists had recommended at least the temporary 
closure of two spawning grounds outside the limits. 205 In short, the Faroe Islands were 
in many ways a 'mini-Iceland'. 
199 RA-DEN: 55. DAN. 32/1, Brun minute, 6.5.1952. Very little has been written on the Anglo-Danish- 
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There was one vital difference, however. The Faroes were still ruled from 
Copenhagen. Having taken the same historical route as the Icelanders, from a free state 
in the Viking Age to Norwegian and later Danish dominion, a slight majority of the 
islanders had voted for full independence in a referendum in 1946. After heated debates 
and consultations with Copenhagen, the end result two years later was a home rule 
compromise. Foreign affairs remained in Danish hands and the population relied on 
economic assistance from the mother-country. 206 Thus, Britain would not have to deal 
directly with Faroese politicians over fishing limits but rather with Danish diplomats. 
And they were certainly different from 61afur Thors, Hans G. Andersen and all the 
obstinate Icelanders. To begin with, a deep-rooted passivity characterised Danish 
foreign policy, based on historical and geographic realities and summarised in the 
description that 'Denmark is a little land'. 207 Furthermore, the economy relied on British 
purchases of eggs, bacon and other agricultural products. In 1950, they constituted 
around 70% of all Danish exports and over half went to Britain. It has in fact been 
claimed that economic relations between Copenhagen and London resembled 'a typical 
colonial dependency'. 208 The cultural ties were equally strong. There existed in 
Deninark 'a pro-British feeling ... of the greatest cordiality', wrote the British Council 
representative in Copenhagen in 195 1.209 To sum up, in the words of Paul Mason in the 
Foreign Office, Ji]t is difficult to see how our relations with Denmark can ever 
basically be anything but good'. 210 
The affinity counted. Despite calls from T6rshavn (the seat of the local government in 
the Faroes) and some willingness to protect stocks there and around Greenland, the 
Danes were not going to be troublesome. In late 1952, Count Reventlow, Ambassador 
in London, reassured Anthony Nutting that under no circumstances would a dispute on 
206 See Kirsten Harder, De Dansk-FTroske Forhold 1945-48 (Odense: Odense University Press, 1979). 
207 Uffe Ostergaard, 'Danish National Identity: Between Multinational Heritage and Small State 
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Icelandic lines arise between Britain and Deninark. 211 Yet the Danes could not be totally 
inactive. In the Greenlandic case, British trawlermen had struck new fishing grounds in 
1951 and the Danish authorities rightly worried that the Icelandic extension would 
increase interest in the waters off Greenland. In March 1953, they drew a number of 
short baselines off the island's west coast but sought British comments before they were 
imposed. In June, Copenhagen accepted a few changes which Britain suggested and 
Nutting could not but comment that 'I wished the Icelanders had been one quarter as 
sensible'. All comparisons were unrealistic, however. 212 Greenland was a true colony, 
with a population of hunters moving into the modem world under complete Danish rule, 
and the new line was hardly enforced or respected. Trawlers would fish right up to the 
icy shore and the crews even enjoyed some salmon fishing in the rivers! 213 
The more developed Faroe Islanders could not be treated in such a manner. At 
the end of June 1953, the Danes handed British officials an aide-memoire on a proposed 
revision of the 1901 territorial waters treaty. A three-mile limit was still foreseen but 
baselines were introduced and some of them were almost 'Icelandic', as Harry Hohler 
wrote to Thyne Henderson in Reykjavik. They were both longer than the old ten-mile 
maximum for bay closures which Britain wanted to prevail in the world and they were 
drawn between islands, thus turning 'international straits' into 'inland waters'. 214 
Although the Danes would not set obstacles in the way of British warships, the 
Admiralty was adamant that it was 'vital to preserve rights of navigation through the 
straits as a matter of principle'. 215 And while the Faroese grounds provided only about 
6% of the total distant water catch, it was high-quality fish. The industry was only 
willing to accept the most minimal of changes, and it was ready to wield its economic 
weapon, should the need arise. 216 
On the other hand, the relative modesty of the Danish wishes, as well as their 
congenial approach and disposition, made a 'give and take negotiation' seem 
possible. 217 In December 1953, informal talks took place in London and a draft 
agreement quickly evolved. Faroese territorial waters would continue to be three miles, 
drawn from the low-water mark, but a separate fishing limit would be measured from ad 
211 PRO: F0371/100459/ND1353/5, Nutting minute, 1.12-1952. 
212 R. A-DEN: 55. DAN. 32/1, Reventlow to Nutting, 24.3.1953. PRO: F0371/106181/ND1352/19, Nutting 
minute, 18.6.1953. 
213 Social-Demokraten, 9.8.1956. 
214 PRO: F0371/106182/ND1352/25, Hohler to Henderson, 27.7.1953. F0371/106183/NDI 352/34, 
Hohler minute, 28.9.1953. 
215 PRO: MAF209/1466, Shawyer to Wall, 29.11.1953. 
216 PRO: MAF209/1466, Wall minute, 7.7.1953. 
217 PRO: F0371/106183/ND1352/48, interdepartmental meeting, 16.11.1953. 
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hoc lines a bit farther out. 218 At last, British success was within reach in the struggle for 
the freedom of the high seas. Then, however, hitches appeared. The industry was 
unhappy with the compromise and insisted that an important demarcation line to the 
west off the islands must be modified. The arrangement should also be binding for 25 
years, the right of British trawlers to mend nets in a few harbours should be guaranteed, 
and no Faroese trawling should be allowed within the new limit. 219 In T6rshavn, the 
Lagting majority responded by rejecting the net-mending proviso and calling for 
guarantees that Faroese access to the British market would not be impeded. 220 
So, would a solution fail, primarily because of disagreements over the reparation 
of fishing nets? '[T]hese Norsemen are difficult people to influence', Jack Ward, 
221 Assistant Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, tiredly noted in the autumn of 1954. 
In local elections on November 6, the separatist and socialist Republican Party tripled 
its representation in the Lagting. Although it remained in opposition, a new coalition in 
the assembly stuck to the objections on the mending of nets. And on Humberside, the 
industry was as insistent in its demands. 222 The stand-off was broken, however, because 
an Anglo-Danish 'diplomatic alliance' emerged, against the 'extremists' in T6rshavn, 
Aberdeen and Humberside. In Copenhagen, Foreign Ministry Secretary-General Nils 
Svenningsen reached the conclusion that the British wishes were 'understandable'. 223 In 
London, meanwhile, Ward insisted that if the industry were to reject a proposal which 
the authorities deemed agreeable, then 'the full authority of the government should be 
invoked to deal with any attempts to place a ban on the import of fish from Denmark 
and the Faroes or to stage a strike'. 224 Another 'Iceland' would not be accepted. At the 
final stage, Danish officials persuaded the Faroese coalition that they had to accept a 
confidential minute on the permission to mend nets in selected harbours, 225 and British 
officials urged the owners and trawlermen to make do with such an assurance. 226 
Another secret addition to the proposed settlement concerned a pledge by the authorities 
in T6rshavn not to allow local trawling within the new limits, and a firm and solid 
218 PRO: F0371/106184/ND1352/64, Anglo-Danish meeting, 7.12.1953. 
219 PRO: MAF209/1467, meeting with industry representatives, 18.2.1954. 
220 R. A-DEN: Danish Aide-Memoire, 26.5.1954. 
221 PRO: F0371/111440/ND]351/112, Ward minute, 2.9.1954. 
222 RA-DEN: 55. DAN. 3 1 /111, Paulson minute, 26.10.1954. 
223 RA-DEN: 55. DAN. 3 1/111, Svenningsen minute, 12.11.1954. 
224 PRO: F0371/11144liND1351/149, Hohler minute, 11.11.1954. 
225 RA-DEN: 55. DAN. 3 1/111, Svenningsen minute, 9,12.1954. 
226 PRO: N/tAF209/1469, industry meeting record, 3.3.1955. F03 71/116246,, ND 13 51/4 1, Ward to 
Berthoud, 29.3.1955. GFVOA: Council meeting, 1.3.1955. 
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pledge by the British industry not to prevent landings of fish caught by Faroe Islanders 
or Danes. 227 
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Figure VIII. The ad hocf1shing limits around the 
Faroe Islands, 1955. 
On March 29,1955, Anthony Eden 
announced that an agreement on a 
revision of the 1901 treaty. which 
modestly extended the fishing limits 
off the Faroe Islands, had been 
reached with Denmark. 228 It would 
last for at least 12 years and the Danes 
enforced it against all other nations. 229 
Britain could be pleased. For the first 
time after the Second World War, a 
conflict over fishing limits and 
territorial waters had been resolved to 
her liking. Besides, in December 
1953, near the beginning of the 
negotiating process, Anthony Nutting 
had told Foreign Secretary Eden that a 
friendly compromise should not only 
be applauded on its own merits but also because it would 'provide a precedent for the 
sort of settlement we have always urged on Iceland' . 
230 This impetus was just as evident 
at the end of the talks. The agreement, said Eden, 'will represent a fair settlement by 
mutual give and take and show the proper way of resolving fishery problems of this 
231 kind'. 
Yet, in spite of the hopes that the Faroese model could be used in all dealings 
with the Icelanders, no such strategy had been formed. 'Here is the first news I have had 
about the Faroese agreement', wrote Henderson to Hohler in September 1954 when an 
227 RA-DEN: 55. DAN. 3 I/IV, Knuth and Macmillan 'agreed minute', 22.4.1955. 
228 Hansard, Vol. 539, cols. 23-24,29.3.1955. 
229 In practice that mostly meant the Soviet Union which fished for herring around the islands and asked 
for continued rights up to the old three-mile limit. Ultimately, such requests were turned down. RA-DEN: 
55. DAN. 3 IN, minutes of Prime Minister Hansen's meeting with Bulganin, Molotov, Mikoyan and 
Khrushchev, 5.3.1956. Also Thorsteinsson, I-lernadarm6l, 102-106. 
230 PRO: F0371/106184/ND1352/75, Nutting to Eden, 10.12.1953. Also MAF209/1467, Christie minute, 
19.7.1954. 
23 ' Hansard, Vol. 539, cols. 23-24,29.3.1955. 
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end of the affair seemed to be at hand, citing an Icelandic news report. 'Is it true? 232 
And after the completion the following year, Henderson could not thrust the good 
example in the face of the Icelanders because it had barely been mentioned in the local 
papers. The only other information he had was one short telegram and a press cutting 
from the Fish Trades Gazette. 233 Thus, the accurate estimate in Whitehall that all the 
maritime disputes were intrinsically linked did not transform into a coherent policy. 
Rather, officials continued the 'pragmatic' habit of being against all changes and then 
tackling one imminent problem at a time, being swept, figuratively speaking, from one 
whirlpool in the North Atlantic to another. Furthennore, the inert expectation that the 
Icelanders would be impressed by the Faroese negotiations was not based on a realistic 
appraisal of their sum and substance. The Faroe Islanders had wanted a proper baseline- 
measured four-mile limit. They were only dissuaded from that aim by the looming 
threats of a landing ban and pressure from their Danish masters who were always 
determined to maintain the friendliest relations with Britain. In Reykjavik, the Anglo- 
Danish agreement was compared with the 'bacon deal' on territorial waters from 
1901.234 While such claims about a direct link between Jutland pigs and Faroese fish 
were completely unfounded, the Danes were definitely more committed when it came to 
agricultural produce, their greatest interest in relations with Britain. 235 As for any effect 
on the Icelanders, the Foreign Office had to accept in the end that the premise from the 
Faroe Islands had only stiffened them. 236 The North Atlantic was not a Faroese lake. 
As if this was not unpleasant enough, the Faroe Islanders and the Danes also 
warned that should Iceland force through a better deal for herself than they had acquired 
through amicable negotiations, then surely the settlement should be revised. 237 Hence, 
from the British point of view it seemed like only the bad aspects of one settlement in 
the North Atlantic carried weight elsewhere. Never was this more evident than in the 
next compromise which Britain had to accept in the northern waters. While the 
Icelanders totally ignored the British successes against the minuscule Faroe Islanders, 
they noticed very well the defacto retreat against the might of the Soviet Union. 
232 PRO: F03 71/111440/ND 13 51/122, Henderson to Hohler, 7.9.1954. 
233 PRO: F0371/116248/ND1351/73, Henderson to Given, 8.6.1955. 
234 RA-DEN: 55. DAN3 I/II, Christensen to Copenhagen, 20.9.1954. PRO: F0371/116443/NLI351/131, 
Ward minute, 25.5.1955. 
235 PRO: F0371/116241/ND 1151/7, Currie to Smith, 18.3.1955. The officials who conducted Anglo- 
Danish talks on agricultural purchases were never involved in the Faroese dispute. 
236 PRO: F0371/116443/NLI351/13 1, Ward minute, 25.5.1955. 
237 RA-DEN: 55. DAN. 3 IN, Oldenburg minute, 6.12.1955. 
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2.6. 'For once ... the benefit of a little non-public diplomacy. A 
Pyrrhic Victory in Soviet Waters, 1952-56. 
The powerlessness of Britain in the Barents Sea had been aptly demonstrated in the late 
1940s when British trawlers had at one stage stayed completely away from the fishing 
grounds and the Royal Navy Fishery Protection vessels did not venture inside the Soviet 
12-mile limit of territorial waters. 238 Still, the agreement from 1930 which offered 
Britain limited rights to fish up to three miles from shore remained in force. At the start 
of 1953, however, Moscow abrogated this arrangement, with effect from summer. 239 
British trawling in the Barents Sea seemed to be coming to an end. 
As before, considerable interests were at stake. A fishing trip 'up north' would not be as 
profitable without the excellent plaice grounds inside the 12-mile line. 240 Furthermore, a 
valuable source of clandestine information would be lost, as both the trawlers and the 
Royal Navy fishery protection vessels continued to take photographs and gather other 
data 'in the front line of the intelligence war'. 241 Unsurprisingly, therefore, security 
concerns lay behind the Soviet denunciation. In October 1952, the Soviet Naval General 
Staff informed Defence Minister Nikolai Bulganin that many British trawlers 'possess 
powerful radio transmitters and radar equipment and are basically designed not for 
fishing, but for intelligence-gathering'. 242 
In the Foreign Office, the security motive was acknowledged, along with the 
fact that when the Soviets made the pre-war agreement they were 'beggars in matters of 
commerce-, now they are choosers, they want to get rid of it'. 243 And there seemed to be 
precious little which could be done. Whitehall officials dismissed a possible offer of 
increased trade to sweeten the Soviets. Unless such measures were on a small scale, 
they could run up against balance of payments considerations, opposition in the OEEC 
or restrictions on strategic commerce. If they were insignificant-like a promise to buy 
some vodka as Gwylim Lloyd-George suggested at the Ministry of Food-the Soviets 
238 
See section 1.4,52. 
239 PRO: F0371/106566/NS1351/2, Gascoigne to FO, 5.1.1953. Very little has been written on the 
Anglo-Soviet negotiations on fishing and territorial waters in the 1950s. For a summary, see Butler, 
Soviet Union, 61-62. 
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24 1 Aldrich, Hidden Hand, 523. Also Mason Reffearn (with Richard J. Aldrich), 'The Perfect Cover: 
British Intelliaence, the Soviet Fleet and Distant Water Trawler Operations, 1963-74', Intelligence and 
National Securiry, Vol. 12, No. 3,1997,171-174. PRO: ADMI/28914, 'Fishery Protection Charge 
Document No. 1', 26.8.1955. 
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244 
would not be interested . The threat of retaliation was also examined. The Soviet 
Union did sell some canned fish and caviar to Britain under the terms of a commercial 
agreement from 1934. This trade was so insignificant, however, that an Iceland-style 
ban on these imports would be 'a pathetic form of retaliation', as Harry Hohler put It. 245 
Still, it seemed to be the only possible response. In early March, Selwyn Lloyd advised 
the Soviet Embassy in London, in a 'friendly tone', that Britain might have to repeal the 
1934 treaty if she lost her fishing privileges in the Barents Sea. 246 
As it happened, no such thing occurred. On June 24,1953, the Soviet authorities 
declared that they were satisfied with a one-year extension of the 1930 agreement and in 
the summer of 1954 they again agreed to such prolongation. 247 This was good news for 
the trawlermen who continued to fish in the northern waters and Sir William Strang, the 
Permanent Under- Secretary, was elated: 'For once we have had the benefit of a little 
non-public diplomacy'. 248 In other words, the experts had been allowed to discuss, 
negotiate and reach a friendly solution, free from outside interference. It was classic 
'old diplomacy', 249 and it was tempting to view the fair accomplishment off the Faroe 
Islands in similar light. Nils Svenningsen, Strang's counterpart in Copenhagen, 
belonged to the 'old guard' in the Danish Foreign Ministry and once remarked in the 
course of the Faroe talks that he thought it 'so much better to deal with such problems 
by friendly negotiation through the diplomatic channel than in the Icelandic manner'. 250 
In general, a nostalgic yearning for 'old diplomacy' was misguided. Yaacov 
Vertzberger has written about this exaggerated faith in diplomatic discussions, or 'the 
naive belief that the principles of action shared in the subculture are stronger than 
differences of national interest'. 25 1 As for the Soviet case in particular, the positive 
outcome could not be contributed mainly to the sublime skills of British officials. From 
1953, the year of Stalin's death, Anglo-Soviet relations were relatively warm, 
culminating in the famous 'spirit of Geneva' in 1955, the first peacetime meeting 
244 PRO: MAF209/1216, Wall minutes, 21.2.1953 and 25-2.1953. F0371/106566/NS1351/15, Mason 
minute, 10.2.1953. F0371/106566, Lloyd-George to Eden, 24.2.1953. 
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249 See Lord Strang, The Foreign Office (London: George Allen and Unwin, 195 5), 171-18 1. A. J. P. 
Taylor, Europe: Grandeur and Decline (Han-nondsworth: Penguin, 1967), 364-367, and Svein Swther, 
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between the leaders of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. 252 In this period, 
a Whitehall meeting on the Barents Sea fisheries correctly estimated that the Soviet 
leaders might regard the donation of fishing rights as a 'relatively cheap concession 
which they can make with a view to gilding their "New Look" policy'. 253 Moreover, 
British officials disliked the prospect of having to ask for the concession year after year. 
In the summer of 1955, Britain therefore asked for negotiations on a long-term 
agreement on fishing in the Barents Sea. These began in Moscow at the end of July, 
right after the top summit at Geneva. The Soviet negotiators made several references to 
the improved atmosphere in international relations but were not so agreeable on the 
actual contents of a new treaty. The areas where trawlers could go up to three miles 
from shore would be narrowed and the settlement should only run for five years, not at 
least ten which Britain desired. 254 The Soviet Union also refused to concede any fishing 
rights near the mouth of the White Sea, insisting on a baseline to close it which was 
longer than the Faxa-Bay line and thus potentially embarrassing for Britain. 255 
In the course of the negotiations, an agreement was reached on slightly extended 
fishing zones but Moscow would not budge on other fronts, and when the Fisheries 
Department warned that the trawling industry would be critical if the final product 
would not be to their liking, Jack Ward asked, somewhat scornfully: '[W]ho is going to 
get criticised? Soviet govt? Or HMG for not going to war about it?, 256 And he 
emphasised that 'we should be careful not to become, as it were, prisoners of the British 
fishing industry'. 257 This was not Iceland. 'The essential consideration in these 
negotiations', said the Foreign Office, 'is that we have no bargaining position and any 
Russian offer is in the nature of a bonus'. 258 
In the end, the trawler owners and officers had to accept the limits of British 
influence. 259 On May 25,1956, a five-year agreement on fishing up to three miles in 
252 Richard Bevins and Gregory Quinn, 'Blowing Hot and Cold: Anglo-Soviet Relations', in Wolfram 
Kaiser and Gillian Staerck (eds), British Foreign Policy, 1955-64. Contracting Options (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 2000), 209-23 8. Also Gunter Bischof and Saki Dockrill (eds), Cold War Respite: The Geneva 
Sumn7it of 1955 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000). 
253 PRO: MAF209/1482, interdepartmental meeting, 6.1.1954. Also F0371/111739/NS1351/33, Hohler 
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certain sections off the Soviet coast was signed in Moscow. 260 In public, both officials 
and the industry's spokesmen put the conclusion in a good light. 261 Privately, however, 
they had to admit that, despite a clause on non-prejudice with regard to the general view 
on territorial waters, Britain had 'gone a long way towards accepting the Soviet 
jurisdiction over a 12-mile limitý. 262 Tacit acknowledgement of the White Sea closure 
could also be prejudicial. The Canadians were quick to notice, for instance, that it might 
strengthen their claim to the Gulf of St. Lawrence. 263 It will also be seen that in 1958, 
when the Icelanders declared a 12-mile limit and Britain responded by naval protection 
in the disputed waters, they constantly referred to the precedence of the Anglo-Soviet 
264 
agreement . 
The benefits of the settlement in 1956, whether in terms of fishing or 
intelligence, were quite costly, therefore. The principle of narrower limits had so 
obviously been prejudiced and the primacy of power in the maritime disputes had been 
highlighted. '[W]e negotiated with the Russians', as a member of the Foreign Office 
A, 'ý3 
Kan 
44"c 
tz4 r 
later recalled, 'because we were not strong 
enough to enforce what we regard to be our VA 
KA 
right to fish anywhere in the high seas 265 
Then again, the correlation of forces would 
surely be more favourable in the struggle 
against Iceland which, in the opinion of 
many British officials, had not been settled 
because of Icelandic obstinacy and 
WHI 
Figure IX. Thefishing concessions in the 
Barents Sea, 1956. 
unreasonableness? In 1955, as the terms of 
Britain's 'surrender' to the Soviets were 
being negotiated, a charge against the 
Icelanders was contemplated in London. The 
four-mile dispute would soon come to an 
end. 
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2.7. "Only a Show of Force May ... Bring the Icelanders to 
Reason'. Iceland, 'Suez' and 'Gunboat Diplomacy'.. 1955 
By late 1954, it was clear that the dispute with Iceland over the four-mile extension two 
years before would not be solved by concessions in Reykjavik. Previous chapters have 
demonstrated how negotiations and agreements with the Faroe Islands and the Soviet 
Union did nothing to deter the Icelanders, and that the landing ban was no longer 
hurting them. Still, in early 1955, Harry Hohler wrote wishfully to Thyne Henderson 
that the sanctions and the signs of greater accommodation elsewhere would show 'even 
the Icelanders ... that unilateral action is not recognised by other countries and merely 
gets them into trouble'. On which Henderson commented, more realistically: 'What 
trouble? 5266 The stalemate would continue unless Britain retreated or advanced, and as 
has been discussed, she would only move either way if it were necessary; if a crisis 
occurred. Later in 1955, and again the following year, such incentive seemed to have 
appeared. With all the appropriate reservations about the limits of historical analogies, it 
could be argued that a miniature 'Suez' might have happened in the waters off Iceland. 
First, there was some hope that a peaceful way out could be found. In November 1954, 
the OEEC formed an ad hoc committee on the Icelandic fishing dispute, under the 
chairmanship of the Swiss G6rard Bauer. P6tur Benediktsson, Iceland's delegate at the 
organisation, had periodically complained about the ban and was by this stage waging a 
267 'substantial propaganda campaign', as Fisheries Secretary Wall observed. The OEEC 
representatives were on the whole convinced freetraders and sympathised with the 
Icelandic cause. 268 Another hope for an end to the affair lay on Humberside. The 
fishmongers had never been enthusiastic about the ban, preferring competition in prices 
and supplies. 'The merchants are mad for our fish', Agnar KI. J6nsson wrote in 
November 1954 '269 and at a 
heated meeting with the owners a year later they insisted 
that the ban 'should never have been put on'. Jack Croft Baker of the BTF called them 
'dim-witted' but somehow an agreement was reached to wait and see if the OEEC talks 
would produce a solution. 270 In 1955, the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices 
266 PRO: F0962/24, Hohler to Henderson, 4.3.1955. 
267 PRO: MAF209/1486, Wall minute, 14-10.1954. For a summarý, of the OEEC mediation in 1954-56, 
see Si-, urj6nsson, 'Skjolin', 82-87. 
268 Thl-URN: 1996-B/63-3/15. D. 00 1 . 9, P. Benediktsson to 
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(Reykjavik: Mdl og menning, 1998), 249-252. 
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Commission also had a brief look at 'the boycott' and found it 'most unusual', while a 
more detailed study would be needed before a judgement on its merits could be made. 271 
Even in Iceland there were positive signs. They were small, it must be said, but 
in early 1954,01afur Thors, now Prime Minister, 272 asked Professor Bourquin, the main 
advocate of Norway's case at The Hague and an adviser to the Icelanders in 1952, 
whether some concessions could be offered, for instance the shortening of a few 
baselines, without damaging Iceland's principled right to follow the Norwegian 
example. 273 Most of the country's trawler companies were operating at a loss, partly 
because the authorities subsidised the smaller fishing vessels and partly because they 
missed the British market with its potential for higher prices. 274 Moreover, many 
Icelanders (the Conservatives in particular) grew uneasy over a lasting economic 
reliance on Moscow, and not completely without reason. At the end of 1953, the first 
year of the Soviet-Icelandic trade agreement, Igor Sysoev suggested from Reykjavik 
that the good bargaining position might be used directly to ftirther the Communist cause 
in Iceland. If the Icelandic authorities were uncooperative, they would be told that the 
Soviet Union 'might be forced to reduce or cancel all purchases of fish products'. 275 A 
crude, counter-productive threat of that kind was never made. Still, in late 1955, P6tur 
Benediktsson confided to W. Harpham, the British representative at the OEEC, his 
anxiety that the Soviets might try something on those lines: 'What could Iceland do if 
the Russians told her to leave NATO, in default of which the Russians would suspend 
all purchases in Iceland? 276 
In short, incentives for a 'give and take' solution existed. In February 1955, 
Britain tried to entice the Icelandic authorities into a dialogue by a personal letter from 
Winston Churchill to 61afur Thors, undoubtedly mindful of his grumpiness after the 
4 277 snub' in London in January 1952 . 
Thors was impressed and the Icelandic authorities 
did contemplate moves to improve the atmosphere, for instance by granting British 
trawlers permission to seek shelter inside the four-mile limit without their gear 
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completely stowed, as required under present regulations. However, no changes in the 
fishing limit could be discussed and in the end the Icelanders reached the conclusion 
that even the non-stowing concession would not be offered, as the British skippers 
might abuse it and 'dip' the trawl inside. 278 
The problem was that on all sides, the motives for conciliation were weaker than the 
temptation to 'toughen it out'. In London, predictably, no crisis meant little attention. In 
late 1954, Derick Heathcoat Amory, the new Minister in the arnalgated Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, underlined that '[t]he fish problem was one of the least 
of his troubles'. 279 Concerns about the legality or the geopolitical disadvantages of the 
landing ban were also offset by the seductive calculation that Ji]f we withdraw our only 
bargaining weapon [the Icelanders] may just feel that they have gained complete 
victory'. 280 
In Reykjavfk, fears over Soviet influence were similarly counterbalanced by the 
comfort of having escaped from the reliance on the British market. The authorities also 
remained hostages to their own rhetoric about Iceland's undisputed right and need for 
the limits extension. 'It is typical for Icelandic politics that the authorities tend to excite 
the population so much through their own propaganda that sensible negotiations become 
impossible', the Danish Minister, Bodil Begtrup, pointed out astutely in the spring of 
1955 . 
28 1 Both the fish stocks and Iceland's economy would easily have survived a few 
changes to the limit-but the Icelandic government might have collapsed. The primacy 
of domestic politics excluded any notable concessions. It was, in a sense, a 'disregard 
for diplomacy', the antithesis of the classic 'non-public diplomacy' which Permanent 
Under-Secretary Strang had detected behind the successful talks with the Soviets in the 
same period. On the Icelandic side, Agnar KI. J6nsson said that he wished to enter into 
honest negotiations but his arguments carried no weight in Reykjavik. 282 
This 'disregard for diplomacy' naturally meant that arbitration or adjudication 
were less likely to lead to a solution. After a series of strenuous meetings at the OEEC 
up to March 1955, Bauer could only complain that 'he felt as if he were up against a 
brick wall. He was in the presence of two parties who would not meet each other'. 
283 
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The talks continued, but a quick result was not in sight. Likewise, neither side really 
wanted to refer the conflict to the International Court. 'The trouble has been to avoid 
that path', Wall reminded Hohler in September 1954,284 and the Icelanders, while 
confident about victory on the present line, feared that it might halt their drive for 
further extensions. It may be recalled that the Althing's Conservation Law of 1948 
included the intention to control fisheries above the whole continental shelf. reaching 
some 50 miles seawards. After 1952, calls for further extensions could therefore be 
heard in and outside Parliament, 285 and as Henderson reported to London in February 
1955, Prime Minister Thors assured him that he had no intention of negotiating with the 
British over the four-mile limit: 'I asked why not, and he said ... that whatever result 
he 
got by negotiation would preclude him from doing what he intended to do-to move the 
fishery limit gradually outwards as occasion offered'. 286 In the Foreign Office, Harry 
Hohler found Thors's utterances alarming enough to notify Jack Ward, the Assistant 
Under- Secretary. A 'crisis' appeared to be in the making. Thus, a 're-representation' of 
the problem was again called for, to use the language of decision-making theories. 
Initially, 'escalation' was the chosen outcome. Ward was as worried as Hohler and 
concluded 'that only a show of force may in the long run bring the Icelanders to reason'. 
He alerted the recently appointed Permanent Under- Secretary, Sir None Kirkpatrick, 
who was equally quick to form an opinion. On March 11, he recommended that if a new 
extension were announced, 'we should give naval protection to our. trawlers'. 287 Things 
were hotting up. 
From the implementation of Iceland's new limit in May 1952 to the end of 1956, 
Icelandic coast guard vessels arrested 15 British trawlers for illegal fishing in waters 
which Britain regarded as high seas. 288 Others got away, even if shots were sometimes 
fired across bows, and after one such incident, Anthony Nutting could not but comment 
that the 'Palmerston mantle has clearly fallen on 01afur Thors! 289 The trawlermen were 
enraged and demanded that Britain, the old naval power, showed the flag in the disputed 
284 PRO: MAF209/1478, Wall to Hohler, 6.9.1954. Also F0371/116438/NLI351/20, Ward minute, 
13.1.1955. 
285 blafsson, Saga, 104-105. 
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waters. 
290 At the beginning of 1954, some 400 skippers had signed a petition for naval 
291 
protection off Iceland . 
The strategic, political, legal and moral aspects of such action were at least as 
dubious as they had been both in the Norwegian dispute and when Thomas Dugdale 
deemed the use of force against Iceland 'unthinkable' in early 1953.292 So it seemed at 
least to Nutting when he discounted the skippers' agitation. 293 Consequently, the 
Kirkpatrick directive was not applauded unhesitatingly in VAiitehall. P. D. Nairne at the 
Admiralty's Military Branch liaised with the Foreign Office and estimated that a trawler 
protection flotilla would require at least three fishery protection vessels and two 
additional frigates on permanent station. In an era of constant cuts, the Royal Navy 
would be hard put to provide such a presence. And how would the use of force off 
Iceland compare with the practical acceptance of the twelve-mile limit in the Barents 
Sea? Moreover, had the effect on Iceland's attitude to NATO been considered? 
Ministers should explore all avenues in search of a friendly solution, Naime concluded, 
'before they consider instructing our ships to sink Icelandic gunboats in defence of our 
trawlers'. 294 
Similar whispers of apprehension could be heard at lower levels in the Foreign 
Office. 295 The combative Kirkpatrick was not put off, however, and as Ward 
commented, Nairne's cautious response was 'sadly lacking in the Nelson touch'. The 
comparison with the Soviet situation could be dismissed, because the 'fact that we have 
to submit to pressure from the second largest power in the world is not a reason why we 
should put up with pressure from one of the smallest'. Likewise, Alliance 
considerations should not limit British options, because jo]ther NATO countries have 
shown no disposition to pull chestnuts out of the fire for us'. Besides, Britain would 
simply be using force in self-defence on the high seas: 
The purpose of our demonstration should be to force the Icelanders to take the 
dispute to arbitration and to behave as a NATO ally should. While there is no 
legal justification for such action, there are surely common-sense grounds for 
290 PRO: MAF209/1475, Captain, Fifth Fishery Protection and Minesweeping Squadron, to Leach, 
16.11.1953. Brunskill to author, 28.10.2000. 
291 Yorkshire Post, 26.1.1954. Also Robinson interview, 5.5.200 1. 
292 See sections 1.2,34-35, and 2.3,86-87. 
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breaking the law in order to deal with a law-breaker who will not submit to the 
non-nal rules. 296 
In other words, Britain would defend her perpetual interests without regard to legal 
niceties or capricious allies. Palmerston was haunting the Foreign Office; Pax 
Britannica had not passed. In December 1955, a Cabinet paper about naval protection in 
case of further extensions by Iceland was prepared. Warships would protect trawlers 
and 'take all necessary steps to prevent arrest and to rescue any arrested vessels'. 297 
Although they were not to open fire unless fired on first, it was quite possible that the 
Royal Navy would shoot in anger in the North Atlantic for the first time since the 
Second World War-against an ally in NATO. 
This prospect accentuates the constant struggle in British foreign policy during a 
transitory period of decreasing influence: between accommodation, admission of 
weakness and interdependence on the one hand, and a stubborn, realist defence of the 
traditional national interest on the other. The recommended policy in 1955 was pure 
power politics. The previous 'Not-My-Problem' and 'Make-It-Go-Away' approaches to 
the Icelandic issue would be replaced by a much more assertive course, a 'To-Hell- 
With-It' attitude, perhaps. It was both unfortunate and telling that when the will to take 
some initiative and be ahead of events finally appeared in London, the wrong action was 
proposed. The mistake was neither unique, nor made in a vacuum. While men like 
Kirkpatrick and Ward did not base their decisions about the fishing dispute on a sound 
knowledge or experience of Icelandic affairs, they had wider preconceptions and 
analogies in their minds. In the mid-1950s, in a sense, the Suez Canal flowed through 
Icelandic waters. 
'Suez', the failed operation against Colonel Nasser's Egypt in 1956, was for Britain 'the 
298 defining moment of the post-war period' . It 
highlighted, as Lord Gladwyn wrote, how 
British decision-makers were 'living in the shadow of our Imperial past with small 
conception of the real problems that awaited solution. 299 In the mid-1950s, the 
Icelanders were accused of abusing British interests in much the same way as the 
Egyptians when they nationalised the Canal. The Hull Daily Mail spoke of 'Iceland's 
Nasserism', 300 and in Reykjavik, Henderson saw other similarities with the situation in 
the Middle East. He mockingly called Prime Minister Thors 'Olafur Mossadegh', 
296 PRO: F0371/116445/NLI 351/186, FO draft submission, September 1955. 
297 PRO: F0371/116448/NL 1351/260, draft paper, December 1955. 
298 Hennessy, Muddling Through, 97. 
299 Lord Gladwyn, The Menioirs of Lord Gladwyn (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), 284-285. 
300 Hull Daily Mail, 18.10.1956. 
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finding the 'obstinate old man' guilty of the same disregard for Britain's rights as the 
repulsive leader who appropriated the oil installations in Persia. 301 In general, Valur 
Ingimundarson has spoken of a 'Third-World-Effect' to describe Iceland's relations 
302 with the West in the post-war period . Henderson, Ward and Kirkpatrick would have 
agreed. 
Still, would a small 'Suez' have occurred in the North Atlantic if the Icelanders 
had extended the fishing limits afresh? The dire consequences of naval protection, 
which the lower-ranking officials in the Foreign Office and the Admiralty foresaw, 
could certainly have come about. The Icelanders, far from 'seeing reason', would have 
united against the common foe. Their fervour against British 'imperialism' during the 
Suez crisis is revealing enough: when the fishery protection destroyer HMS Bramble 
arrived in Reykjavik harbour on November 1,1956, the day after British parachute 
landings near Port Said, a crowd of people repeatedly unleashed the ship's moorings 
and shouted, 'get off to Egypt, you murdering British pigs'. 303 The political 
repercussions in Iceland would have been severe as well. In 1955, the Progressives, 
increasingly unhappy in the coalition with the Conservative Party, started secret talks 
with the Social Democrats about an electoral alliance which might bring them majority 
in the next polls, most likely as soon as the following year. A main plank in their 
platform would be the dismissal of US forces, 304 and anti-Western feeling in Iceland 
would certainly have intensified if the turrets of British warships had been turned on the 
country's tiny coast guard vessels. 
As it happened, Britain and Iceland were saved from a crisis of serious 
proportions because, on the one hand, the trigger of a further extension was not quickly 
pulled in Reykjavik. On the other hand, in late 1955 the painstaking talks at the OEEC 
had begun to give cause for qualified optimism. Indeed, the proposed Cabinet paper 
about naval protection specifically mentioned that they should be allowed to proceed to 
breakdown or settlement before its recommendations were put in motion. 
305 Ahead lay a 
year of reckoning. 
301 PRO: F0371/111531/NL1351/50, Henderson to Matthews, 2.6.1954. 
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2.8. Climax. Domestic Politics, High Politics and the End of the 
Landing Ban, 1956. 
In 1956, the landing ban finally ended, but only after a series of ups and downs in the 
OEEC negotiations. In the meantime, a crisis of immense proportions had tested 
Iceland's relations with the Western world. The New York Times warned that the 
country might be 'drifting into the Soviet orbit', 306 and Britain appeared at least partly 
to blame. 'Unless the fishing dispute is settled soon to ease the bitter feeling for this 
country', wrote a Bank of England official, '... the present Prime Minister, much as he 
personally favours the West, will be forced to accept ... Russian offers to launch his 
development programme'. 307 At the end of 1956, however, a truce on cod and Cold War 
had been reached. That settlement was an excellent example of who had power over 
whom in the whole dispute over fishing off Iceland after the Second World War. 
At the end of 1955, the mediation at the OEEC had brought the warring sides close to 
an agreement, heavily in favour of Iceland. Mur Benediktsson argued that in return for 
a removal of the landing ban, the Icelandic authorities would be willing to offer the 
small concession which they had contemplated after Winston Churchill's letter to 
01afur Thors in February 1955: a permission for trawlers to seek shelter with their gear 
unstowed and unshackled. For their part, the British side was ready to accept the present 
fishing limit de facto in return for a quota on Icelandic landings to prevent a glut on the 
market, and an assurance on no subsequent extensions before the United Nations had 
conferred on the width of territorial waters. 308 
On its own, a concurrence between diplomats in Paris meant little, however. 
Benediktsson worried that although a solution on these lines would constitute a 
4massive victory', 'pseudo-arguments' from Icelandic party politics might stand in the 
way. 309 Most significantly, Hermann J6nasson, leader of the Progressive Party, was 
against any government decision on the fishing limits before the forthcoming 
elections. 310 Yet, he could be persuaded to accept the weaker compromise that the 
Althing would pass a resolution about a temporary standstill on further extensions. At 
the end of January, the coalition parties were ready to take this step. 31 1 Then, however. 
306 New York Times, 24.7.1956. 
307 BEA: OV35/7, Jackson report, 24.8.1956. 
308 SSi-DbP: Olafsson memorandum, 26.11.1955. PRO: F0371/116448/NLI351/237, Ellis-Rees to FO, 
5.12.1955. 
309 Thi-URN: 1996-B/63-3 15. D. 00 1.15, BenedMsson to Gudmundsson and Thors, 7.1.1956. 
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domestic complications had arisen on Humberside and in London. First, the trawler 
owners and officers demanded, in addition to quota restrictions and the non-stowing 
allowance, a pledge on no more extensions for at least ten years but preferably a half- 
century. 312 Thus, the task was not only to negotiate with the Icelanders but also the 
trawlermen. 
Furthermore, an agreement had to be reached within Whitehall. International 
disputes could be entangled, yet nothing compared to the complexities of Britain's 
interdepartmental conflicts. As Anthony Sampson once wrote: 'A man at the Board of 
Trade will talk about "those Min. of Ag. people" as if they were serving a foreign 
power'. 313 When the Foreign Office and the Fisheries Department introduced the quota 
idea, the Board of Trade seemed suddenly to apprehend that a ban on Icelandic iced fish 
imports existed. It was, in the words of Sir Edgar Cohen, one of the department's 
secretaries, 'about the most restrictive practice we have seen in our post-war history'. 314 
Only after a series of stiff departmental meetings did the Board drop its objections, on 
the grounds that this fishy business was clearly 'a special case'. 315 By then, however, 
the Fisheries Department was also stalling the process, fearing that if the promised 
Althing resolution was passed before the industry was ready to follow with their part of 
the bargain, Heathcoat Amory would be challenged in Parliament to exert pressure on 
Humberside. 
Fatefully, the Icelanders were therefore asked to put the action on hold and 
representatives of the British and Icelandic trawler owners were invited to the OEEC 
headquarters in Paris to hammer out the exact details of a quota agreement. 316 Meetings 
took place in February and again in April. It inevitably fell on the British owners to do 
most of the giving, for discussions on limits past and present were explicitly left out of 
the agenda. 317 They saw little need to be overly accommodating, therefore, and as a 
member of the Foreign Office said, 41 now feel about these negotiations rather as 
Napoleon (I think) did about some of his business when he remarked, "Heaven preserve 
me from my friends; I can deal with my enemies"'. 318 The talks produced no result and 
a window of opportunity had clearly been lost. Departmental squabble in Whitehall was 
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to blame, as was the owners' intransigence. But the domestic situation in Iceland also 
intervened. While the Althing resolution on no extensions before United Nations 
deliberations would have been passable at the start of the year, by spring, elections 
loomed large and the Progressive Party again saw advantages in opposing a deal with 
Britain. 3 19 Furthermore, the whole gamut of Iceland's foreign relations was by this stage 
seriously upset. In February, Selwyn Lloyd (now Foreign Secretary), Heathcoat Amory 
and James Stuart had told the Cabinet that the ban's strategic disadvantages could no 
longer be accepted: 
A prolongation of the dispute would increase the economic dependence of 
Iceland on the Soviet bloc; it would also strengthen the hands of the 
Communists in Iceland, whose aim is to deny the United States the use of the 
vital air base at Keflavik and to bring about the withdrawal of Iceland from the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 320 
Later in the year, these words seemed to ring true indeed. During the campaign before 
the Icelandic elections in the summer of 1956, and not to mention after the momentous 
outcome, it looked as if Britain had left it too late to lift the ban. 
The 1956 crisis in Iceland's relations with the United States and NATO has been 
researched in detail. 321 Only the 'fish' aspect needs to be detailed here. In short, in 
March the Progressives and the Social Democrats tabled an Althing resolution about the 
revision of the 1951 defence agreement with the United States, so that local personnel 
would maintain all military installations and although Iceland would remain in NATO, 
American troops were to leave the island. Around the same time, Hannibal 
Valdimarsson, the influential left-leaning Social Democrat (sometimes known as the 
Icelandic 'Bevan' )322 was expelled from that party and fonned an electoral bloc with the 
Socialists, the so-called People's Alliance. They supported the Althing resolution and 
the Conservative-Progressive coalition was of course finished. Elections were to be held 
in June. 
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The Americans responded by halting all construction at the Keflavik base, an 
important element in Iceland's economy. 323 Simultaneously, they concluded that the 
idea of having Icelanders in charge of the base was wholly unrealistic. The US presence 
in Iceland was 'vital' and the Joint Chiefs of Staff even argued that a departure would 
be 'unacceptable'. 324 Furthermore, a move towards demilitarisation in Iceland might 
encourage neutralist tendencies elsewhere in NATO, fairly soon after the Soviet- 
inspired 'spirit of Geneva' and at a time when the Alliance was 'going through a 
difficult patch', in Lord Ismay's words. 325 Some wooing was therefore needed. The 
United States aimed to influence the outcome at the polls and a significant part of that 
strategy involved a demonstration of the economic benefits of Western co-operation. 326 
In Washington, President Eisenhower reportedly came back to the idea of a wholesale 
purchase of Iceland's annual fish catches, 327 and the American dislike of the landing ban 
naturally intensified. It must be lifted, wrote John J. Muccio, the Minister in Reykjavik, 
who could see 'no more effective action for helping election situation here'. 328 On June 
8, the London Embassy therefore made an 'urgent plea' to have the embargo 
'immediately removed'. British officials fended off sudden action by pointing out- 
accurately-that it would only arouse suspicions so late in the day and that the ban was 
not the main reason behind the developments in Iceland . 
329 They also argued the well 
rehearsed line that the ban was not illegal and there was nothing the authorities could do 
about it. Yet, it had to be acknowledged, as Fisheries Secretary Wall worried, that 'the 
future of the American base at Keflavik is getting mixed up with the fisheries 
dispute'. 330 
If the Conservatives, the only pro-American party, had emerged victorious after 
the June elections, the United States would undoubtedly have put even more pressure on 
the British authorities. But the vote resulted in the formation of a coalition of the 
Progressives, the Social Democrats and the People's Alliance. Hermann J6nasson 
became Prime Minister and the Social Democrat Gudmundur i. Gudmundsson took the 
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Foreign Ministry. Their parties got two other ministerial posts, as did the People's 
Alliance, so for the first time in the history of NATO, a member-state had 
'Communists' in its regime: Hannibal Valdimarsson and the resolute and charismatic 
L6dvik J6sepsson who became Minister of Fisheries. Before the elections, both the 
Progressives and especially the Social Democrats had vowed that they would not co- 
operate with the People's Alliance. 33 1 The pull of power proved strong, however, as 
well as the opportunity to exclude the Conservative Party from government for the first 
time since the Republic's foundation in 1944. These domestic interests weighed more 
than Western anguish about the inclusion of 'Communists' in the coalition. 
So, after the elections the 'Left regime', as the coalition was called, assumed 
power. Almost overnight, the American attitude became very hostile. Economic 
coercion began and the new coalition found it impossible to raise much needed loans in 
the West. 332 Correspondingly, the attitude on the landing ban was reversed. On August 
14, American diplomats in London expressed the wish that 'nothing should be done 
until a more viable government was in power in Iceland'. 333 The Icelanders were losing 
their strong friend in the struggle against Britain. Furthermore, they were facing 
American fury when the Soviet Union was waiting in the wings with favourable loans 
and offers of ever increased trade. Such, at least, was the impression of Western 
officials outside the United States who feared that intimidation would precipitate the 
misfortune which it was meant to counter. 334 , Too much tendency to shun it', said a 
member of the Foreign Office on the new regime, 'might lead to another "Czech coup" 
in Iceland' 
. 
335 The far-fetched comparison was not altogether silly. In the last years 
before the Communist take-over in Czechoslovakia in 1948, British diplomats had been 
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'It is not ... a question of throwing good money after 
bad', said Ambassador Sir Philip 
Nichols in 1947, 'but rather of continuing to pay premiums on a secondary insurance 
336 policy which may one day be useful' . 
331 StefAn J6hann Stefdnsson, Minningar (Reykjavik: Setberg, 1967), 107. 
332 Whitehead, All 
, v, 
76-77. 
333 PRO: F0371/122522/NL]351/68, Hohler minute, 14.8.1956. Also NARA: RG59/840B. 245/8-756, 
Dulles to London, 7.8.1956. 
334 NA-CAN: RG25/6113/50373-40- 1.1, Pearson to NATO delegation, 24.7.1956. UD: 33.6/1 UIV, Oslo 
to NATO delegation, 13.8.1956. PAAA: 1323/17, van Scherpenberg minute, 28.8.1956. 
335 PRO: F0371/122522/NLI351/164, Hannan to Given, 2.8.1956. 
336 PRO: F0371/65785/N8873/12/12, Nichols to Bevin, 25.7.1947. Also Mark Steinitz, 'The US 
Propaganda Effort in Czechoslovakia, 1945-48', Diplomatic History, Vol. 6, No. 4. Fall 1982,359-388. 
120 
Mostly, however, the similarities between Reykjavik and Prague were 
superficial. Notwithstanding their dislike of foreign troops, the Icelanders were 
predominantly pro-Western and geographically in the Western sphere of influence. 
Gradually, American officials realised that the new governinent was not determined to 
expel the US forces, despite the campaign rhetoric. Foreign Minister Gudmundsson, in 
particular, was a fierce anti-Communist who wanted to maintain the status quo, more or 
less. 337 Negotiations about the continuation of the Keflavik base were opened, with 
simultaneous talks on economic assistance and loans. Both were proceeding 
satisfactorily when the Soviet invasion of Hungary clinched a Progressive/Social 
Democrat acceptance of permanent American presence on the island-as well as vital 
financial aid. Faced with the worse choice of losing power, the People's Alliance had to 
accept defeat on the troops removal. Thus, as Th6r Whitehead has written, 'the first 
NATO government with pro-Communist participation had been materially strengthened 
by American "dollar diplomacy". Such were the paradoxes of the Cold War'. 338 
Unsurprisingly, the easing of nerves in the United States revived the 
unhappiness with the landing ban. In November, when Icelandic and American 
representatives were discussing the arrangements at Keflavik and economic assistance 
to Iceland, the notion of loans to purchase fishing vessels emerged. But this would only 
be sensible, it was pointed out in Washington, if an increasing portion of the catches 
was sold 'in Free World markets'. 339 Publicly, meanwhile, a reporter who visited 
Iceland (and was unaware of the progress at the US-Icelandic talks) described the 
British embargo as a 'lesson in how to lose an air base-plus radar and naval facilities 
of immense importance to American security'. 340 Although the economic and political 
effects of the embargo were exaggerated, Jack Ward was right when he argued in late 
October that the authorities ought to 'remove this boycott-millstone from around all our 
British necks ... 
We should thus cease to be exposed to the criticism of Americans and 
other friends'. 341 
During the Icelandic crisis in the summer and autumn of 1956, quiet probing had 
continued at the OEEC headquarters in Paris. By September, it was clear that the only 
outstanding issue was the scope of an assurance by the 'Left regime' in Reykjavik about 
337 Thorleifur Fridriksson, Undirheimar islenskra stj6rnmd1a (Reykjavik: Orn og Orlygur, 1988), 127. 
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future actions. 342 This could still be a tricky problem. In its policy statement, the 
coalition stated that an extension of the fishing limits was 'a pressing necessity'. 343 The 
Socialists, forced to backtrack on the base question, were determined not to give up 
another primary goal and the two other parties only found it in order to wait beyond a 
discussion on the law of the sea at the United Nations General Assembly in November 
and December. They would not promise longer abstention, for then the government 
might collapse. 344 In Britain, however, the trawling industry held out for more. 345 In 
early October, the advance towards a solution was halted and British diplomats 'on the 
spot' were dismayed. In Paris, Sir Hugh Ellis-Rees sympathised with the obvious 
internal difficulties of the Icelandic government and complained that 'we are now 
completely in the hands of the industry over inter-goverrimental texts'. 346 In Reykjavik, 
the ambitious and energetic Andrew Gilchrist, who had replaced Henderson earlier in 
the year, agreed. Ever since his arrival, he had been underlining that the ban was a 
useless nuisance which should be removed as soon as possible. But he was finding out, 
like his predecessors, that messages from Iceland could receive scant attention in 
London. Gilchrist had to wonder if the Foreign Office did not 'fully accept the views on 
347 the local situation which I have been putting forward from Reykjavik' . 
That had certainly been the case before. Yet, the trawling industry had been 
obdurate once too often. By the beginning of November, the consensus was reached in 
Whitehall that the landing ban should be lifted because it was ineffective, disliked at 
international level, and probably illegal. 348 On November 8, the leaders of the BTF were 
told in no uncertain terms that the time had come to accept what was on the table. The 
replacement of the ban by controlled Icelandic landings would mean, as Fisheries 
Secretary Wall put it, that the industry 'will be rid of the boycott before it is knocked on 
the head by the Restrictive Trade Practices Act'. Obstinacy, on the other hand, would 
only encourage the extremists in Iceland who were intent on making further limits 
extensions. Most reluctantly, the trawler owners agreed. 349 On November 14, the trawler 
owner associations of Iceland and Britain signed an agreement in Paris on the 
342 PRO: F0371/122523/NLI351/188, Ellis-Rees to FO, 13.9-1956. 
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resumption of Icelandic landings in British ports. There was a ceiling on the total 
amount of catches but it was generous and Icelandic vessels would not be passed over in 
times of glut. Simultaneously, the Foreign Ministry in Reykjavik announced that British 
trawlers could seek shelter close to shore with their gear unstowed, and that the 
government did not expect to widen the fishing limits before the conclusion of the UN 
General Assembly. 350 
Thus ended the dispute which had began in 1952. In the end, Britain had to do almost 
all of the giving. Although the final settlement was reached between the trawler owners 
on either side, in essence the dispute had been about Britain's refusal to concede 
Iceland's extension of fishing limits. 35 1 The British industry could never have 
maintained the embargo for so long if the authorities had accepted that action at the 
beginning. The whole dispute highlights, therefore, three main aspects of the maritime 
disputes in the North Atlantic after the Second World War. 
Firstly, the power of a domestic pressure group in Britain was demonstrated. For 
four years, the formulation of foreign policy was effectively assigned to Humberside. 
The trawling industry held 'a veto' on any proposal to end the conflict, as Lord John 
Hope pointed out in the Foreign Office at the start of 1956.352 Legal and strategic 
considerations did not manage to outweigh the demands of the pressure group. 
Moreover, these demands were based on a misapprehension. Despite the dire 
predictions about the catastrophic effects on distant-water fishing, catches were 
excellent throughout the period. By the end, even reputed 'Iceland haters' among the 
skippers admitted in private that they were actually benefiting from the conservation 
effects of the new limits. 353 Furthermore, it has been demonstrated how the trawler 
owners were interested in the removal of competition on the British market, per se. At 
the OEEC, Pdtur Benediktsson would urge Britain to 'treat them like naughty 
schoolboys' and they truly got away with far too much mischief . 
354 The authorities both 
should and could have drawn a line sooner than they did. Although the dramatic 
measures about government purchases or troops in the ports which were aired at the 
onset would have been absurd, officials came to mention that they could coerce the 
350 Sigurdsson, S6kn, 257-258. Olafsson, Saga, 92-93. 
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industry, for instance by threatening to withdraw the white fish subsidy, an important 
source in the running of trawler companies. 355 
Secondly, the decision-making process itself contributed to Britain's refusal to 
accept defeat. There was the lazy notion that a problem postponed was a problem 
solved, and a tendency to discount infonnation from envoys at the scene if it did not fit 
with the wishful thinking in Whitehall. Departmental disputes did not help either. As the 
dispute went on, the Foreign Office admittedly grew restive but the officials at the 
Fisheries Department proved staunch defenders of their clients' interests. 356 And 
unfortunately, the delay in accepting the inevitable, through deference to the industry 
and indecision in Whitehall, only meant that the final surrender was worse than a 
dignified retreat would have been before. 'The Icelandic dispute is over', a ftirious Hull 
skipper pointed out after the settlement in Paris, 'and where are we at the end of 4/2 
years wrangling-worse off than when the dispute started'. 357 
Thirdly, therefore, the conflict highlights the miscalculations on power by the 
British side. This was of course most obvious in the way Iceland broke the ban by 
selling fish to East and West, accentuating the island's strategic importance during the 
Cold War. The 'big stick' of the landing ban was not so big after all. The dispute was a 
case study of power politics in a new environment. In November 1955, an American 
diplomat in Reykjavik summed up the situation as well as any scholar of international 
relations might have done: 
In more 'normal' times it would have been rash indeed in a nation of Iceland's 
size to sidestep a legal test and play so casually with the argument of 'vital 
interest' so dear to larger powers. When vital interests clash and legal tests are 
not possible, cruisers are often called upon to lend their weight to the argument. 
In this case, however, the Icelanders have correctly judged that the vital British 
interest lay on the side of letting Iceland have its way. Any overt use of force 
might have shaken Iceland out of NATO ... 
Had she not been in NATO it is easy 
to suppose that the course would have been quite different. 
358 
When British Officials took a long, hard look at the correlation of forces in the North 
Atlantic, they had to agree that the constraints of alliance and interdependence were 
preventing a traditional defence of a traditional interest. 'It is distressing to note once 
again', wrote Ward in the Foreign Office, 'how in international bodies any rascally 
small country is allowed to set the pace and our supposed allies and friends expect the 
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United Kingdom to show noblesse oblige and defer'. 359 But then this was the reality 
which had to be faced. It was no good trying to wish it away. Of course it could also be 
fought, as indeed Ward and Ivone Kirkpatrick had contemplated in their Suez-like 
frame of mind. In the mid-1950s, however, a fight against the extensions of maritime 
jurisdiction would have been a tough one, to say the least. Not only was Iceland 
deceptively strong when all things were considered, but neither was she the sole 
adversary. 
359 PRO: F0371/122524/NLI351/228, Ward minute, 17.10.1956. 
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2.9. Decolonisation at Sea. The Continuous Demise of the 
Three-Mile Limit, 1954-1956. 
At the end of 1956, only the most optimistic observer in London could argue that the 
defence of narrow territorial waters was holding up well. After all, the de facto retreat 
from the three-mile rule off Iceland had been preceded by inconvenient compromises 
with the Soviet Union and the Faroe Islands, and before that a dejure defeat against 
Norway at The Hague. Furthermore, a survey of the whole globe in 1954 showed that 
only about 20 states, mainly Western or 'old' Commonwealth, adhered to the three-mile 
rule. Of these, some were definitely shifting towards a wider limit of territorial 
waters. 360 The rest-mostly the Communist bloc and the 'third world'-had almost 
wholly rejected the three-mile principle. Grotius was finally dead, as one legal expert 
was to announce. 361 
The traditional view on the freedom of the high seas was also confused by increased 
interest in the continental shelf. Exploration of oil in the North Sea began in earnest and 
as one Whitehall official estimated, rather cautiously but with great accuracy as it turned 
out, 'the division of the bed of the North Sea may become a practical issue in the 
comparatively near future'. 362 A new aspect of the 'national interest' was emerging and 
although Britain and other maritime powers always maintained that rights to the 
continental shelf were completely separated from a title to the seas above, a state like 
Iceland could easily 'abuse' such claims to include fish as well, as Legal Adviser 
Fitzmaurice underlined. 363 
Most radical, still, were a number of Latin American states, primarily Chile, 
Ecuador and Peru, the signatories of the Santiago Declaration on a 200-mile limit in 
1952.364 In November 1954, this extensive claim was sensationally enforced deep off 
the coast of Peru. The country's Navy and Air Force forcibly seized five whaling 
vessels of the Greek shipping mogul. Aristotle Onassis. They were later ordered to pay 
a fine of three million US Dollars, a huge amount at the time. 
365 Since the whaling fleet 
held a Marine and War Risk insurance with Lloyd's in London, the penalty fell on 
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them. 366 Britain was therefore involved and had her own whaling effort to worry about 
as well. British shipping circles strongly condemned the harsh measures and, like the 
owners and trawlermen on Humberside in the Icelandic dispute, called for Royal Navy 
protection. 367 As off Iceland, however, the Admiralty was wary. In the summer of 1956, 
Nairne at Military Branch pointed out that although a frigate from the America and 
West Indies Station could easily sail to the disputed waters, a stronger presence would 
probably be required, something which could only be done 'at the expense of our heavy 
Cold War commitments elsewhere'. 368 And even if whaling interests and the principle 
of the freedom of the high seas were deemed important enough to risk naval battles, 
Chile, Ecuador and Peru would never relinquish their ocean claims because of such 
pressure. Furthennore, a passive policy on the Latin American expansion was also 
followed in Washington. The United States faced a similar dilemma as Britain after 
warships from Ecuador fired on and captured Californian tuna fishing vessels within its 
proclaimed 200-mile limit. The matter was raised in Congress and sanctions demanded. 
Still, the Ecuadorians were certain that the United States would not take any such action 
since, as one of their Ministers told the American Ambassador in Quito, Ecuador would 
have to retaliate in turn, and then adding with a laugh, 'you know the Russians are 
breathing down our necks'. 369 
Thus, the South American action highlights, if insignificantly, how the Cold War 
influenced the composition of power in the 1950s. An 'exploitation' of the 
superpowers' need for allies was not a unique Icelandic phenomenon. The US 
reservation certifies as well that Nairne's lack of the 'Nelson touch' in the South 
Pacific, just as the North Atlantic, was very logical. The correlation of power in the 
international system had developed to Britain's disadvantage when it came to her 
perceived interest of narrow territorial waters. 370 The gradual demise of the three-mile 
rule was decolonisation at sea, as it were. The 'have not' nations wanted to expel 
foreigners from their coastal waters just as much as colonized peoples wanted to put an 
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end to European exploitation of inland resources. 371 Indeed, in the mid-1950s the 
Colonial Office contended, mainly with colonies in the West Indies and East Africa in 
mind, that coastal states, which relied to some degree on fish stocks in their contiguous 
372 waters, must have the right to take unilateral measures against foreign fishing. The 
argument was, as Fitzmaurice ruefully stressed within Whitehall, quite understandable 
but unfortunately almost identical with the view of many coastal powers which Britain 
was trying to combat. 373 
Consequently, the biological or 'rational' reasons for equal access to fishing 
banks, which 'three-milers' like Britain or the United States espoused, cut little ice with 
the 'have nots' who compared it with nineteenth century imperialists, proclaiming a 
tutelary role against their colonial charges. The distrust was particularly obvious in the 
spring of 1955 when FAO, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations, convened in Rome a special conference on the living resources of the sea. 374 
Even when British fish scientists spoke of the need for regulation and conservation of 
high seas fisheries, the Latin Americans and other proponents for change 
unscrupulously used those arguments to advance their national sovereignty cause. 375 
Ultimately, the present or possible risk of stock depletion was not only a biological 
problem. Calls for conservation were also a continuation of politics by other means. 376 
Hence, the general development of the law of the sea in the mid-1950s reconfirms the 
importance of commitment, so obvious in the Anglo-Icelandic conflict. As the Foreign 
Minister of Chile put it in October 1954, 'necessity is the great generating source of 
law'. 377 
Naturally, juridical argumentation and debate was still important. It was portentous, 
however, that the International Law Commission, the main venue for that aspect of the 
story, convened on the premises of the old League of Nations in Geneva, perhaps the 
epitome of the futility of principle without power. It may be recalled as well that in the 
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Anglo-Norwegian dispute, the one landmark case on territorial waters after the Second 
World War, Britain had suffered a clear defeat. In 1953, moreover, Professor 
Lauterpacht, the British member of the International Law Commission, had just barely 
managed to stave off a forthright rejection of the three-mile rule in that body. The 
following year, he warned again that a rigid adherence to three miles was bound to 
create the impression 'that our attitude is purely negative and lacking in reasonableness 
and accommodation'. 378 
Now these were not novel thoughts. Again, a recall of recent developments 
would reveal that a reasonable initiative of, say, a six-mile limit for all purposes had 
already been discussed in Whitehall . 
379 And as before, all suggestions for a pragmatic 
action continued to disappear amidst 'Imperial', interdepartmental and institutional 
inhibitions. First of all, the exaggerated need for impossible powers in unnecessary 
places still blurred British views on the law of the sea. The perceived interests of 
Empire precluded a self-imposed departure from the three-mile rule. The analysis was 
by now familiar. The governing authorities in Gibraltar, Singapore and Hong Kong, to 
take an example, warned that any deviation from that principle could enable 
neighbouring powers to block free passage to these 'vital' outposts. 380 Secondly, 
departmental disagreements meant that a consensus on action remained impossible. 
When suggesting a change in the British position, the Colonial Office was sometimes 
joined by the Scottish Home Department which regularly argued for a ban on foreign 
trawling in the Moray Firth and the Firth of Clyde. 381 But the Fisheries Department 
could always point to the negative consequences for the distant-water fleet, especially 
with regard to the struggle against four miles and the closure of bays and fjords off 
Iceland. 382 Thirdly, these dampers on change were reinforced by the ingrained 
preference for a wait-and-see attitude. In March 1956, a Whitehall summary said that 
Britain might soon have to accept something like a six-mile limit of territorial waters: 
'But this is not a step we wish to take before we have to'. 383 Here again was the highly 
un-pragmatic policy of inaction. Later the time would arrive when Britain was prepared 
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to take the six-mile step. By then, however, a 12-mile step was required, at least. On the 
high seas, Britain was missing the boat. 
This was not a unique misfortune. More famously, 'too little, too late' has been a 
popular verdict on British attempts to control decolonisation around the globe. 384 In 
Europe, Britain was also missing a boat, notwithstanding the unfair benefit of hindsight 
and the intricacy of the European integration process . 
385 'You are just sticking to your 
guns', Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister and one of the main movers in 
the process, is to have remarked shortly after the ground-breaking Messina Conference 
at the beginning of June 1955 which London more or less ignored. 'England has not 
moved at all, and I am not going to move either'. 386 On the oceans, Britain also stuck to 
her guns, if only metaphorically in this day and age, and in the summer of 1955 the law 
of the sea had its own Messina. On 20 June, 1955, after a 'stiff fight' by Britain and a 
'dramatic reversal of fortune', the International Law Commission approved by seven 
votes to six a new, provisional draft by Franýois the Rapporteur. It confirmed the 
legality of the three-mile principle and the invalidity of all limits above 12 miles. 
Claims to waters in between were neither approved nor rejected but the text read that 
'international law does not require states to recognise a breadth beyond three miles'. 
This seemed a British triumph. The proposal 'comes as near to an affirmation of the 
three-mile rule as is ever likely to emerge', wrote Fitzmaurice (who had replaced 
Professor Lauterpacht in the Commission). On closer look, however, the mishmash was 
'hardly comprehensible' as the Icelandic Andersen remarked. Fitzmaurice was also 
realistic enough to admit that the halfway gain might well be lost later. 387 
That fear became clearer at the next session of the International Law 
Commission in 1956 when its members had been instructed to conclude the long and 
entangled work on the width of territorial waters. The Commission convened in late 
April and on June 8, the final and fateful vote on the limits issue took place. 'The three- 
mile limit is the only legal rule in existence', Fitzmaurice emphasised in public, 
blatantly against better knowledge. 388 He could again claim a victory of sorts as the 
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Commission accepted a compromise proposal by the Greek Spiropoulos. But whilst 
similar to Franýois's formula it did not, crucially, seek to verify the three-mile lirmt: 
1. The Commission recognises that international practice is not uniform 
as regards the delimitation of the territorial sea. 
2. The Commission considers that international law does not permit an 
extension of the territorial sea beyond twelve miles. 
3. The Commission, without taking any decision as to the breadth of the 
territorial sea within that limit, notes, on the one hand, that many 
states have fixed a breadth greater than three miles and, on the other 
hand, that many states do not recognise such a breadth when that of 
their own territorial sea is less. 
4. The Commission considers that the breadth of the territorial sea 
should be fixed by an international conference. 389 
In its closing report, the International Law Commission also discussed the proposal that 
exclusive fishing rights could be claimed on the basis of 'special economic 
circumstances'. The Icelanders had often raised this matter in international venues, most 
noticeably at the FAO Conference in Rome the summer before, and it was of course 
favoured by the Colonial Office in London. In Geneva, Fitzmaurice worked hard against 
the idea and again the Commission could not come to a clear conclusion. It did confirm, 
however, that the Icelandic contention 'may reflect problems and interests which 
deserve recognition in international law'. 390 
So, to sum up, this was the legal situation in 1956: for seven years Britain (and other 
maritime powers) had not only managed to stave off a repudiation of the three-mile rule 
at the International Law Commission but also prevented an endorsement of a wider 
limit. This was an achievement which confirmed British legal and diplomatic skills. On 
the other hand, the success was only secured by sacrificing the compromise strategy 
which all knew would in the end be inevitable. Within the Commission, Britain had at 
best achieved a Pyrrhic victory. Future battles would be even harder, partly because of 
the rigid defence of the three-mile limit. Predictably, the 'have nots' interpreted the non- 
committal Spiropoulos solution in their favour, just like the Latin Americans had earlier 
used the Truman Declarations rather freely. Hans G. Andersen, for instance, would 
assert that from now on all extensions to 12 miles were permissible. 391 In any case, as 
Fitzmaurice asserted after the Commission's wrapping up in 1956, in the next encounter 
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cno amount of legal argument, however cogently put and however much supported by 
authority, will make the slightest impression'. 392 It would be a political battle where 
bargaining and concessions would be called for. Even the Admiralty agreed. But while 
it was ostensibly prepared to consider a retreat to six miles to stave off something 
worse, the usual proviso that '[w]e shall have to wait and see' seriously undermined the 
apparent show of good sense. 393 
By late 1956, however, the tide was clearly turning. The UN General Assembly 
confirmed that a Law of the Sea Conference would be held in the near future and from 
New York Fitzmaurice wrote words of caution to Fisheries Secretary Wall: 'For your 
information the point that is worrying is the possibility that the strategic and other 
factors requiring a narrow breadth of territorial sea may eventually be made to prevail, 
but only by admitting a wider breadth for the specific purpose of fisheries'. 394 In other 
words, Britain might have to surrender fish for security. Such a sacrifice would of 
course be difficult but, furthermore, the procrastination would have to end. Britain 
would have to show foresight instead of the everlasting wait-and-see attitude, and a 
level-headed recognition of contemporary capabilities would have to replace a wistful 
harking for past realities. As if that would happen. 
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Ill. Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea. Cod 
War and International Conferences, 1956-1960 
3.1. Blackmail and Blindness. Preparations for the First Law of 
the Sea Conference,, 1956-58 
The rather gloomy assertion about Britain's damaging obstinacy highlights a main 
theme of this thesis, namely that the British fight for the freedom of the high seas in the 
North Atlantic was marked by outdated ideas about the country's interests and 
capabilities. The following assessment of events up to the law of the sea conference in 
1958 will confirm this claim. It will also reaffirm that the supposedly pragmatic policy 
of not crossing bridges precipitately harmed the British bargaining position. At the 
crucial moment, Britain was unprepared. On the other hand, this part of the story shows 
as well how hard it was to negotiate a tolerable deal with opponents like the Icelanders 
who seemed powerful enough to 'blackmail' whomever they chose. 
The Icelandic Socialists, having been forced to accept the postponement of any move on 
fishing limits over the United Nations General Assembly in late 1956, were determined 
to force through an extension as soon as possible afterwards. ' Such determination was 
by no means only on the Socialist agenda, however. Two MPs from the Conservative 
Party called for action in Parliament and Andrew Gilchrist accurately predicted that 'it 
would be quite wrong to imagine that a Conservative-dominated Cabinet would be less 
likely to act on limits than the present lot'. 2 
Yet, although there was unity in Iceland on the need for new measures, timing 
was a different matter. Apart from the People's Alliance and enthusiastic individuals 
elsewhere, all parties seemed willing to show some accommodation and wait until the 
forthcoming conference on the law of the sea. The Socialists were undeterred, 
nonetheless, and in the summer of 1957 a full-blown Cabinet crisis erupted. Uldvik 
J6sepsson called for a limited extension off the fishing limit in fall, with seasonal 
closures outside Faxa-Bay, the Westfiords and the Eastfiords, 12-16 miles seawards. 
3 
Although the move would undoubtedly have been popular, Gudmundsson threatened to 
resign unless the Fisheries Minister agreed that any change should be postponed until 
1 J6sepsson, Landhelgisindlid, 34. 
2 PRO: F0371/128767/NL1351/19, Gilchrist to Given, 19.2.1957. Italics in the original. Also 
Althingistidindi 1956-1957 D, cols. 317-320,393-40 1, and, 41thingistidindi 1956-1957, A, 402-405. 
3 Thi-FRN: 1989-B/555-1/L. 11.1, J6sepsson memorandum, 21.6.1957. 
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the UN conference. 4 The life of the coalition hung in the balance. As Gilchrist 
estimated, if J6sepsson issued a new regulation on fishing limits single-handedly, which 
was within his constitutional right, 'I should not expect to find any Icelander anxious to 
take the responsibility for withdrawing it'. He did not discount the possibility that Prime 
Minister J6nasson, never as amenable as Gudmundsson, might change horses in 
midstream and go with the People's Alliance. 5 That would have left the Social 
Democrats in an awful position, and their acquiescence in the Socialist proposal could 
not be excluded. In the end the Progressives and the Social Democrats were convinced 
enough of the need to wait for the Law of the Sea Conference. In return, J6sepsson had 
them promise in private that immediately after its conclusion, the fishing limits would 
6 be extended . 
The Icelandic patience should not be explained by a reference to a sudden respect for 
the principle of negotiations about the delimitation of the sea. Iceland's power in any 
conflict with Britain, vested as it was in her strategic position in the North Atlantic, 
would decrease dramatically if the rulers in Reykjavik incurred the wrath of the 
authorities in Washington. It may be recalled that only the year before the prospect of 
American anger had encouraged the Progressives and Social Democrats to abandon 
their plan, admittedly always half-hearted, to expel US forces from the island. The 
happy ending had convinced the Americans that Socialist participation in the Icelandic 
goverm-nent could be tolerated and in the spring and summer of 1957, the United States 
gave Iceland, which as usual needed assistance badly, a string of generous loans. 7 But 
they were of course contingent upon an American presence in Keflavik and a pro- 
Western policy in Reykjavik .8 'No 
base-no money' remained the message from 
Washington. 
As before, however, the Icelanders could also play power politics. 'No money- 
no base' was another way to describe the bargaining. In the spring of 1957, the Soviet 
Union had renewed the pledge from the previous autumn to provide a huge loan in 
exchange for fish. 9 The Progressives and the Social Democrats were not keen to 
4 PRO: F0371/128768/NLI351/44, Gilchrist to FO, 6.6.1958 and 7.6.1957. F0371/128768/NLI351/46, 
Gilchrist to FO, 12.6.1957. Also J6sepsson, Landhelgisni, ýlid, 34-36. 
5 PRO: F0371/128768/NLI351/44, Gilchrist to FO, 6.6.1958. 
6 J6sepsson, Landhelgism6lid, 36-37. These assurances were given in October, according to J6sepsson. 
7 Together, Iceland received more than $14 millions. See Ingimundarson, Struggle, 52-55, and 
i eldlinu, 
346-362. 
8 FRUS 1955-1957 IV, 620-623, Northem-European chiefs of mission conference, London, 19. - 
21.9.1957. 
9 Ingimundarson, Struggle, 53-54, and i eldlinu, 346-352. Also blafsson, Kxrufjlagar, 217-233. 
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increase the Icelandic dependence on the eastern bloc but the Moscow proposition was 
favourable, and they certainly knew how to use it. "Iceland is playing off the West 
against the East to obtain finance', it was observed at the Bank of England. 10 When 
Hans G. Andersen was pleading with Paul-Henri Spaak for one of the loans which, 
uniquely, was to be organised through NATO, he warned that a rejection could put 
Iceland into the clutches of the Soviet Union. " And that, it goes without saying, could 
not be allowed to happen. The Reykjavik government received the loan and gladly 
accepted the precondition that the Soviet advances would be rejected. 12 Although there 
was relief in Washington that Iceland was kept in the right camp, there was no 
happiness about Icelandic tactics and the price which had to be paid. 'Is Iceland 
blackmailing us? ' asked an exasperated National Security Council official in August 
1957.13 While 'blackmail' was too strong a word to describe the Icelandic negotiation 
tactics, the assistance to the left-wing government demonstrates brilliantly how the 
'Communist bogeyman' continued to strengthen the Icelandic side on the Cold War 
field. The loans saga demonstrates as well how realistic or non-doctrinaire American 
decision-makers could be in the advancement of their most basic interest, the military 
and strategic position against the Communist bloc. 14 
The US willingness to go to almost any lengths to secure its strategic interests in 
Iceland was bad news for the British. During the four-mile dispute earlier in the decade, 
they had suffered the strategic strength of the demanding ally in the north and in the 
summer of 1957, Gilchrist heartily asserted what was to be mooted in Washington: 
'blackmail' was without doubt the right word for Iceland's relations with the West. 15 
Within NATO, Britain was the strongest opponent of a special rescue operation for the 
Icelanders, arguing that the money would be wasted on over-ambitious projects in a 
badly run economy. 16 Moreover, Britain would probably have liked to extend the 'no 
10 BEA: OV35/7, note for the Deputy Governor, 26.8.1957. 
1 PRO: F0371/128756/NLI 0338/34, Andersen to Spaak, 1.7.1957. 
12 Ingimundarson, Struggle, 55. Also North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Archives, Brussels 
[henceforward NATO]: C-M(57)116, IS-0007, 'The Economic offence of the Sino-Soviet bloc'. Report 
by the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy, 21.8.1957. 
" DDE: White House Office, National Security Council Staff. Papers, 1948-61. Special Staff File Series, 
Box 3, 'Iceland', Weber memorandum, 20.8.1957. For similar expressions, see NA-CAN: 
RG25/6113/50373-1.2, Washington Embassy to Ottawa, 5.3.1957, and SA: UUKK, 6.9.1957. 
14 Although any comparison with the Icelandic situation can only be indirect, see here Michael Hunt's 
survey of American 'opportunism' and ideology in relations with the Third World. Michael H. Hunt, 
'Conclusions: the Decolonization Puzzle in US Policy: Promise versus Performance', in David Ryan and 
Victor Pungong (eds), The United States and Decolonization. Power and Freedom (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan 2000), 207-229. 
15 PRO: F0371/128769/NLI351/60, Gilchrist to Roberts, 16.7.1957. 
16 PRO: F0371/128756/NLI0338/45, Brimelow minute, 1.8.1957, and F0371/128769 NL1351, '64, 
Brimelow to Smart, Treasury, 9.8.1957. 
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base-no money' provision so that it would cover assurances on fishing limits as well., 7 
In fairness, John Muccio repeatedly conveyed to Foreign Minister Gudmundsson the 
'sincere hope' that Iceland would refrain from a limits extension before the law of the 
sea conference. 18 Undoubtedly, these representations influenced the decision to wait. 
They were not ultimatums, however. At the highest levels in Washington there was no 
doubt that strategically vital installations mattered more than the unconditional defence 
of a legal principle, not to mention the interests of some British trawlermen. 
If this was not worrying enough in London, the United States appeared ever more 
willing to surrender fish for security all over the world. From the summer of 1956, when 
the International Law Commission gave its inconclusive verdict on territorial waters, 
American military thinkers had stepped up their effort to demonstrate to the 'free world' 
the numerous strategic disadvantages of extensions. 19 a The security interests of the US 
must outweigh all other considerations', stated the Department of Defense in late 1957, 
insisting that three miles for navigation be guarded and that the quidpro quo should be 
a 12-mile exclusive fishing limit. 20 Before the conference, the United States did not 
commit itself to such bargaining, preferring to see which way the wind would blow and 
toying with the idea of 'abstention', whereby only states which had fished in coastal 
waters would retain that right. 21 Yet, a compromise on 12 miles for fishing would 
certainly be supported if the need arose, and that would probably be the case. 22 The 
Americans knew just as well as most others who were preparing for Geneva that a pure 
three-mile limit would never be accepted there. 
Furthermore, Canada was going to submit to the conference a proposal for an 
additional nine-mile fishing zone. Facing steadily increasing foreign fishing off its 
coasts, Ottawa had always been unwilling to take unilateral measures like Norway or 
Iceland but the conference seemed to offer an excellent chance to protect the fishing 
17 PRO: F0371/128767/NLI351/17, interdepartmental meeting, 13.2.1957. 
18 NARA: RG59/740B. 022/2-1857, Stanford memorandum, 18.2.1957, RG59/740B. 022/5-2157, Muccio 
to Dulles, 21.5.1957. PRO: F0371/128768/NLI351/44, Gilchrist to FO, 7.6.1957. 
19 PRO: F0371/121205/GWI/67, Washington Embassy to FO, 30.8.1956. Also NATO: AC/100-VR/6, 
IS-AC-0370, verbatim record of presentations in connection with defence planning, 25.2.1956, and FRUS 
1955-57 XI, 559-566, Department of Navy memorandum, undated but received in State Department 
25.10.1956. The arguments are familiar from earlier discussions of the British Admiralty's objections to a 
repudiation of the three-mile principle: expensive enforcement, navigational problems, possible closure of 
straits to warships, reduction of free air space, clandestine use of neutral territorial waters and increased 
difficulty in obtaining intelligence off foreign shores. 
20 NARA: RG59/399.731/11-157, Sanders to Bums, 1.11.1957, and RG59/399.731/12-2757, Sprague to 
Murphy, 27.12.1957. 
21 NARA: RG59/399.731/10-57, Luboeansky to Dreier, 3.10.1957, and RG59/399.731/10-2157, Sanders 
memorandum, 22.10.1957 
22 FRUS 1958-1960 11,648, State Department paper, 20.2.1958. 
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grounds through international agreement. 23 On top of American ambivalence, the 
Canadian attitude could not but seriously worry the British. Other potential allies looked 
willing to break ranks as well. Both Norway and Denmark felt, like Canada, that the 
conference provided an opportunity to satisfy fishing interests without the 
unpleasantness of unilateral or legally debatable actions. Admittedly, Norway's 
maritime interests were still contradictory. 24 In the southern part of the country, the 
herring fishermen who sailed close up to other shores would be hurt by a general 
extension. Norwegian seal and whale hunters and the great merchant fleet were also 
against all encroachments on the high seas. On the other side, however, were the inshore 
fishen-nen off North Nor-way who demanded, as they had done in the late 1940s, an end 
to the 'trawler plague'. 25 Gradually, the advocates of extension gained a slight 
advantage. In late January 1958, Fisheries Minister Nils Lys6 argued that on balance a 
12-mile fishing limit would best serve the country's interests, and that if Denmark, 
Iceland and Canada all supported such a line at Geneva, then so must Norway. 26 (The 
reduction of territorial waters from four miles to three would have to be accepted as 
well). The Norwegian delegation was instructed to take no initiative but support the 
Canadian compromise when it had gained ground and even, instead of a breakdown of 
the conference, a 12-mile limit of territorial waters. 27 
Danish views varied in a similar way. The fishermen of Denmark were against 
extensions and the authorities in Copenhagen were unwilling, as had been evident in the 
Anglo-Faroese negotiations earlier in the decade, to upset Britain or try to shape the law 
of the sea. 28 The Faroese, however, would not remain passive, especially if their 
neighbours the Icelanders cruised ahead of them. Already at the end of 1956, when 
Iceland had received Britain's tacit acceptance of a four-mile limit and an agreement on 
landings in the fishing ports, the Faroese wished for a revision of the more 
circumscribed limits which were negotiated with Britain the year before. The Danish 
authorities managed to stave off such calls by pointing to the forthcoming conference, 
29 
but an agreement on extensions there, for instance the Canadian compromise, would 
23 See A. E. Gotlieb, 'Canadian Diplomatic Initiatives: The Law of the Sea', in Michael Fry (ed. ), 
'Freedom and Change'. Essays in Honour ofLester B. Pearson (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 
1975), 136-140. 
2' For an overview, see Atle SondenA, 'Bakgnmen for den norske fiskerigrenseutvidelsen i 1961', (BA 
thesis, University of Oslo), 1994,35-58, and Floistad, 'Hovedlinjene', 74-78. 
25 Floistad, 'Hovedlinjene', 74-76. 
26 UD: 26.11/23/IX, Lys6 to Foreign Ministry, 21.1.1958. 
27 SA: joint meeting of Foreign and Constitutional Committee and Maritime and Fisheries Committee, 
19.2.1958. 
28 See section 2.5,99- 100, and Finn Laursen, Danmark og havretten (Copenhagen: Dansk 
Udenrigspolitisk Institut og Jurist- og Okonomforbundets Forlag, 1988), 17-23. 
29 RA-DEN: 55. DAN. 3INI, Svenningsen to Steensen-Leeth, 25.6.1957. 
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obviously solve a lot of problems for Denmark. Notwithstanding the preference for 
passivity, the Danish representatives at Geneva would endorse proposals for change if 
they thought they had a fair chance of success. 30 
Thus, Britain could not count on the support of Demnark and Norway, just like 
she could exclude Canada outright and harbour serious doubts about the United States. 
And if that was the case with friends, what was to be expected from all the unmistakable 
opponents, like the Communist bloc, the South Americans and the newly independent 
states of Africa and Asia? They would all campaign for six, 12 or more. 31 In short, all 
hopes that a pure three-mile rule could be sanctified at Geneva would be a sure sign of 
wishful thinking. 
British preparations for Geneva only began in earnest in October 1957, four months 
before it was set to begin. Legal Adviser Fitzmaurice it was who shocked the system 
into action by a long memorandum on the conference ahead. His analysis was frank but 
fair: the three-mile rule would never be ratified at Geneva and an extension to 12 miles 
could only be avoided by the offer of some compromise line. Two main options should 
be considered, the Canadian suggestion of three-mile territorial waters and an additional 
nine-mile fishing zone, or, which Fitzmaurice seemed to favour, a six-mile limit for all 
purposes. If Britain and the United States promoted such a solution, along with 
'reasonable concessions on fishery conservation' farther out, then they might just be 
able to hold the line. 32 
The Legal Adviser's analysis caused little joy in Whitehall, although all 
professed that something had to be done. 33 But how hard it would be! The Fisheries 
Department pointed out that six miles was the absolute maximum which the industry 
could tolerate and the trawler owners themselves insisted that they could only accept 
such a concession if Britain would first 'fight tooth and nail' for the status quo. Six 
miles, moreover, might lead to the need for direct subsidies, a commitment which the 
government was keen to avoid. As for a 12-mile limit, that would simply 'ruin' the 
industry. 34 At a meeting with the owners on February 11, John Hare, who only the 
month before had become Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, promised that 
30 PRO: F0371/134956/NLI351/31, Copenhagen to FO, 29.1.1958. 
31 See Swarztrauber, Three-Mile Limit, 209-2 10. 
32 PRO: F0371/127722/GWI/I 12, Fitzmaurice memorandum, 16.10.1957. 
33 PRO: MAF209/1642, Wall to Wright, 15.11.1957, F0371/127722/GWI/I 12, Dickinson to Wright, 
21.11.1957, and Hetherington to Wright, 22.11.1957. 
34 PRO: MAF209/1643, BTF minute, 17.2.1958. Also Bryrimor Jones Library, University of Hull 
[henceforward BJL]: DPW/13/1 1, Phillips to Patrick Wall, 15.2.1958. 
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the three-mile rule would indeed be stoutly defended. Six miles would only be offered if 
it was absolutely essential and he did not mention at all the possibility of a 12-mile 
limit. 35 It was of course natural that a guardian of the industry's interests like Hare 
would listen to its opinions and he understandably did not want to start his tenure at 
MAFF by upsetting the BTF. Even so, it was unfortunate that claims about the 
calamitous consequences of a 12-mile limit were swallowed, hook, line and sinker. The 
injury was exaggerated and the history of the four-mile disputes with Norway and 
Iceland, where forewarnings about 'ruin' failed to materialise, should have been 
36 remembered . 
Meanwhile, the Service Departments were as forthright in their fight for three- 
mile territorial waters. A retreat to six miles would close or restrict various high seas 
passages, and the old worries about disadvantages in wartime and increased 
opportunities for Soviet submarines resurfaced. The Chiefs of Staff concluded, 
therefore, that the lesser of two evils would be the three-mile territorial sea with 
additional fishing limits. 37 Six miles could be suffered in the last resort, but only if naval 
and air rights of free passage would still be measured from three miles. 38 As before, the 
Chiefs were too stuck in the past when they exaggerated the need for unchanged access 
to old outposts of the Empire. Speculations about the drawbacks of wider limits in a 
fature war were unrealistic as well. As P. D. Nairne wrote in the Admiralty, a nuclear 
exchange would probably not leave Britain in a position to do much in the way of 
blockading enemy or neutral waters. Thus, 'it is doubtful whether wider territorial limits 
would be as embarrassing as they might at first appear'. 39 But Naime clearly did not 
catch the attention of his peers, whose minds had been shaped in the naval battles of one 
or even two world wars. '[I]n strategic terms we're always thinking of the last war', one 
40 Whitehall official later lamented . 
So, would no compromise fit with Britain's 'national interest'? There existed, as 
Deputy Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend wrote in mid-February, 'an almost insoluble 
conflict between strategic and economic interests' .41 Apparently, 
it could be as hard to 
get a policy accepted in London as it would be in the outside world. And there was not 
35 PRO: MAF209/1643, Wall minute, 17.2.1958. 
36 Catch figures in the 1960s were to show that fishing outside 12 miles remained feasible. Fisheries 
Jurisdiction in Iceland (Reykjavik: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1972), 10-11. 
37 PRO: DEFE4/103, COS(5 8), 8th meeting, 23.1.195 8. 
38 PRO: CAB129/9l, C(58)37, Nutting memorandum, 14.2.1958. On passage rights, see Churchill and 
Lowe, Law, 68-76. 
39 PRO: ADM 1/265 5 1, Naime minute, 27.1.1958. For similar doubts about the disadvantage of wider 
territorial waters for the acquisition of intelligence, see Director of Naval Intelligence minute, 1.1.1958. 
40 Sir Guy Millard, Private Secretary to Anthony Eden, quoted in Hennessy, Muddling Through, 130. 
41 PRO: CAB21/2762, Trend minute, 17.2.1958. Also LC02/7798, Dobson minute, 17.2.1958. 
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much time to spare. Only on February 18 did the Cabinet discuss Britain's policy on 
territorial waters, less than a week before the start of the conference and for the first 
time in five years if a short mention of the Icelandic dispute in 1956 is excluded. Yet 
this was an avowed 'vital interest'. Symbolically, the item was last on the agenda and 
the minutes indicate a fairly brief discussion. The Attorney General, Sir Reginald 
Manningham-Buller, pointed out that the law of the sea was not developing in Britain's 
favour but other Ministers emphasised that the trawling industry relied on narrow limits. 
A six-mile concession seemed tolerable but only if present passage rights were 
maintained. The meeting admitted, however, that the conference would hardly bless 
such a reservation and Macmillan summed up by saying that 'our aim must be to 
promote a majority decision by the Conference which would inflict the least damage to 
our own interests, both strategic and economic'. Manningham-Buller, who was to lead 
the British delegation at Geneva, was instructed to report on initial developments there 
before the government would commit itself to any particular policy. 42 Britain would 
wait and see. 
The belated handling and the rather rash conclusion demonstrate a double 
indolence. On the one hand, if the delimitation of territorial waters concerned Britain so 
much, then the matter should have been debated in detail. On the other hand, a frank 
examination of that kind might have forced the decision-makers in the highest echelons 
of power in London to realise that the times were changing, regardless of British wishes 
to the contrary. Here again, therefore, was the problem of 'pragmatism'. The preference 
for reaction and aversion to forward thinking lessened the likelihood of a well worked- 
out policy. Quiet, calm deliberation would not untangle the maritime knot because time 
had run out. 43 Already in the summer of 1957 did officials at the Fisheries Department 
worry about 'the apparent lack of drive in the Foreign Office in these matters'. 44 
Tellingly, they failed to have the forthcoming conference discussed at a meeting of 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers even though they described it as 'the biggest thing in 
international law which has hit this country'. 45 But since it had not hit already it was not 
worth debating. 
Instead, the 'pragmatic' wait-and-see attitude increased the danger of 
'groupthink', wishful thinking and short-sightedness-all blemishes which before had 
42 PRO: CAB 128/32, CC(58), 17'h meeting, 18.2.1958. CAB21/2762, Trend minute, 17.2.1958. 
43 'Quiet, calm deliberation disentangles every knot' was a favourite maxim of Macmillan. See Peter 
Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office andIts Holders Since 1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2000), 253- 
254. 
44 PRO: MAF209/1642, Savage minute, 29.5.1957. 
45 PRO: D035/9053, Diggines minute, 6.6.1957. 
140 
led to miscalculations in Britain's failed fight for freedom of the high seas. First, 
Fitzmaurice unquestionably knew most in London about the prevailing currents in the 
law of the sea, and outside Whitehall he privately admitted that only a proposal on the 
Canadian lines stood any chance of acceptance at Geneva. 46 His more circumspect 
observations in the 'long memorandum' and elsewhere were probably influenced by the 
calculation, equally correct, that whatever he might argue within Whitehall, officials 
who knew less about the external factors but held strong convictions about what Britain 
could tolerate would never agree to anything like the Canadian alternative. The 
politicians would be even less knowledgeable and more prejudiced. 
A fair degree of wishful thinking could also go unchecked when there was so 
little time to examine the actual situation. In general, it is a well known phenomenon 
that under stress, decision-makers tend to suppress negative input and exaggerate the 
potentiality of their previously held beliefs . 
47 When the Cabinet discussed the six-mile 
offer on February 18, the reservations which Fitzmaurice had stressed in his 
memorandum on that concession-the rights of coastal states to regulate fisheries 
outside territorial waters and the absolute need for unity with the United States-were 
never mentioned. On the contrary, the proposal was made yet more unattractive to the 
majority of participants at Geneva by the rider on passage rights up to three miles. 
Admittedly, Ministers realised that such a reservation might well not be accepted. 48 In 
fact, it was definitely a 'non-starter', as Fitzmaurice wrote in retrospect, but always 
knew. 49 The Americans, furthermore, seemed determined not to waver at all from the 
three-mile limit of territorial waters. 50 For them, the British approach was anathema. 
The promise to fight stoutly before any peace offer at Geneva was also 
detrimental. At home, Hare and other British statesmen could reap some short term 
rewards by putting up a hopeless but heroic resistance. On the other hand, at the 
conference and in the long run, serious damage could result from the bravado. In 
particular, the obstinacy might have adverse effects off Iceland. In the last days before 
the conference, Ambassador Gilchrist felt that although the Icelanders were determined 
to extend the fishing limits, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and many others 
wanted Britain to 'build a bridge'. They did not spell out how it should be constructed 
and Gilchrist may have exaggerated the goodwill, but his conclusion was correct: 'If we 
46 UD: 26.11/23/Vlll, Seyerstad minute, 4.11.1957. NARA: RG59/399.731/2-2158, Gowen to Dulles, 
21.2.1958. 
47 See Vertzberger, The World, 98-99,120,189-191, and Holsti, 'Theories', 99-136. 
48 PRO: CAB 128/32, CC(58), 17'h meeting, 18.2.1958. 
49 PRO: F0371/133746/GWI 1/19, Fitzmaurice report, July 1958. 
50 NATO: C-R(58)1 1, IS-0008, NAC meeting, 22.2.1958. 
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don't build a bridge, we shall be confronted with unilateral extensions, as sure as eggs is 
eggs' .51 This was true 
but in February 1958, worries about the mood in Reykjavik could 
be put off. First, Britain would have to state her case at Geneva, ominously described on 
the eve of the conference as 'the last resting place of so many lost causes'. 52 
51 PRO: F0371/134956/NLI351/35, Gilchrist to Brimelow, 14.2.1958. Also NARA: RG59/399.731/2- 
2458, Muccio to Dulles, 24.2-1958. 
52 Manchester Guardian, 4.2.1958. 
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3.2. Dead Ducks, Non-Starters and a Stab in the Back: The 
Geneva Conference, 1958 
On February 24,1958, the first United Nations Law of the Sea Conference began in 
Geneva. Delegates from 87 states gathered to decide on numerous maritime matters. 53 
The breadth of the territorial sea was most significant but the regime of fishing and 
navigation on the high seas would also be debated, as well as the continental shelf and 
the rights of landlocked states. Discussions would first take place in committees and 
then be followed by a plenary session where proposals would need a two-thirds majority 
for approval. 54 It was a mammoth gathering, the largest conference which the United 
Nations had ever organised. 
The magnitude showed. After about four weeks of deliberations, progress had been 
disappointingly slow. In addition to a prolonged wrangle about procedure. the delegates 
had-almost ritual istical ly-spent much time establishing that they were determined to 
stand their ground. 55 In the process, four main groups evolved: the Soviet bloc was the 
most cohesive and had a clear aim, to advocate the 12-mile limit of territorial waters. 
The Afro-Asian bloc was also for extensions, united by a resistance to all forms of 
'colonialism' and Western exploitation. Similarly, the Latin American bloc wanted 
action but was divided into the '200-milers' and more moderate countries. And then 
there was the group which advocated or accepted narrow territorial waters, consisting 
mainly of Western states (apart from Canada and Iceland of course). 56 
The real differences of opinion were worsened by a clash in approaches to the 
conference. For most of the Latin Americans and Afro-Asians, it was a political venue. 
Repeatedly and lengthily, they spoke about colonial injustice and rejected all references 
to established international law. Conversely, the 'learned' representatives of the West, 
annoyed by the harangue, tried to highlight the juridical, historical, economic and 
strategic reasons for the reinforcement of the three-mile rule. 
57 Britain, the erstwhile 
53 The number of states attending fell by one during the conference because of the unification of Egypt 
and Syria in the United Arab Republic. For an overview of the conference, see Swarztrauber, Three-Mile 
Limit, 209-214, and W. W. Bishop, 'The 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the 
Living Resources of the High Seas', Columbia Law Review, Vol. 62, No. 7,1962,1206-1229. 
54 See Davis, keland, 78-80. 
55 PRO: F0371/133266/UEW 11/100, Greenhill to Sudbury, 2.4.1958. 
56 For a detailed analysis of the blocs, see Alexander Govin Nadeson, 'An Analysis of the Geneva 
Conferences on the Breadth of the Territorial Sea', (PhD-thesis, The American University, Washington, 
DC, 1968), 58-76. 
57 PRO: F0371/133746/GWI 1/19, Fitzmaurice report, July 1958, NARA: RG59/399.731/4-2758, Geneva 
delegation to Washington, 27.4.1958. Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University 
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master of the seas, was then in the forefront, led by the formidable Manningham-Buller. 
A leading silk and practitioner at the Bar, he was known to friends as 'stout and 
stalwart' but as *Bullying Manners' to others. 58 True to brief and nature, he defended 
the three-mile rule with much aplomb . 
59 Behind the scenes, however, Manningham- 
Buller held the limited six-mile concession in reserve and tried to convince the 
American representatives of its benefits. 60 They, in turn, urged the British to embrace 
the Canadian initiative (which quickly had become known as the '3+9' proposal), once 
it was absolutely clear that the three-mile limit would not be ratified. The British 
approach, complained Arthur H. Dean, the leader of the United States delegation, was 
ýcompletely unrealistic' and could cause great damage. 61 For if the West was to have its 
way, unity was vital. 
Already on March 4, the United States therefore decided to use what was known 
in Washington as the 'Dear Harold' strategy: 
62 President Eisenhower expressed to 
Prime Minister Macmillan his grave concerns over the refusal to accept the '3+9' 
63 
proposal. The pressure resulted at once in a frantic re-examination in the British camp. 
On the battlefront, Manningham-Buller and Fitzmaurice thought that if the US- 
Canadian approach looked likely to achieve the required majority at the conference with 
British support, then it should be supported. 64 This was quite a turnaround. Observing 
events in Geneva for the BTF, Sir Famdale Phillips was dismayed and back in Britain, 
the Fisheries Department continued to record the 'calamitous' effects of a 12-mile 
fisheries limit. 65 Somewhat surprisingly, the Chiefs of Staff did not welcome the 
proposed change either. Having conceded before the conference that a further fishing 
zone might be the necessary price for narrow territorial waters, they now argued that on 
close examination a further fishing limit was in fact inadmissible since it could 
Library, Ithaca, New York [henceforward CUL]: 4 100, Box 85, Dean to Ehrlich, 15.4.1958, and BA- 
BML: B 116/13178, Meseck minute, 26.4.1958. 
58 For the former description, see Peter Rawlinson, A Price Too High. An Autobiography (London, 1989), 
246. For the latter, see Alistair Home, Macmillan 1957-1986 Volume 1I of the Official Biography 
(London: Macmillan, 1988), 347. 
59 Davis, Iceland, 3 1, and Times, 26.2.1958. 
60 PRO: CAB 129/92, C(58)52, Lloyd memorandum, 25.2.1958. 
61 NARA: RG59/399.731/3-458, Dean to Dulles, 4.3.1958. 
62 On this description, see DDE: Christian A. Herter Papers. Box 4, Chronological File - March 1958 (4), 
Herter to Jandrey, 8.3.1958. 
63 FRUS 1958-1960 11,651-652, Eisenhower to Macmillan, 4.3.1958. 
64 PRO: NIAF209/1643, Wall to Hitchman, 4.3.1958, and CAB21/2762, Trend minute, 10.3.1958. 
65 BJL DPW/13/200, Phillips to Patrick Wall, undated but written in early March 1958. PRO: 
MAF209/1643, Savage minute, 5.3.1958. 
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eventually become a proper territorial sea. Britain should simply stick to the tried and 
tested three-mile rule. 66 
The disregard for realities is stunning. The Chiefs might as well have decided 
that British supremacy in the age of Pax Britannica had been very pleasant and should 
be re-established. Unfortunately, however, the defenders of fishing and strategic 
interests in Whitehall seemed more convincing than the messengers from the front. The 
proceedings at Geneva had developed into something resembling a crisis and such 
situations may result in a 'contraction of authority', when top decision-makers overrule 
lower-level specialists. 67 Moreover, Manningham-Buller misread the currents at the 
conference and quickly felt that the fight for the three-mile rule was not yet lost, 
especially if an agreement on regulated fishing on the high seas could be established. 68 
On March 8, Macmillan said so to Eisenhower, and greatly exaggerated the supposedly 
disastrous economic consequences of a 12-mile limit, weaving in some strategic losses 
for good measure: 
You ask that commercial considerations should not be permitted to control. It is 
not merely a matter of commerce, but of the livelihood of a large number of 
people of this country. Arrangements which denied to our nationals our 
traditional fishing grounds on the high seas, as a general extension of fishery 
limits to 12 miles would do, would put in jeopardy the very existence of the 
most modem part of our fishing fleet ... which 
is of great strategic importance to 
us in terms of both men and ships. 69 
Four days later, the Prime Minister wrote the President again, stating the British belief 
'that there may be quite a measure of support for a three-mile limit for all purposes'. 
70 
But this 'Dear Ike' persuasion did not work. 'We believe this is wishful thinking', the 
American delegation at Geneva rightly commented, 'and longer UK postpones facing 
up to hard decision the more difficult it will be to keep those who want to help us in 
line'. 71 On March 14, Eisenhower urged Macmillan afresh to reconsider. 72 So shortly 
after Suez, the Prime Minister might have been expected to heed the American advice. 
His top priority, it has been said, was the resurrection of the 'special relationship' 
66 PRO: DEFE4/105, C. O. S. (58) 22nd meeting, 7.3.1958. Also DEFE5/82, COS(58)69, Vice Chief of 
Naval Staff note, 11.3.1958. 
67 Charles Hermann, Crises in Foreign Policy. A Siniulation Analysis (New York: Bobbs-Merill, 1969), 
161,163. A similar thing had happened to Fitzmaurice during the Suez debacle. 'Fitz is the last person I 
want consulted', Anthony Eden is then to have retorted. 'The lawyers are always against our doing 
anything'. Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson: the Stort, of Suez (London: Constable, 1967), 95 
68 PRO: CAB 129/92, C(58)58, Manningham-Buller memorandum, 7.3.195 8. 
69 PRO: PREM 11/2976, Macmillan to Eisenhower, 8.3.1958 
70 PRO: PREM 11/2314, Macmillan to Eisenhower, 12.3.195 8. 
71 FRUS 1958-6011,656, Geneva delegation to Washington, 12.3.1958. Also KCLMA: MF602-0096, 
Herter memorandum, 13.3.1958. 
72 FRUS 1958-60 11,658, Eisenhower to Macmillan, 14.3.1958. 
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between Britain and the United States. 73 Furthermore, Manningham-Buller had lost his 
short-lived hope for the survival chances of the three-mile limit and Fitzmaurice, never 
as optimistic, wrote to London on the same day as Eisenhower: 'It is perhaps not 
realised at home that at present the United Kingdom position at the conference is one of 
the most intransigent'. 74 Macmillan, understandably, got both angry and confused. 
'Someone will have to try to analyse for me this position. Fitzmaurice's last telegram 
goes back on everything I have been made to say to the President'. 75 
Yet no change occurred. On March 18, the Cabinet decided to introduce the six- 
mile alternative when the time was ripe and oppose the '3+9' option. 76 The 're- 
representation' of the problem had, if anything, hardened the Cabinet. Just like Britain 
had ignored adversary developments in the Icelandic dispute earlier in the 1950s, she 
would now, to use descriptions from theories on decision-making, 'toughen it out' 
77 instead of executing 'corrective action in response to negative feedback'. The United 
States would be snubbed, on a matter which was supposedly of vital interest to Western 
security. Thus, the theory on the 'special relationship' after the upset in 1956 is either 
wrong or, which seems more likely, it has its limitations. A rift with Washington could 
be risked at Geneva because decisions on the law of the sea could hardly create an 
immediate crisis of Suez proportions. 
The primacy of domestic politics was yet again demonstrated. Macmillan's 
remonstrations with Eisenhower had highlighted this British lodestar on the law of the 
sea. John Hare, so new and presumably eager at MAFF, must have had a major say in 
the outcome. He was, as Alistair Home wrote, 'an influential man for whom Macmillan 
had great personal respect'. 78 Hare had seemingly found it easy to convince his 
colleagues that the British delegation should put up a fight, if only to show the trawling 
79 industry that they were not being abandoned . Macmillan also admitted at a 
later stage 
that '[i]t is easy for us to gain political prestige here by an intransigent attitude'. 
80 A 
retreat, meanwhile, would have been condemned. Indeed, at Geneva both Manningham- 
73 E. g. Dickie, 'Special'No More, 97, and Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, 205. 
74 PRO: CAB21/2762, Fitzmaurice to FO, 14.3.1958. 
75 PRO: PREM 11/2314, Macmillan minute, undated but from 14. -18.3.195 8. 
76 PRO: CAB 128/32, CC(58), 24h meeting, 18.3.1958. 
77 See Billings and Hermann, 'Escalation or Modification', 1. Also section 2.2,76-77. 
78 Home, Macmillan 1957-1986,344. 
79 PRO: CAB130/145, GEN. 642, Is'meeting, 20.3.1958. 
80 Department of Special Collections and Western Manuscripts, Bodleian Library, University of Oxford 
[henceforward BOD]: MSS. Macmillan, diary, 21.4.1958. 
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Buller and Fitzmaurice forwarded to the Americans the Cabinet's gloomy prediction 
that acceptance of the '3+9' proposal might even bring down the government. 81 
This danger was exaggerated, or probably non-existent. But here the trawlermen 
and owners were the proverbial 'tough guy in the back room'; the British version of 
Iceland's Communist bogeyman. The problem was only that angry fisherinen on 
Humberside did not convey as much fear in Washington as the image of 'Communists' 
taking over in Reykjavik. The Americans continued to reject Britain's six-mile idea and 
stuck to the Canadian proposal. 82 In private, Fitzmaurice seriously doubted whether the 
right course had been taken and Manningham-Buller advised Macmillan that the '3+9' 
option definitely served British interests better than breakdown at Geneva, the most 
likely result of Western disunity. 93 As before, however, the pressure for change was 
resisted. A decision had been made and wishful thinking was stronger than a sober 
acceptance of negative realities. 
On March 29, the feared breakdown began in earnest. The Canadians formally tabled 
the '3+9' solution, more determined than ever to advance their claims. 84 In the next few 
days, some 20 proposals were submitted to the conference, ranging from motions on a 
six-mile limit to a number of proposals which allowed states to claim territorial waters 
up to 12 miles, and even more in special circumstances. 
85 
The moment to counter had arrived. On April 1, Great Britain submitted her 
qualified six-mile offer. Marmingham-Buller's voice, it was noticed, was fraught with 
emotion when he introduced the proposal, emphasising that it was a huge sacrifice for 
the sake of a solution. 86 He added, however, that Britain still viewed three miles as the 
proper limit of territorial waters, apart from the Scandinavian four-mile line. 
87 And this 
was the crux of the matter. The British 'concession' was no such thing. Admittedly, the 
fishing limit was to be widened but with the caveats about air and sea passage, the 
additional three miles meant practically nothing to many states. Nonetheless, by 
providing an option on the smallest possible concession, the move did serve the purpose 
of reducing the prospect of approval for the Canadian alternative. The Americans, who 
81 FRUS 1958-60 11,661,665, Geneva delegation to Washington, 17.3.1958 and 20.3.1958. 
82 FRUS 1958-60 11,667-668,674-676, Geneva delegation to Washington, 25.3.1958 and 30.3 ). 1958. 
83 UD: 26.11/23/Xll, Stabell minute, 24.3.1958, and PREMI 1/2314, Manningham-Buller to Prime 
Minister, 28.3.1958. 
84 PRO: ADMI/27059, minute on Commonwealth delegations meeting. Geneva, 22.3.1958. 
85 J6nson, Friends, 77, and blafsson, Saga, 158-159. 
86 Morgunbladid, 17.4.1958. 
87 Times, 2.4.1958. 
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had sensed a growing support for the '3+9' solution before the British action, were 
forced to rethink their strategy. 88 
Therefore, on April 15, the next shock came at Geneva: The United States put 
forward a proposal on six-mile territorial waters and an extra six-mile fishing limit, but 
with 'historic rights' of fishing preserved in the outer zone. The six-mile concession 
was calculated to satisfy most security concerns, and calls for fisheries conservation 
should partly be met by the outer zone, whereas distant-water fishing nations would also 
be content with the preservation of historic rights. A number of states which had been 
prepared to support the '3+9' proposal decided to back the American initiative. Norway 
and Denmark were among the converts and the solution seemed ideal for British 
trawling interests in the North Atlantic. 89 Still, British officials and Ministers found it 
extremely hard to endorse the idea. Duncan Sandys, the Minister of Defence, 
immediately wrote to Macmillan that Britain simply could not accept anything beyond 
three miles unless all existing rights of innocent passage were preserved. 90 In the first of 
two meetings the same day, the Cabinet accepted Sandys's arguments but then realised 
that if the strategic aspect was good enough for the United States, it should be good 
enough for Britain. The British delegation would support the American proposal for the 
remainder of committee sessions at Geneva and in plenary session as well if satisfactory 
assurances on passage provisions had then been achieved. 91 
At last, Britain and the United States had found common ground. It would have 
happened sooner if proper preparations for the conference had taken place in London. 
'It was unsatisfactory that decisions on such important issues had to be taken at such 
short notice', Ministers agreed in their latter session on April 15. In addition, the Anglo- 
American insistence on a fight for the three-mile limit before the offer of concessions- 
in a way a policy of burning bridges before trying to build them-reduced the chance of 
success for the new alternative. Many states had been hardened by the preceding 
intransigence and little room remained for substantial lobbying. Macmillan, for one, 
was by no means confident this eventful day: 'The maritime powers are isolated, and in 
spite of much help from US, almost powerless'. 92 
88 FRUS 1958-60 11,683-685, Geneva delegation to Washington, 9.4.1958. 
'9 For a detailed examination of Norway's position at the conference, see Sondend, 'Bakgrunnen', 65-85. 
For Denmark, see Laursen, Danmark og havretten, 17-23. 
90 PRO: PREM 11/2314, Sandys to Macmillan, 15.4.195 8. 
rd 91 PRO: CAB128/32, CC(58), 3 I't meeting, 15.4.1958, and 33 meeting, 21.4.1958. 
92 BOD: MSS. Macmillan, diary 15.4.1958. 
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The new proposal would always be opposed by the Communist countries and a 
sizeable number of states in the other non-Westem blocs. The decision to steer closer to 
Britain also separated the Americans from the Canadians and when the motion was in 
preparation, George Drew, High Commissioner in London and leader of Canada's 
delegation, condemned the British for luring the United States away from the 3+9' 
solution. JH]e attacked me personally and was most abusive', said Manningham-Buller 
after one of their encounters. 93 The Canadians went on the offensive and offered a new 
combination of six-mile territorial waters (even wider for those states which had already 
made such claims), with an outer six-mile zone of exclusive fishing rights. 94 Thus, 
despite the ingenuity of the American compromise, Western harmony had not been 
achieved. 
And Canada was not the only ally to dissent. Her anger paled next to the 
indignation in Iceland. From the onset at Geneva, the Icelanders had supported the 
'3+9' proposal but proposed as well that nations which were 'overwhelmingly 
dependent' on fisheries should have preferential access to fishing grounds outside 
national jurisdiction. 95 Likewise, Icelandic Ministers reiterated previous assertions 
about an immediate decision on extension after the conclusion of the conference. 96 In 
mid-April, the US proposal was therefore a huge disappointment, and reported as a 'stab 
in back', cabled Theodore Olson, the American Char& d'Affaires in Reykjavik. 97 From 
left to right, the Icelanders condemned the move, for the reserved historic rights to work 
up to six miles would be maintained by all states which had fished in the region for the 
previous decade. 98 Moreover, as Olson added, '[w]orst danger ... is psychological and 
political impact on US-NATO defence relationship '. 99 Foreign Minister Gudmundsson 
had been quick to tell the Americans and other Western representatives in Reykjavik 
that the passing of the new offer at Geneva could have 'the most serious consequences 
for Iceland's foreign policy'. 100 'No support-no base', was the signal which could be 
93 PRO: PREM 11/2314, Geneva delegation to FO, 14.4.195 8. On the personal animosity between 
Manningham-Buller and Drew, see also LTD: 26.11/23/XII, Stabell minute, 31.3.1958. 
94 TiMes 
, 19.4.195 8, and Gotlieb, 'Canadian 
Diplomatic Initiatives', 14 1. 
95 J6nsson, Friends, 80-83, and Olafsson, Saga, 171-184. Iceland had originally put this idea forward at 
the Rome conference in 1955 on the living resources of the sea. 
96 E. g. Foreign Minister Gudmundsson's statement in Althýdubladid, 11.3.1958, and PRO: 
F0371/134958/NLI351/73, Gilchrist to FO, 15.4.1958. 
97 NARA: RG59/399.731/4-1658, Olson to Dulles, 16.4.1958. Also FRUS 1958-6011,699, Olson to 
Washington, 17.4.1958, and Magnass, Landhelgisb6kin, 77-78. 
98 The period was reduced to five years later in the conference. 
99 NARA: RG59/399.731/4-1858, Olson to Dulles, 18.4.1958. 
100 UD: 26.11/23/Xlll, Reykjavik Embassy to Foreign Ministry, 18.4.1958. Also PAAA: B80/244, 
Hirschfeld to Bonn, 17.4.1958, and PRO: F0371/134958/NLI351/74, Gilchrist to FO, 17.4.1958. 
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Figure X 'Are the Americans biting Iceland in the back at drefatal moment? 'An Icelandic cartoon, 
May 1958. 
read between the lines, not because Gudmundsson or other pro-Western politicians so 
wished, but because the public would supposedly accept the Socialist line that an enemy 
over fishing limits was an enemy in other fields as well. As intended, the United States 
took fright. The rulers in Reykjavik were immediately told that the American 
administration appreciated the 'unique position and problems of Iceland' and was 
urgently seeking ways to recognise that fact. 101 The result was not very encouraging, 
however. First, the closure of Faxa-Bay was offered; a measure which, as Gudmundsson 
brusquely pointed out, had already been secured defacto. 102 A promise on 'abstention' 
was then aired but, again, the Icelanders were after more than the status quo. 103 And if 
the Americans were to go further to meet Icelandic demands, they might lose support 
elsewhere. When Arthur Dean was working to secure British acquiescence in the US 
proposal, Manningham-Buller had ascertained that the historic rights in the proposal 
104 were 'clearly intended to cover our rights off Iceland'. 
This dilemma had not been solved when the conference drew to a close. 
Agreement was reached on various important aspects of the law of the sea; including the 
use of baselines, a 12-mile contiguous zone for fiscal and sanitary purposes and 
innocent passage through international straits, a particular British worry. Furthen-nore, 
coastal states where granted exclusive rights to mineral sources on their continental 
101 NARA: RG59/399.731/4-1758, Herter to Reykjavfk, 17.4.1958. Also Morgunbladid, 16.4.1958. 
102 NARA: RG59/399.731/4-2058, Olson to Dulles, 20.4.1958. 
103 NARA: RG59/399.731/4-2158, Herter to Geneva delegation, 21.4.1958. 
104 PRO: PREM 11/2314, Manningham-Buller to FO, 14.4.1958. 
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105 
shelf, as well as all living resources 'in constant physical contact with the seabed' . 
This success, however, was overshadowed by the failure to settle the all-important 
width of territorial waters. In the final vote on April 25, no proposal received the 
necessary two-thirds majority. The American submission came closest, with 45 in 
favour, 33 against and seven abstentions. 106 In the early hours of April 27, the 
conference was over. 
Overall, the proponents of narrow territorial waters could take some solace from 
suffering the smallest defeat at Geneva. The ratification of a 12-mile rule had also been 
averted. Moscow had of course campaigned for that limit and Macmillan was 'highly 
pleased over the outcome and Soviet diplomatic defeat'. 107 This joy was apparent in 
American circles as well. 108 But it was misguided. At Geneva, the battle lines were not 
primarily drawn from east and west, but from north and south. Macmillan, 
Manningham-Buller, Dean, Dulles and other Western personalities would have 
benefited from 'taking off the Cold War lens'. 109 The common cause of the Soviet 
Union and, say, Mexico, Saudi Arabia and Iceland was more tactical and anti-colonial 
than Communistic. Thus, the alleged triumph over Soviet machinations was rather 
shallow and on closer look, Britain had few reasons to be cheerful. The Icelanders and 
other progressive 'extensionists' could be happier with developments at Geneva than 
the 'three-milers'. As Fitzmaurice summed up, for Britain the conference was 'a 
prolonged holding operation' which had succeeded there and then. 'But time is not on 
our side'. " 0 
So, what lessons could be drawn from the whole colloquy? First, the three-mile 
rule was clearly 'a dead duck'. "' Consequently, the British policy of offering only the 
smallest concessions at the last possible moment had been fallacious. Much later, when 
Fitzmaurice had become one of Britain's leading experts on international law, he cited 
the 1958 conference to support the contention that 'the lesson of the Sibylline books is 
105 See Arthur H. Dean, 'The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What was Accomplished', AJIL, 
Vol. 52, No. 4,1958,616-624. 
106 blafsson, Saga, 169. The Canadian proposal received 35 ayes, 30 nays and 20 abstentions. 
107 NARA: RG59/399.731/4-2558, Dean to Dulles, 25.4.1958. 
108 NARA: RG59/399.731/4-3058, Dulles to Dean, 30.4.1958 
109 For this description, see Matthew Connelly, 'Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South 
Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence', American Historical Review, Vol. 105, No. 3, June 
2000,739-769. At Geneva, some Western representatives realised that the real divide was not between 
East and West but between, as the Gennan Fisheries Director Gerhard Meseck put it, 'the white race' and 
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to accept the possible when it is still timely'. ' 12 The narrative has brought up familiar 
flaws in British decision-making which explain why this advice was not heeded: 
conservative strategic considerations, influence of pressure groups, wishful thinking and 
preference for reactive 'pragmatism', that great misnomer. The legalistic approach to 
the conference was equally unfortunate, or the departure from 'our standard operational 
procedure', as Andrew Gilchrist wrote, 'that the law is an adjunct to diplomacy and 
must never become a substitute for it'. ' 13 The rather quixotic fight against 'Communist' 
calls for wide territorial waters was also damaging, as was the feud between 
Manningham-Buller and George Drew. The deeper, theoretical explanations must not 
exclude the significance of individuals and chance. Although not likely, it is possible 
that smoother men than 'Bullying Manners' and Drew, once described as 'an 
exceptionally stubborn man', 114 could have hammered out with Arthur Dean a more 
feasible compromise than the failed one at Geneva, for instance the idea of phased-out 
historic rights which was to be promoted by Britain, Canada and the United States at the 
follow-up conference two years later. 115 
The situation post-Geneva had, after all, to be kept in mind. Victories could be 
claimed in the conference hall but what would actually happen on the oceans? The 
British government swiftly declared that since no agreement had been reached, three 
miles still remained the proper limit of territorial waters. 116 In reality, however, Britain 
looked prepared to keep alive a six-mile concession. 117 In the North Atlantic, her most 
vital 'battlefield', the chances of such a settlement with Oslo and Copenhagen were fair. 
The Icelanders, on the other hand, had emphatically rejected a six-mile solution in any 
shape and form. In the spring of 1958, they seemed determined to extend further and 
Britain would hardly be able to do anything about it. Or would she? 
112 See Edward McWhinney, 'The Codifying Conference as an Instniment of International Law-Making: 
From the 'Old' Law of the Sea to the 'New", Syracuse Journal ofInternational Law and Commerce, 
Vol. 3, No. 2,1975,309. The story of the Sibylline prophetic books is that Tarquin, king of ancient 
Rome, eventually got only three of them for the same price that was initially set up for the whole set. 
113 Gilchrist, Cod Wars, 106. 
114 By Lester Pearson. CUL: 4100, Box 85, Dean to Dulles, 28.11.1958. 
115 See section 3.9,20 1. At the final session in Geneva in 195 8, It was decided to recommend to the 
United Nations that another conference be held to seek an agreement on the width of territorial waters. 
61afsson, Saga, 185-188. 
116 
Thnes, 29.4.1958. 
117 PRO: F0371/134962/NLI351/162, Marmingham-Buller to Macmillan, 1.5.1958. 
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3.3. Cod War Scare. The Primacy of Domestic Politics and the 
Disregard for Diplomacy, April-August 1958 
With hindsight, the last proper chance of bridge-building between Iceland and Britain 
was lost at the Law of the Sea Conference. Responsibility for this failure lay more in 
London than in Reykjavik and the consequences were serious. When that almost 
tragicomic affair called 'cod war' began in September 1958 and British warships were 
pitted against coast guard gunboats off Iceland, Thomas Brimelow wrote in the 
trenchant manner which often comes with knowing better but being ignored: 'we are 
already reaping around Iceland the consequences of the orthodox legal doctrine which 
we upheld at Geneva'. ' 18 Even so, developments in the summer of 1958 were also to 
demonstrate that divides may not be bridged if the people on the other side are against 
it. Or as the Icelandic saying goes: rarely bears but one side blame when two fall foul. 
At once after Geneva, Fisheries Minister J6sepsson reminded his coalition partners of 
the promise from late 195 7 to act when the conference was over. ' 19 As it happened, they 
needed little incitement and Foreign Minister Gudmundsson told Gilchrist that an 
extension was both justified and inevitable. 120 Still, its means, timing and extent could 
be debated and Gudmundsson apparently admitted that immediate action would be both 
difficult and dangerous. 12 1 For what might Britain do? The British Ambassador warned 
that his govenunent 'would not tolerate unilateral measures by Iceland on what Britain 
regards as the high seas'. 122 The forceful assertion resembles Laurence Collier's first 
reaction in Oslo to the full enforcement of the four-mile limit off Norway back in 1948; 
a warning which then turned out to be empty. 123 A decade later, Gilchrist was probably 
bluffing as well. During the Geneva conference, when Icelandic declarations about an 
imminent extension had led to calls on Humberside for naval protection, he reasoned 
that he simply could not 'see the Americans ... 
being prepared to encourage us or to 
allow us to enforce any such thing'. 124 In the Foreign Office, 'Micky' Joy, deputy head 
of Northern Department, argued likewise. 125 
118 PRO: F0371/134985/NLI351/822, Brimelow minute, 3.9.1958. 
11 9 Vilhjdlmur Hjdlmarsson, Ei, steinn i stormi og stillu (Reykjavik: Vaka, 1985), 69. 
120 Papers of Gudmundur 1. Gudmundsson, Reykjavik [henceforward GiG]. IV: Gudmundsson 
memorandum, 28.4.1958. 
121 PRO: F0371/134959/NLI351/93, Gilchrist to FO, 26.4.1958. 
122 Times, 1.5.1958, and PRO: F0371/134960/NLI351/112, Gilchrist to Gudmundsson, 29.4.1958. 
123 See section 1.2,3 1-35. 
124 PRO: F0371/134958/NLI351/80, Gilchrist to FO, 18.4.1958. 
125 PRO: F0371/134959/NLI351/101, Joy memorandum, 26.4.1958. 
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The question, therefore, was also what the United States would do. On May 5-7, 
NATO Foreign Ministers gathered in Copenhagen and both Iceland and Britain used the 
occasion to stress that they could not budge an inch (not to mention a mile). When 
Gudmundsson had repeated that Iceland could wait no longer to extend the limits, 
Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary, passed a slip of paper to John Foster 
Dulles, saying that in the past Britain would simply have broken off diplomatic relations 
and sent a battleship. 'Now they dare not break relations and have no battleship', Dulles 
thought to himself. And Britain, as he continued, presumably did not dare because the 
Icelandic Foreign Minister claimed that unless the government made a move, 'the 
Communists will take over'. 126 While Gudmundsson obviously disliked the Socialists' 
calls for immediate unilateral action, he unhesitatingly used-and overstated-their 
power to insist that his hands were tied. 
This gamesmanship had worked well before. In Washington, Eisenhower had a 
brief look at reports from the NATO summit and was reminded of Bismarck's 
expression, 'the tyranny of weakness'. 127 The Icelanders were so feeble that they could 
not be fought, for that would be bullying, and their allegiance was strategically vital. 
Hans Morgenthau's warning about not allowing a weak ally to determine the decisions 
of stronger states, which was mentioned in connection with the Anglo-Norwegian 
dispute and the formation of the Atlantic Alliance, would be fitting here as well. Indeed, 
at the time the Icelandic dispute was mentioned as an example of 'the need and the cost 
of alliances'. 128 But still, should unilateral measures be tolerated? Between meetings in 
Copenhagen, Dulles said that an arrest of a trawler in disputed waters would in his mind 
constitute 'aggression on the high seas'. 129 While no solution was found at this stage, 
Gudmundsson promised a respite in Reykjavfk of a week or so and Henrik Bjbmsson, 
the Permanent Secretary of Iceland's Foreign Ministry, continued consultations within 
the North Atlantic Council in Paris. 130 
It was a fairly safe assumption that action in Iceland would not be postponed 
again. Britain was thus faced with an ultimatum and theories on negotiation state that 
such situations may simply stiffen and anger the adversary. ' 31 Then again, they can also 
make people give in. After the Copenhagen summit, K. J. Pritchard in the Admiralty dug 
126 NARA: RG59, Bureau of European Affairs. Office of European Regional Affairs. Political-Military 
Numeric Files, 1953-62, Box 15, excerpt from a letter from Dulles to Eisenhower, 7.5.1958. 
127 DDE: Ann Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 10, Eisenhower to Dulles, 7.5.1958. 
128 Woodhouse, British Foreign Policy, 100- 10 1. Also section 1.2,39. 
129 RA-DEN: 55. ISLAND. I/IV, Kronmann to Oldenburg, 8.5.1958. 
130 GiG-1: Bj6msson report, 7. -16.5.1958. 13 1 Lebow, Art, 84-85. 
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up the familiar reasons against a robust protection of British rights on the 'high seas'. It 
could seriously hurt NATO, the legal position was unclear, world opinion would 
severely criticise the use of force and the Navy would be hard put to provide constant 
patrol off Iceland. 132 'Perhaps Sandys has abolished the last gunboat', the Economist 
wryly commented a short while later, referring to the Defence Secretary's infamous 
White Paper of 1957 and its severe naval cuts. 133 Alliance officials also urged Britain to 
discount the naval option, 134 and despite the apparent firmness of Dulles, Iceland's 
reliance on the riches of the sea was appreciated in Washington. JI]f any nation has the 
right to expand its exclusive fishing limits it is Iceland', said Christian Herter, Under- 
Secretary of State. 135 Dulles would in fact say, with more conviction than during the 
small talk in Copenhagen, that whereas he understood the apprehension over Iceland's 
intentions, he hoped that 'war would be waged on paper rather than with bullets'. 136 
That, in short, was the American attitude: Britain should protest but not use force. The 
United States did not want a 'mini-Suez' in the North Atlantic. 
But would the British obey? At Geneva they had ignored American wishes, in 
ostensible contradiction to the theory about post-Suez obedience to the United States. 
The following conflict with Iceland created another such discrepancy with the general 
rule. On May 15, a provisional decision was made in London. Should the Icelanders 
extend their fishing limits, British trawlers would be protected-even if as Selwyn 
Lloyd noted, 'in an extreme case this policy might result in the sinking of an Icelandic 
gunboat'. 137 The lukewarm tolerance of NATO and American installations would then 
descend to new lows in Iceland. Yet, that risk was deemed worthwhile for a number of 
reasons, as familiar as the calls for caution. The five 'p's' reappear. First, there was the 
pressure from Humberside. 'Our fishing industry will be ruined', was Macmillan's main 
worry, not unfitting as such but greatly exaggerated. 138 Then there was Britain's 
prestige. While the Prime Minister did accept the constraints on the country's 
capabilities (and probably found it easier than his predecessors), he was fundamentally a 
romantic Imperialist who wanted the old naval power to maintain a leading role on the 
132 PRO: ADM306/8, Pritchard to First Lord of the Admiralty, 12.5.1958, and note for First Lord, 
13.5.1958. 
133 Economist, 7.6.1958,874. Also Grove, Vanguard, 197-215. 
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world stage. 139 A surrender to a tiny island over rights on the high seas did not befit 
such a state. The precedence involved would also be hurtful. Significantly, the Danes 
insisted that, accommodating as they were, under no circumstances should the Faroe 
Islands have to accept a worse arrangement with Britain than Iceland. 140 Moreover, the 
legal principle appeared to be impressive, or at least the traditional British view on the 
law of the sea. After Geneva, Manningham-Buller's thinking no longer needed to be 
restrained by considerations about the need for compromises. He concluded that 'the 
use of force by Icelandic vessels in support of the claim [for increased limits] would 
entitle us to use force, including armed force, in resisting it'. 14 1 Lastly, the capability 
was there, almost enticingly. Notwithstanding the Admiralty's reservations, Britain had 
the power to act with vigour. 
Thus, the 'tyranny of the weak' would be tested. Six warships were required for 
continuous patrol so two ships from the Home Fleet were made ready for use off 
Iceland with the Fishery Protection Squadron. 142 Directives for trawler skippers were 
prepared, stating the need to concentrate under naval protection, 143 and whilst 'utmost 
endeavours' would be used to prevent the capture of trawlers, the Royal Navy should 
never open fire unless an Icelandic gunboat had done so first. The object would then be 
to destroy the vessel's gun, not to sink it. 144 But despite the reservations, Britain was 
ready to wield force in the North Atlantic for the first time since the Second World War, 
and against an important ally in NATO. That was quite a commitment for cod. 
Iceland was yet to take the final plunge. On May 15, the day of the British Cabinet 
decision on naval protection, Permanent Secretary Bj6msson told Foreign Minister 
Gudmundsson from the Council talks in Paris that if the Icelanders offered fishing rights 
for 3-4 years in the outer six miles of a 12-mile zone, there would be just a chance of an 
agreement. 145 After this weak hint of hope, extremely tense and complicated debates 
began in Reykjavik. Although J6sepsson knew about the NATO discussions, he was 
never privy to them and now threatened that if the government did not issue new 
139 Young, Britain, 174-176. Also Anthony Sampson, Macmillan. A Study in Ambiguity (Hannondsworth: 
Penguin, 1967), 110 and 129. 
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regulations on an extension, he would do so on his own. 146 Nonetheless, on May 18, 
J6nasson and Gudmundsson made a secret offer: in return for a recognition by all 
NATO states of a 12-mile fishing limit, measured from new, wider baselines, Iceland 
would offer foreigners the right to fish in certain areas within the outer six-mile zone for 
three years. 147 The government would collapse and bitter elections ensue, but the 
Progressives and Social Democrats were prepared to defend this rather favourable 
compromise. Two days later in Paris, however, Britain rejected the proposition and 
Spaak sent a personal message to Prime Minister J6nasson, appealing for more time and 
almost threatening economic reprisals if the Icelandic government did decide to go 
ahead right away. 148 
The quandary was now complete. On the one hand, J6nasson realised that the 
NATO states would not bless an ostensibly 'Communist'-led drive for immediate and 
unconditional extension. Bj6msson also advised that an acceptance of further 
negotiations would strengthen the Icelandic cause 'Immensely'. 149 On the other hand, 
coalition calculations and party politics could not be ignored. 'The Prime Minister', 
wrote Gilchrist, 'is horrified at the thought of fighting an election in which both the 
Communists and Conservatives will accuse him of cowardice and knuckling under to 
foreign threats'. ' 50 Such propaganda was always to be expected from the Socialist camp 
but it could be argued that the Conservative Party acted selfishly by offering little 
support at the height of the Cabinet crisis. The American Embassy in Reykjavik, usually 
well disposed towards the Conservatives, asserted that 'their primary interest was to 
manoeuvre the Progressives into a position where they were forced to support the 
Communist position on the fisheries issue'. 15 1 Furthermore, J6nasson was a stubborn 
man who instinctively did not want to bow to pressure. 152 Spaak's tough message had 
mostly irritated him and on May 21, the Progressive Party declared that it would not 
seek further discussions within NATO before any action on the fishing limits. 153 The 
Social Democrats, the greatest supporters of prolonged probing in Paris, were left to 
decide if they wanted to leave the coalition. After a few days, when the government was 
146 See J6sepsson, Landhelgismdlid, 69-70. 
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repeatedly on the verge of collapse, they most reluctantly gave in. On May 24, it was 
announced in Reykjavik that on June 30, new regulations on a 12-mile fishing limit 
would be issued, taking effect on September 1. 
Again a crisis had been averted but a long-term agreement was nowhere nearer. The 
primacy of domestic politics meant that convictions about correct behaviour in an 
international dispute had to be discarded. Maybe it also mattered that Gudmundsson 
was supposedly 'weak-nerved'. 154 But in fairness the Social Democrats were in a 
difficult position and the Foreign Minister was determined to have the People's Alliance 
out of government before September. 155 
Furthermore, the British side had not shown much willingness to treat the case 
as a political problem which needed a political, or an ad hoc solution. The Icelanders 
were first to deal the efforts in Paris a fatal blow but another lunge came from London. 
Despite J6nasson's rejection of Spaak's appeal for patience, he made a new compromise 
proposal. Iceland could claim exclusive fishing limits up to six miles and an outer six- 
mile zone where historic rights would be respected, subject to certain conservation 
restrictions. 156 But Sir Frank Roberts, Britain's Permanent Delegate at NATO, said that 
this formula still would not do, and Spaak complained that Britain was both 
ýunnecessarily legalistic' and by now totally isolated in Paris. Learning this in London, 
Brimelow made frantic phone calls to Fisheries Secretary Wall and Assistant Legal 
Adviser Gutteridge. Afterwards, he and Roberts concluded that the paragraph about 
restrictions on historic rights could be accepted, with the wording 'under conditions to 
be negotiated with the Icelandic government'. 157 
The text would be submitted to the two governments. In Reykjavik it was swept 
aside by the coalition's declaration on an extension in September. In London it fared no 
better. The Prime Minister was furious and protested that the proposed agreement 
ýseems to concede everything [the Icelanders] want under the weak phrase "conditions 
to be negotiated". I was not asked: I would like to know what Minister authorised the 
154 PRO: F0371/134983/NLI351/731, Gilchrist to FO, 29.8.1958. American diplomats in Reykjavik said 
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Foreign Office to make this decision'. 158 Macmillan's dominance over the rather modest 
Foreign Secretary has been well documented. 159 It has also been said that senior 
diplomats 'despaired at the way he could be browbeaten later in Cabinet over the very 
issues on which he had so painstakingly forined clear opinions'. ' 60 In this case, Lloyd 
certainly did not fight the Foreign Office comer. On the contrary, he meekly conceded 
that Britain's consent in Paris had been given 'in error'. The Prime Minister was 
relieved. 161 His line was the orthodox legal case of Manningham-Buller, not the 
political calculations in the Foreign Office. As before, when decision-making on a 
rather outside and dormant issue like Iceland or fish was transferred to the highest 
levels, prejudiced men would reach prejudiced conclusions. 'I am not an expert ... 
but', 
Macmillan tellingly wrote when he thwarted the efforts which Brimelow, Roberts, Wall 
and Vallat had blessed. 162 Similarly, Ministers even expressed the naYve hope that a 
declaration on British fimmess, coupled with offers for further discussions, would 
'educate' the Icelanders. 163 On June 4, Britain therefore responded to the Icelandic 
announcement on a 12-mile limit in September by expressing 'surprise and regret' 
which, incidentally, were almost the same words which had been used to protest the 
Norwegian move to enforce the four-mile baseline limit in 1948. The authorities in 
London had not acted further then but now they asserted that they would prevent all 
attempts to interfere with trawlers 'on the high seas'. 164 
So, had the bridge finally been burnt, and from both ends for that matter? During the 
four-mile dispute, Agnar KI. J6nsson had argued with Harry Hohler about the precise 
meaning of the word 'discussion'. ' 65 Now Gudmundsson stated that while the 
authorities in Reykjavik were 'ready to discuss' the 12-mile extension, they did not 
want to give the impression that they were prepared to 'negotiate' on it. 
166 In line with 
this narrow definition, the Icelanders firmly rejected a Danish suggestion on a 
conference to reach a regional agreement on fishing limits in the North Atlantic. 
167 
Neither did formal protests over Iceland's intentions by a number of states have any 
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effect. 168 Meanwhile, the determination in Britain was also criticised. Most 
significantly, the United States was 'deeply disturbed' over the decision to employ 
warships against an ally in NATO. 169 The Canadian Drew, presumably still smarting 
from the skirmishes with Manningham-Buller at Geneva, estimated as well that far from 
4educating' the Icelanders, public warnings about trawler protection would simply 
increase their determination. 170 He was right. Even the most pro-Western paper in 
Reykjavik derided the June declaration in London: 
It is as though the British government thought we were living in the 17 th or 18 th 
century when it was thought wonderful to use cannons unhesitatingly. ... It 
is 
... in the nature of the Icelanders that one can get him to do various things by 
kindness but by nastiness he will never be induced to do anything at all, not even 
that which might benefit him most. The British note is, therefore, having 
completely the opposite effect to what was intended. 171 
At the Foreign Office, Brimelow was not pleased, confiding to both Norwegian and 
Danish officials that the Attorney General was against all concessions while the 
diplomats were anxious to reach a modus vivendi. 172 He might easily have mentioned 
Macmillan and the weakness of Selwyn Lloyd as well. The expert could do little, 
however. 'Brimelow is a respectful and intelligent man but naturally he must obey his 
masters', Kristirm Gudmundsson, Iceland's Ambassador in London, would later 
remark. 173 In the summer of 1958, a Cabinet decision had been taken and as Lord 
Vansittart, the former Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Office, wrote that year, '[t]he 
soul of our service is the loyalty with which we execute ordained error'. 174 
Thus, the slide towards 'cod war' demonstrated the same 'disregard for 
diplomacy' which had contributed to the deadlock in the previous fishing dispute with 
the Icelanders. In September, when the conflict off Iceland had begun, the complaint 
could indeed be heard that 'in other days such an issue might have been settled at dinner 
by a few Ambassadors'. 175 Apart from Brimelow being overridden, Andrew Gilchrist 
was more or less left out of the decision-making process and derided, as he put it, the 
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'nonsense the Foreign Office and our people in Paris ... cooked up for me'. 
176 His idea 
for a solution was almost identical to the proposal which Gudmundsson and J6nasson 
had offered during the dire days of May; an ad hoc agreement that 'while the 12 miles is 
all Icelandic, they will graciously allow certain foreign nations to fish up to six for the 
next four years'. 177 And as for the Icelanders, both Gudmundsson and J6nasson claimed 
to regret that they had not ended the uneasy co-operation with the Socialists in the 
spring. 178 In the diplomatic corps, likewise, Andersen was clearly unhappy with his 
government's intransigence while Bj6rnsson complained that the left-wing coalition 
was ruining Iceland's relationship with her allies. 179 The circumvention of the 
diplomatic preference for compromise was of course mainly caused by the perceived 
importance of the case. For the politicians, the dispute was far too weighty to be left to 
the diplomats. Events will also demonstrate that Gilchrist could be quite gung-ho and 
that the sincerity of Andersen's lamentations was open to doubt. Furthermore, the 
'disregard for diplomacy' did not mean that no efforts were made to reach a solution. 
On the contrary, the last weeks before 'D-Day' on September I were marked by intense 
diplomatic activity in Paris, London and Reykjavik. But the thing is that it all failed. Yet 
again the power of domestic politics was demonstrated, as was the importance of 
individuals, reduced control of developments when the pressures of time began to tell 
and, in the end, the preference for a realist trial of strength rather than concessions of the 
liberal kind. 
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3.4. On the Brink. Cod War Comes, August 1958 
The crisis over the extension of Iceland's fishing limit in the spring of 1958 was much 
like a ceremonial dance of aggression before the real fight. Threats were made and 
battle lines drawn. In late summer, a similar sequence of events occurred. This time, 
however, the outcome was different. If the spring was Agadir in 1911, then August was 
1914. The first 'cod war' would not be postponed again. 
By the start of August, a month before 'D-day', the Admiralty had completed its plans 
for protection off Iceland. 'Operation Whippet' came into being. 180 Building on the 
preparatory work in May, it aimed to prevent the arrest of British fishing vessels and 
secure their release if they were caught, but never by the use of fire unless the 
Icelanders did so first. The fishing fleet was to congregate in three fishing 'havens'. 
They would be moved as needed and the trawlers were meant to be inside them for at 
least the first three days of their trip. After that, they could work outside the 12-mile 
limit if they so wished but Barry Anderson, Captain of the Fishery Protection Squadron, 
underlined that skippers should not be tempted to stray away inside in search of fish: 
'Remember how stragglers in the last war were easily snapped up! 181 
Clearly, this could be a serious business. Ambassador Gilchrist even wondered 
whether British subjects should be evacuated from Iceland. 182 More realistically, 
Foreign Minister Gudmundsson reiterated that the problem of the fishing limits would 
not be solved with the 'Commies'. 183 Throughout the summer, he was in touch with 
leaders of the Conservatives who indicated that they could support an offer which, 
provided that the 12-mile principle would be recognised, gave foreigners the right to 
fish within that line for a limited period. 184 As with Gilchrist's idea for a solution to the 
problem, this was basically the failed Icelandic offer from May, and barring a 
remarkable change of mind in London, it seemed destined to suffer the same fate. 
Another cause for concern was the Conservative determination to make political gains 
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in the process, probably by insisting on elections instead of simply forming a new 
government. When campaigning, they would then claim that they had to be called to the 
rescue because the Progressives and the Social Democrats had been foolish enough to 
work with the Socialists. 185 For Gudmundsson and J6nasson, the collapse of the 
coalition was much less attractive in such circumstances. As in spring, therefore, the 
American Embassy was justifiably unsure if the Conservatives would 'put 
statesmanship above partisanship'. 186 
In addition, the 'slipperiness' and 'cunning' of Hans G. Andersen confused an 
already complex situation. 187 On August 11, fishing experts from a number of NATO 
countries joined permanent delegates and officials in Paris in search of a solution to the 
dispute. The talks were noncommittal but Andersen, mostly acting without authority or 
directives from home, did not discount suggestions about a total quota on catches in 
Icelandic waters, with 60% allocated to Iceland and a trawling ban in certain breeding 
grounds outside the four-mile limit. 188 This way out was not acceptable in Reykjavik, 
however. On August 22, Gudmundsson said so and instructed his Ambassador to 
remind the North Atlantic Council of the May proposal, which the Conservatives also 
looked likely to support. 189 yet, fatefully, Andersen again decided to act on his own. He 
only put forward the idea of a six-mile compromise, with some unspecified mention of 
12 miles in the text. 190 This became a draft agreement in Paris. A six-mile limit would 
remain in force for three years or until an international conference had agreed on the 
width of territorial waters and fishing limits. The prerequisite '12' would appear 
through a pledge by Iceland not to interfere with trawling between six and 12 miles. 191 
On August 27, the Cabinet in London concluded that the proposal was tolerable, 
with minor modifications. 192 Andersen had obviously encouraged optimism but was it 
not completely false? His conduct was in total contradiction to more accurate reports 
from Reykjavik, leaving the Foreign Office 'dumbfounded' over the discrepancy. 193 
And the next morning it was all over. After a meeting with Gudmundsson, Gilchrist 
telegrammed to the Foreign Office: 'I think we are in a mess. The Minister for Foreign 
Affairs says quite specifically that text is unacceptable as it stands, and that it is not at 
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all in accordance with his instructions to Hans Andersen'. 194 The freethinking 
Ambassador had kept the talks going in Paris, most likely because he knew that the 
renewed offer from May would never be accepted in negotiations. Only the immediate 
prospect of naval clashes might force Britain to give in. Andersen, therefore, had mostly 
been leading people on and won no friends through the plot. 195 It almost worked, 
however. After a Ministerial meeting in London early on August 29, the Icelanders were 
offered that in a preamble to an agreement on six miles for three years or less, their 
intention to extend to 12 miles would be 'noted'. Although the British authorities would 
also make a 'complete reservation of their rights', Iceland would in practice have got 
almost everything she wanted. 196 Nevertheless, Andersen now said straight out, 
knowing the inevitable response in Reykjavik, that the concession was insufficient since 
a recognition of the legal right to 12 miles was still lacking. 197 This late in the day, a 
retreat from that claim was inconceivable. 
Britain, it seemed, found it very hard to step back from the brink as well. Partly, 
the coloured 'Cold War lens' was to blame. When the Icelandic government rejected the 
latest proposal in Paris, Macmillan's synopsis was succinct: 'I fear that Russia and the 
198 Communists have got a strong hold on them'. It is true the Progressives and the 
Social Democrats were afraid of showing less resolution than the People's Alliance and 
Gudmundsson's strategy to get the Socialists out of government had obviously failed. 
But still, Macmillan was misreading the circumstances. The whole affair was not a 
Kremlin conspiracy. On the one hand, while some were more amenable over tactics, all 
Iceland's politicians were united over the 12-mile goal. On the other, an extension was 
in itself a goal for the Icelandic Socialists, not merely a tool to make trouble. 'The 
People's Alliance did not advocate 12 miles in order to harm NATO', J6sepsson said 
afterwards, 'but it was happy that this would be one of its results'. 199 
The misguided detennination not to concede to 'Moscow' made Macmillan even 
less inclined to show goodwill towards the Icelanders. Furthermore, events had gathered 
their own momentum. On August 26, when hopes for a settlement were probably at 
their highest, Ken Pritchard, so guarded in the Admiralty in May, advised that the plans 
for naval protection on September I must not be upset, regardless of any developments 
194 PRO: F0371/134982/NLI351/712, Gilchrist to FO, 28.8.1958. 
195 E. g. Gilchrist, Cod Wars, 77-80, and SA: UUKK, 4.9.1958. Also Paul-Henri Spaak, The Continuing 
Battle. Memoirs of a European 1936-1966. Translated fi7om French by Henry Fox (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1971), 279-280. 
196 PRO: PREM 11/2313, minute of meeting of Ministers and officials, 29.8.1958. 
197 PRO: F0371/134982/NLI351/727, NATO Pen-nanent Delegation to FO, 29.8.1958. 
198 BOD: MSS. Macmillan, diary, 29.8.1958. 
199 Quoted in Davis, Iceland, 67-68. 
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in Paris, since the organisation of the operation had been very complicated. 200 At the 
risk of hyperbole, the First World War and Barbara Tuchman's Guns ofAugust spring 
to mind. 201 It was as if a general mobilisation could not be cancelled although it might 
facilitate a diplomatic agreement because it would be that much harder to organise the 
forces again. On August 25, HMS Hound, a minesweeper with a standard displacement 
of 1122 tons, a speed of 16 knots and a 4-in gun, had departed Britain for routine fishery 
patrol, to be turned, if required, to protection off Iceland. 202 Two days later, HMS 
Eastbourne sailed for the Iceland grounds, flying Barry Anderson's tenant. She was a 
2150 tons Type 12 'Whitby' class frigate with a top speed of 30 knots and two 4.5-in 
guns. HMS Palliser and HMS Russell followed, two new Type 14 'Blackwood' class 
frigates of 1180 tons, a speed of 28 knots and anned with three 40-mm guns. 203 The 
'boats of August' had sailed. 
Predictably, the imminent appearance of warships did anything but deter the 
Icelanders. In the evening of August 29, Prime Minister J6nasson described the 
possibility of naval presence as 'foolish threats'. 204 The outside intimidation had united 
and committed the Icelandic nation, from left to right, for the first time since the 
Republic's foundation in 1944. Admittedly, the head of the coast guard P6tur 
Sigurdsson quietly confessed that Iceland's Lilliputian fleet of six tiny vessels was 
'utterly incapable' of fending off nearly one hundred British trawlers under Royal Navy 
cover. 205 Only the flagship Th6r could effectively arrest and, if necessary, tow a trawler 
to harbour. Specially built for coast guard duties in 195 1, Th6r was 693 tons, had a 
maximum speed of 18 knots and was armed with one 57-mm gun. Then there was the 
507 tons., Egir, a veteran from the 1920s, again with a 57-mm gun but a top speed of 
only 13-14 knots which meant that she could hardly chase down British trawlers. The 
rest of the Icelandic 'navy' consisted of a Catalina aircraft and four boats under 200 
tons, with a maximum speed of 10- 13 knots and a 47-mm gun. 206 
200 PRO: ADM306/8, Pritchard note, 26.8.1958. 
20' Barbara Tuchman, The Guns ofAugust (London: Robinson, 2000 (original ed., 1962)). The origins of 
the 'cod war'-again with the caveat about hyperbole-partly fit what has been called "'The road to war" 
as a genre ... in which the protagonists ... usually precipitate their 
doom by their own schemes'. See 
Antoine Capet, 'Richard Overy with Andrew Wheatcroft, The Road to War' (book review), 
<http: //www2. h-net. msu. edu/reviews/showrev. cgi? path=14921973890923>, accessed 22.11.2000. 
202 John Coombes to author, 21.1.200 1. Also Algerine Association homepage, 
<http: //www. cronab. demon. co. uk/algerine. htin>, accessed 19.8.2002. 
203 Leo Marriott, Royal Navy Frigates since 1945 (London: Ian Allan, 2 nd ed. 1990), 69-75. 
204 BBC Written Archives Centre, Reading [henceforward BBC]: News bulletin, 21: 00,29.8.1958. 
205 NARA: RG59/740B. 00/6-1258, Reykjavik to Washington, 12.6.1958. Also Magm]Iss, 
Landhelgisb6kin, 157. 
206 Magn6ss, Landhelgisb6kin, 157, and Morgunbladid, 18.7.1958. 
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Figure Xf. Royal Navy destroyers andfrigates (and a tanker) vs. the Icelandic coast guardfleet. First 
figure below vessels is for displacement, second for speed, and third for size of crew (all figures 
approximate). 
On the other hand the Icelanders took heart from finding fishing in havens a 
ridiculous idea of ignorant landlubbers, since the fish would continue to swim as they 
pleased and the supremely independent skippers would not like to work so closely 
207 
together that all would know if they had hit a lucky ground . Furthermore, the naval 
protection would be costly. '[Y]ou will make cheap cod as expensive as salmon', said 
Prime Minister J6nasson. On the evening of August 31, he also told Gilchrist that the 
Icelanders foresaw 'a long-term operation' where time would be on their side. 208 And 
207 Thj6dviljinn, 28.8.1958. 
208 Daily Mail, 30.8.1958, and PRO: F0371/134983/NLI351/737, Gilchrist to FO, 31.8.1958. 
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would the British have the stomach for that? Power, it has been observed, can largely 
depend on prestige or reputation and the Icelandic public was inclined to think, to take a 
crude example, that 'the time has passed when we have something to fear from this 
second-rate "Empire" which has been kicked out of almost every colony in the 
world' . 
209 Likewise, the Conservative Bjarni Benediktsson estimated, according to 
Gilchrist, that 'if the Icelanders could not face the prospect of direct trouble with us, still 
less could we afford to become involved in "a second Suez"'. 210 In this sense, the Cold 
War connotations also continued to aid the Icelanders. While the authorities in 
Reykjavik underlined that the country's presence in NATO was not for discussion, 
serious repercussions to the Alliance were always possible and one of Iceland's 
Ambassadors warned in late August that 'if allies fire at us, then they are no longer our 
allies'. 211 It could be called 'blackmail' or 'the tyranny of weakness', but as the dispute 
was moving from the diplomatic table to the disputed waters--or from liberal 
'interdependence' in international relations to the harsher realities of Realpolitik-the 
Icelanders were fairly confident that, despite British might, they would still be stronger. 
In general, Britain was of course in retreat. In July 1958, an authoritative Whitehall 
report, 'The position of the United Kingdom in world affairs', stated that '[w]e can no 
longer operate from the position of overwhelming strength-military, political and 
economic-which we enjoyed in the heyday of our Imperial power'. 212 As for the high 
seas in particular, the weakening of Britain had been clear at Geneva. It had also been 
demonstrated earlier in 1950s, when Icelandic 'power politics' forced through an 
acquiescence in the four-mile limit. 
Moreover, the intrinsic faith in compromises, mentioned earlier in connection 
with Britain's complaisant conduct in the fisheries dispute with Norway, must be kept 
in mind. 213 In the summer of 1958, Macmillan spoke of 'our natural good manners and 
reticence'. 214 The last offer to Iceland about a temporary six-mile limit and the claim to 
12 'noted' with reservations definitely showed how far the British side was willing to 
go to meet the adversary's wishes. Had it been accepted, a disagreeable precedent 
would have been strengthened in the North Atlantic and the legal principle would have 
209 Mcinudagsbladid, 5.5.1958. 
210 PRO: F0371/134973/NLI351/482, Gilchrist to FO, 1.7-1958. 
21 1 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25.8.1958. Also Thi-SO: 1993-3-1, Foreign Ministry press release, 
23.8.1958. 
212 PRO: CAB 130/153, GEN. 659, I" meeting, 7.7.1958. Also Kaiser and Staerck (eds), British Foreign 
Policy. 
213 See section 1.2,59-60. 
214 PRO: PREM 11/2315, Macmillan minute, 24.6.1958. 
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been prejudiced. That would have been especially unfortunate ahead of the planned 
follow-up conference on the law of the sea. The trawling industry and its guardians in 
Parliament would have made the popular complaint that the Foreign Office had 
typically abandoned the national interest. 215 
Icelandic intransigence saved the diplomats from that charge. It could be argued, 
still, that elsewhere they had already given away British rights. Junior officials in the 
Foreign Office thought that the Barents Sea agreement from 1956-a de facto 
acceptance of a 12-mile limit in exchange for restricted fishing inside the line-looked 
like a pertinent blueprint for a retreat off Iceland. 216 This opinion was also voiced in 
Washington and Moscow. 217 The prejudicial effects of the agreement were certainly 
obvious and in the last weeks before 'cod war' the Icelanders remarked disparagingly 
that the Royal Navy had not been sent to the Barents Sea to contest the 12-mile rule. 218 
When Brimelow reminded Iceland's Ambassador in London that Britain had reserved 
her legal position with the Soviets, he jokingly replied that everyone in Reykjavik 
would probably be very happy if they could enjoy a similar arrangement. 2 19 But that did 
not happen. The problem was that Iceland was so much smaller than the Soviet Union, 
so the temptation to apply or threaten gunboat diplomacy was that much greater. And 
the Soviet settlement had of course been determined by the correlation of forces, not the 
'non-public diplomacy' which Sir William Strang had so praised. 220 In the Barents Sea, 
Britain was the weaker party but Iceland was different. 'I believe that the best hope now 
rests in old-fashioned quiet diplomacy', said the American Ambassador Muccio but as 
Joy wrote in the Foreign Office: 'Off Iceland, we believe that we can enforce our 
right' . 
22 1 This was Realpolitik, pure and simple. The existence of physical power almost 
enforced its use. 
However, the British standpoint was not only decided in Britain. It may sound 
banal but it must be emphasised that foreign policy is influenced by what the foreigners 
are doing. Muccio also argued that the success of quiet diplomacy would depend on the 
will in both Reykjavfk and London to make concessions, and there was some truth in 
Andrew Gilchrist's comment that 'our enemies the Russians had been willing to 
215 Examples of condemnations of the Foreign Office abound. Churchill, for instance, is to have called it a 
'cowardly lot of shuffling scuttlers'. See Hennessy, Muddling Through, 197. 
216 PRO: F0371/134968/NLI351/379, Gallagher minute, 12.6.1958. 
217 NARA: RG59/740B. 022/8-1358, Herter to Paris, 13.8.1958, and AVPRF: 96/15/119-29, Zyryanov to 
Loginov, 12.11.1958. 
1 
218 E. g. Timinn, 17.8.1958, and Daily Telegraph, 30.8.1958. 
29 GiG-IV, Gudmundsson to Reykjavik, 25.8.1958. Also Schram, Um 16gmceti, 56-60. 
220 See section 2.6,105. 
221 CUL: 4100, Box 85, Muccio to Moore, 28.7.1958, and PRO: F0371/134968/NLI351/379, Joy to 
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negotiate with us, our allies the Icelanders refused'. 222 The recourse to gunboat 
diplomacy was not taken lightly. British decision-makers, liberal-minded and disposed 
towards compromise, became hard-hearted realists in part against their will. In other 
words, the attitude towards Iceland was still affected by the 'inherent tension' in British 
foreign policy, to repeat Richard Little's description, or by what Paul Sharp has called 
the oscillation between 'hegemonic posturing and middle power humility'. 223 The 
officials who wrote the paper on the position of the United Kingdom in world affairs in 
July 1958 may have concluded that hegemony was gone for good but in the same 
month, British troops flew into Jordan and other cases of engagement could easily be 
found. 224 That summer, Harold Macmillan was also strikingly aggressive about Britain 
and Europe, a subject where interdependence and humility would have been in order. 
On the contrary, he contemplated that if the members of the recently formed Common 
Market would not agree to British wishes on a parallel Free Trade Area in Europe, '[w]e 
would withdraw from NATO. ... We would surround ourselves with rockets and we 
would say to the Germans, the French and all the rest of them: "Look after yourself with 
your own forces. Look after yourselves when the Russians overrun your countries"'. 225 
The more coolheaded officials in Whitehall were far from glad over such 
outbursts. 
226 Furthermore, they stemmed from uncertainty rather than arrogance. On 
227 Europe Macmillan was 'a man at war with himself . In 
like manner, Gilchrist would 
sometimes refuse to acknowledge the restraints on British power and the strategic 
strength of Iceland. 'If we are to use naval action at all', he wrote when he was in that 
frame of mind, '... we should catch an Icelandic gunboat in the act [of arresting a 
trawler], disable her by non-violent means, (query: shoot her rudder off), tow her to 
England, and condemn her for piracy in an Admiralty Court. 228 This frustration was as 
foolish as the anger over Europe and, agonisingly, both Gilchrist and Macmillan 
realised the risks of browbeating the Icelanders. While the Prime Minister may not have 
been 'at war' with himself over Iceland, he was certainly at unease. 'We shall protect 
222 PRO: F0371/134991/NLI351/975, Gilchrist to FO, 2.10.1958. 
223 Paul Sharp, Thatcher's Diplomacy. The Revival ofBritish Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1997), 20. For Little, see section 2.2,78. 
224 In Southwest Arabia, for instance, the 1950s were 'the heyday of British imperialism'. See Spencer 
Mawby, 'Britain's Last Imperial Frontier: The Aden Protectorate, 1952-59', The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, Vol. 29, No. 2, May 2001,96. Also Kennedy, Realities, 33 1. 
225 PRO: PREM 11/2315, Macmillan minute, 24.6.1958. 
226 See Ellison, Threatening Europe, 201-209. 
227 Young, This Blessed Plot, 12 1. 
228 PRO: F0371/134963/NLI351/175, Gilchrist to FO, 13.5.1958. Also F0371/134978/NLI351/579, 
Gilchrist to Brimelow, 24.7.1958. 
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our trawlers as best we can', he wrote on September 1, the first day of 'cod war' in 
1958. 'But there is no future in it'. 229 
The disquiet was somewhat eased by the calculation that naval protection might not 
necessarily lead to critical clashes. On August 3 1, Barry Anderson emphasised that 'the 
keynote of the operation would be the friendly touch' . 
230 That same day, Pdtur 
Sigurdsson gathered all the gunboat captains in Reykjavik where they were instructed, 
as Hermann J6nasson also stressed in public, 'to show the utmost caution at the onset 
when everyone is tense and the situation a powder keg*. 23 1 At a meeting with Gilchrist 
in the evening, with the day of decision only a few hours away, the Prime Minister 
refused to go into details about the proposed enforcement. Yet the Ambassador could 
conclude, reinforced by reports of J6nasson's more forthright talk with the American 
Muccio, that if a trawler refused to obey coast guard orders and immediately appealed 
for naval assistance, 'no boarding attempt will be made'. 232 
Gilchrist's analysis must have pleased Macmillan. Earlier in the day, he had 
issued the executive order for 'Operation Whippet', having the Admiralty confirm at the 
same time that the three trawler havens could easily be moved out to the six-mile 
line. 233 His battle plan seemed to involve a robust but fair establishment of British rights 
with the option of a dignified retreat towards the last compromise proposal from Paris. 
The Admiralty had also seemed to harbour the hope that the over-stretched Royal Navy 
would only be needed for about three months, 'until the situation is cleared up by 
approach to United Nations or other authority'. 234 This conflict, however, would not be 
over by Christmas. 
229 BOD: MSS. Macmillan, diary, 1.9.1958. 
230 Glasgow Herald, 1.9.1958. 
231 Visir (2 nd ed. ), 1.9.1958. Also Olafsson, Saga, 295-297. 
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3.5. 'We Don't Deal with the Brits, We Beat Them'. 
Entrenchment off Iceland, September 1958 
On September 1,1958, the diplomatic dispute turned into a naval contest as Royal Navy 
warships began to protect British trawlers from arrest by Icelandic gunboats. It was, at 
least in the opening stages, an exciting affair which brought a posse of foreign reporters 
to Iceland for the first time in the Republic's history. And it was serious; 'the nearest 
thing to armed conflict that has taken place in Europe since the Hungarian insurrection', 
as John Gunther, the American writer, observed in 1961.235 Previous discussions here- 
on the currents which went back to the 19th century, developments after the Second 
World War and most lately the preceding months of 1958--explain why a difficult 
fishing dispute between Britain and Iceland was likely to break out, or how a 'cod war' 
came. It is a different task now to recount how the 'cod war' of 1958 broke out. To 
compare, it is as if entangled alliances and other underlying explanations of the Great 
War make way for more unforeseeable causes in 1914 like the assassination in 
Sarajevo--or as Harold Macmillan famously said when describing the unpredictability 
of causation in history: 'Events, dear boy, events'. 236 
'The long ships are lurking 
tonight', Commodore Anderson 
signalled to the Admiralty just 
before the watershed at zero 
hour, Monday the first of 
September. 237 Within the three 
fishing havens-which for no 
particular reason were called 
'Butterscotch', 'Toffeeapple' 
and 'Spearmint'-the warships 
watched the gunboats as they 
notified trawlers that they were 
235 See Benedikt Gr6ndal, Iceland From Neutrality to NATO Membership (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 
1971), 59. 
236 For this oft-quoted remark, see e. g. 'Vvhy MayT BBCi, 1.12.2000 
<http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/uk_politics/1042909. stm>, accessed 28.8.2002. For a summary view on the 
importance of chance and contingencies in historical explanation, see Young, Britain and the World, 228. 
237 PRO: ADM306/18, CTG334.0 (the designation for Anderson, as Commander of the Task Group) to 
Admiralty, 22: 41,31.8.1958. 
Figure XII. The 12-mile limit and the three 'havens'in 
September 1958. 
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fishing within the new limit and risked arrest. Although no ftirther action was taken, 
there was little cause for optimism. To a man, the Icelanders were enraged over the 
British 'invasion'. 238 
Then things got worse. At dawn on September 2, when the notoriously dense 
Eastfjord-fog had descended over 'Spearmint, the Icelanders struck. Maria JOa 
steamed close ahead of the Grimsby trawler Northern Foam and compelled her to stop 
while the flagship Th6r sneaked alongside and sent a party of men. aboard. They 
immediately demanded control of the ship. 'To hell with you', the skipper replied and 
had the engines put out. Meanwhile, the radio operator sent an emergency signal to 
HMS Eastbourne, some 20 miles away. The Icelanders had only managed to get the 
trawler going when the warship arrived on the scene, with guns fore and aft trained on 
Th6r. 239 The Northern Foam stopped again and it was time for Commodore Anderson 
to try to defuse the volatile situation. Using a loudhailer he called to Captain Eirikur 
Krist6fersson on the Icelandic gunboat: 'Kris, Kris, this is bloody daft! I'm coming over 
to talk to you'. 240 So he duly did and simultaneously a 12-man outfit from Eastbourne 
was sent to the trawler. Two officers were armed with pistols and ratings had 
truncheons. The Icelanders offered no resistance, however, and onboard Th6r 
Krist6fersson and Anderson firmly argued, to no avail, the rights and wrongs of the 
case. The Commodore then returned to his ship and told his men in Northern Foam to 
order the Icelandic troop off the vessel. They were put on a boat but when this was 
noticed in Th6r she sped away. The Icelanders had to be taken on board Eastbourne 'as 
guests'. In Iceland, however, they were called prisoners. 241 
238 Althýdubladid, Morgunbladid, Timinn and Thj6dviljinn, 2.9.1958. 
239 PRO: ADM306/18, CTG334.0 to Admiralty, 22: 21,2.9.1958, Daily Mail, 3.9.1958, and Notley to 
author, 8.2.2003. Enclosed was letter to his wife, 5.9.1958. 
240 Imperial War Museum Sound Archive, London: 11245/11, Frank Goldsworthy interview, April 1990. 
241 PRO: ADM306/18, CTG334.0 to Admiralty, 13: 35,2.9.1958 and 22: 21,3.9.1958. In mid-September, 
the Icelanders were unceremoniously put ashore in Faxa-Bay. Magnfiss, Landhelgisb6kin, 114-115 
Figure MIL Sailorsfrom I-IMS Eastbourne board the Northern Foam. 
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As this was unfolding, Maria JOia decided to make a go for another Grimsby 
vessel, the Lifeguard, trawling in the vicinity. But after the surprise move earlier in the 
morning, her crew was prepared to fight. When the gunboat sailed up to the trawler, the 
trawlermen leapt up behind the bulwark, wielding boathooks, rope-ends and an axe. 
After a running scuffle, fortuitously without serious injuries, the boarding attempt was 
repelled. 242 Britain had gained a minor victory in the 'cod war', a description which was 
apparently invented after these clashes. 243 British superiority was not surprising but 
what, as Sir Frank Roberts complained in Paris, had happened to the Icelandic 
instructions about initial carefulneSS? 244 In fact, they still stood. The problem was that 
Captain Krist6fersson, the most senior officer in the service, loathed P6tur Sigurdsson 
and was determined to act as he saw most fit when the nation's honour was at stake. 245 
'I remember that we were rather worried about Eirikur because he was considered rather 
too pugnacious', an official in the Prime Minister's Office later recalled. 246 Any hopes 
for an incident-free period of gradually reduced tension had been shattered. An 'event', 
partly determined by one man's pride, had dramatically changed all aspects of the whole 
dispute. 
After the battles in 'Spearmint', the Icelanders' ire reached new heights. In the 
evening, a crowd of a few hundred people, mostly teenagers, assembled outside 
Gilchrist's residence where he had invited a group of foreign correspondents to dinner. 
But the people were disappointingly timid and Eddie Gilmore, the eminent American 
reporter, is to have complained: 'Mr. Ambassador, there ain't no action! Looks like you 
brought us here under false pretences. No goddam headlines for A. P. out of this 
serenade'. 247 The Ambassador's response has long since entered diplomatic folklore for 
he is said to have donned a kilt and danced a Highland reel on the building's balcony. 
248 
While the truth is not as colourftil, Gilchrist did taunt the people outside by playing full 
blast on his gramophone bagpipe music and military marches. 
249 The protesters were 
aroused and threw rocks, smoke bombs and flares at the house. Windows were broken 
amid jeers and shouts that 'Vikings never give Up,. 
250 In the midst of the m8l6e, 
Gilchrist also went out to the garden to 'walk his dog', facing down the mob in the 
242 Ing6lfur Kristjdnsson,, 4 sy6rnpallinum (Akureyri: Kv6ldv6kudtgdfan, 1959), 280-282, and Daily 
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'approved pukka sahib tradition' as Time magazine described the encounter. 25 1 The 
energetic Ambassador, described by friends as 'maverick' and 'tough', wanted trouble 
and got it. 252 The goal was to demonstrate to the world the uncivilised radicalism of the 
Icelanders and lessen the sympathy which they enjoyed in the struggle against 
'Goliath I. 253 
A more tactful man would have lied low that night. Gilchrist's ruse did nothing to 
increase the likelihood of a solution, the main aim of all the other diplomats who were 
concerned with the dispute. On September 3, after the clashes at sea and the 'riot' in 
Reykjavik, Hans G. Andersen suggested from Paris that the government unilaterally 
give foreign fishermen the right to operate up to six or even four miles for the next three 
years. In light of the new circumstances Britain would almost be forced to accept such a 
compromise which the Social Democrats, Progressives and Conservatives had, after all, 
been willing to offer in the last days of August. But as Andersen accurately added, 'this 
may be considered absurd since there have already been violent clashes'. 254 There was 
no room for talks and later in the day the Icelandic government flatly rejected a Danish 
proposal for a ministerial meeting in NATO. 255 The United States was of course 
particularly anxious as organisations throughout Iceland demanded the rupture of 
256 diplomatic relations with Britain and withdrawal from NATO . 
As in Reykjavik, however, retreat was not an option in London. That same day, 
knowing his masters' minds, Thomas Brimelow immediately shot down a vague 
formula of voluntary abstention by British trawlers which American diplomats 
suggested to him. 257 But Brimelow also knew what could, and could not, be achieved 
off Iceland. In 'strict confidence' he opined to the Americans that London had made a 
'basic mistake in decision to protect their trawler fleet'. 258 Earlier Brimelow had also 
25 1 Time, 15.9.1958,23. Also Thorgeir Thorgeirsson, Ja-thessi heimur (Reykjavik: Idunn, 1984), 141- 
144. 
252 On Gilchrist, see letter to author from anonymous diplomat, 6.7.2000, and Peck to author, 30.3.2001. 
Also Palliser interview, 2.4.2001, and Summerhayes interview, 22.11.2002. 
253 Gilchrist, Cod Wars, 83-91. 
254 Thi-SO: 1993-3-1, Paris to Reykjavik, 3.9.1958. 
255 PRO: F0371/134984/NLI351/761, Gilchrist to FO, 3.9.1958, and F0371/134984/NLI351/782, 
Copenhagen to FO, 3.9.1958. 
256 NARA: RG59/740B. 022/9-358, Elbrick memorandum, 3.9.1958. Magn(iss, Landhelgisb6kin, 107-108, 
116-117. 
257 PRO: F0371/134984/NLI351/781, Brimelow minute, 3.9.1958. 
258 NARA: RG59/740B. 022/9-358, Morris to Washington, 3.9.1958. This is a sanitised version without 
the British official's name but it may safely be assumed that it was Brimelow. The view expressed 
corresponds with his minority opinion and it is documented that he met with American diplomats that 
day. 
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told other foreign representatives that nobody shared such 'heresy' as he put it. 259 He 
alone could not break the 'groupthink' mould. Further events, however, might force 
through a change in policy. In the Western haven of 'Butterscotch', the gunboat Albert 
collided with the trawler Burfell. Both vessels suffered minor damage and tempers ran 
high . 
260 From the frontline, Commodore Anderson signalled to the Admiralty: 'I 
appreciate the political problems but urge a face saving interim solution be found 
quickly for both countries if only to save needless loss of life 5.261 
On September 4, the crisis continued. When sailing close to HMS Russell in 
'Butterscotch', the gunboat , Egir took a steep starboard turn as if to hit the frigate, or at 
least that is how it looked from her bridge. Russell was abruptly forced off course. 
Although _ýEgir 
had thicker plates and could seriously damage the thin-skinned frigate, it 
was wrong to imagine that the gunboat was going for a head-on collision with a warship 
more than five times her size. This was a game of cat and mouse and while the mouse 
may have achieved a moral victory the frigate would not yield again. The day before, no 
less a character than the First Sea Lord, Admiral Mountbatten of Burma, had assured 
the leadership of the American Navy, anxious as before over the Keflavik base, that the 
Fishery Protection Squadron had 'strict instructions to do nothing to provoke the 
Icelanders and make every effort to avoid incidents'. 262 But up north in 'Butterscotch', 
London-endorsed rules about the use or threat to use weapons disappeared into the deep 
as the Commanding Officer of HMS Russell shouted over a hailer: ', Egir, if you try to 
ram me I will blow you out of the water'. 263 Determination was needed in the disputed 
waters and the Royal Navy Commanders, fine sailors and fiercely proud of their service 
and country, would take nonsense from no-one. Like Krist6fersson and the other 
gunboat captains, they were not, to use the jargon of international relations studies, 
'dependent variables'. 
Again, however, the old maxim was illustrated that 'the tougher we get, the 
tougher [they] will get'. 264 On the evening of September 4, one of the largest gatherings 
in Iceland's history took place in Reykjavik. In an unprecedented move, speakers from 
259 UD: 33.12/39/111, London to Oslo, 2.9.1958. Also PAAA: B80/245, London to Bonn, 5.9.1958. 
260 Thi-FRN: 1989-B/555-1, Coast guard press release, 3.9.1958, and PRO: ADM306/18, HMS Russell to 
Admiralty, 15: 37,3.9.1958. 
261 PRO: ADM306/18, CTG334.0 to Admiralty, 10: 50,3.9.1958. 
262 University of Southampton Library Archives and Manuscripts: MBI/1153, Mountbatten to Duerfeldt, 
3.9.1958. 
263 Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph, 5.9.1958. Also ADM306/18, HMS Russell to Admiralty, 18: 00, 
4.9.1958, and Thi-FRN: 1989-B/555-1, Igir to head of coast guard, 5.9.1958. 
264 In 1946, US Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace said, 'the tougher we get, the tougher the Russians 
will get'. See Martin McCauley, The Origins of the Cold IYur 1941-1949 (London: Longman, 2 nd ed., 
1995), 136. 
175 
all political parties called for unity against the common enemy and most rapturous was 
the applause when the representative from the People's Alliance sounded the battle cry 
which at once became ingrained in the nation's conscience: 'We don't deal with the 
265 Brits, we beat them' . After this show of solidarity, calls for caution or compromise 
would be likened to treason. '[N]o Icelander will even consider a further discussion 
about settlement', Gudmundsson wrote to Spaak in Paris, and Hans G. Andersen is to 
have grumbled that 'everyone in Reykjavik has gone stark staring mad'. 266 
And this is how 'cod war' came. The entrenchment was complete and Macmillan's 
scheme for a solution had sunk in spectacular fashion. 'The Prime Minister says that I 
have misled him', Gilchrist bemoaned, but that was unfair. 267 Macmillan had read 
reports from Reykjavik most selectively and despite the assurances about initial caution 
by the coast guard, he probably realised that he would count on Icelandic grace at his 
own peril. The prolongation of the conflict also demonstrated that those Icelanders who 
calculated that Britain would back down after a while, either by her own volition or 
after American pressure, were just as wrong. A long stand-off lay ahead. 
265 Thj6dviljinn, 5.9.1958. 
266 Thi-SO: 1993-3-1, Gudmundsson to Spaak, 11.9.1958. PRO: F0371/134986/NLI351/844, NATO 
Permanent Delegation to FO, 11.9.1958. 
267 Thi-SO: 1993-3-1, Kristinn Gudmundsson to Reykjavik, 8.10.1958. Unfairly, Icelandic writers have 
also blamed Gilchrist for sending false reports to London. See J6nsson, Friends, 9 1,99, Sendiherra, 104, 
112, and Th6r, British Trawlers, 187-189. 
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3.6. Power and Perseverance. Cod War as a Continuation of 
Politics, 1958-59 
Although numerous events were to occur off Iceland over the following fishing seasons, 
none changed much the capabilities of the warring sides. They had varying strengths 
and weaknesses but taken together, tiny Iceland and Great Britain could only thwart 
each other, not gain victory. In absolute terms, British superiority was of course obvious 
to all. The Icelandic coastguard 'fleet' could have been immobilised or sunk in a matter 
of days. But 'cod war', as proper wars, was simply a continuation of politics by other 
means. It also proved to be a classic case of the complexities of power in the era of Cold 
War and increased interdependence in international relations. 
First, the 'cod war' would not be won or lost at sea. Skirmishes continued, including 
Anderson's and Krist6fersson's exchange of biblical citations and a naval 'battle' when 
the crews of a trawler and gunboat pelted each other with dried cod and potatoes. 268 
Other episodes were far more serious. In November, for instance, Th6r wanted to arrest 
a trawler which had most likely been poaching within the old four-mile limit. 'If she 
resists I will shoot', Krist6fersson cabled to HMS Russell nearby. 'If you fire at her I 
-, -"I ,ý 
Iz 
WO 
Figure XIV. Size matters? HMS Eastbourne prevents lite coast guard vessel Maria Hilia from 
approaching the trawler Stella Canopus in thefirst days of the 'cod war. 
268 For the biblical despatches, see Daily Telegraph, 6.9.1958. Also Proverbs 1, verse 17-19, and Proverbs 
29, verse 16. For the cod and the potatoes, see Times, 10.9.1958. 
shall sink you', replied the frigate's commander, echoing earlier warnings to Egir. The 
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trawler got off the hook and only in February and April 1959 did the Icelanders manage 
to arrest two trawlers for illegal fishing within four miles. 269 But such 'stragglers' could 
not expect the defence of the Royal Navy. In the havens outside, fishing was safer, if 
inconvenient and sometimes stressful, for the gunboats would 'buzz' the trawlers by 
sailing alongside of them and declaring that they were poaching in Icelandic waters. 'Up 
yours' was the polite reply. Occasionally, warning shots were fired and boarding 
attempts prepared. Such aggravation the trawlermen called 'superbuzzing'. 270 If needed 
in those circumstances, the frigate commanders would simply warn that they could also 
open fire. 271 Usually, however, peace prevailed. 'The whole thing seems to be on an 
4'old boy" basis', said one of the naval officers in early 195 9.272 
Regardless of British superiority, this state of affairs was certainly not feasible in 
the long run. The repair facilities in Iceland were needed and sick or injured seamen 
could no longer be taken to harbour since the trawler would be detained and charged 
with poaching. Initially, warships were allowed to bring in such cases but this 
concession was quickly abandoned. 273 Catches in havens were often unsatisfactory and 
the unavailability of shelter under the lee of the land was grievous over the winter 
months. 274 Nor was indefinite naval protection appealing from the Admiralty's point of 
view. The costly and troublesome burden of keeping warships and a tanker on 'cod war' 
duty (only the additional cost of oil amounted to f50, OOO per month) confirmed the 
275 fears over Britain's 'overstretch' in the post-war period . Moreover., HMS Palliser and 
Russell were badly damaged after severe shuddering in the rough waters off Iceland. 276 
In short, the environment and the elements were on Iceland's side. *Hitler and Napoleon 
made it to the gates of Moscow', a coast guard officer later said smilingly, 'but they did 
not survive a northern winter'. 277 
The underdogs also benefited from compassion on the world scene. Even in 
Britain, Brimelow pointed out that 'we have a publicity problem ... with 
far too much 
269 PRO: ADM306/20, HMS Russell to CTG334.0,22: 01,13.11.1958, and Magmiss, Landhelgisb6kin, 
151-156,171-184. 
270 PRO: ADM306/6, 'Operation Whippet'. 'No. FP 230. Captain FPS's OP-Order 1-58', 3.9.1959. Also 
Sigurdsson interview, 2 7.6.200 1, Mussell interview, 4.12.2002, and Taylor interview, 8.12.2002. 
271 E. g. PRO: ADM306/24, CTG334.0 to Admiralty, 6.6.1959. 
272 Navi, News, April 1959,8. 
273 
274 
MagmIss, Landhelgisb6kin, 144-145. 
E. g. Daily Telegraph, 3.1.1959. From 1958 to 1959, British catches off Iceland decreased ftom 
217,475 to 176,644 tons. It must be remembered, though, that catches could easily fluctuate for natural 
reasons. Th6r, British Trawlers, 242. 
275 PRO: ADMI/27139, Admiralty minute, 7.10.1958. F0371/143119/NLI352/107, Pritchard to 
Brimelow, 23.10.1959. 
276 PRO: ADM306/29, Anderson to Admiralty, 26.10.1958. 
277 Kjwmested interview, 3.6.2002. 
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278 
sympathy already for "poor little Iceland"' . 
Yet it only went so far and the Icelanders 
came to deplore the lack of interest in the dispute. Isolated incidents like the 
confrontation between Th6r and HMS Russell received attention but after the initial 
thrill, the journalists had gone, disappointed as one of them told a Royal Navy 
Commander, tongue in cheek, that 'you didn't sink the , Egir and give me a lead 
story'. 279 At the end of 1958, Thor Thors, Ambassador in Washington and at the United 
Nations, complained that most of his fellow diplomats had come to regard the *cod war' 
as 'some easy banter ,. 280 
Most importantly, the 'Communist' scare did not seem to work as well as before. To be 
sure, the strength of the People's Alliance was still acknowledged. 'Hermann is in the 
hands of the Communists', Gilchrist is to have described Iceland's Prime Minister on 
the first day of the conflict. 28 1A few days later, ftirthermore, the Beijing regime 
declared a 12-mile limit of territorial waters off mainland China. In late August, they 
had begun an intensive shelling of the Nationalist-controlled islands of Quemoy and 
Matsu and the 12-mile declaration was directly connected to that operation. 282 At the 
same time, the Soviets were rattling their weapons over the status of West Berlin. 'One 
does not need much imagination to notice a certain semblance between Quemoy, 
Iceland and Berlin', Fisheries Director Meseck wrote for the Cabinet in Bonn. 283 
Although a direct connection of this kind was not made in Washington, John Foster 
Dulles worried-while discussing the offshore islands crisis at the start of September 
when 'cod war' had erupted-that seemingly 'the Sino-Soviet strategy is designed to 
284 
put strains on us at many separate places' . 
It may be recalled that Western statesmen had claimed to see Communist 
machinations on these lines at the Geneva conference. 285 As in that case, the han-nony 
now was coincidental rather than prearranged. On more quiet days than September 1, 
1958, Gilchrist also realised that J6nasson would not have acted very differently without 
the 'Communist clutches'. But the Ambassador was frustrated and it was probably 
tempting to explain the failure to find a diplomatic solution by the insurmountable 
278 PRO: F0371/135001/NLI351/1194, Brimelow to Gilchrist, 8.12.1958. 
279 Hammond interview, 7.9.2001. Hanu-nond cited a letter to him from Tom Baistow, 30.10.1958. 
280 Papers of Asgeir Asgeirsson: Thors to Asgeirsson, 3 1.12.1958. 
28 1 Foss interview, 5.9.2002. 
282 , Mao Zedong's Handling of the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958: Chinese Recollections and Documents'. 
Translated and annotated by Li Xiaobing, Chen Jian and David Wilson, CWIHP 
<http: //www. gwu. edu/-nsarchiv/CWIHP/BULLETrNS/b6-7al7. htm>, 6,9,12. Accessed 24.3.2000. 
283 BA-BML: B 116/4263 8, Meseck memorandum, 15.1.1959. 
284 KCLMA: John Foster Dulles Papers (microfilmed), MF596-0874, Dulles to Macmillan, 4.9.1958. 
285 See section 3.2,150. 
179 
object of 'Communist' machinations. After all, that is what politicians in Iceland had 
often done, and they continued to play on fears of an anti-Western backlash. In early 
October 1958, for instance, the Icelandic Prime Minister warned Ambassador Muccio 
that Jh]ostile feelings towards the British might reach such intensity that we might have 
to break off diplomatic relations with Britain and even withdraw from the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation'. 286 Would it have happened? The Norwegian Lange, who 
probably watched the dispute closer than any other NATO Minister, argued early on 
that no matter what, Iceland would remain in the Alliance. 287 The Icelanders relied on 
economic goodwill and assistance from the West, and the crisis in 1956, when they 
looked ready to expel the American forces from Keflavik, had demonstrated how 
angrily the United States might respond to a charge against its perceived vital interests 
in the North Atlantic. 288 The 'no base-no money' bond still restrained the authorities in 
Reykjavik. 
After the outbreak of 'cod war', it even seemed as if the Icelanders had cried 
wolf once too often. In Paris, General Secretary Spaak had lost all patience with them. 
'Whatever Iceland's strategic value to the Alliance', he confidentially insisted, 'it would 
be a grave mistake to give way before such blatant blackmail on the part of small 
countries'. 289 Dulles, similarly, told Ambassador Sir Pierson Dixon in New York how 
'it would be quite wrong that [Britain] should yield on what was an important question 
of principle affecting other parts of the world'. 290 In all likelihood he was thinking of 
Quemoy and Matsu, a far greater worry for the United States in the larger context. But 
this incidental one-sidedness highlighted the inconsistency and ignorance which so 
often plagued top-level decision-making in Britain as well. At the NATO meeting in 
Copenhagen in the spring of 1958, Dulles had appeared to incite the British before 
asking them to wage war only on paper. Now he encouraged Britain again, much more 
than the State Department would have liked. 291 In Reykjavik, Muccio also sided firmly 
with Iceland, as recounted later by a member of the British Embassy staff. 'You damn 
British, you can't do this to the Icelanders. You know, you're sending those damn 
286 Thi-FRN: 1989-B/555-1/L-1-11, J6nasson to Muccio, 3.10.1958. 
287 NA-CAN: RG25/8352/10600-F-40-1.1, UN Permanent Mission to Ottawa, 17.9.1958. 
288 See section 2.8,119. 
289 PRO: F0371/134986/NLI351/830, NATO Permanent Delegation to FO, 10.9.1958. Spaak also wrote 
Gudmundsson that a solution was only possible if both sides made concessions. Thi-SO: 1993-3-1, Spaak 
to Gudmundsson, 25.9.1958. 
290 PRO: F0371/134988/NLI351/886, Dixon to FO, 16.9.1958. 
29 1 For State Department anxiety over the naval protection, see NARA: RG59/40B. 022/10-458, Burgess 
to Dulles, 4.10.1958. 
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warships up there. They're just off the ... coast, people in their homes can see them off 
their doorstep. You must stop this whole thing'. 292 
Within NATO, feelings were also divided between sympathy for Iceland's 
reliance on fisheries, and unhappiness with her unwillingness to make any concessions. 
The intransigence appeared to compare unfavourably with Britain's compromise offer, 
which always stood, of six miles for the time being. 293 Then again, although the dire 
warnings about Iceland's presence in the Alliance were taken with a grain of salt, few in 
the West doubted that if Icelandic sailors lost their lives in clashes with the Royal Navy, 
an infuriated population would definitely call for the rupture of diplomatic relations 
with London. Afterwards, a withdrawal from NATO was easily imaginable. Low-risk 
resistance by Britain could therefore be tolerated, but not escalation. It was no wonder, 
then, that reports on the increased likelihood of clashes were badly received in 
Washington. At the end of February 1959, the lucrative spring season was beginning 
and two British havens were to be established to the south and west off Iceland, in the 
midst of fishing grounds which local line- and net-fishermen frequented and were 
closed to Icelandic trawlers. Muccio was alarmed and this time the US administration 
was obviously angered. The language, if not the intensity, was beginning to resemble 
communications just before Suez. '[W]e would hope British would not take any such 
action without consulting us', was the American message in both Washington and 
London: 'The reported action, if true, would have a divisive effect on NATO at a time 
when NATO solidarity is essential'. 294 
Still, Britain did not change course. In the Foreign Office, the Icelanders were 
deemed to be feigning it again and a shift in havens, which was needed to follow the 
fish, was not considered worth all the fuss. 'The [Foreign] Secretary did not have time 
to see this', was scribbled on a minute about the American worries. 295 In a pro forma 
discussion, the Cabinet endorsed the new arrangement, on the potentially shaky 
assumption that the trawlers would refrain from provocative behaviour. 296 The 
Americans were not pleased and repeated their 'grave disquietude'. 297 Would Britain 
never learn to cut her losses? In connection with the Icelandic dispute, they would 
mention that she was already contributing to instability within NATO by 'colonial' 
292 Karlsson Kidson interview, 21.2.2002. Also NARA: RG59/40B. 022/9-1558, Muccio to Dulles, 
15.9.1958. 
293 NATO: C-R(58)66, IS-0008, NAC meeting, 18.12.1958, and GiG-1: Andersen report, 21.12.1958. 
294 NARA: RG59/740B. 022/2-2858, Herter to London, 28.2.1959. 
295 PRO: F0371/143116/NL1352/41, Brimelow minute, 4.3.1959. 
296 PRO: PRO: F01 109/228, Joy minute, 1.3.1958, and CAB 128/33, CC(59), 14"' meeting, 4.3.1959. 1 297 NAR-A: RG59/740B. 022/3-259, Merchant memorandum, 2.3.1959. 
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intransigence over the 'Cyprus problem', another island where Macmillan, in February 
1959, prioritised that British interests must be protected. 298 
For the following weeks and months, everyone was riding their luck in the 
protected fishing grounds, which soon included a new haven off the Westfiords. A 
number of Icelandic nets were wrecked through trawling, the gunboats 'buzzed' and 
4superbuzzed', and tension was high. 299 Still, no crisis came. Had one arisen, American 
anxiety would have turned to fury and it only seemed a matter of time before there 
would be casualties on either side. Commodore Anderson blamed the Icelanders' 
aggressive tactics while they felt that they had more to fear from the frigates. At the end 
of May, Anderson trained the guns of his frigate on Maria JOa after she had fired 
warning shots towards a British trawler. 'I want you boys to fully understand that I was 
not bluffing', he announced on the trawler radio. 'I will not have this nonsense from 
these people'. 300 
Bluff or no bluff across the table, the stakes were certainly high. Seemingly, one side or 
the other would have to fold at some stage, and if there was one undisputable factor in 
the composition of power in the conflict, it was Icelandic commitment. Not that it 
mattered much at that stage, but at the end of 1958, a new regime had been formed in 
Reykjavik, the left-wing coalition having collapsed after disputes over economic 
reforms. The Social Democrats fonned a minority government with Conservative 
support. Gudmundsson kept his post at the Foreign Ministry and Emil J6nsson, who had 
been President of the Althing, became Prime Minister. He swiftly emphasised that no 
policy changes should be expected, as it would be 'suicidal for any government to give 
in'. 301 If confirmation was needed, it came on May 5,1959, when the Parliament 
unanimously reaffirmed Iceland's right to the whole continental shelf, and stated that 
'fishery limits of less than 12 miles from baselines around the country are out of the 
question'. 302 The unity on this 'highest common denominator' was so great that the 'cod 
war' did not figure largely in two parliamentary elections later in the year. 
298 NARA: RG59/740B. 022/10-458, Burgess to Dulles, 4.10.1958. BOD: MSS. Macmillan, diary 
20.2.1959. Also Holland, Pursuit, 265-266, and Edward Johnson, 'Britain and the Cyprus Problem at the 
UN, 1954-58', Journal ofImperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 28, No. 3,113-130. 
299 British Aggression, 9-15, Morgunbladid, 26.3.1959, and Thj(jdviljinn, 22.4.1959. Also Baker to author, 
4.4.2002, and Cook to author, 12.11.2000. 
300 GiG-IV: Maria J0a to coast guard HQ, 2.6.1959. Also PRO: ADM306/24, Anderson to Admiralty, 
21.5.1959. 
301 RA-DEN: 55. ISLAND. I/IX, Kronmann to Oldenburg, 13.1.1959. Kronmann was recounting a 
conversation with Gilchrist. 
302 See J6nsson, Friends, 106. 
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Emil J6nsson was a 'friendly and helpful' man, according to both Gilchrist and 
Henderson before him. 303 At the outbreak of the dispute, he had deplored the 
ýchauvinistic' mood in the country, finding it similar to 'the old attitude towards 
Denmark when those who were accommodating got branded as traitors' . 
304 This was a 
silent minority view, however, and in November 1959, a new Conservative- S oci al 
Democrat coalition was formed, the so-called 'Reconstruction regime'. blafur Thors 
regained the Premiership and although he could be as friendly as J6nsson, he was 
certainly not going to be overly helpful . 
305 '1 have the right of God on my side', he had 
306 gallantly proclaimed in the summer. 'I have the right of a small nation to exist' . Thus, 
the importance of 'culture', or 'Third-World-effect' in Icelandic foreign policy, must be 
re-emphasised here. 307 For most Icelanders, the 'cod war' was a continuation of the 
struggle for independence, a colonial fight just like the separation from the Danes in 
1944. Political freedom had been won but sovereignty over the country's sole resource 
was still to be secured. '[T]hink of Iceland in terms of Ghana', Gilchrist wrote to 
Brimelow in September 1958.308 Peter Kidson, another Briton in the Reykjavik 
Embassy, also lamented that his government 
... 
had failed dismally to understand the Icelandic psychology and make the 
necessary allowances for the sensitivity of a very small country which had so 
recently gained its independence. His own people, he thought, might have 
applied some of the lessons they had learned the hard way in their dealings with 
Ireland, with which there were striking historical and temperamental 
similarities. 309 
This was a problem. Regard for Iceland's intransigent nationalism was either limited, or 
it merely hardened British minds, because 'culture' and commitment mattered on that 
side as well. First, prestige still counted and as Brimelow ruefully estimated in March 
1959, although the Admiralty would not regret an end to 'Operation Whippet', a 
withdrawal of the warships would involve a 'loss of face', greater than a decision not to 
303 PRO: F0371/116426/NLI012/1, Henderson to Macmillan, 27.7.1955. F0371/128749/N-LI012/1, 
Gilchrist to Lloyd, 25.9.1957. 
304 RA-DEN: 55. ISLAND. INII, Knuth to Svenningsen, 26.8.1958. 
305 Papers of Hilmar Foss, Reykjavik [henceforward HF]: Foss to Mangeot, 18.11.1959. 
306 Michael Frayn, 'Political aims in Iceland', Manchester Guardian, 18.8.1959. 
307 Ingimundarson, Uppgi6r, 33 1. Also section 2.7,114. 
308 PRO: F0371/134932/NLI016/1, Gilchrist to Brimelow, 24.9.1958. 
309 NA-CAN: RG25/3993/10600-W-40-2, Copenhagen to Ottawa, 16.6.1959. On the importance of 
perceptions of the adversary, see Rosemary Foot, Substitutefor Viclorv: The Politics of Peacemaking at 
the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). For a discussion on British 
perspectives of other peoples, see e. g. David Cannadine, Ornamentalisin. How the British saw their 
Empire (London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 2001). 
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grant it the summer before would have done. 310 Likewise, the pull of principle remained 
strong. Although Fitzmaurice was not so unequivocal, other members of the Foreign 
Office mentioned that Britain's efforts to defend 'historic rights' at the second Law of 
the Sea Conference might be seriously prejudiced, should fishing cease within Iceland"s 
12-mile limit. 31 1 And the precedent set by surrender would, as before, be noticed 
elsewhere in the North Atlantic. 312 
Finally, domestic pressure always had to be reckoned with. In mid-May, just 
after the Althing declaration about no surrender and the continental shelf, Prime 
Minister Macmillan insisted that 'if we agreed a 12-mile limit for Iceland we lost our 
fishing industry in this country and this was something which no UK Government of 
whatever complexion would be prepared to tolerate'. 313 This was an exaggeration. Still, 
the trawling industry would of course be furious if the authorities were to abandon 
them. At the start of the conflict, the Icelanders decided to refrain from sending trawlers 
with catches to British ports, lest the owners and crews were provoked to impose a new 
landing ban. In early 1959, however, they tried to test the waters and when Ing6ýfur 
Arnarson (incidentally the first vessel to carry fish to the ill-fated George Dawson in 
1953) brought her catch to Grimsby, the port's Trawler Officer's Guild threatened to 
strike. Dennis Welch, its militant secretary, insisted that not only was it intolerable that 
the Icelanders could sell fish on the British market but sanctions were also essential to 
break them. The Guild only backed down because the Hull skippers voted against any 
action at this stage. 314 The pressure continued, however, and there were cases later in 
the year when Icelandic trawlers had to be diverted from Humberside because they 
would not have been unloaded. 315 Clearly, the economic 'weapon' might be branded if 
Britain would put an end to the naval protection. An interdepartmental meeting in 
Whitehall thus agreed that any evaluation of such a step would have to include the fact 
310 PRO: F0371/143107/NLI351/87, Brimelow minute, 19.3.1959. As one historian later put it, in 1959 
'[t]he British ... 
had a large psychological and economic investment in withstanding Iceland's claim to a 
12-mile exclusive fishing zone'. See NARA: RG59/POL33-8, Box 2019, Beverly Rowsome, 'The UN 
Conference of 1960 on the Law of the Sea: Pre-Conference and Conference Diplomacy on Fisheries and 
the Territorial Sea'. Historical Studies Division Paper, US Department of State, June 1973,28. 
311 PRO: F0371/143107/NLI351/87, Gutteridge and Fitzmaurice minutes, 11.3.1959, and 
F0371/141810/GW327/1, Simpson minute, 25.3.1959. 
312 PRO: F0371/143107/NLI351/87, Brimelow minute, 11.3.1959. Also MAF255/435, Godber minute, 
9.11.1959. 
313 PRO: PREM 11/2677, note on Macmillan-Drew meeting, 11.5.1959. 
314 
315 , 
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that 'our own fishing industry are in no mood to accept further concessions at their 
expense'. 316 
To sum up, both Britain and Iceland had reasons aplenty not to surrender. On the other 
hand, they could hardly advance either. For the Icelanders, the threat to leave NATO 
was not credible unless a disaster of some kind occurred at sea, and would they in any 
case bite to blood the Western hand that fed them? 3 17 For the British, escalation carried 
the risk of condemnation and American pressure, possibly of Suez proportions. 
Still, the stand-off could not last forever and as strange as it may sound, Iceland 
was gradually proving stronger. The 'cod war' superbly supports the maxim that 'power 
has no absolute existence. What matters is not the aggregation of resources, but the 
ability to apply appropriate force about a given point'. 318 In the summer of 1959, 
Gilchrist said sarcastically that 'the whole thing ... was merely a good example of 
power politics in action (from the Icelandic side, bien entendu)'. 3 19 Needless to say, 
Britain was also trying to play power politics. The only difference was that it did not 
work. The British body of decision-makers had, consciously and unconsciously, broken 
some cardinal rules of bargaining with threats of force, as described for instance by 
Richard Ned Lebow: 
Do not make threats where the costs of failure would be greater than the benefits 
of success. If the outcome of the threat is unpredictable, the odds are against 
you. A threat is only worth the risk if you are reasonably confident that it will 
succeed. 
Do not make threats you are unprepared to carry out. 
Do not make threats likely to damage important relationships. Even when 
successful, such threats may bring short-term gains at the expense of greater 
long-term losses. 320 
In September 1958, it had appeared pragmatic, for reasons of power, prestige, pressure, 
principle and precedence, to use the Royal Navy as a tool in a diplomatic negotiation. 
By the second half of 1959, Britain only wanted to beat a dignified retreat from the 
troubled waters off Iceland. The long-terin impracticality of short-term pragmatism was 
316 PRO: F03 71/143113/NL 13 51/197, FO to NATO Permanent Delegation, 3.11.1959. Also MAF209/68, 
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United States and the Conservative- Social Democrat 'reconstruction government' was given $3 millions 
in late 1960. See Ingimundarson, 'Vidborf Bandarikjanna', 343-344. That coalition also received a $30 
million stabilisation aid from the OEEC, IMF and the USA. Ingimundarson, Struggle, 58. 
318 Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 75. Also Booth, Navies, 29. Habeeb, Power, 125-128. 
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beginning to tell. But how and when might the withdrawal take place? Experience 
elsewhere would suggest that 'muddling through', 'drifting' or 'hanging on', rather 
common British endeavours in the post-war period, could last for a fairly long time. 321 
Only a shock in connection with Icelandic casualties on the fishing grounds might have 
forced through a policy change. 322 At first sight, a referral to the International Court 
would also have seemed to provide the required way out. Yet, in spite of faith in their 
basic argument, neither side was really willing to put its case to The Hague where it 
would, in any case, have dragged on for a few years. 323 Most reasonably, British 
decision-makers could pin their hopes on the second Law of the Sea of the Conference, 
to be held in early 1960. First, however, it was tempting to think, as some had done in 
the mid-1950s, that a tolerable agreement with the Faroe Islands would lead the 
Icelanders to 'see reason'. In 1958-59, alongside the stalemate off Iceland, more 
progress was made elsewhere in the Atlantic. 
321 See Hennessy, Muddling Through, and Kennedy, Realities, 315-384. 
322 In general, as John Stoessinger argues, 'people abandon their bad habits only when catastrophe is close 
at hand. The intellect alone is not enough. We must be shaken, almost shattered, before we change'. See 
Pickering, Britain's Withdrawal, 202-203, and Frankel, Making, 196-197. 
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3.7. The Friendly Alternative? Agreement off the Faroe Islands, 
1958-59 
As if an international conference and a 'cod war' did not cause enough friction over fish 
in 1958, a dispute also arose over the fishing limits off the Faroe Islands. 324 Not only 
did it need a solution in its own right, but it was inevitably tied to developments 
elsewhere. In the larger context, this Faroese factor was unfortunate in two ways. On the 
one hand, the presence of the Faroe Islanders waiting to sail in the Icelanders' wake 
strengthened Britain's determination not to succumb to the inevitable off Iceland. On 
the other, the more favourable correlation of power in Britain's struggle against the 
Faroe Islands supported the wishful thinking that since a satisfactory settlement could 
be reached there, so might the Icelandic conflict have a happy ending, after all. 
When the Icelanders were stating their intention to declare a 12-mile limit at the Geneva 
conference in the spring of 1958, Faroese Home Rule Premier Kristian Djurhuus 
assured British officials that the Faroe Islanders would never accept a worse deal than 
their neighbours in the North Atlantic. 325 Thus, on June 6, the Lagting in T6rshavn 
resolved to extend the fishing limits, as Reykjavik intended, to 12 miles on September 
1.326 Naturally, domestic politics were involved. Elections were due, in November at the 
latest, and a miniature version of the Icelandic party scene was visible on the Faroe 
Islands. Erlendur Patursson, the leader of the separatist and socialist-oriented 
Republicans was in some ways a Faroese version of Lddvik J6sepsson and continued to 
harden the opinions of most other politicians. 'You don't negotiate with a thief over 
your life', he insisted in the summer of 1958, resembling the subsequent 'cod war' cry 
in Iceland of not dealing with the Brits, but beating them. 327 
The British apprehension about falling dominos in the North Atlantic was 
therefore fair. But as the Icelandic dispute was brewing, and the Faroese waited in 
anticipation, the farsighted Thomas Brimelow wondered whether Britain could not 
construct a strategy. If enticing concessions were offered to the Faroe Islands, the 
Icelanders would have to 'take the initiative in asking that we should grant to them 
whatever concessions we have granted to the Faroese'. They would realise that 
compromises were 'not only more correct but also more profitable', and the world 
324 Next to nothing has been written on this conflict. For a short overview, see Patursson, Fiskii, inna, 51- 
58. 
325 PRO: F0371/13473KND1351/7, Cullis to Brimelow, 23.4.1958. 
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community would also see that Britain was genuinely willing to negotiate with a small 
nation. 328 Brimelow's idea was not well received in Whitehall. Manningham-Buller, 
still ignoring the prevalence of politics in the law of the sea, reminded him that the 1955 
agreement with the Faroe Islands was meant to last for ten years and should simply be 
329 honoured . More valid, 
however, were Fishery Secretary Wall's doubts whether 'the 
Faroese tail could successfully wag the North Atlantic dog'. 330 It seemed as if even the 
coolheaded Brimelow was being guilty of wishful thinking. On its own, this suspicion 
sufficed to damage his proposal. As he himself also admitted, the trawlermen would not 
(to put it mildly) like to sign away fishing rights premeditatedly. And fundamentally the 
idea of shaping events went against the spirit of reactive 'pragmatism' which prevailed 
in Whitehall. An interdepartmental meeting agreed that although concessions might turn 
out to be necessary, any 'initiative' must come from Denmark. 331 
That happened in mid-June 1958 when the authorities in Copenhagen asked for 
talks with Britain on a revision of the arrangement from 1955. Prime Minister H. C. 
Hansen had earlier declared that in principle, Denmark wanted a 12-mile limit off the 
Faroe Islands, because of the population's extreme dependency on fisheries. 332 In closed 
conversation with Sir Roderick Barclay in Copenhagen, Secretary-General Nils 
Svenningsen also stressed 'the explosive situation in the Faroes'. Patursson's 
'Communists' and other pro-independence parties might even gain victory in the 
forthcoming elections. 333 In the late 1950s, Washington stressed that the Faroe Islands 
were of equal strategic importance to the United States and NATO as Iceland or 
Greenland 
'334 So Svenningsen emphasised that the 
'general interest of the West required 
that the Faroese should be given satisfaction'. 335 Again, a 'mini-Iceland' situation 
seemed to be in the making. At the start of July, in reply to the Danish request for talks, 
Britain emphasised that the 1901 treaty with the additions from 1955 had served all 
parties well and should remain in force. 336 While not as important as the waters off 
Iceland, the Faroese grounds were valuable, especially for Aberdeen and the smaller 
Grimsby trawlers. 337 After the 12-mile declaration in T6rshavn, the trawler owners were 
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reported to have threatened a ban on the landings of fish from Danish and Faroese 
vessels. 338 The apparent slide to a conflict on Icelandic lines continued. 
This is where such similarities end, however. Despite their sympathy, the authorities in 
Copenhagen did not like the Faroese 12-mile declaration, just like they had not 
welcomed calls to follow Iceland's lead earlier in the decade. Danish fishermen were 
against limit extensions, particularly if such measures would harm their access to the 
British market, and within the Foreign Ministry the old 'bacon-consideration' 
resurfaced briefly: 'economic dependence on exports to Britain ... must make Denmark 
opt for a more moderate policy'. 339 Furthermore, the Danish government had repeatedly 
stated its aversion to unilateral extensions, the follow-on Law of the Sea Conference lay 
ahead, and the delimitation of the state's fishing limits was not a local Faroese affair. 340 
Danish officials freely told outside observers that they were mainly calling for the talks 
with Britain to 'keep face' in T6rshavn. 341 National 'culture' also mattered. Hansen, as 
most Danes, was notably Anglophile and a devoted believer in the 'Denmark is a little 
land' philosophy. 342 The Danes simply did not want to rock the boat. Yet, Britain was 
not going to misuse their benevolence because, as Burke Trend summarised for 
Macmillan in October, Copenhagen had characteristically been 'very friendly', unlike 
the Icelanders. 343 This amiability should be met in kind. 
By this stage, negotiations between Britain and Denmark had already begun. On 
September 12, the two parties met in London, under the leadership of John Hare and 
Denmark's Finance Minister, Viggo Kampmann. Notwithstanding the favourable 
disposition, a compromise could not be reached before the opposing sides had tabled 
their utmost positions. In addition, both 'bogeymen' and more manifest adversaries 
were to intervene at one stage or another. First, the spectre of communism appeared. 
Shortly before the opening round, the Danes reiterated that unless a 12-mile limit was 
established, the Faroese might break ties with Dem-nark. After that, the danger might be 
that 'the Communists would, in due course, take over in the Faroes and establish 
344 
progressively closer and eventual military links with the USSR'. At the meeting 
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itself, Kampmann voiced this caution again although he thought it necessary to add that 
the Danes were 'not trying to conjure up ghosts here'. 345 
Again Britain was subjected to 'blackmail', as the Embassy in Copenhagen put 
it, and this time by the miniature Faroe Islanders, via the most pro-British of peoples. 346 
But would it work? On September 4, when the 4cod war' was at its sudden height and 
naval protection was fast diminishing Iceland's fondness for NATO, Danish officials 
recognised that Britain seemed to be sidestepping the strategic connotations in the 
Icelandic case. 347 At the talks in London, Hare also complained how 'it was not 
acceptable that the larger members of NATO always had to make concessions to protect 
Alliance unity'. 348 Moreover, the Danes were so obviously bluffing when they raised 
the risk of a Soviet satellite on the Faroe Islands-a 'Cuba' less than 200 miles from 
John O'Groats, as it were. Even the Americans concluded that enfant terrible Patursson 
was not Moscow-oriented, but more in the co-operative mould . 
349 Neither was the 
Faroese desire for full independence as unequivocal as it had for instance been in 
Iceland before and during the Second World War. 350 
Deep down, both the Danes and the British knew that the 12-mile demand could 
safely be put aside. During a second and third round of talks in October, when 
representatives from T6rshavn also participated, a compromise emerged. It was mostly 
based on the American proposal from Geneva about '6+6+historic rights'. No foreign 
fishing would be allowed within a six-mile limit, drawn in part by Danish-favoured 
baselines and in part from the British-type low-water mark, while traditional trawling 
could continue in the outer zone, subject to seasonal closures in three 'boxes'. Britain 
also had to accept the Danish insistence that if the Icelanders were offered better terms, 
the agreement could be revised . 
35 1 The Danes well remembered the anger in T6rshavn 
in the mid-1950s when the Icelanders, through confrontation, got more than the Faroese 
had been given after amicable negotiations. In London the Cabinet was probably 
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relieved to hear some positive developments on fish and adjudged this demand to be 
fair. 352 
All seemed to be developing satisfactorily. But then the British trawlermen and owners 
intervened. When they got wind of the supposed compromise, they adamantly refused 
to accept three 'boxes' outside the six-mile limit. Some suggested that the Royal Navy 
should instead be instructed to enforce Britain's rights off the Faroe Islands. 353 As 
before, alliances in this conflict were across boundaries, however. The diplomats in 
Copenhagen and London were working together for a solution, fending off the 
6extremists' in the ports, be they British or Faroese. At a meeting with industry 
representatives in London, Ambassador Barclay gladly picked up a Danish 'weapon' 
and warned that intransigence would abet secessionist tendencies among the Faroese. If 
they broke from Denmark, they might seek aid 'from other, particularly Communist, 
sources'. 354 In the event, the socialists and the separatists made little or no gains in the 
November elections. 355 Although the British industry then forced through an appeal to 
reduce the size and number of the 'boxes', both Brimelow and Barclay spoke so half- 
heartedly that the Danes knew well that they would not hurt any feelings by rejecting 
the pleas. 356 In Paris, Sir Frank Roberts also reinforced the inclination not to fight the 
industry's comer by describing how a successful outcome of the Faroese negotiations 
could be used to emphasise British open-handedness: 'I know that Spaak himself had 
been hoping for this, if only to heap coals of fire on the head of Iceland'. 357 
In February 1959, the trawling industry in Britain, most grudgingly, and the 
Faroese Lagting, with a large majority, accepted the draft agreement. 358 On April 27, it 
took effect. The Danes enforced the limit against all nations, undeterred both by a 
number of formal protests from other nations, 359 and the wish by the Soviet Union, the 
only state apart from Britain which did significant fishing off the Faroes, to receive 
special rights within the new line. 360 The settlement was a compromise, in the truest 
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sense of the word. Yet it can not be seen as the good formula which the Icelanders 
should have accepted. Britain was willing to meet Danish wishes because they were not 
as tough as the Icelandic ones. Had there been no 12-mile extension off Iceland in 1958, 
there would have been no qualified '6+6' agreement off the Faroe Islands in 1959. And 
the Danes and the Faroese were probably more willing to compromise because they 
held on to the caveat-the one thing that Copenhagen actually insisted on -that should 
Iceland secure a better deal, the Faroese settlement could be revised. In fact, the 
Icelanders suspected with some justification that they were simply expected to break the 
ice with all the hardship it entailed, and then the Danes and the Faroese (as well as the 
Norwegians for that matter) could smoothly follow. 'Could not Her Majesty's 
Government begin negotiations with the Icelanders? ' Secretary-General Svenningsen 
had astutely asked in the summer of 1958.361 
So, one problem had been solved in the North Atlantic. Yet Britain had no reason to 
celebrate the turn of events. In February 1959, 'Micky' Joy calculated that even if the 
authorities in Reykjavik would never accept the same terms, they would see what could 
be achieved if people were willing to 'negotiate in a realistic spirit'. 362 But not even that 
happened. As with the Anglo-Danish agreement of 1955, the new compromise had no 
effect on the Icelanders. It was simply another 'bacon-deal', said the Socialists and 
others were as disparaging. 363 Furthermore, the Faroese solution was on lines which had 
been considered utterly unacceptable only a year before, and other states with an interest 
in resisting the drive towards wider limits criticised British officials for this prejudicial 
concession before the second Geneva conference. 364 Moreover, the 'triumph' had been 
achieved against the feeble Faroe Islanders who had been represented by placid 
Anglophiles in Copenhagen. A satisfactory agreement with the Danes, as Brimelow 
correctly estimated in the summer of 1958, 'would be easier than with almost anyone 
else'. 365 In short, if this was a victory, what would a defeat look like? 
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3.8. 'Positive Adaptation'. Icelandic Impasse and Preparations 
for the Second Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1959-60. 
The wider the scope, the weightier the implications. The Faroese agreement was just a 
footnote in the development of the law of the sea. Conversely, in February 1959, when 
that settlement was all but secure, the Cabinet underlined that the second Law of the Sea 
Conference, to be held in early 1960, 'must not fail'. Otherwise a number of 
'irresponsible states' would declare territorial waters of 12 miles or more. 366 In 
consequence, Britain would have to show greater flexibility than before, work for 
Western unity and accept almost any concession to get a solution. Similarly, the British 
position would be strengthened if the Icelandic dispute could be solved before the 
conference. 367 Iceland's support for a 'Western' compromise would then be secure and 
Britain could not be accused as easily of 'bullying' the perceived weaklings of this 
world. 
Before the first conference in 1958, Britain had belatedly patched up an unrealistic 
policy-initial defence of the three-mile rule, followed by the infamous '3+3-3' 
proposal and finally a grudging support for the American formula of '6+6+historic 
rights'. This attempt to reach an agreement on the width of territorial waters had failed 
but in 1960, a fresh bid could be made. Thus, the preparations for the second 
conference, as well as the proceedings themselves, constitute an excellent 'laboratory' 
situation for students of foreign policy decision-making, especially the 're- 
representation of problems'. The problem was unchanged and the scenario similar, so it 
could be assumed that the experience of failure would lead to an improvement in policy. 
In other words, 'positive adaptation' might occur where the discrepancy between reality 
368 and perception was reduced . 
In early 1959, the most knowledgeable officials in London needed little 
conversion. They realised perfectly well that if the proponents of narrow limits were to 
obtain the least damaging solution at the forthcoming conference, they would have to 
accept larger concessions than they had been willing to contemplate the first time 
around. Furthermore, as both Brimelow and Legal Adviser Fitzmaurice underlined in 
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the Foreign Office, the fishing interests could not be allowed to predominate, for such 
subservience 'has throughout bedevilled all our policy and prevented any agreement 
being reached'. According to Fitzmaurice, even the fishery officials admitted that in the 
very last resort Britain might have to swallow a 12-mile fishing limit at the upcoming 
conference. 369 The Service Departments also agreed that the fight for the three-mile rule 
was lost, 370 and when the administration in Hong Kong protested over the negative 
consequences of a deviation from that limit, the Colonial Office pointed out that 'our 
ability to direct these movements is limited' . 
37 1 Apparently, perception and reality had 
more or less coalesced in Whitehall. 
It was primarily at Cabinet level that 'positive adaptation' was needed. At the 
beginning of February, Ministers accepted that the proposal of '6+6+historic rights' 
would never be ratified at Geneva. Still, these rights were 'necessary to the prosperity of 
our fishing industry', as Selwyn Lloyd told his colleagues, and the Cabinet decided that 
Britain's next line of defence should involve a different compromise, a '6+6+limited 
historic rights'. States which had traditionally fished in distant waters would retain the 
freedom to do so up to six miles, but only so that the catches would not exceed present 
levels. 372 The concession resembled the idea of 'abstention' which American officials 
had contemplated before the first conference, and it was a smaller step than Fitzmaurice 
and Brimelow would have liked. On the other hand, in the first half of 1959 they knew 
that a final decision would be premature, and at least the Cabinet was debating the 
problem a year in advance, not less than a week as had been the case the year before. 
Now there would be ample time to face the facts. 
Moreover, Britain had to co-ordinate tactics and objectives with conventional 
allies on the international scene, in particular the United States and Canada, two of the 
main players at Geneva in 1958. In subsequent discussions, the Americans always 
emphasised that the most important goal was to secure a six-mile territorial sea, and 
some fishing concessions farther out would then be indispensable. Initially, they did not 
discount the idea of limited historical rights, keeping in mind that the United States 
could not go so far to satisfy the coastal states that support from distant-water fishing 
nations would be lost. 373 The Canadians were tougher, assuring British officials in 
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370 PRO: ADMI/27057, Pritchard minute, 17.12.1958, and West to Pritchard, 22.1.1959. 
371 PRO: ADM 1/27057, Macleod to Officer Administering the Government of Hong Kong, 19.6.1959. 
372 PRO: CAB129/96, C(59)15, Lloyd memorandum, 30.1.1959. CAB128/33, CC(59), 4h meeting, 
3.2.1959. 
373 NARA: RG399.731/4-2159, Richard memorandum, 21.4.1959, and PRO: ADMI/27057, Pritchard to 
First Lord, 26.6.1959. 
194 
March and April 1959 that only a plain '6+6' could gain the necessary two-thirds 
majority at the new conference. 374 Yet, they also realised that such a proposal would 
hardly succeed unless Britain and most other Western states decided to back it. During a 
new round of talks in June, High Commissioner Drew indicated that Canada might be 
willing to consider the continuation of historical rights in the outer six-mile zone for 
five years, with a possible, but not guaranteed, prolongation through bilateral treaties. 375 
Meanwhile, the United States and Canada also conferred and in October they reached a 
provisional agreement to accept-as a fallback position at the conference-a solution 
which would be roughly on those lines. 376 If, however. developments at Geneva 
demonstrated that a stipulation on limited fishing rights could prevent an agreement on 
six-mile territorial waters, the Americans would drop it. 'Defence interests are 
paramount', Arthur H. Dean reiterated in December 195 9.377 
At first, Britain indicated that as it stood, the US-Canadian formula was 
unacceptable. 378 Other traditional 'three-milers' disliked it intensely as well, and could 
only be brought to accept a long phase-out period for historic rights; at least 25 years 
and with no discriminating catch limitations. 379 Conceivably, therefore, the Western 
powers would be as divided as they had been at the first conference. But lessons had 
now been learned. In December, and again in January 1960, the Cabinet reluctantly 
agreed that the freedom to fish between six miles and 12 in perpetuity could not be 
defended. As Prime Minister Macmillan summed up, Britain might even have to accept 
the plain '6+6' solution. 380 This apparent flexibility indicated that when given time, 
British statesmen could acknowledge the divide between their perception and reality. 
The problem had always been the dastardly phenomenon of 'too little, too late', but in 
early 1960, on the eve of the conference at Geneva, the Cabinet's flexibility seemed to 
confirm that Britain was no longer going to be left behind. 
The Attorney General was the first casualty of the retreat from earlier positions. The 
proceedings at Geneva in 1958 had demonstrated that the law of the sea was primarily a 
political matter where legal considerations were not paramount. Neither the industry nor 
374 PRO: F0371/141784/GWI 1/17, Ottawa to CRO, 6.5.1959, and Burns to de Zulueta, 9.5.1959. 
375 NA-CAN: RG25/83 54/10600-W-40- 1, record of British-Canadian talks, 15. -17.6.1959. 
376 FRUS 1958-60 11,734-74 1, Herter to Lloyd, 11.11.1959. 
377 NARA: RG59/399.731/12-1159, Richards memorandum, 11.12.1959. Also FRUS 1958-60 11,743- 
746, Washington to all diplomatic posts, 31.12.1959. 
378 NARA: RG59/399.731/11-259, Richards memorandum, 2.11.1959. 
379 NARA: RG59/399.731/11-1759, Whitney to Dulles, 17.11.1959. 
380 PRO: CAB 128/34, CC(60), I" meeting, 4.1.1960. Also CAB 128/33, CC(59), 61" meeting, 3.12.1959, 
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the Foreign Office liked Manningham-Buller's juridical Iens', 381 and in December 
1959, Macmillan declared that the department which was 'primarily concerned' should 
assume the leadership at Geneva. Potentially, the decision could have resulted in an 
even more rigid posture at the conference, for it was John Hare at MAFF who was 
chosen. 382 
Moreover, adaptability in theory was one thing, actual implementation another. 
In the waters off Iceland, Britain kept defending the right to fish up to four miles. It may 
be recalled that in early 1959, officials had debated whether to call off the whole 
operation. However, no pressing need arose (no crisis) so the stand-off continued. Later 
in the year, however, a strong case was again made for a withdrawal. In March 1959, 
the patrol had been increased from three to four warships as more trawlers went to 
Iceland in the summer period but from November, only two vessels were needed on 
constant station. Yet, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet complained, 'the 
continuation of the Icelandic dispute, far beyond the time limits originally foreseen, is 
now exerting a serious and adverse effect upon the weapon efficiency of the fleet'. 
Training programmes were dislocated, ships withdrawn from NATO exercises and 
visits to foreign ports cancelled. In an age when the Admiralty was constantly fighting 
cuts in expenditure, the plight may have been exaggerated but the conclusion was fair: 
'As constituted in peacetime, the fleet cannot permanently withstand this drain on its 
resources'. 383 
Besides, the operation was certainly not lessening the resolve of the Icelanders. 
In discussions with the American Muccio, Andrew Gilchrist (who was leaving the 
Reykjavik post) readily conceded the 'inefficacy' of the 'British show of force'. 
384 As 
expected, the United States agreed with this estimate and Arthur Dean had earlier 
stressed that the Icelandic dispute must be 'got out of the way' before the conference. 
385 
The Icelanders themselves also kept up the pressure. In late November, 61afur Thors 
(having assumed the Premiership in the Conservative- Social Democratic coalition) 
assured Gilchrist that if 'really illegal incidents took place, ... Iceland would walk 
38 1 BJL: DPW/13/200, Phillips to Wall, 7.5.1959, and BJL: DPW/13/3, Wall to Phillips, 1.3.1960. 
382 PRO: CAB21/2763, Macmillan to Kilmuir, 18.12.1959. 
383 PRO: ADM306/38, Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet to Admiralty, 13.7.1959. In an off-the-record 
chat with a British journalist, Thomas Galbraith, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, also confirmed that the 
Admiralty 'has no kind of vested interest, much less enthusiasm, for the operation'. HF: Mangeot to Foss, 
17.8.1959. 
384 NARA: RG59/740B. 022/12-859, Muccio to Dulles, 8.12.1959. 
385 PRO: ADM] /27057, Manningham-Bulier to Kilmuir, 16.7.1959. 
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386 
straight out of NATO'. Still, his new regime put forward one gesture: fines against 
British trawlers, accumulated since September 1,1958, would be suspended if Britain 
withdrew her warships and respected the 12-mile fishing limit. 387 
A termination of the 'cod war' on these terms would take the form of a near total 
British surrender. At a NATO Ministerial meeting on December 17, Lloyd said so to 
Gudmundsson who replied that he would then have to 'intervene on traditional lines' at 
the meeting itself. 388 This he did, warning that the Icelanders were 'losing faith in 
NATO' because of the dispute. Lloyd replied by repeating Britain's offer of a six-mile 
compromise, a non-starter if ever there was one. 389 But at least a semblance of 
negotiations had begun and in Paris, both the Foreign Secretary and Sir Frank Roberts, 
the Permanent Representative, suggested informally that the Alliance should intervene 
to 'find some modus vivendi which would avoid the danger of incidents'. 390 With both 
British and Icelandic blessing, this took the form of secret mediation efforts by General 
Secretary Spaak and Halvard Lange of Norway. Spaak, who had been bitten once or 
even twice by the Icelanders in 1958, doubted whether they would be willing to accept 
any meaningful compromise, and Lange was mostly responsible for the proposal which 
they produced on January 22,1960: in return for a withdrawal of warships and the end 
to British fishing within the 12-mile limit, Iceland would promise to cancel for good all 
charges for poaching, and nothing in the agreement could be said to prejudice the views 
of the two parties at the forthcoming conference. 391 
Although the formula was obviously fashioned out of their own suggestions, the 
Icelanders managed to be unhappy about it, pointing out that they were being asked to 
drop fines against trawlers indefinitely, while Britain could send the Navy again to the 
disputed waters. In talks with Roberts, Spaak and Lange, Andersen also stated, quite 
frankly, that the Icelandic authorities were not that keen to see the warships leave. The 
reason was, as Britain's new Ambassador, Charles Stewart, seconded from Reykjavik, 
they 'might not be too displeased if there should be a small "incident" during or 
immediately before the ... conference. 
They would then be able again to pose as the 
386 PRO: F0371/143114/NL1351/231, Gilchrist to FO, 1.12-1959. Also NHC: Politico-Military Division, 
Box 209. Series XXVIII. Iceland. Force Levels - NATO matters, Muccio to SACLANT, 6.12.1959. 
387 PRO: F0371/143114/NL 1351/230, Gilchrist to FO, 27.11.1959, and F03 )71/143114/NLI351/23 1, 
Gilchrist to FO, 1.12.1959. 
388 PRO: F0371/143114NLI351/240, Roberts to FO, 17.12.1959. 
389 NATO: C-R(59)50, IS-00 10, NAC meeting, 17.12.1959. 
390 PRO: F0371/143114/NLI351/248, Roberts to Lloyd, 23.12.1959. 
39 1 Thi-SO: 1993-2-1, Andersen to Reykjavik, 23.1.1960. PRO: F0371/151669/NLI351/14, Roberts to 
FO, 23.1.1960. 
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innocent small nation being bullied by an imperialistic big brother'. 392 The British side 
had more valid reasons to complain and Sir Frank Roberts argued for at least some 
limited fishing in the outer six miles. 393 Andersen immediately shot down any such 
hopes, however, by stressing that the 12-mile limit had assumed an 'almost religious 
importance' in Iceland. 394 If there was to be a 'compromise', it would involve a 
complete British withdrawal. 
It was an agonising decision to make. On February 1, Selwyn Lloyd argued that the 
departure of warships and trawlers would weaken Britain's case at Geneva and the 
industry would call it 'a betrayal of their interests'. 395 On the other hand, the Admiralty 
would welcome an end to 'Operation Whippet' and as Fitzmaurice wrote to Lloyd the 
following day, 'the maintenance of naval protection during the conference cannot fail to 
place us morally under a cloud, and to make it less likely that we shall achieve our 
alms'. 396 
In yet another show of novel accommodation, the Cabinet all but faced up to the 
realities off Iceland. Although Ministers could not bring themselves to accept the 
Lange-Spaak formula, probably for fear of condemnation on Humberside, 397 on 
February 3 they decided to ask the industry to suspend all fishing within 12 miles off 
Iceland during the conference, in return for a confidential undertaking from Reykjavik 
not to interfere with trawlers which 'inadvertently' strayed inside the line. 398 Lange and 
Spaak left the centre of the stage and it was now up to the industry to decide British 
attitude; in a way much as they had been able to determine Britain's actual policy on the 
four-mile limit in the early 1950s. The trawlermen and owners were also torn between 
contrasting choices. Radical representatives, like Dennis Welch from the Grimsby 
Officers' Guild, wanted no surrender while moderates within the industry, especially 
among the owners, were persuaded by the argument that a temporary concession off 
Iceland might yield lasting dividends at Geneva. 399 On February 18, the leaders of the 
BTF told John Hare that for the duration of the conference they would not send their 
392 UD: 33.12/39/IV, Stabell minute, 25.1.1960. PRO: F0371/151669/NLI 351/20, Stewart to McAlpine, 
5.2.1960. Also NA-CAN: RG25/8352/10600-E-40-1.2, Robertson memorandum, 29.1.1960. 
393 PRO: F0371/151669/NL 1351/14, Roberts to FO, 28.1.1960. 
394 UD: 33.12/39/IV, Stabell minute, 25.1.1960. Also 31.2/8/Xl, Gudmundsson to Lange, 27.1.1960. 
395 PRO: F03 71/151669/NL 13 51/20, FO minute, 1.2.1960. 
396 PRO: F0371/151670/NLI351/25, Fitzmaurice to Lloyd, 2.2.1960. 
397 Sir Frank Roberts was said to have told Hans G. Andersen 'that while UK Ministers were favourably 
disposed, the trawler interest had successfully argued such a solution might appear to grant defacto 
recognition to Icelandic claim to 12 miles'. NA-CAN: RG25/8355/1066-2-40-1.2, Watkins to Ottawa, 
15.2.1960. 
398 PRO: CAB 128/34, CC(60), 5th meeting, 3.2.1960. 
399 PRO: F0371/150833/GW12/5 1, Welch report, 4.2.1960. Also Yorkshire Post, 24.2.1960. 
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vessels at all to the waters off Iceland, arguing that a withdrawal outside 12 miles would 
indicate a certain recognition of that line. They also knew their skippers well enough to 
realise that they would always try to sneak inside if the fish was there, thus risking 
incidents and arrests. 400 Furthermore, many skippers had grown tired and frustrated of 
fishing in havens, 401 and if an agreement were reached at Geneva, they would only have 
missed a part of the lucrative spring season off Iceland. 
The Cabinet was pleasantly surprised that the owners did not even need to be 
pressed hard . 
402 In Paris, Paul-Henri Spaak welcomed the show of goodwill as well and 
urged the Icelanders to respond in kind by suspending all fines for poaching. 403 In the 
absence of official commitments in London, they did not want to take that step, 
politically inflammable as it would always have been. Secretly, however, Bjami 
Benediktsson, Minister of Justice and hence responsible for the coast guard service, 
404 instructed his captains to 'avoid incidents' . At midnight on March 14, three 
days 
before the opening of the conference, British warships and trawlers left the Icelandic 
grounds. At last, Britain had showed a great degree of accommodation and foresight- 
but would it be enough? 
400 PRO: CAB 129/100, C(60)32, Hare memorandum, 19.2.1960. 
40' E. g. Kristjdnsson, 4 sý6rnpallinum, 323-324, and Kjxrnested interview, 24.3.1999. 
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3.9. 'Outside Any General Rule of Law. Britain, Iceland and the 
Geneva Conference, 1960 
The second conference on the law of the sea was a simpler affair than the first one in 
1958. The number of delegations had risen to 88 but this time the international 
community 'only' needed to agree on the width of national jurisdiction, whereas the 
previous meeting had debated other complex issues like baselines, the continental shelf 
and rights of passage in international straits. The comparative simplicity showed in both 
the duration and organisation of the 1960 conference. It began on March 17 and lasted 
six weeks (three shorter than in 1958) and it worked in one committee (compared to five 
the first time) which was then followed by a plenary session. 405 During the debates, it 
also became clear that the balance of power had changed and at the final session in late 
April, only a single vote decided between success and failure at Geneva; or between 
4chaos' and order in the law of the sea. 
The '12-milers' were still formidable, and determined to hold their ground. The Soviet 
Union put for-ward a proposal on 12 miles as the permissible limit for both territorial 
waters and fishing limits. Mexico and a group of Afro-Asian states tabled a similar 
motion and in mid-April, just before voting at the committee stage, the Soviets 
announced that they had decided to withdraw their motion. Instead, they would endorse 
the other submission which had gathered more supporters and was known as the '18- 
power proposal' . 
406 The West faced a 'well-organised, well-disciplined voting bloc', as 
the American Dean had predicted at the beginning of the proceedings. 407 But unlike the 
first conference, when the traditional defenders of narrow territorial waters had been 
divided and badly organised, in 1960 they quickly joined forces. The earlier experience 
was so clear that 'positive adaptation'-the convergence of perception and reality-was 
almost inevitable. 
First of all, the three-mile rule was hardly mentioned. Even the deeply 
conservative Chiefs of Staff in London concluded that while such a narrow limit would 
best serve Britain's strategic interests, six miles were acceptable 'in view of the political 
405 For an overview of the conference, see Arthur H. Dean, 'The Second Geneva Conference on the Law 
of the Sea: The Fight for Freedom of the Seas', ARL, Vol. 54, No. 4,1960,751-789, and D. W. Bowett, 
'The Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea', International and Coniparative Law 
QuarterlY, Vol. 9, Pt. 3,1960,415-435. 
406 Bowett, 'Second United Nations Conference', 421-423. 
407 NARA: RG59/399.731/3-1960, Dean to Herter, 19.3.1960. Also Nadeson, 'Analysis', 58-67. 
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408 difficulties involved' 
. 
Furthermore, on March 15, two days before the opening round 
at Geneva, the Cabinet accepted John Hare's estimation that an indefinite retention of 
historic rights inside 12 miles was impossible. A phase-out period of about ten years 
could be achievable but in order to prevent 'a complete breakdown of the conference', 
Britain might have to vote for an immediate abandonment of all fishing within a 12- 
mile liMit. 409 The Canadians also showed signs of reconciliation. Although they entered 
the conference with their old '6+6' proposal, they indicated behind the scenes that they 
might be prepared to consider a phase-out period in the outer zone; a compromise which 
410 the Norwegians also favoured . Once at Geneva, moreover, High Commissioner Drew 
found that relations with Hare and the British delegation were 'close and extremely 
cordial'; a positive change from the spats with Manningham-Buller in 1958.411 
Even so, the 'big three' in the Western camp--the United States, Britain and 
Canada-began the conference in apparent disagreement. Arthur H. Dean suggested the 
'6+6' solution with historic rights, but restricted to current catches. George Drew 
described that as a 'typical imperialistic proposal' and John Hare was openly 'shocked' 
by the Canadian attitude. 412 Having said that, all of them were Primarily paying lip 
service to demanding interests, about to be abandoned. Drew learned that Hare's 
remarks were essentially for domestic consumption, and that the American opener was 
ýmore or less ... a concession to certain 
distant water fishing states and to their own 
fishing industry'. 413 The window dressing had been damaging in 1958 but this time it 
was more superficial and did not last as long. Again, a lesson had been learned the first 
time around. At Geneva rumours soon abounded that Britain, Canada and the United 
408 PRO: DEFE4/125, COS(60), 14'h meeting, 25.2.1960. Also DEFE5/99, COS(60)36, First Sea Lord 
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States would ultimately propose a '6+6' agreement with historic rights which would 
expire after a certain time. 414 
On April 8, the pretence was over and the campaigning began in earnest. The United 
States and Canada tabled a joint proposal of '6+6' with a phase-out period of ten years 
for distant-water fishing in the outer zone. Britain was not a cosponsor and, ostensibly, 
her support was not secure. For a while, John Hare and the fishery officials in London 
appeared willing to examine the prospects of a nine-mile proposal for both fishing and 
territorial waters which, in the long run and in spite of the strategic drawbacks, would 
arguably serve the trawling industry better than the US-Canadian compromise. 415 The 
Admiralty, however, would never have accepted that argument-the contention that 
ýwar is less important than fish', as one of its officials put it. 416 Besides, '6+6+phase- 
out' was the reality which had to be faced. On April 11, Hare announced that even if the 
transitory period was much too short, the British delegation would vote for the new US- 
Canadian proposal. 'Britain is preparing to accept great hardship to serve so good a 
cause', opined the Daily Telegraph. 417 
Thus, one 'extremist' from 1958 had moved to the middle ground, but what 
about the Icelanders, habitually at the other extreme end of the spectrum? On the eve of 
the conference, they were as insistent on their interests as they had ever been. They 
would never accept an indefinite retention of historic fishing inside the 12-mile limit, 
and they aimed to have Iceland's extraordinary reliance on the riches of the seas 
418 acknowledged . Unsurprisingly, the 
Icelandic delegation was therefore displeased with 
the initial position of the United States, not to mention Britain. Although both Dean and 
Hare claimed to be 'very sympathetic' to Iceland's unique situation, they did not appear 
willing to codify any 'special rights' measures. 419 Undeterred, on March 31 the 
Icelanders introduced a proposal on preferential treatment for coastal states which were 
overwhelmingly dependent on fisheries. 420 Moreover, they insisted that they would vote 
for what was then the Soviet proposal on 12-mile territorial waters and fishing limits. 
When C. Cadieux of the Canadian delegation pleaded against that decision, Hans G. 
Andersen, Iceland's chief official at Geneva, mentioned the importance of domestic 
414 Morgunbladid, 2.4.1960, and Financial Times, 7.4.1960. 
415 PRO: F03 71/15082 1 /GW 11/67, Geneva delegation to FO, 7.4.1960, and Hare to Lloyd, 9.4.1960. 
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12.4.1960. 
417 Daily Telegraph, 11.4.1960, and Bowett, 'Second United Nations Conference', 426. 
418 GiG-111: Andersen to Bjbmsson, 3.11.1959, and Thorsteinsson, Utanrikisthj6nusta 11,622-623. 
'19 Olafsson, Saga, 401-402, and SSi-DbP Olafsson minute, 8.4.1960. 
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politics. 'They would have their heads chopped off at home if they didn't', he said about 
the leaders of the Icelandic all-party delegation, Foreign Minister Gudmundsson and 
Benediktsson, the Minister of Justice. 'It was quite clear to me', said Cadieux, 'that 
Andersen agreed fully with our position but that he is overbome by the Ministers who in 
turn have pressure for radical action on them'. 42 1 Back in Iceland, the conference was 
closely followed and sparks flew between the governing parties and the opposition. The 
Conservatives were 'more Yankees than Icelanders', said the SocialiStS, 422 and a 
rejection of a 12-mile proposal, simply because it was favoured by the Soviet Union and 
not by the West, was inconceivable. Any port in a storm was still the Icelandic creed. 
In the committee vote on April 13, the Icelanders voted for the Soviet-supported 
'18-power proposal'. Yet it narrowly failed to get the required simple majority. It was 
too restrictive for the most radical Latin Americans and the US-Canadian proposal was 
appealing enough for many moderate states. That submission was safely adopted, with 
43 votes to 33 and 12 abstentions. On this showing, however, it would not receive the 
two-thirds support which would be needed in the plenary session. Furthermore, 
Iceland's own motion was also accepted, by 31 votes to 11 with 36 abstentions. 423 The 
Icelanders, while confident to achieve the required simple majority, were pleasantly 
surprised by the support which showed a growing recognition of their utter dependence 
on fisheries. They also benefited from a sympathy for the 'underdog' in the dispute with 
Britain. 424 Therefore, the vote showed, on the one hand, that the Western 'bloc' had to 
work harder to get the necessary support for its proposal, and on the other that the 
Icelanders had to be induced to come on board because if they were unhappy, they 
could do a lot of damage by haranguing about the 'colonial' and 'imperialistic' 
encroachment in their waters. In short, success at Geneva could hinge on an end to the 
'cod war' off Iceland. 'Dean and I have continued to impress the vital importance of 
agreement [with Reykjavik] upon Hare', Drew cabled to Ottawa. 
425 
An ignorance of Icelandic wishes could also have consequences beyond the law of the 
sea. After all, Icelanders of every political persuasion had described the American 
campaign for historic fishing rights at the first conference as a 'stab in the back'. On 
April 7, before the committee voting at Geneva, Tyler Thompson, the new American 
421 NA-CAN: RG25/8352/10600-E-40-1.2, Cadieux memorandum, 29.3.1960. 
422 Thj6dviljinn, 5.4.1960. 
423 Bowett, 'Second United Nations Conference', 427-428. 
424 David blafsson, 'A hafrdttarrddstefnu 1960', in blafar Egilsson (ed. ), Bjarni Benediktsson i augum 
samtidarmanna (Reykjavik: Almenna b6kaf6lagid, 198-35), 160-16 1. 
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Ambassador in Reykjavik, reported that such anger was now simmering in the 
country. 426 At Geneva, Dean readily accepted the political implications and he also saw 
intrinsic merits in the Icelandic 'special rights' proposal: Iceland was truly dependent on 
fisheries and the American delegation had openly argued that the conference had to 
consider such exceptions to the general rule. However, the fishermen of New England 
and the Pacific Coast were already angry over the retreat to a phase-out period of 
fishing rights, and Britain and other distant-water fishing states were deeply unhappy 
with the possible effects of the Icelandic proposal, not only off Iceland but as a general 
rule. 427 There were limits to the 'positive adaptation'. While Joe Cobley, Vice-President 
of the BTF and observer at Geneva, had agreed with John Hare that the US-Canadian 
proposal had to be supported, he incurred the immediate wrath of Dennis Welch and 
like-minded 'militants' on Humberside. 428 In London, the Labour opposition also 
complained that the government 'should have made more of a fight on phasing issue', 429 
and Harold Macmillan was to stress that the British delegation must under no 
circumstances support concessions beyond the US-Canadian resolution without prior 
reference to Cabinet. 430 
Clearly, the Icelanders could only be offered an ad hoc settlement which did not 
impinge on the general rule of '6+6' and phase-out historic rights. Before the committee 
vote on April 13, the Danes had managed to 'sell' their support for the US-Canadian 
compromise by securing a confidential assurance from Britain that she would only insist 
on the maintenance of fishing for five years in the 6-12-mile zone off the Faroe 
Islands . 
43 1 Here was a useful precedent but-predictably enough-the Danes insisted 
that they could not accept an arrangement which left the Faroese worse off than the 
Icelanders, since such an outcome would result in Denmark 'losing the Faroes'. 432 Thus, 
when the British side went on to seek a special agreement on these lines with Iceland's 
representatives at Geneva, they realised that, as one official put it, 'the Icelandic 
decision is the master-one'. 433 
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427 FRUS 1958-1960 11,793-795, Pelly and Magnusson to Herter, 19.4.1960, and Geneva delegation to 
Washington, 19.4.1960. Also PRO: F0371/150821/GWI 1/67, FO to Brussels, 8.4.1960. 
428 HCA: DBTH20/1 0 1, Cobley report, 9.4.1960, and Welch to Henderson, 8.4.1960. Also PRO: 
F0371/150822/GWI 1/83, Geneva delegation to FO, 7.4.1960. 
429 NARA: RG59/399.731/4-1160, Whitney to Herter, 11.4.1960. 
430 PRO: F0371/150824/GWI 1/113, Phelps to Samuel, 22.4.1960. 
431 PRO: F0371/150821/GWI 1/67, Barclay to FO, 9.4.1960, and 12.4.1960. Also UD: 31.2/8/XIV, 
Geneva delegation to Oslo, 12.4.1960. 
4 -3,2 PRO: F0371/150823/GWI 1/100, Selby to FO, 19.4.1960. Also MAF209/1665, Kampmarm to Hare, 
20.4.1960. 
433 PRO: F0371/151669/NLI351/56, FO minute, 21.4.1960. 
204 
Before the conference, even the headstrong J6sepsson (who represented the People's 
Alliance in the Icelandic delegation) had privately conceded that a proposal on 
continued historic rights might be accepted if it included severe limitations on their 
scope and duration. 434 In early April, the Canadian Drew also learned from Hare at 
Geneva 'that the UK are likely, if necessary, to withdraw altogether from the 12-mile 
435 zone around Iceland' . That, of course, was in line with the British presumption before 
the conference that a general concession of this kind might be inevitable, 'in the last 
resort', and after the committee voting in mid-April, Andersen advised Dean and Drew 
that that moment had arrived; if Britain gave a 'private' assurance on a withdrawal 
beyond 12 miles, the Icelanders would support the US-Canadian compromise in the 
plenary session. 436 Still, Britain understandably wanted to seek a less painful solution 
before accepting such a complete capitulation in Icelandic waters which could then lead 
to similar retreats elsewhere. During and after Easter in mid-April, British officials 
conferred with Andersen and Fisheries Director David 61afsson who was also at 
Geneva. After a series of meetings, they produced a 'draft agreement' which permitted 
trawling to all nations in certain areas within the outer six miles for an unspecified 
period (Britain's opening bid was seven years). In return, Iceland would get some 
restrictions on foreign fishing in restricted areas outside the 12-mile limit. 437 Joe Cobley 
of the BTF was consulted throughout, and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice appeared 'not 
unhopeful that this new basis for negotiations with Iceland would prove successful'. 438 
However, British officials had learnt through bitter experience that opinions of 
Andersen and other Icelandic officials counted for little on their own. Ministers would 
have the final say. Initially, they did not discount the emerging solution and as Bjarni 
Benediktsson supposedly tried to impress on Lddvfk J6sepsson, 'we Icelanders must ... 
somehow negotiate with the British because this situation back home cannot 
continue' . 
439 But despite the tentative show of compromise before the conference, the 
Socialist 'fighter' rejected all ideas about concessions within the 12 miles, as did the 
Progressive leader Hermann J6nasson, also at Geneva. In public, therefore, the 
Conservatives and the Social Democrats felt that they could not but reiterate that the 
Icelandic delegation would fight all ideas about a retreat from the 12-mile liMit. 
440 This 
434 GiG-111, preparatory committee for the law of the sea conference, 7b meeting, 18.2.1960. 
435 NA-CAN: RG25/8355/10600-Z-40-1.2, Geneva delegation to Ottawa, 9.4.1960. 
436 NA-CAN: RG25/8354/10600-W-40-2, Geneva delegation to Ottawa, 14.4-1960. Also BA-BML: 
B 116/13189, blafsson to Meseck, 15.4.1960. 
437 PRO: N/IAF209/1858, MAFF minute, 17.8.1960. 
438 NA-CAN: RG25/8354/10600-W-40-2, Geneva delegation to Ottawa, 14.4.1960. 
439 J6sepsson, Landhelgismcilid, 144. Also PRO: MAF209/1665, Hutchison to Aglen, 16.5.1960. 
440 Ahhýdubladid, 12.4.1960. Also Visir, 22.4.1960. 
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argument was reinforced after Benediktsson and Gudmundsson met with Prime 
Minister Thors who had flown to London for discussions with them. On their return to 
the conference, the two Ministers told Hare that they now 'feel it to be politically 
impossible to make any agreement on the lines proposed' . 
44 1 The government had just 
initiated vital but hurtful economic reforms and did not want to create more resentment 
in the country by appearing to back too far away from an undiluted 12-mile limit, so 
sacred in Icelandic minds. 442 Yet again, domestic considerations prevented an 
international negotiation. 
Instead, the Icelandic delegation put forward an amendment to the US-Canadian 
proposal; a proviso that the ten-year phase-out period 'shall not apply to the situation 
where a people is overwhelmingly dependent on its coastal fisheries for its livelihood or 
economic development'. 443 The rider resembled Iceland's own submission on 'special 
rights' and was doomed to fail. The United States, Britain and Canada, the main movers 
behind the Western effort at Geneva, were prepared to accept an ad hoc solution to the 
almost unique situation of Iceland, but not a sweeping modification of the general 
rule. 444 A weaker worded supplement on preferential fishing rights for coastal states 
under scientifically proven conditions, which Brazil, Cuba and Uruguay proposed and 
the Western powers reluctantly accepted, did not appease the Icelanders. 445 Even the 
Canadians, usually so sympathetic to their case, were deeply disappointed. '[T]hey have 
been unwilling to negotiate with the UK', Drew commented on April 23, when the 
crucial final vote was only days away, 'and have stood entirely on the ground that they 
must be considered outside any general rule of law and be granted 100% recognition of 
the claims which they unilaterally made'. 446 
To sum up, Britain was not to blame for the failure to reach an agreement with 
the Icelanders at Geneva. British decision-makers had been accommodating, liberal- 
minded and attentive to the principles of compromise and interdependence in 
international relations. The problem was, as the Daily Mail lambasted at one stage, that 
447 'Iceland has not moved by a cable's length from her original demands' . But had the 
British not been prepared to surrender completely off Iceland, 'if necessary'? They 
"' PRO: F0371/150825/GWI 1/12 1, Geneva delegation to FO, 23.4.1960. 
442 On the economic reforms in 1960, see Bjami Bragi J6nsson, 'Hafta- og styrkjakerfi d islandi', in J6nas 
H. Haralz (ed. ), Frd kreppu til vidreisnar (Reykjavik: Hid islenska b6kmenntaf6lag, 2002), 209-215. Also 
Johannessen, 61afur Thors 11,306-309. 
443 Bowett, 'Second United Nations Conference', 429. 
444 NARA: RG59/399.731/4-2060, Dillon to Dean, 22.4.1960. 
445 For an Icelandic critique of the proposal, see blafsson, Saga, 415. 
446 NA-CAN: RG25/8353/10600-F-40-1.2, Geneva delegation to Ottawa, 23.4.1960. 
447 DailY Mail, 12.4.1960 (leading article). 
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never offered the ultimate concession of an immediate abandonment of all fishing inside 
Iceland's 12-mile limit, partly because of the knock-on consequences, but also because 
in the last days of the conference, the proponents of the US-Canadian proposal had 
become cautiously optimistic that they could achieve a two-thirds majority, regardless 
of Iceland's non-compliance. 448 From the beginning of the plenary session, the United 
States led a campaign of 'intensive lobbying'. both at Geneva and through diplomatic 
missions all over the world . 
449 The British side also lent their support. 450 On April 26, 
the day of the final vote, tension was great at Geneva but the American delegation felt 
that a fairly safe margin of security had been reached. 'We had it all agreed to', Dean 
later recalled, 'we had five or six votes to spare'. 451 
As expected, the Icelandic proposals were rejected, both the original submission 
from the committee stage and the amendment to the US-Canadian compromise. At this 
stage, and especially after all the lobbying, far fewer states were willing to sympathise 
with the Icelandic cause. The decisive moment, however, was to follow. In a hair- 
raising roll call, 54 voted in favour of the US-Canadian proposal, 28 were against and 
five abstained. Thus, the motion had failed by one vote! 452 Reportedly, one member of 
the American team 'choked up and was nearly in tears'. 453 'Back to chaos', was on the 
lips of many other delegates at Geneva. 454 
What had happened? Arthur H. Dean blamed 'our Russian friends' but such Cold War 
inference was mostly as misguided as it had been in 1958; among the last minute 
'defectors' were Ecuador, Chile, Japan and the Philippines, not exactly Soviet 
satellites. 455 Rather it was alleged that the aggressive pressure had backfired on the 
Americans. They had acted like 'a bull in a china shop', said one of the British 
delegates. 456 In the event, Iceland's vote could also have tilted the balance, as Dean 
448 NARA: RG59/399.731/4-2260, Geneva delegation to Washington, 22.4.1960. Also Manchester 
Guardian, 23.4.1960, and 1isir, 25.4.1960. 
449 Times, 14.4.1960. Also the numerous telegrams to various diplomatic posts from April 13-26. NARA: 
RG59/399.73 1, followed by date. 
450 PRO: F0371/150824/GWI 1/107, FO to 12 diplomatic missions, 15. -19.4.1960, and 
F0371/150824/GWI 1/110, FO to II diplomatic missions, 19. -20.4.1960. 
451 JFDOHP: Dean interview, 88-89. 
452 Bowett, 'Second United Nations Conference', 432. 
453 Seattle Times, 27.4.1960. 
454 
Times, 27.4.1960. 
455 JFDOHP: Dean interview, 89, and NARA: RG59/399.731/4-2860, Geneva delegation to Washington, 
28.4.1960. It must be added, though, that in that report, Dean said it was ji]mpossible to describe third 
degree methods, threats of personal violence, threats of ostracism on returning to their own country and 
other methods Saudi Arabia, USSR, UAR [United Arab Republic] and other Arab League members used 
in effort not to get them vote "yes"'. Also Nadeson, 'Analysis', 71-73. 
456 blafsson, Saga, 43 1. Also BA-BML: B 116/13189, Meseck report, 28.4.1960, and PRO: 
F0371/150826/GWI 1/140, Ashford-Russell report, 2.5.1960. 
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ruefully remarked after the voting: 'Constantly pressed UK for Icelandic solution and if 
this had occurred before conference would have had Icelandic vote and would have 
avoided conference sympathy for small nation's problems'. 457 And it must be pointed 
out that had the US-Canadian proposal been aired in 1958, it would probably have 
458 sailed through. 'Too little, too late' was not only a British malady. At Geneva in 
1960, the leaders of the Soviet and 'Afro-Asian' blocs told Dean that the United States 
would be 'begging on knees for 12-mile territorial sea within three years'. In the main, 
they were right. 459 
The incredibly close result at the second conference begged the question what 
would have happened if one vote had gone the other way. 460 Bjarni Benediktsson had 
affirmed, if informally, that the Icelandic government would respect any decision which 
received the required majority. 461 Iceland would therefore have been bound by a '6+6' 
limit with a phase-out period for foreign fishing. Yet that would not have been so bad 
for the country. 'It is said that the Icelandic delegation ... were regretting their vote and 
beginning to realise what they have lost', Fitzmaurice reported from Geneva. 462 After 
all, Britain had been willing to offer Iceland that historic rights would only apply for 
five years, at most, and the Brazilian/Cuban/Uruguayan amendment on special 
situations would also have helped the Icelandic authorities. But in a sense, the 
Icelanders had ensured that they would benefit from whatever result at the conference; 
favourable exceptions if the general rule was accepted but a free hand in case it all 
foundered. 
For Britain, however, the failure at Geneva was devastating. The application of 
an idealistic policy of concessions and compromises had failed to safeguard Britain's 
perceived interests on the high seas. And what could follow? John Hare immediately 
declared that, in effect, nothing had changed; that '[w]e shall retain exactly the same 
457 NARA: RG59/399.731/4-2860, Geneva delegation to Washington, 28.4.1960. More than a decade 
later, this explanation for the defeat of the American proposal in 1960 was uppen-nost in Dean's mind. 
CUL: 4100, Box 84, Dean to Bundy, 19.10.1972. 
458 For such a wise-after-the-event observation, see also Rowsome, 'The UN Conference of 1960', 75-76. 
459 NARA: RG59/399.731/3-1760, Geneva delegation to Washington, 17.3.1960. In 1967, the United 
States and the Soviet Union began to work together for a universal agreement on a 12-mile limit of 
territorial waters and fishing limits. See Swarztrauber, Three-Mile Limit, 244-248. 
460 The result was of course a prime case of the importance of 'chance' in history. The voting of Guinea is 
a good case in point. Abdourahmane Diallo, the country's sole delegate, was, according to Dean, Ian 
elderly quiet man who took little active part in conference ... 
be told us just before voting it was "historic 
rights" which he objected to, but hinted that he might at least abstain on US-Canadian joint proposal. His 
vote, however, was negative; an abstention would have saved us. Later claimed he was confused'. 
NARA: RG59/399.731/4-2860, Geneva delegation to Washington, 28.4.1960. 
461 PRO: F0371/151669/NLI351/43, Stewart to Mason, 2.3.1960. 
462 PRO: F0371/150825/GWI 1/128, Geneva delegation to FO, 28.4.1960. A British journalist at Geneva, 
with good connections with the Icelandic delegation, got the saine impression. 
F03 71/151674/N-L 1351/77, Mason to Stewart, 20.6.1960. 
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view about the law of the sea as we've entertained up to now'. 463 This was brave talk 
but behind the scenes-in a self-contradiction which summarised how difficult it was 
for decision-makers in London to accept the new correlation of Power in the post-war 
period-Hare was more realistic. A return to Realpolitik appeared inconceivable and he 
chided 'those with legalistic rather than practical minds' who spoke as if three or four 
miles were again the rule of the day. 'How do you enforce that measure? ' he asked. 
'Certainly nobody is going to do it with gunboats again'. 464 The fight against wider 
limits was over. Only the terms of defeat had to be determined. 
463 PRO: MAF209/1854, record of interview, 26.4.1960. This was also the strategic view. See 
DEFE5/102, COS(60)125, COS report, 3.5.1960. 
464 NA-CAN: RG25/5388/10600-W-40-2, Geneva delegation to Ottawa, 21.6-1960. 
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IV. Pax Nordica. Surrender on the High Seas, 
1960-1964 
4.1. An Agreement with Wise and Reliable Friends. The 12-Mile 
Extension off Norway, 1960-61 
The looming sea change could be detected right after the finale at Geneva. In the 
corridors of the conference hall, delegates were not so concerned with developments in 
Iceland. The Icelanders were expected simply to hold their ground. Rumour had it, 
however, that the Norwegians would now act, convinced that since the international 
effort had failed, unilateral action was inevitable. ' An extension off Norway could 
signal the end of Britain's fight against the encroachments on the high seas in the North 
Atlantic, for if she acquiesced, how could she continue to resist Iceland's claims, or 
similar wishes on the Faroe Islands? On the other hand, a few considerations could ease 
British uneasiness over the unfriendly, if understandable, act in Oslo. The Norwegians 
were good 'Atlanticists' and 'Europeans' who made bad unilateralists. 
The first factor in Britain's favour was linked to European integration: the monumental 
change on the international landscape which British decision-makers had first tried to 
ignore and then mould to their own liking. In 1957, Britain began to work for a Free 
Trade Area of all states in the OEEC, including the six continental countries which had 
formed the European Economic Community (EEC). But 'the Six' in the EEC were not 
enthusiastic and in November 1958, Charles de Gaulle's objections killed off the 
concept. 2 The authorities in London had to focus on a weaker alternative, an agreement 
on free trade within 'the outer Seven' (Austria, Britain, Denmark, Norway Portugal, 
Sweden, and Switzerland). In the summer and autumn of 1959, detailed negotiations 
took place and on January 4,1960, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was 
formally founded. 3 
At the end of the 1950s, Britain was still Norway's largest single trading partner 
and it seemed that wherever in Europe the rulers in London ended, their counterparts in 
1 Visir, 29.4.1960. For an overview of the Norwegian extension to 12 miles, see Sondend, 'Bakgrunnen", 
132-145, Floistad, 'Hovedlinjene', 83-88, Rollag, 'A Special Relationship? % 66-73, and Eriksen and 
Pharo, Kald krig, 359-366. 
2 See Ellison, Threatening Europe. 
3 See David Phinnemore, 'The Nordic countries, the European Community (EC) and the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA), 1958-84', in Lee Miles (ed. ), The European Union and the Nordic Countries 
(London: Routledge, 1996), 32-46. 
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Oslo would have to follow. 4 Fishery concerns made that hand-in-hand journey 
uncomfortable, however. While the proposed Free Trade Area of the outer Seven was 
not to encompass foodstuffs, the Norwegians wanted to have fish products included. In 
Britain, the fishing industry was adamantly opposed to a concession of that kind, in 
much the same sense as the NFU and the protectors of Commonwealth connections 
stood against the liberalisation of agricultural trade. As Harold Macmillan agonised in 
the summer of 1959, when the Danes had hammered through a 'bacon' compromise, 
'[w]e seem to have settled the Danish question with pigs-at what political cost to 
ourselves I cannot tell. We have now a Norwegian problem onfish. I doubt if we can 
risk this as well'. 5 Gradually, the authorities in Oslo realised that fresh fish could not 
come under the free trade criteria but they held on to frozen fillets, using the debatable 
argument that they were 'industrial products', and acting as if they might be prepared to 
stay outside the emerging agreement unless they had their way. 6 Ultimately, Britain 
gave in. 'The government have been so mad keen about this thing', complained Sir 
Famdale Phillips of the BTF near the end of 1959, that 'they are prepared to let one or 
more industries take a knock'. 7 
Still, only a single 'knock' would be tolerated. The British team in the free trade 
negotiations warned that the 'question of fishing limits' would have to be tied to the 
question of fish imports. 8 Initially, the Norwegians refused to consider such linkage, but 
in the end they felt that they could not take their brinkmanship to the extreme limit. In 
return for a toll-free access for 24,000 tons of frozen fish from the three Scandinavian 
countries (which more than satisfied Norwegian needs) Britain acquired the stipulation 
that this arrangement could be revised if a 'fundamental change' in fishing limits 
occurred. 9 
Such, in short, was the situation in April 1960, when the law of the sea conference 
finished in failure. On May 2, Foreign Minister Lange told Selwyn Lloyd that the 
Norwegian government would 'inevitably' be expected to extend the fishing limit to 12 
4 For the most detailed examination on Norway's accession to EFTA, see Svein Olav Hansen, 'Det norske 
EFTA-sporet i 1950-dra. En studie av Norges Europa-politikk, med swrlig vekt pd perioden 1956-1960', 
(BA thesis, University of Oslo 1990). For a summary, see Eriksen and Pharo, Kald krig, 312-318. 
5 BOD: MSS. Macmillan, diary, 15.7.1959. 
6 '[T]hese frozen fillets very nearly jeopardised the conclusion of the EFTA convention', a Treasury 
official later recalled. PRO: T312/35, Owen minute, 12.9.1960. For the Norwegian negotiating position 
and internal doubts about it, see SA: UUKK, 7.9.1959, and 15.10.1959. Also Hansen, 'Det norske EFTA- 
sporet', 273-292. 
7 Times, 4.12.1959. 
8 UD: 44.33/13/IV, Ibsen minute, 10.9.1959, and 44.33/13N, London Embassy to Oslo, 29.10.1959. 
9 Eriksen and Pharo, Kald krig, 316. 
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miles. 10 On May 13, he announced in the Storting that Norway had decided to act. A 
precise date was not set and Lange specifically mentioned the need to hold talks with 
interested parties, first and foremost Britain. " This was not really 'unilateral action' a la 
Iceland, much more an invitation to enter honest negotiations. 
Consequently, British officials were not that disappointed over the Norwegian 
declaration. They also felt that in any case they were in a fairly good bargaining 
position, or as Bredo Stabell, the leader of Norway's delegation at Geneva, told 
American diplomats in Oslo, 'the UK had a negotiating lever because of the frozen fish 
12 problem' . On the other 
hand, Britain could also see a number of advantages in a swift, 
friendly settlement. Right after the debacle at Geneva, British and Canadian delegates 
had suggested that the 54 supporters of the US-Canadian proposal should sign a 
convention on its lines, in the hope that it would gradually assume the character of, or at 
least influence, international law. 13 Successful bilateral talks with a friendly state like 
Norway might perhaps produce a blueprint for such a convention of the willing. 14 The 
precedence could even be useful in an attempt to break the deadlock off Iceland. 
Admittedly, the wishful thinking of recent years about a Faroese agreement swaying the 
Icelanders was gone. Rather the hope was that the existence of a British agreement with 
another Nordic country would help the Icelandic government to fight the no-surrender 
line of the opposition. 15 
From late May to September, Britain and Norway held three rounds of talks on fishing 
limits. Fisheries Secretary Basil Engholm led the British team; Stabell headed the 
Norwegian delegation. As expected, they quickly agreed that the US-Canadian 
compromise from Geneva should form the basis of their discussions. Only two 
considerations interrupted the otherwise plain sailing, and both were as evident within 
the British team as in discussions across the negotiating table. First, disagreements arose 
over the nature of jurisdiction in the outer six miles during the phase-out period. The 
Norwegians wanted full control whereas the British suggested 'Joint policing', at the 
10 PRO: F0371/150838/GW12/121, FO minute, 2.5.1960. 
" Sondend, 'Bakgrunnen', 127-129. Norway also had to enter negotiations with other states but the 
British talks inevitably set the pace. See Eriksen and Pharo, Kald krig, 363-366. 
12 NARA: RG59/399.731/5-660, Willis to Washington, 6.5.1960. Also Sonden5, 'Bakgrunnen', 130-13 1. 
13 PRO: CAB 128/34, CC(60), 28"' meeting, 28.4.1960, and 30'h meeting, 10.5-1960. In 196 1, On the 
concept of the 54-nation convention gradually faded away. See e. g. NA-CAN: RG25/5389/10600-J-40-2, 
Drew to Ottawa, 2.11.1961, and FR US 1961-63 XXV 
<http: //www. state. gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xxv/6029. htm>, docs. 484-503, accessed 15.6.2003. 
14 PRO: F0371/150840/GW12/140, Scarlett to FO, 28.5.1960. 
15 PRO: F0371/151743/NN1351/37, Mason minute, 18.8.1960, and F0371/151745/NN1351/61, 
McAlpine to Rose, 18.10.1960. 
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insistence of the Fisheries Department which was acting upon the trawlermen's 
suspicions towards Norway's coast guard fleet. 16 The Foreign Office was willing to 
concede the claim and the diplomats were clearly unhappy about the continued 
influence of fisheries officials on the maritime aspect of British foreign POIICY. 17 The 
second 'ripple' was caused by a similar divergence of views within Whitehall. Engholm 
recommended-while accepting the 'need to be good Europeans'-that Britain should 
unashamedly exercise the 'EFTA bargaining power' in the talks with the Norwegians. 18 
The Foreign Office people were perfectly willing to use frozen fish to intimidate the 
Norwegians but they also stressed that wider interests must prevail. Norway was needed 
within EFTA, for reasons of prestige as well as economics, so in the end Britain would 
always have to give in. 19 
These differences were never deep and in late September, the expected 
compromise was reached. Britain would not have jurisdiction in the outer six miles but 
neither would the Norwegian coast guard vessels have authority to arrest British 
trawlers. They could only report alleged infringements which would then be 
investigated in Britain. The phase-out clause would run for a decade, not five years as 
the Norwegians had wanted, but they got four trawler-free 'boxes' in the outer zone. 20 
The six-mile extension took effect in April 196 1, the extension to 12 miles in September 
that same year. 21 
Had fisheries interests prevailed, Britain would have wielded the EFTA 
4 weapon' more forcefully and the negotiations might have dragged on, or perhaps 
foundered. In 1960, however, the decision-makers in London had grown weary of the 
process of short-sighted doggedness, followed by greater losses than would have been 
suffered by an initial show of flexibility. Engholm himself realised this, a man of 
cexcellent political judgement' who would never fight the fishing industry's case to the 
22 bitter end . Apparently, 'pragmatism', or the 
'positive adaptation' to reality which had 
began to set in after the first Geneva conference and the stalemate off Iceland, had 
become a permanent feature of British policy on the law of the sea. Then again, it was 
16 PRO: F0371/151740/NN1351/12, McAlpine minute, 2.6.1960, and SA: UUKK and maritime and 
fisheries committee, 17.9.1960. Also SondenA, 'Bakgrunnen', 131-137. 
17 BOD: Reilly papers, Ms. Eng. c. 6924, fol. 3, and PRO: F03 71/151740/NN 13 51/12, Mason minute, 
3.6.1960. 
18 PRO: F0371/150842/GW12/170, Simpson minute, 13.9.1960. 
19 PRO: F0371/151741/NN1351/23, FO minute, 21.6.1960, and F0371/151744/NN1351/52, Mason 
minute, 22.9.1960. 
20 The agreement was signed on 17.11.1960. Cmnd. 1224, Fishery Agreement between [Britain] and 
[Norwaýj (London: HMSO, 1960). 
21 SondenA, 'Bakorunnen', 139-145. n 22 BOD: Reilly papers, Ms. Eng. c. 6924, fol. 3. Also Reilly interview, 13.3.1999. 
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very easy to be an affable liberal when the opponent was in the same frame of mind. If 
the authorities in Oslo had insisted on their utmost demands, they would not have 
accepted the long phase-out period or the inability to make arrests outside the six-mile 
limit. But Norway was not Iceland. Overall, inshore fishing was an auxiliary aspect of 
the economy so there was ample scope for concessions. Furthermore, the Norwegians 
were almost by nature pro-British. For Macmillan, Halvard Lange was 'an old friend + 
a very wise + reliable man'. 23 The 'give and take' fisheries agreement was therefore an 
excellent example of the principle of interdependence in international relations. In fact, 
Norway and Britain almost acted as if an agreement had been reached at the law of the 
sea conference at Geneva. 
Unsurprisingly, the fishermen of North Norway were still unhappy with the 
outcome. They were the 'Icelanders' in the case, as committed but powerless because of 
the intermediaries in Oslo and their additional considerations. 24 Likewise, the Icelandic 
authorities were not impressed with the Anglo-Norwegian agreement, 25 and all things 
considered, it was not really a momentous achievement. An amicable compromise was 
always on the cards. Conversely, a solution to the 'cod war' would be the true test of 
Britain's pragmatic adaptability on the international scene. The surrender would be 
hardest where it was most needed. 
23 BOD: MSS. Macmillan, diary, 6.3.1958. Also Rollag, 'A Special RelationshipT, 81. 
24 Sondend, 'Bakgrunnen', 136-137. 
25 GiG-Vl: H. Gudmundsson to Gudmundsson, 1.10.1960. Also Morgunbladid, 8.11.1960. 
214 
4.2. "We Are All Right, Jack, to **** with You'. Non-Negotiations 
with Iceland, 1960 
The '6+6' offer at Geneva, its narrow defeat and the subsequent agreement with 
Norway all indicated that Britain's fight against the 12-mile limit off Iceland was fast 
becoming untenable. Only the extent of possible phase-out rights for trawling in the 
outer six miles could conceivably be subject to negotiation. In the summer of 1960, 
Whitehall officials told foreign diplomats in London that Britain might be content with 
a 2-3 year period in order to solve the conflict 'without losing face completely'. 26 A 
settlement of this kind was of course precisely on the lines which the Icelanders had 
offered in 1958, before the outbreak of 'cod war'. Now, however. they had grown in 
strength while international law had developed against Britain's wishes. Why should the 
Icelanders give in, therefore? Why respect the principles of interdependence when 
independence was achievable? Or as the Navy News put it, Iceland was saying to the old 
maritime power: 'We are all right, Jack, to **** with you'. 27 
A few days before the final result at Geneva in April 1960, the trawler owners and the 
authorities in London had decided what to do in the disputed waters off Iceland, in case 
the conference ended in failure. The owners, having refrained from sending their vessels 
to the Icelandic grounds for its duration, agreed to remain outside the 12-mile limit, in 
the hope that such a show of goodwill might tempt Iceland to talk. 28 (A short while later 
they set this period of grace for three months, or until August 12). The Royal Navy 
would still accompany the trawlers because black-listed vessels could not put into 
Icelandic ports if the need for assistance arose. On April 28, the day of the endgame at 
Geneva, 'Operation Mint' was therefore put into effect. Three warships and a tanker 
were to be on patrol outside the 12-mile line and help with medical emergencies or 
necessary repairs. They would only venture inside to save life or to intervene if the 
Icelanders were attempting to arrest a trawler which had broken the owners' instructions 
and gone closer to shore in search of fish. This latter stipulation was kept secret, 
however, lest the skippers were encouraged to abuse it and 'stray' within the limit. 29 
26 NA-CAN: RG25/5388/10600-W-40-2, London Embassy to Ottawa, 5.8.1960. For a detailed 
examination of the 'cod war' in 1960-61, see Gudmundsson, "'Thau eru"', and Thorsteinsson, 
Utanrikisthj6nusta 11,622-635. 
2' Navy News, May 1960 (leading article). 
28 PRO: CAB 128/34, CC(60), 28th meeting, 28.4.1960. 
29 PRO: ADM306/7, Admiralty to Commader-in-Chief Home Fleet, 28.4.1960, and Admiralty to CFPS, 
29.4.1960. From early June, the number of warships on patrol was reduced to two. 
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Initially, it appeared as if the British restraint had been acknowledged in 
Reykjavik. It may be recalled that although the Icelanders had voted against the US- 
Canadian proposal at Geneva, not all of them were overjoyed with the continued 'chaos' 
on the high seas. Gudmundur i. Gudmundsson deplored what had happened and Justice 
Minister Bjami Benediktsson, by now the undisputed crown prince of the Conservative 
Party, was said to be 'far from happy'. 30 On April 29, he announced that the 
government had resolved to waive all charges against British trawlers for infringements 
of the 12-mile limit, so that they could safely enter Icelandic ports or seek shelter under 
the lee of the land .31 This 'amnesty' removed the covert rationale for the presence of 
British warships off Iceland. On May 1, the first trawler docked in Reykjavik for repairs 
and met no malice. Yet warships were kept on 'cod war' duty because, as the Foreign 
Office estimated, a complete withdrawal would signal a clear surrender and 'evoke 
criticism from the trawler industry and in Parliament'. 32 The skippers and mates were 
already angry over the decision to remain outside the 12-mile limit, especially since a 
number of Icelandic trawlers sailed to Humberside and got excellent prices. In early 
May, the Grimsby Trawler Officers' Guild threatened to strike unless all landings by 
Icelanders were suspended and naval protection offered up to six miles, the almost- 
accepted compromise at Geneva. 33 The owners condemned the move and it was 
ultimately postponed but it exemplified the strong emotions among the trawlermen. 34 
At sea, the skippers also showed their displeasure. They sneaked inside the 12- 
mile limit, hesitatingly at first but then in droves. By the beginning of June, about half 
of British catches probably came from waters within the line. 35 The audacity naturally 
increased the risk of incidents with the coast guard and the Royal Navy frigates found 
themselves in the uncomfortable circumstances of reminding the skippers that they 
should not enter the 12-mile zone. Although the owners suspended the most flagrant 
offenders, the violations continued and in mid-June, the Commander of HMS Crossbow 
got so exasperated that he actually ordered a trawler to steam outside of the line. 36 
Never before had Icelandic fishery jj urisdiction been protected so assiduously! 
30 PRO: F0371/151673/NLI351/63, Burrows to FO, 2.5.1960, and F0371/151672/NLI351/58, Stewart 
to FO, 29.4.1960. 
31 Morgunbladid, 30.4.1960. 
32 PRO: F0371/151699/NLI354/45, FO to Reykjavik, 9.5.1960. 
33 MRC: MSS. 126/GE/l/5 1, GSDFVEFU, extraordinary general meeting, 6.5.1960, and PRO: 
MAF209/1854, Graham minute, 6.5.1960. 
34 GFVOA: special meetings, 11.5.1960,13.5.1960, and 14.5.1960. 
35 PRO: MAF209/1862, Williams to Chief Inspector of Fisheries, 1.6.1960. 
36 PRO: ADM306/19, HMS Crossbow to Admiralty, 10.6.1960, and 18.6.1960. Also Guardian, 
27.5.1960. 
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The frigate's conduct infuriated the trawlermen and produced an embarrassing 
question in the House of Commons about Britain's position on the width of territorial 
waters. 37 In Iceland, meanwhile, the authorities were criticised for the abject failure to 
defend the 12-mile limit. 38 After Geneva, the government had secretly ordered the coast 
guard fleet 'to use all discretion and avoid incidents wherever possible'. 39 The leniency 
could not last when it was so blatantly abused and on June 28, a team from the Th6r 
boarded the Northern Queen, a prominent 'poacher'. HMS Duncan arrived on the scene 
and sent an armed party to the trawler. Since the evidence about the ship's alleged 
position inside the limit could be disputed, the Icelanders gave up the attempted arrest, 
but only under strong protest. 40 Another serious incident occurred on July 10, when the 
Grimsby Town apparently tried to ram the 6dinn which replied by firing a solid shot at 
the trawler. Despite numerous threats, such action had not been taken since 1954 when 
Belgian vessels were particularly bothersome off the south coast. 41 These incidents, 
alongside other altercations, demonstrated that something had to be done. The 
Icelanders learned how Selwyn Lloyd threatened the owners that unless they disciplined 
their people, the British government would 'not bother more' with the situation off 
Iceland . 
42 Afterwards, the tension eased somewhat but the fragile status quo could not 
last forever. Either side would have to give in or escalate its commitment-or they 
could meet and negotiate. 
Despite the encouraging decision on the 'amnesty' for 'poachers' at the end of April, 
the Icelandic authorities did not appear willing to go further to secure a solution. First, 
they felt that the waiving of charges was an adequate concession. As before Geneva, 
they also pointed out that they were pushing through painful economic reforms and 
could not risk the outcry which might follow an announcement on talks with Britain, 
especially after the confrontations on the fishing grounds in the summer. 43 Furthen-nore, 
the Icelanders could not resist the temptation to think that they only had to wear out 
their opponent, calculating that Britain would hardly dare to send the Navy inside the 
37 BJL: DPW/13/3, Welch to Engholm, 14.6.1960, and Hansard, Vol. 625, cols. 38-39, written answer, 
22.6.1960. 
38 E. g. Tj6dviljinn, 17.6.1960, and 25.6.1960, and Tisir, 20.6.1960. 
39 PRO: F0371/151674/NLI351/81, Stewart to FO, 24.6.1960. Also Kjxmested to author, 22.2.2000. 
40 PRO: ADM53/153454, HMS Duncan logbook, 28.6.1960. 
41 Morgunbladid, 12.7.1960. 
42 Thi_S6: 1993-3-2, K. Gudmundsson to Reykjavik, 16.7.1960. Also PRO: MAF209/1862, Lloyd to 
Hare, 13.7.1960. 
43 PRO: F0371/150838/GW12/123, Stewart to FO, 13.5.1960, and F0371/151675/NLI351/87. Stewart to 
FO, 12.7.1960. 
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12-mile limit again. 44 If and when they wanted to sit down at the negotiating table, only 
minor modifications could be discussed, at most the three-year phase-out period and 
extended baselines which had been offered in 1958.45 
The NATO-weapon reappeared as well. After the Grimsby Toivn affair, the 
Progressive leader Hermann J6nasson-never more than lukewarm towards the 
American presence in Iceland-demanded that the government seek naval assistance 
from the United States, under the terms of the Defence Agreement from 1951. The 
Socialists, aware of the unease it might cause at the Keflavik base and in Washington, 
were only too pleased to support the request. 46 In spite of open ridicule from the 
coalition parties, American officials were rather anxious, in particular because Bjami 
Benediktsson of the Conservative Party had earlier warned them that if British warships 
resumed protection within the 12-mile limit, 
Icelandic government with his support and on his initiative would withdraw 
from NATO. Benediktsson said with considerable feeling that this was not a 
threat but a statement of cold fact which he made despite fact he had always 
been and was now wholehearted supporter NATO. 47 
On the whole, British officials took the warning as seriously as the Americans, although 
they felt that '[t]here must clearly be a large element of bluff and blackmail in such a 
statement'. 48 Nonetheless, didn't that leave Britain with just the option of retreat? The 
time had arrived for a true test of 'pragmatism' and 'positive adaptation'. 
In the high summer of 1960 a swift decision was needed because the trawler 
owners' three-month period of grace still stood to expire on August 12. For a while, 
British officials hoped against hope that the trawling industries of the two countries 
might somehow work out a modus vivendi. Yet that prospect was as unrealistic as it had 
been in the early 1950s when the decision-makers in London decided to forward the 
four-mile conflict to Humberside. 49 Similarly, the threat of economic sanctions was 
discussed and then discounted because it would upset the OEEC, stiffen the Icelanders 
and probably increase their deplorable trade with the Soviet Union, an aspect of 
44 PAAA: B80/335, Rowold to Bonn, 27.5.1960, and RA-DEN: 55. DAN. 32/Il, Paludan to Kronmann, 
16.6.1960. 
45 PRO: F0371/151700/NLI354/73, Stewart to FO, 6.7.1960, and F0371/151676/NLI351/98, Stewart to 
FO, 23.7.1960. 
46 ALTH: Foreign affairs committee, 13.7.1960. 
47 NARA: RG59/740B. 022/5-51960, Thompson to Herter, 19.5-1960. 
48 PRO: F0371/151699/NLI354/56, Roberts, to Mason, 15.6.1960. Also Mason minute, 3.6.1960, 
Stewart to Mason, 9.6.1960, MAF209/1862, Engholm minute, 14.6.1960, and NARA: RG59/740B. 022/5- 
2660, Burgess to Herter, 26.5.1960. 
49 Thi-SO: 1993-3-2, Gudmundsson to Andersen, 22.7.1960, PRO: F0371/151674/NLI351/81, FO to 
Reykjavik, 29.6.1960, and F0371/151675/NLI351/93, McAlpine minute, 27.7.1960. 
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Iceland's economy which NATO was actively examining. 50 A suggestion on yet another 
attempt by the Alliance itself suffered similar fate, in particular because Paul-Henri 
Spaak was highly sceptical and spoke disparagingly of the 'chronically intransigent' 
Icelanders. 51 Already at the start of June, the Foreign Office had reached the depressing 
conclusion that 'we have almost reached the stage when little ftirther can be done 
through the diplomatic channel with Iceland without threatening protection or offering 
some concessions. (This would mean in effect acquiescing in a 12-mile liMit),. 52 
Among the diplomats, the geopolitical and strategic arguments against the use of 
warships were overwhelming. 53 Moreover, in late July Selwyn Lloyd advanced their 
case with greater conviction at Cabinet level than he had done in 1958. even to the 
extent of using the 'Communist bogeyman' in a manner worthy of the Icelanders 
themselves: renewed naval protection would be condemned in the United Nations, it 
could drive Iceland out of NATO and it might possibly lead to 'some Soviet 
intervention in Icelandic waters'. 54 In similar circumstances two summers before, 
4escalation of commitment' had been chosen over capitulation, despite the obvious 
disadvantages but because of strong determinants on British policy: the five 'p's' of 
power, prestige, pressure, precedence and principle. Now the developments of 
international law and the negative experience of naval protection had strengthened the 
case for a surrender. Even so, the core dilemma about naval protection remained the 
same. 'If we give it', as Macmillan summarised a fortnight before the deadline of 
August 12, 'Iceland may go out of NATO and the American base may be at risk. If we 
don't, it is a betrayal of our own men'. 55 Likewise, the industry would demand a 
handsome subsidy in compensation for the abandonment of traditional fishing grounds, 
and a complete acceptance of Icelandic demands would definitely hurt Britain 
elsewhere in the North Atlantic. The Danes would evoke the confidential assurance 
about a revision of the 1959 agreement on Faroese limits, and the Norwegian 
56 negotiations could also be prejudiced . 
50 PRO: F0371/151674/NLI351/77, Berthoud minute, 30.5.1960, and MAF209/1862, MAFF minute, 
6.7.1960. On the NATO factor, see NATO: C-M(60)69, IS-00 11, Committee of Economic Advisers 
report, 1.7.1960, and C-R(60)29, IS-0012, NAC meeting, 6.7.1960. 
51 PRO: F0371/151676/NLI351/109, Roberts to FO, 2.8.1960. 
52 PRO: MAF209/1854, MAFF minute, 1.6.1960. 
53 PRO: F0371/151676/NLI351/99, FO minute, 25.7.1960, and F0371/151677/NL1351/121, Mason 
minute, 2.8.1960. 
54 PRO: CAB 128/34, CC(60), 46th meeting, 26.7.1960. 
55 BOD: MSS. Macmillan, diary, 30.7.1960. 
56 PRO: CAB21/4321, undated official law of the sea committee paper, from late July 1960, and T3) 12/35, 
Jackling to Owen, 31.8.1960. 
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The danger of bad precedence was admitted in the Foreign Office. 57 Aware of 
the legal principle at stake, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Kilmuir, was wary as well . 
58 And 
of course the most consistent objections to the 'lie down flat' option came from John 
Hare and the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. 59 In mid-June, in an interview with 
Morgunbladid, Iceland's largest newspaper, Hare was resolute, even provocative, and 
confirmed that 'we will not recognise the 12-mile fisheries limit'. 60 In London on July 
25, he overrode Lloyd in the Ministerial law of the sea committee, persuaded Kilmuir to 
join him, and together the two advised the Cabinet to accept the resumption of naval 
protection on August 12 if the Icelanders had not agreed to begin negotiations. The 
warships would only sail up to six miles, not four, and they would leave after five years, 
in line with the offer to Iceland at Geneva. In other words, with Iceland as with Norway, 
Britain would act like an agreement had been reached at the conference. It would 
merely have to be policed by the Royal Navy. Kilmuir and Hare argued that this might 
be the compromise which would secure British interests, while easing all the 
disadvantages of 'gunboat diplomacy': 
i) It would set a definite time to the continuation of protection, and the 
continued use of naval vessels. 
ii) It would preserve our position at the Faroes, and with Norway. 
iii) By basing ourselves on Second Geneva it would make us less liable to 
criticism from other countries. 
IV) By appearing essentially reasonable it might make it more difficult for 
Iceland to take some hasty action such as withdrawal from NATO. 
V) It might encourage Iceland to talk so as to secure better phase-out terrns, 
particularly if we told them in advance we intended to take this action in 
default of discussions. 61 
Be that as it may. The Keflavik base and Iceland's presence in NATO would still be 
jeopardised-as Benedilasson's passionate warning had indeed signified. 'Important as 
our fishing interests are' stated the Foreign Office, 'it would seem to be out of all 
proportion to incur political risks of this magnitude in order to secure on a hazardous 
62 basis five year's fishing rights within 12 miles off Iceland' . Sir Patrick Reilly, the 
high-ranking diplomat who was shortly to learn more about cod than he ever cared, later 
57 PRO: F0371/151675/NL1351/94, Allan minute, undated but on FO minute, 22.7.1960. 
58 PRO: CAB 129/102, C(60)121, Kilmuir memorandum, 25.7.1960. 
59 PRO: MAF209/1862, Winnifrith minute, 28.7.1960. 
60 Morgunbladid, 15.6.1960. 
61 PRO: CAB21/4321, undated official law of the sea committee paper, from late July 1960. Also PRO: 
CAB 129/102, C(60)12 1, Kilmuir memorandum, 25.7.1960m and MA F209/1862, Winniftith minute, 
28.7.1960. 
62 PRO: F0371/151676/NLI351/99, FO minute, 25.7.1960. 
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remarked that 'it would have been grotesque, absolutely, at that stage of the Cold War, 
to risk losing the base in Iceland, a nonsense to put that into danger'. 63 
In the event, the Cabinet did not have to accept or reject the proposal on 
protection for five years because, independently, the Icelanders had also begun to worry 
what would happen on August 12. In Reykjavik, Ambassador Stewart repeatedly 
warned that neither the skippers nor the owners could be persuaded to stay longer 
outside the 12-mile limit unless some talks were started. On July 22, the government 
therefore decided that Hans G. Andersen should travel to London. Still, he would have 
no authority to indicate that 'negotiations' on the 12-mile limit were possible. As 
Gudmundur i. Gudmundsson told him, all discussions were 'politically dangerous' and 
he was even to avoid any contact with the Icelandic Embassy where Kristinn 
Gudmundsson, the Foreign Minister for the Progressive Party in 1953-56, was now 
Ambassador. 64 On July 28, Andersen arrived in London and proved true to his 
instructions; he was 'almost excessively cautious', and made a very bad impression on 
British officials. 65 More would be needed to sway the Icelanders. In the first week of 
August, Lord Home (who had then replaced Selwyn Lloyd at the Foreign Office) wrote 
personal letters to both Foreign Minister Gudmundsson and Prime Minister Thors, 
66 
urging them in the kindest of phrases to seek an 'honourable and just' settlement . 
The Icelandic government was torn. Undoubtedly, most of its members wanted 
an end to the dispute and realised that they would then have to offer some concessions, 
probably a short phase-out period. Ever since September 1958, however, all political 
parties in Iceland had insisted-to use the famous slogan-that they would not deal 
with the Brits, but beat them. In early August 1960, Ministers knew that large sections 
of the public, not to mention the opposition, would condemn all moves towards 
'negotiations'. 'They had a psychological fear of this word', as Permanent Secretary 
Henrik Bjbmsson said in the Foreign Ministry. 67 Therefore, the Icelandic government 
felt that it was making a great sacrifice when, on August 8, it decided to accept British 
proposals for 'talks' on the dispute. 68 On the same day, Home and Christopher Soames 
(who had taken over from John Hare at MAFF) met representatives of the owners, 
skippers and mates and persuaded them to prolong the policy of staying outside 12 
63 Reilly inter-view, 13.3.1999. 
64 Thi-SO: 1993-3-2, Gudmundsson to Andersen, 22.7.1960, and PRO: F0371/151676/NLI351/98, 
Stewart to FO, 23.7.1960. Also Gudmundsson, "'Thau eru"', 82-83. 
65 PRO: F0371/151677/NLI351/1 10, Mason to Wyndham, 3 )0.7.1960, and F0371/151680/NLI351/160, 
Gore-Booth minute, 12.8.1960. 
66 Thi-SO: 1993-3-2, Home to Gudmundsson, 5.8.1960, and Home to Thors, 7.8.1960. 
67 PRO: F0371/151677/NLI351/112, Stewart to FO, 7.8.1960. 
68 Thorsteinsson, Utani-ikisthj6nusta 11,627. 
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miles for another two months . 
69 But the price for the postponement was a promise by 
the authorities, which the Cabinet accepted in principle, that Britain would 'resume 
naval protection at the end of two months if no form of negotiations had been started by 
then'. 70 Also, the Icelanders gave an informal pledge not to resume landings on 
Humberside after the summer lull, unless an agreement on the fishing limits had been 
71 reached . 
A crisis had been averted at the eleventh hour. Again, British decision-makers had 
demonstrated a certain skilfulness in the day-to-day management of precarious 
situations. Home's benign messages were totally devoid of threats and the British side 
had accurately calculated that the Icelanders would realise that if they refused even to 
discuss the conflict, they could lose much sympathy for their case. They must have felt 
Spaak's grudge; Norway was negotiating, and Tyler Thompson, the American 
Ambassador, repeatedly urged them to open talks. 72 Furthennore, the Icelanders 
naturally knew that if nothing had happened by August 12, the trawlers might flock 
inside the 12-mile limit and put tremendous pressure on British rulers to provide them 
with protection. 
Had the Icelandic government rejected the British overtures, the policy-makers 
in London would inevitably have turned their attention to the alternative of five-year 
protection. On August 4, the Admiralty had prepared instructions for 'Operation 
Bailiff: naval protection up to six miles in three havens; 'Pheasant', 'Partridge' and 
'Woodcock'. 73 This plan was not discarded although the Icelanders had decided to enter 
into discussions, for the British knew well enough that their old adversaries had not 
turned overnight into placid, pacifying moderates. On the contrary, on August 10, a 
4very gloomy and almost hostile' Hans G. Andersen told Andrew Stewart that he had 
been 'in this business for nearly two years now and never got anywhere. He saw no 
purpose in trying again'. 74 Apparently, if the talks were to lead to a conclusion, they 
would still have to entail a near total British surrender. As before, therefore, a problem 
postponed was not really a problem solved. 'If we do not get agreement within two 
months', said Christopher Soames to Harold Macmillan, 'I do not believe any power on 
69 PRO: N/IAF209/1862, MAFF minute, 8.8.1960. The decision in Reykjavik was not known to them then 
but Home told the meeting that the Icelandic government was considering British appeals for talks. 
70 PRO: CAB 128/34, CC(60), 49b meeting, 8.8.1960. 
71 PRO: F0371/151679/NLI351/148, Stewart to FO, 27.8.1960. 
72 NARA: RG59/740B. 00/8-460, Reykjavik Embassy to Washington, 4.8.1960, and PRO: 
F0371/151678/NLI351/127, Caccia to FO, 5.8.1960. 
73 PRO: ADM306/49, Captain FPS OP-ORDER 2-60,4.8.1960. 
74 PRO: F0371/151678/NLI351/132, Stewart to FO, 10.8.1960. 
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earth would stop [the owners and skippers] going in to fish. And after what the Foreign 
75 
Secretary and I told them the other day, they will expect to be protected'. So, the only 
basic change was that instead of August 12,1960, October 12 now loomed large. But 
that would almost certainly be the final, final deadline. The 'cod war' would soon be 
over. 
75 PRO: PREM 11/2976, Soames to Macmillan, 11.8.1960. 
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4.3. An End to 'Pragmatism' and the Primacy of Domestic 
Politics? Conclusion of the Cod War, 1960-61 
It did not augur well for a friendly end to the 'cod war' that it was something of a 
victory in itself just to get the Icelanders to talk (and not to *negotiate', it may be noted). 
Neither did it ease the search for a solution that the Foreign Office had gone further 
down the road to the meeting point of perception and reality than other departments in 
Whitehall, and probably Prime Minister Macmillan as well. In the end, however, a 
united British side all but gave up the fight for a lost cause. Instead, after more than a 
decade of lagging 'pragmatically' behind events, the decision-makers in London were 
going to show foresight and actively guard themselves against the prospect of further 
setbacks on the high seas. Moreover, at long last the Icelandic government seemed 
prepared to face the fury of its domestic opponents and make a compromise with 
Britain. 
On August 8,1960, when the authorities in Reykjavfk accepted the British appeal for 
discussions, they added that they could only begin after a month or so, when the initial 
denunciation and surprise in Iceland would have subsided a bit. 76 As expected, the 
Socialists and the Progressives immediately condemned the move and over the next few 
weeks, numerous organisations, unions and town councils passed resolutions against a 
retreat from the 12-mile limit. 77 Furthermore, the Social Democrats and especially the 
Conservatives needed time to convince their own members of the need to confer and 
possibly compromise with Britain. Near the end of August, Bjarni Benediktsson told 
Ambassador Stewart that at least two Conservative MPs could not bring themselves to 
vote for any concessions, which meant that a deal with Britain would not have a 
majority in the Althing. 78 By early September, the Social Democrat Gudmundur i. 
Gudmundsson was a bit more optimistic and suggested that talks could start at the end 
of the month . 
79 However, on September 22, only three weeks before the 'D-day' of 
October 12, Prime Minister Thors warned Stewart that he was experiencing 'great 
76 Thi-SO: 1993-3-2, J6nsson minute, 9.8.1960. 
77 E. g. Thj6dviljinn, 9.9.1960,15. -16.9.1960,22. -23.9.1960, and 28. -29.9.1960. 78 PRO: F03 71/151679/NL 13 51/148, Stewart to FO, 27.8.1960. Also Gudmundsson, "'Thau eru"', 89- 
9 1. Although the government had a majority of six in the Parliament, it was a two-chamber body so a 
defection by two members would result in an even vote-and defeat-in one chamber. 
79 PRO: F0371/151681/NLI351/161, Stewart to FO, 10.9.1960, and F0371/151681/NLI351/163, 
Stewart to FO, 16.9.1960. 
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difficulty in arriving at any solution which would give a chance of reaching agreement 
without seriously imperilling the life of his government'. 80 
The Ambassador accepted that Icelandic Ministers would not have called upon 
themselves the charge of kow-towing to Britain unless they honestly wanted to reach a 
81 
successftil conclusion. On the other hand, both Soames and his officials at the 
Fisheries Department suspected that the regime in Reykjavik was merely playing for 
time. 82 They certainly disliked Stewart's conciliatory tone, complaining that he 'appears 
to be more Icelandic than the Icelanders'. 83 Yet again, the messenger was criticised for 
bringing the 'wrong' news. Soames also stressed that the Cabinet had in principle 
agreed to resume protection if the two sides failed to reach a settlement before October 
12.84 The Foreign Office, however, was highly critical of the Fishery Department's 
inability to understand the 'grave consequences' of renewed naval pressure. 85 For the 
diplomats, the return of the Royal Navy to the 12-mile zone was not really an option. 
But at the same time, a lasting standstill was inconceivable. Something or someone had 
to give way. 
86 Ken Booth once wrote: 'Prestige is the sex appeal of politics among nations'. The 
importance of 'prestige' has indeed been highlighted here. Concern for this ill-defined, 
yet important, concept had blurred the British vision of the new international 
environment after the Second World War. It had also influenced the thinking of the 
newly independent Icelanders, proud and sensitive as they were. Rarely was this as 
evident as in early 1952, when blafur Thors felt snubbed after his failure to discuss 
Iceland's proposed four-mile extension with British Ministers. 87 Political opponents 
continued to taunt him by recalling the futile visit to 'some underlings' in Whitehall, 
and David Sumi-nerhayes, second in command at the Embassy in Reykjavik in 1960, 
later recalled that during the deadlock in the autumn of that year, 'blaftir Thors made it 
quite clear he wouldn't talk to anyone except Macmillan'. 
88 
80 PRO: PREMI 1/3015, Stewart to Mason, 22.9.1960. 
81 PRO: F0371/151678/NLI351/135, Stewart to FO, 17.8-1960. 
82 PRO: PREM 11/2976, Soames to Macmillan, 23.9.1960. 
83 PRO: MAF209/1863, Savage minute, 24.8.1960. 
84 PRO: PREM 11/2976, Soames to Macmillan, 23.9.1960. 
85 BOD: Reilly Papers, Ms. Eng. c. 6924, fol. 9. Also PRO: F0371/151678/NLI351/136, Stewart to 
Mason, 17.8.1960, F0371/151678/NLI351/135, Mason minute, 19.8.1960, and MAF209/1863. Engholin 
minute, 1.9.1960. 
86 Booth, Nav, ies, 50. 
87 See section 2.2,7 1. 
88 Summerhayes interview, 22.11.2002. Also Timinn, 31.8.1958, and PRO: F0371/151681/NLI-'551/163, 
Stewart to FO, 16.9.1960. 
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For Britain, there could be no harm in such an encounter. It would, as Heath 
Mason pointed out in the Foreign Office, 'greatly enhance the prestige of the Icelandic 
government and the Icelandic Prime Minister ... and make it easier for them to 
accomplish the difficult task which they have set themselves of reaching an agreement 
with US,. 89 Macmillan himself readily agreed. In general, he was a strong believer in 
4summit diplomacy', 90 and on the afternoon of September 24, the day before a 
scheduled journey to the United Nations in New York, he summoned a group of 
officials to Chequers to discuss Icelandic fisheries. As one of them later recounted, the 
Prime Minister said that he 'now wanted to use 20 minutes to discuss the dispute and 
asked those present to describe it because he was going to solve it'. 91 Having armed 
himself with speaking points, Macmillan then stopped at Keflavik airport the day after, 
en route to the United States, and had a working lunch with 61afur Thors. 
From the onset, both Prime Ministers used their strongest arguments to enhance 
their case. Macmillan impressed upon Thors the tremendous respect which the 
trawlermen had earned after their sacrifices in two World Wars. 'These men's 
livelihood is at stake', he emphasised, while admitting that Britain would have to accept 
12 miles as a general rule for fishing limits. A phase-out period in the outer six miles 
was essential, however, and all he asked for was five years. 92 Thors countered by 
quoting the God-given right of a small nation to live off their only resource, the fish 
93 stocks in the waters around an inhospitable island . According to Macmillan, Thors 
also lamented that the 12-mile limit had become 'a national issue, almost obsessive'. 
Macmillan then replied: 
I said that I thought he had a perfectly good case to present on the basis I had set 
out. 12 miles imposed on Britain, against her will and against international law. 
The proudest naval tradition in the world brought to heel. Five years transition, 
twice as favourable as Norway. 
Macmillan also mentioned some limitations in the outer six miles and even raised the 
enticement of economic concessions. The Icelandic Prime Minister agreed that it all 
sounded well but, again in Macmillan's account, he repeatedly asserted 
89 PRO: F0371/151681/NLI351/168, Mason minute, 20.9-1960. 
90 See Deighton, 'British Foreign Policy-Making', 6, and Richard Aldous, "'A Family Affair": Macmillan 
and the Art of Personal Diplomacy", in Richard Aldous and Sabine Lee (eds), Harold Macmillan and 
Britain's World Role (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 10. 
91 This was Eric Roll at MAFF. SSi-DOP: 61afsson interview with Roll, 16.11.1992. 
92 According to his speaking points. See PRO: PREM 11/3015, undated note. Also 4 lthingistidindi 1960 
D, col. 46,2.3.196 1. 
93 Johannessen, 61afur Thors 11,320-323. 
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... that it was too late, the Icelandic people 
believed that the 12-mile battle was 
already won. I said that this was not so. I would have to support my fishermen if 
Iceland attacked them, contrary to existing international law. Mr Thors said that 
in that case he would fall from office, and Iceland fall into Soviet control. I said 
that I would do my best to help him. We had given in about everything. He must 
do something to help me. 94 
Harold Macmillan left Keflavik rather unimpressed with 01afur Thors. The doyen of 
Icelandic politics was 'a nice old boy, but clearly a weak man in a weak position' . 
95 His 
stress on 'Communist' power in Iceland had of course invited the risk of such an 
estimate. Yet Macmillan felt that, if pressed, Thors would and could 'give something'. 96 
The Foreign Office concurred. The meeting had not changed British minds. 97 It was in 
Iceland that the necessary change in thinking occurred-or a 'positive adaptation' to 
reality. The day after the Keflavik meeting, Permanent Secretary Bj6rnsson assured 
Ambassador Stewart that it had been beneficial, 'if only because Mr Thors now realises 
from the highest level that Iceland too must make a contribution to an agreement'. 98 
The ice had been broken. On October 1,1960, only 12 days before the trawling 
industry's final period of abstention from the 12-mile zone was due to expire, formal 
negotiations between Iceland and Britain finally began. A team of British officials went 
to Reykjavik, led by Patrick Reilly, the former Ambassador to the Soviet Union who 
had recently been appointed head of the Economics Department in the Foreign Office. 
Reilly's selection, as compared to Basil Engholm's leadership in the talks with Norway, 
signalled a determination by the Foreign Office to avoid a prevalence of fishing 
concerns in the discussions. " This late in the day, with so much at stake, diplomacy 
would have to prevail. 
The signs were not good. In Reykjavik, thousands gathered to protest against 
any deviation from the 12-mile limit. 'No deal-no retreat-no surrender', was the 
Socialist slogan, echoing the war cries of September 1958.100 A few MPs from the 
coalition parties also remained unconvinced that concessions were needed. 101 Besides, it 
was far from clear exactly what the Icelandic authorities wanted from Britain; the only 
94 PRO: F0371/151682ýNL1351/172, Dean to FO, 25.9-1960. 
95 Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 1959-1961 (London: Macmillan, 1972), 274. 
96 PRO: F0371/151682/NLI351/172, Dean to FO, 25.9.1960. 
97 PRO: F0371/151682/NL 1351/172, McAlpine minute, 30.9.1960. 
98 PRO: F03 71/15168 1 /NL 13 51/168, Stewart to FO, 26.9.1960, and Summerhayes interview, 
22.11.2002. 
99 Engholm was still a member of the British delegation and he and Reilly got on well. Reilly interview, 
13.3.1999. Also PRO: MAF209/1863, Engholm minute, 1.9.1960. 
100 Thj6dviljinn, 2.10.1960. 
101 GiG-V: Andersen and Bj6msson report, 10.10.1960. 
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certainty being that they would want a lot. This was confirmed during the 
negotiations. 102 Before they began, Whitehall officials had agreed to offer economic 
privileges, for instance an increase in the quota for the import of tariff-free frozen fillets 
to Britain. 103 In Reykjavik, Hans G. Andersen, the leader of the Icelandic team, 
welcomed this idea but suggested other preferences as well, like the revision of the 
agreement on landings in Britain, the possibility of Iceland's accession to EFTA, and 
perhaps financial assistance. 104 Furthermore, the Icelanders insisted that in return for a 
phase-out period inside the 12-mile limit, they must get reciprocal restrictions on 
trawling outside the line, or a 'zig-zag' agreement, as Foreign Minister Gudmundsson 
told Reilly. 105 At least six baseline changes in Iceland's favour would also be necessary 
and an agreement on these lines could only be for three years, not four or five. "' Most 
ominously, however, as the British side realised after a few days of discussions in 
Reykjavik, the Icelanders had set their eyes on the whole continental shelf, stretching 
more than 50 miles out to sea. '[T]hey did not make much effort to conceal [this] 
ultimate aim', Reilly reported, a warning which Lord Home underlined in red ink back 
in London. 107 
Thus, the first round of talks ended with no visible success and the guarded 
optimism after Macmillan's meeting with Thors had greatly diminished. 108 A transition 
period of only three years would be hard to sell on Humberside and most of the 
proposed baseline changes went significantly beyond the specifications which had been 
accepted at the first Geneva conference in 1958. Predictably, the Chiefs of Staff argued 
that even though Iceland was merely thinking of fishing limits, the danger of adverse 
precedence would affect Britain's general position on the width of territorial waters. 109 
And then there was the claim to the continental shelf Nevertheless, the discussions had 
not been broken off indefinitely and the British authorities felt that they had to ask the 
owners and the trawlermen to prolong yet further the self-imposed ban on fishing within 
the 12-mile limit which was scheduled to end on October 12. Even Soames agreed to 
102 For a detailed description of the negotiations, see SSi-DbP: blafson report, 12.10.1960. 
103 PRO: F0371/151682/NLI351/177, Dean to FO, 29.9.1960. 
104 SSi-DbP: blafsson minute, 3.10.1960, and PRO: F0371/151683/NLI351/185, Stewart to FO, 
4.10.1960. The Icelandic government never pressed hard for EFTA membership. See bli Kdri Olason, 
"'Politically impossible". EFTA-ums6kn i kJ61far thorskastrids', in Erla Hulda Halld6rsd6ttir (ed. ), 2. 
islenska s6guthingid 11 (Reykjavik: Sagnfrxdistofnun Hdsk6la islands, Sagriffizedingaf6lag islands and 
Sbguf6lag, 2002), 426-435. 
105 PRO: F0371/151683/NL 10 15/8, Stewart to FO, 4.10.1960. Also SSI-DOP: Olafsson minute, 
3.10.1960. 
106 PRO: F0371/151684/NLI351/195, Stewart to FO, 8.10.1960. 
107 PRO: F0371/151684/NLI351/200, Reilly report, 7.10.1960. 
108 BOD: MSS. Macmillan, diary, 9.10.1960, and Dail ,v 
Telegraph, 10.10.1960. 
109 PRO: DEFE5/108, COS(60)298, Vice Chief of Naval Staff memorandum, 26.10.1960, and 
DEFE4/1 30, COS(60), 67"' meeting, 27.10.1960. 
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pressurise the industry because the tenuous contact with the Icelanders would certainly 
perish if the trawlers were to sail inside. Home also warned that Moscow might offer to 
protect Iceland's fishing limits: 'Khrushchev, he said, was in a dangerous mood; he was 
trying throughout the world, for example in the Congo, Cuba and Laos, to bring 
countries into the Communist embrace and [at the United Nations] he had specifically 
named Iceland'. 110 Once more, the 'national interest', as seen from Humberside, 
differed from the view through the 'Cold War lens' in London. And once more, the 
Kremlin and the 'Communists' strengthened the Icelandic ranks in the 'cod war'. Home 
seemed to believe what he was saying and Sir Patrick Reilly, fresh from Moscow, felt 
that if a satisfactory solution to the conflict was not found, Khrushchev 'might jump at 
the chance to intervene in another colonialist affair ... 
by sending warships to Icelandic 
waters'. "' A disappointed industry, aware that permanent fishing rights inside 12 miles 
off Iceland were probably all but lost, agreed to the governiuent's plea for an extension 
of the breathing space. 112 
Preparations for the next round of talks began at once but the strategic 
connotations appeared to have reduced British power, for the decision-makers in 
London now had little faith in the usefulness of naval force. 'I was much struck by the 
quasi-unanimity against resuming protection', wrote Reilly to Stewart after a meeting of 
Ministers on October 20, chaired by Macmillan. Only Soames made a plea for it, 'and 
that was a very half-hearted one'. Undoubtedly, the Icelanders had also come to think 
that the Royal Navy would never again enter the 12-mile zone, or as Reilly added, 'I 
need not say how important it is that the Icelanders should not get wind of this, though I 
dare say they are beginning to suspect it'. 113 So, apart from the vanishing willpower, the 
make-believe was going as well. 
The deterioration in Britain's negotiating position was evident when the talks resumed 
on October 27. Hans G. Andersen and Fisheries Director David 
Olafsson went to 
London, armed with their government's proposals for a solution. 
114 In comparison to the 
suggestions which had been floating around in Reykjavik, the baselines and the outside 
areas were even more exorbitant, while Britain's transitory rights inside the 12-mile 
110 PRO: F0371/151705iNL1354/141, Mason minute, 12.10-1960. 
11 'PRO: F0371/151684/NL1351/200, Reilly report, 7.10.1960. 
112 PRO: MAF209/1864, MAFF note, 10.10.1960. 
113 BOD: Reilly Papers, Ms. Eng. c. 6872, fol. 6, Reilly to Stewart, 3.11.1960. So concerned was Reilly 
that he asked Stewart to destroy the letter. 
114 For a record of the talks, see PRO: F0371/151689/NLI351/247, FO minutes, 28.10.1960,31-10.1960, 
1.11.1960, and 4.11.1960. Also SSi-DOP: Olafsson minutes, 27.10.1960,31.10.1960,31.10.1960, and 
4.11.1960. 
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limit were restricted and the 'assurance' against further unilateral extensions was very 
vague. Andersen admitted that he did not expect Britain to accept the proposals, and 
Olafsson even declared that they were influenced by the need to satisfy selfish, short- 
term needs of the inshore fishermen around the Icelandic coastline, 'poorly educated 
and primitive people [who] were primarily concerned to get an eye for an eye, and a 
tooth for a tooth in terms of practical sea areas'. Thus, the notion of tariff reductions and 
suchlike, more important in the long run, had gone by the board and an agreement 
would not be achieved on 'commonsense or economic grounds'. 115 
Sir Patrick Reilly could only say that he was 'puzzled and baffled'. ' 16 In reply, 
Anderson declared that he had been given a reasonable latitude so there was some room 
for manoeuvre. 117 During a heated exchange on November 1, Reilly could wring from 
the 'aggressive and arrogant' Andersen Iceland's 'rock bottom terms'. The baseline 
changes could be reduced to four and the temporary areas for regulated fishing outside 
the 12-mile zone to two. The 'assurance' against unilateral action could also be 
strengthened, for instance by a pledge to refer possible disputes to The Hague, and the 
Icelanders would not insist on economic concessions. 'I pressed him very hard to say 
whether he had definite authority to accept these terms', Reilly noted. 'After shying 
away repeatedly he said that he had'. ' 18 
The talks were postponed on November 4, allowing both sets of officials to 
consult their Ministers, and a feeling of cautious optimism could be detected in 
Whitehall. 119 Still, the old problem of precedence resurfaced. The negotiations with 
Norway were in their final stages and British officials secured a pledge from Oslo that a 
more favourable agreement with Iceland would not affect an Anglo-Norwegian 
agreement. The Danes were tougher, however. Disregarding British appeals for 
restraint, they insisted that the confidential attachment to the 1959 deal on Faroese 
limits (on revision in light of alterations off Iceland) would have to be respected. 120 This 
uncomfortable aspect of the emerging agreement with Reykjavik had not been solved 
when the Icelanders retreated again from the concessions which they had made. In late 
November, Foreign Minister Gudmundsson notified Ambassador Stewart that economic 
privileges would have to be attached to the proposed solution, and the government 
115 PRO: MAF209/1864, Enghohn minute, 31.10.1960. 
116 SSi-DOP: 01afsson minute, 27.10.1960. 
117 PRO: F03 71/151685/NL 1351/219, Stewart to FO, 26.10.1960. 
118 BOD: Reilly Papers, Ms. Eng. c. 6924, fols. 35-36. Also PRO: F0371/151688/NLI351/237, Reilly 
minute, 2.11.1960. 
119 RA-DEN: 55.1SLAND. I/XI, Steensen Leth to Copenhagen, 10.11.1960. 
120 PRO: F0371/151745/NN 1351/63, Home to Scarlett, 3.10.1960, and RA-DEN: 55-ISLAND. I/Xl, 
Svenningsen minute, 25.11.1960. 
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would find it 'very difficult' to accept a reference of future disputes to the International 
Court of Justice. 121 
Reilly was distraught. 'He let me down personally, very badly', he later said of 
Andersen and this twist in the tale. 122 On December 1, a small team of British officials 
again flew to Reykjavik. To Andersen's annoyance, Reilly insisted on meeting Icelandic 
Ministers and stressed that a satisfactory 'assurance' was the key to a solution. The 
Conservative Benediktsson, speaking for his party on this aspect of the problem, 
admitted that although the British attitude was 'reasonable', it was 'very difficult to 
present [it] to Icelandic public opinion'. 123 Even so, after intense discussions the 
government in Reykjavik accepted the notion that while Iceland would continue to work 
for jurisdiction above the continental shelf, six month's notice would be given to any 
limit extension which Britain could then refer to the International Court. 124 But the 
Icelanders would not go further. This commitment could not be a formal agreement 
('the word "agreement" stuck audibly in his throat', Stewart observed when 
Gudmundsson was setting out the government's position). 125 British calls for a more 
solid guarantee only led him to warn that 'Iceland might soon have to consider whether 
it should withdraw from NATO'. 126 Predictably, American officials were worried and as 
the Foreign Office estimated, 'we have reached a climax in our discussions with 
Iceland'. 127 
In London, the choice remained between escalation or acquiescence. Reportedly, the 
fishery officials regarded Gudmundsson's warnings as 'bluff and charged that it was 
high time to 'get tough' with the Icelanders. 128 But as before, that was easier said than 
done. Infuriating as the Icelandic negotiating tactics were, Britain neither had the 
appropriate means to 'get tough', nor would such coercion necessarily be in her general 
interest. The Foreign Office recommended that the Icelandic suggestion on an 
'assurance' be accepted, as long as it could be couched in adequate language. On 
December 8, the Cabinet concurred. 129 
121 PRO: F0371/151690/NLI 351/258, Stewart to FO, 24.11-1960. 
122 Reilly interview, 13.3.1999. 
123 PRO: F03 71/15169 1 /NL 13 51/265, FO minute, 2.12.1960. 
124 PRO: F03 71/15 169 1 /N L 13 51/265, FO minutes, 2.12.1960,3.12.1960, and 4.12.1960. 
125 PRO: F03 71/15 169 1 /N L 13 51/263, Stewart to FO, 4.12.1960. 
126 NARA: RG59/640B. 4146/12-660, Barbour to Herter, 6.12.1960. 
127 PRO: F03 71/15169 1 /NL 13 51/266, FO minute, 6.12.1960. 
128 NARA: RG59/640B. 4146/12-660, Barbour to Herter, 6.12.1960. 
129 PRO: CAB 128/34, CC(60), 62 nd meeting, 8.12.1960. 
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Unfortunately, however, the wording continued to be a stumbling block. Yet 
again, the Icelanders declared their preference for a weaker term than 'agreement', with 
130 
Gudmundsson going so far as suggesting an 'unwritten intention'. In the minds of the 
decision-makers in London, that idea was at best laughable. Notwithstanding the 
appreciation of Britain's powerlessness, the strategic aspect and all the other constraints, 
they were about to lose patience with their slippery opponents. 'They are really 
impossible', Macmillan grumbled, for why did they want to promise a possible referral 
to The Hague but not make it binding? 'The only explanation which suggests itself to 
us', said Patrick Reilly, 'is that they are not prepared to be bound by their own 
undertaking'. 131 Moreover, British officials suspected the Icelanders of calculating that 
continued intransigence would elicit further concessions. 132 On December 14, Lord 
Home conveyed to Gudmundsson his 'severe shock and disappointment' over Iceland's 
latest move. 133 Two days later, Macmillan sent a personal message to Thors: 
I appreciate that you are facing a very difficult problem and I have had this much 
in mind. But I do assure you that we can go no further in order to reach 
agreement upon this basis. If the present negotiations break down we should be 
bound to publish the details of our negotiations to the world and, if we did so, I 
sincerely believe they would give ample evidence that my government have 
been prepared to make very large concessions in order to secure a settlement. 
I must also repeat, as I told you in Keflavik on September 25, that our 
government have no power to prevent British trawlers fishing within the 12-mile 
limit in what we regard as the high seas. If the present negotiations break down, 
we could certainly not prevent their doing so without enacting legislation which 
would be impossible to carry in our Parliament. The situation which would thus 
arise would face us with very distressing decisions on the question of 
protection. 134 
Britain had had enough. There were limits to the appeasement. Yet the allusion to the 
reappearance of the Royal Navy inside the 12-mile limit was mostly bluff. It is almost 
impossible to imagine that the disagreement about phraseology could have led to the 
resumption of naval protection. 135 Had the Icelanders refused to budge and the 
negotiations failed, the informal cease-fire off Iceland would probably have continued, 
with British trawlers staying beyond the 12-mile zone, or entering it at their own risk. 
130 PRO: F0371/151692/NLI351/267, Stewart to FO, 10.12.1960, and F0371/151692/NLI351/269, 
Stewart to FO, 14.12.1960,14.12.1960. 
13 1 BOD: MSS. Macmillan, diary, 15.12.1960, and PRO: F0371/151693/NLI351/281, Reilly minute, 
16.12.1960. 
132 NARA: RG59/640B. 4146/12-1460, Barbour to Herter, 14.12.1960. 
133 Thi-SO: 1993-3-2, Home to Gudmundsson, 14.12.1960. 
134 Thi-SO: 1993-3-2, Macmillan to Thors, 16.12.1960. 
135 See PRO: F0371/151693/NLI351/272, FO minute, 14.12.1960. For the contrary conclusion that the 
Icelandic authorities believed this threat, see Gudmundsson, "'Thau eru"', I 11. 
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The Icelanders appeared to realise this, as Reilly had rightly deduced a few 
weeks before. A de facto victory in the shape of the status quo was within their grasp. 
On the other hand, they undoubtedly feared the threat of publicity after the collapse of 
the talks with Britain and the damage to their credibility as sound allies in NATO. It 
may be reiterated that both Gudmundsson and Benediktsson, the main players in 
Reykjavik at this stage, were sincerely pro-Western. They wanted to be considered 
trustworthy and conciliatory. Furthermore, the fishing aspects of the settlement which 
was now on the table were highly favourable. Fisheries Director blafsson estimated that 
in terms of areas, seasonal closures and the phase-out period, 'we have got from the 
British more than we dared to hope for'. True, according to the latest proposals, the 
Icelanders would not get restricted zones outside the 12-mile limit unless they accepted 
a five-year transition instead of three, but the four new baselines more than made up for 
that loss. 136 Thus, 01aftir Thors told Macmillan at once of his 'sincere wish' to solve the 
conflict and Gudmundur i. Gudmundsson arranged to confer with Home at a meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council. 137 After a series of talks in Paris, and again in London, the 
two Foreign Ministers managed to hammer out a draft understanding. While the 
problematic 'assurance' would be separated from the other parts of the settlement, it 
would still constitute an 'agreement', to be registered at the United Nations. 13 8 From 
now on 'things would go well', Henrik Sv. Bj6rnsson hoped at the Foreign Ministry in 
Reykjavik. 139 
On the one hand, the rulers in Reykjavik had finally realised that they could not squeeze 
Britain further. On the other, they knew that they could only defend the outcome at 
home if they had demonstrably gone as far as they could in the negotiations. Once the 
authorities had pledged themselves to a settlement, the domestic pressure against 
concessions changed from a useful bargaining tool at the international level to a 
dangerous threat in internal politics. 
To begin with, the sceptics within the coalition parties had to be brought into 
line. At the end of 1960, some Conservative politicians wanted instead of the draft 
agreement a plain cease-fire on the 12-mile limit with no new baselines, closed areas or 
136 SSi-DOP: Olafsson minute, 29.12.1960. 
137 PRO: F0371/151693/NLI351/275, Stewart to FO, 16.12.1960. 
138 For descriptions of these talks from the viewpoints of Home and Gudmundsson, see Lord Home, The 
Way the Wind Blows: A n. 4 utobiography (London: Collins, 1976). 173, and Benedikt Grondal, 'Um 
helgina', Althýdubladid, 5.3.1961 
139 PRO: F0371/151693/NLI351/288, Stewart to FO, 23.12.1960. 
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other attachments, and especially not the 'assurance' which they strongly disliked. 140 
The party leaders rejected this change but only with considerable difficulty (including a 
frightful argument between the 'rebels' and Thors when a door was slammed so hard 
that glass got shattered). 14 1 The opponents outside the government camp would be even 
harder to tackle. In January, a number of strikes in the fishing industry prevented 
Ministers from announcing that a provisional agreement with Britain had been 
reached. 142 Whereas the British government appreciated the domestic difficulties, the 
trawlermen grew increasingly restive as the spring season neared and no settlement 
seemed to be in sight. 'Give us gunboats', said the skippers, ' 43 and in early February, 
Home and Macmillan wrote again to Reykjavfk, urging the Icelandic government not to 
prevaricate any longer. 144 Although the Icelandic Ministers promised almost 
immediately that they would soon act, they insisted on the utmost secrecy which made it 
difficult for the authorities in London to soothe the trawlermen. 145 If no agreement had 
been reached by mid-March, the most determined skippers would undoubtedly have 
sailed to their favourite grounds inside the 12-mile limit. 146 
On February 28, however, the government in Reykjavik at last took the plunge, 
announcing that a proposal to end the fishing dispute with Britain would be put to the 
Althing. The police had been put on special alert, since the Socialists were expected to 
organise demonstrations and even riots. 147 While such fears turned out to be unfounded, 
the opposition condemned the draft agreement most ferociously. The parliamentary 
debate lasted for the first nine days of March, sometimes well into the night., 48 
Accusations of 'treachery' and 'treason' could be heard, in particular because of the 
'assurance' and the apparent relinquishment, under duress, of the privilege to extend 
Iceland's fishing limits unilaterally. 149 Undeterred, on March 9, the Althing's 
government majority approved the agreement with Britain, also surviving a vote of no 
140 SSi-DbP: blafsson minute, 29.12.1960, and PRO: F0371/159419/NLI351/7, Stewart to FO, 
20.1.1961. 
14' Baldvinsson interview, 6.9.2002. Also NARA: RG59/640B. 4146/4-116 1, Ekern to Washington, 
11.4.1961. 
142 Thi-URN: 1996-B/88-1 15.13.007.2, Gudmundsson to Home, 23.1.1961, and PRO: 
F0371/159419/NLI351/12, Stewart to FO, 2.2.1961. 
143 Doili, Express, 26.1.196 1. Also Grimsby Evening Telegraph, 8.2.196 1. 
144 PRO: PREMI 1/3307, Macmillan to Thors, 9.2.1961. 
145 PRO: MAF209/1865, meeting with industry representatives, 22.2.1961. 
146 PRO: F03 71/15 7419/NL 13 51/186, FO minute, 16.2.1961. 
147 NARA: RG59/640B. 4146/2-276 1, Thompson to Herter, 27.2.196 1. In stark contrast to Andrew 
Gilchrist's behaviour, Charles Stewart, half-expecting unrest outside the Embassy or his residence, 
instructed the British staff 'that they must do everything possible to avoid giving provocation'. PRO: 
F0371/159420/NL 1351/28, Stewart to Mason, 1.3.1961. 
148 See Althingistidindi 1960 D, cols. 21-484, L-9.3.1961. 
149 For a summary, see J6nsson, Friends, 104-108. 
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Figure XV The 12-mile limitfrom 1958, with thefour new baselines in 1961 drawn by hand. 'Very 
dubious', Foreign Minister Gudmundsson has written next to the new line off the south-west coast. 
confidence. Two days later, an exchange of notes took place. Britain would 'no longer 
object to a 12-mile fishery zone around Iceland', measured from baselines, including the 
four new ones. British trawlers could fish in the outer six miles for the next years, apart 
from seven closed areas, and the hotly disputed 'assurance' read as follows: 
The Icelandic government will continue to work for the implementation of the 
Althing resolution of May 5,1959, regarding the extension of fisheries 
jurisdiction around Iceland, but shall give to the United Kingdom government 
six months' notice of such extension and, in case of a dispute in relation to such 
extension, the matter shall, at the request of either party, be referred to the 
International Court of Justice. 150 
In their defence of the agreement, the government's spokesmen highlighted the baseline 
changes, the closed areas and the short transitory period, and not least the principle of 
law and interdependence in international relations. In an emotional critique of the 
charge that Iceland might lose a case at the International Court, Bjarni Benediktsson 
asked: 'Is it not precisely this attitude, this hypocrisy, this aggression, which has almost 
destroyed the human race? ' 15 1 The authorities in Reykjavik were now making amends, 
wilfally. 'The present Icelandic government is pro-NATO and basically pro-British', as 
4 
"1$, I 
150 Cmnd. 1328, Exchange ofNotes Settling the Fisheries Dispute between the Government of[Britain] 
and the Government ofIceland (London: HMSO, 196 1). 
151 Althingistidindi 1960 D, col. 418,8.3.1961. 
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Heath Mason pointed out at the Foreign Office. 
152 Likewise, the discontent within the 
Conservative Party, the anticipation of widespread demonstrations, and the violent 
response of the parliamentary opposition all confirmed that these pro-Western and pro- 
British decision-makers had at last decided to reject the primacy of domestic politics. 
'They have had to exercise a good deal of political courage to come to terms with us', 
Mason also wrote. 153 Then again, the obtaim-nent of the 'assurance' did not disguise the 
fact that, to quote Sir Patrick Reilly, '[w]e were dealing with skilful and at times 
unscrupulous negotiatiors, who made good use of what was in fact political 
blackmail' . 
154 Britain had been forced to accept a 12-mile fishing limit, extravagant 
baselines, a very short phase-out period and closed areas, in return for a commitment on 
a reference to the International Court. A guarantee of that kind was not even discussed 
in other conflicts since both sides automatically assumed that they could call for that 
way out if the need arose. 155 On the whole, the final settlement was highly favourable to 
Iceland, even 'a massive Icelandic victory' as Andrew Gilchrist was to assert. 156 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, most trawler owners, skippers and mates, as well as 
their representatives in Parliament, were at best bitter. 157 At worst, they went on strike, 
as did the trawlennen of Grimsby. Somewhat ironically, the belligerent Dennis Welch 
alluded to the British ailment of lagging behind events when he condemned the 
outcome, for if it stood, 'we would be indefinitely worse off than if we had accepted the 
12-mile limit two and a half years ago and all our efforts during that time, trouble with 
Icelandic gunboats, fishing in havens, etc., had all been wasted completely'. ' 
58 Yes, if 
only the pragmatism and realism behind the settlement of 1961 had been evident a few 
years before. When the Commander of the frigate on Iceland patrol off the 12-mile limit 
told the trawling fleet about the agreement, a skipper replied exasperatedly: 'Well, what 
the bloody hell are you up here for thenT 159 
152 PRO: F0371/159420/NLI351/27, Mason minute, 21.2.1960. Similarly, later in 1961, the Icelandic 
government made a near identical agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. See Thorsteinsson, 
Utanrikisthj6nusta 11,632-634. 
153 PRO: F03 71/15 9420/NL 13 51/27, Mason minute, 21.2.1960. 
154 BOD: Reilly Papers, Ms. Eng. c. 6924, fol 4. 
155 On this point, see RA-DEN: 55. DAN. 3 I/XIX, memorandum, 19.2.1963. 
156 Gilchrist, Cod Wars, 102. 
157 Hansard, Vol. 63 5, cols. 13 81-13 88,28.2.196 1, and Grimsby Evening Telegraph, 1.3.196 1. 
158 MRC: MSS. 292B/601.95/4, GSDFVEFU and Grimsby Trawler Officers' Guild extraordinary meeting, 
10.3.1961. A pay dispute got entangled with the anger over the Icelandic settlement and the strike only 
ended in April. See Grimsby Evening Telegraph, 26.4.196 1. 
159 Tibby to author, 6.7.2001. 
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4.4. 'As usual, nothing can ever be done about anything. The 
Final Phase of Indecision, Backwardness and 'Pragmatism', 
1961-64 
This study of Britain's failed fight for the three-mile limit should really have ended with 
the Icelandic agreement in early 1961. Britain had recognised the principle of 12-mile 
fishing limits off Norway and around Iceland, and the 12-mile rule had almost been 
accepted at international level. Thus, it was only logical to think that it was in the 
British interest to face the facts and say, as Lord Swinton put it for instance in debates 
over the settlement with Iceland in the House of Lords: 'All right, the three-mile limit 
was accepted tacitly for many years in international law, but that has now gone by the 
160 board'. Old habits die hard, however. The temptation to use coercion to defend 
traditional British policy was still strong, as was the danger of miscalculations on 
Britain's actual power and interests. In spite of the enforced enlightenment off Iceland, 
the story of wishful thinking and vacillation continued for another three years. 
First, however, the inevitable had to be accepted. On March 2,1961, almost 
immediately after the conclusion of the 'cod war', Moscow denounced the Anglo- 
Soviet fisheries agreement from 1956, with the stipulated one year's notice. 161 The loss 
of the right to fish in certain areas up to the three-mile limit in the Barents Sea would be 
a serious blow, said the trawling industry. 162 Yet there was nothing which Britain could 
or should do, as even the Fisheries Department in Whitehall agreed: 'Our position is the 
simple one that we shall take what, if anything, the Russians have to give'. 163 The 
following year, the treaty expired and British trawling in Soviet territorial waters came 
to an end. 164 
For decision-makers who were so ingrained to react to events, the fait accompli 
in the Barents Sea was almost a welcome thing. But the situation was different around 
the Faroe Islands, by this stage the sole territory with narrow fishing limits in the North 
Atlantic. Right after the Icelandic settlement of March 1961, the Faroese demanded the 
same regime for them: a 12-mile limit with new baselines and a phase-out period until 
160 Hansard, House of Lords debates, Vol. 229, col. 33,28.2.1961. 
161 PRO: F0371/159584/NS1351/2, Roberts to FO, 2.3.1961. 
162 Daily Telegraph, 17.7.1961. 
163 PRO: MAF209/1936, Atkinson minute, 24.4.1961. 
164 Butler, Soviet Union, 99. 
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1964.165 Although the Danish authorities were not happy with this enthusiasm, they 
accepted that their North Atlantic subjects ought not to be worse off than the Icelanders. 
The Anglo-Danish agreement from 1959 could be denounced after April 27,1962, and 
it had of course contained the confidential clause on revision in case Iceland would get a 
better deal with Britain. 166 
Right and precedence seemed to be on the Faroese side. Furthermore, British 
officials readily admitted that a resistance to Faroese wishes might incur all the strategic 
risks which had accompanied the 'cod war'. 167 Hence, the former experience of defeat 
undoubtedly softened the British will to fight. And more generally, was it perhaps 
unwise to oppose a 12-mile limit any longer? Shouldn't Britain just go with the flow? 
At the beginning of May 1962, Macmillan initiated a ftindamental examination at 
Cabinet level on law of the sea policy. Britain should declare a 12-mile fishing limit, 
because Je]veryone else has done it and we are the victims now, not the beneficiaries of 
the old system'. 168 
Lord Home agreed, adding that he had 'long been in favour of it'. 169 At MAFF, 
however, Christopher Soames was quick to defend the traditional interest of narrow 
territorial waters. Negotiations over Faroese limits could be prejudiced; the North Sea 
Convention from 1882 restricted British manoeuvrability; and if Britain were to join the 
Common Market, she would have to accept the concept of a common fisheries policy 
where all the member states enjoyed 'equal access ... under an equitable arrangement of 
limits for fishery purposes'. As Soames concluded, 'I am sure we should extend our 
limits sooner or later, but timing is of the essence'. 170 Hitherto, sooner or later had 
meant later or never, and Macmillan was incensed. 'As usual, nothing can ever be done 
about anything', he wrote brusquely to his Minister. 'I will not give this up'. 17 1 Thus, 
the re-examination of British policy continued but a swift decision was impossible. 'It is 
hard to resist the conclusion that we should wait on events', one Whitehall official 
argued, and incredibly enough, another bureaucrat also asserted that 'it is still possible 
for us to maintain that the standard limit is three miles'. 172 Macmillan insisted that he 
165 RA-DEN: 55. DAN. 31/XV, memorandum, 14.3.1961, and Folketingstidende. Forhandlingeri 
Folketings6ret 1960-1961. Samling (Copenhagen: Schultz, 1961), cols. 2549-2552. 
166 See section 3.7,191. 
167 PRO: F03 71/15928 1 /ND 1351/17, Montagu-Pollock to Mason, 15.3.196 1. 
168 PRO: CAB21/4761, Macmillan to Home, 7.5.1962. 
169 PRO: CAB21/4761, Home to Macmillan, 14.5.1962. 
170 PRO: CA1321/4761, Soames to Macmillan, 21.5.1962, and FO to Oslo, 30.8.1962. Also 
MAF209/1832, Engholm minute, 24.4.1962. 
171 PRO: CAB21/4761, Macmillan to Soames, 22.5.1962. Italics in original. 
172 PRO: CA1321/4761, Mackintosh memorandum, 26.9.1962, and CA1321/4981, Cary minute, 
21.11.1962. 
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would only wait until Christmas, but as things turned out, he left office with the limit 
unchanged. 173 
The talks on accession to the Common Market ended in failure in January 1963, making 
that aspect of the matter less relevant, at least for the time being. The following month, 
another part of the puzzle was in the foreground as negotiations on Faroese fishing 
limits began in London. Britain did not try to contest the intention to extend to 12 miles 
from new baselines. Instead, the length of a transitional period inside the line 
predominated the talks. British officials opened with ten years, in accordance with the 
Norwegian agreement. They would 'fight hard' for seven while settling for four, or even 
three, as had been the case with Iceland. 174 The Faroese Lagting, however, had already 
rejected all phase-out rights, insisting on a straight 12-mile limit from April 1963.175 A 
crisis of Icelandic proportions was in the making. At a Ministerial meeting, Foreign 
Minister Per Hwkkerup mentioned the possibility that the Faroe Islanders might demand 
the removal of NATO facilities while Lord Home pointed to the industry's 
intransigence. 176 Indeed, the trawler owners decided to impose a ban on the landings of 
Faroese catches, like they had done in response to the Icelandic four-mile extension in 
1952.177 
As before, however, the difference between Iceland and the Faroe Islands lay in 
Deninark. The Danes, caught between their desire to satisfy both Faroese and British 
wishes, resolved to offer a phase-out period until March 11,1964, when Britain's 
transitory rights expired off Iceland. 178 Ultimately, the Faroe Islanders could not but 
accept such a favourable compromise. In Britain, on the other hand, the trawling 
industry remained committed to a landing ban. In early March 1964, when the Faroese 
12-mile limit was about to come into full effect, the parliamentary correspondent for the 
Times also observed that 'there seemed to be many a member who longed for the days 
of powder and shot diplomacy'. 179 That era was past, however; the 'cod war' experience 
had ensured that the use of the Royal Navy was hardly discussed in Whitehall. Officials 
also knew that the industry's embargo, which was designed to limit landings to the 
average of the last decade, would probably not produce the desired result. It was 
173 PRO: CAB21/4761, Macmillan minute, 17.8.1962. 
174 PRO: F03 71/171669/ND 13 52/27, Reilly minute, 15.2.1963. Also RA-DEN: 5 5. DAN. 3 I /XIX, 
memorandum, 18.2.1963. 
175 RA-DEN: 55. DAN. 31/XIX, memorandum, 8.2.1963. 
176 RA-DEN: 55. DAN. 31/XIX, memorandum, 20.2.1963. 
177 GFVOA: Council meeting, 20.2.1963. 
178 RA-DEN: 55. DAN. 3 I /XIX, Danish aide-memoire, 5.4.1963. 
179 TiM es, 10.3.1964. 
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imposed for over a year, nonetheless, and only became an 'irritant* in Anglo-Danish 
relations. 180 
Thus, on March 11,1964, British trawling within the 12-mile limit around Iceland and 
the Faroe Islands ended for good. In the same year, after a series of meetings with other 
European states, Britain extended her own fishing limit to 12 miles, with a ten-year 
transitory period for traditional fishing in the 3-6 mile zone and permanent historic 
rights in the outer six miles. 181 It was a step in the right direction, but how hard and 
belated had it been! 
The decision had been made like this: by early 1963, after the failure to 
guarantee a long phase-out period off the Faroes and the disappointing end to the 
Common Market talks, Christopher Soames and his department had become fervent 
advocates of a British extension, using the argument which Macmillan had earlier 
espoused, that '[I]ots of other people have got away with it; why shouldn't we?, 182 But 
initially, even this conversion at MAFF did not suffice. So focused were other officials 
and legal experts on the law of the sea as it had been that they found it almost 
impossible to support any change at all. In March 1964, when Britain had in principle 
agreed on an extension, both Francis Vallat in the Foreign Office and Manningham- 
Buller warned that enforcement against all nations 'would be contrary to our 
international obligations and would be an unjustifiable encroachment on the rights of 
other countries to fish on the high seas'. The move could only apply to the original 
signatories of the North Sea Convention from 1882, not newcomers like, for instance, 
the Soviets and the Poles who fished extensively off British shores. ' 83 At the Fisheries 
Department, Ian Graham was 'so shaken' by this message that he immediately 
remonstrated that if British interests were to be protected, 'political expediency' must be 
allowed to 'temper our expressed views on international law. 184 
In the event, the limit was enforced against all nationals but the debate showed 
the extent of the British tendency to prioritise static legal principles at the expense of 
present realities. The clause in the Icelandic settlement of 1961 on a referral of further 
disputes to The Hague was of course another example of this faith. 'Whether the 
180 In late 1965, it was lifted and replaced by an agreement on Faroese sales in Britain, similar to the 
agreement with the Icelanders from 1956. PRO: F0371/180050/CK1351/25, Ratford to Tebbit, 
11.10.1965. 
18 1 Robinson, Trawling, 234-235. 
182 PRO: F0371/176330/GW2/47, FO minute, 6.5.1964. Also CAB21/4981, Soames to Dilhome 
(Manningham-Buller), 4.4.1963. 
183 PRO: F0371/176329/GW2/4, Vallat minutes, 11.3.1964. 
184 PRO: F0371/176329/GW2/4, Graham to Brown, 13.3.1964. 
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Icelandic government like it or not', as one member of the Foreign Office wrote in the 
mid- I 960s, 'this agreement is still in force and is binding on them, no matter how much 
they may try to wiggle out of it'. 185 But would the pledge really hold? Those Icelandic 
politicians who had denounced the 1961 treaty so feverishly would at some stage come 
to power, and as British fishing inside the 12-mile zone came to an end in 1964, the 
Conservatives confirmed that while they would respect international law, they always 
aimed to control the whole continental shelf. 186 Britain's grudging and overdue respect 
for 12 miles came at a time when not only the Icelanders but many other nations had set 
their sights on much wider limits. Britain was still behind the times. 
185 PRO: FC09/255, Davidson to Halford-Macleod, 30.1.1967. 
186 Morgunbladid and Visir, 11.3.1964. Also PAAA: B80/3 89, Hirschfeld to Bonn, 19.3.1964. 
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Conclusion 
Basic Facts 
The basic facts in the history of Britain's fight for freedom of the high seas in 1948-64 
are simple. At the beginning, the three-mile limit of territorial waters was the most 
widespread rule in the North Atlantic. Yet it was neither universal nor undisputed and at 
the end of the era, after a number of conflicts, a 12-mile fishing limit had replaced the 
old regime. 
The Norwegians began the process in 1948 when they decided to enforce their 
baseline-measured four-mile limit of territorial waters. Britain protested the move and 
the dispute was referred to the International Court of Justice. Its ruling, in 1951, was 
totally in Norway's favour. Meanwhile, with the promulgation of the Conservation Law 
of 1948, the Icelanders declared their will to control fisheries over their continental 
shelf. In 1952, they followed the precedence which had been set at the Hague by 
declaring a baseline-measured four-mile fishing limit. The British trawling industry, 
with tacit blessing in London, fought the change by imposing a ban on the landings of 
iced fish from Iceland. At around the same time, Moscow decided to end an agreement 
with Britain on fishing up to three miles off the Soviet coast in the Barents Sea. Unlike 
the Icelandic conflict, Britain had no means of coercion in this case. For a while, 
however, the Soviets graciously allowed British trawlers to work in restricted areas 
inside the 12-mile limit in these waters. In 1955, Britain also secured an agreement with 
Denmark about a partial extension of the three-mile fishing limit around the Faroe 
Islands. A year on, the landing ban on Icelandic catches was lifted and Britain accepted 
Iceland's four-mile limit defacto. 
The events of 1958 demonstrated that the decision-makers in London were not 
ready to retreat further. At the first United Nations law of the sea conference, they tried 
to advance the three-mile rule and could only consent to very minimal concessions in 
order to try to reach an agreement on the regime of territorial waters. The conference 
failed and the Icelanders moved their fishing limits to 12 miles later in the year. Britain 
replied by sending the Royal Navy to defend trawlers from harassment. Initially, the 
tension was high in this first 'cod war'. It eased as time went on but neither side 
appeared willing to give in and the conflict was unsolved when the second law of the 
sea conference began in 1960. Despite the willingness by Britain, the United States and 
other traditional proponents of the three-mile rule to tolerate wider national jurisdiction, 
this attempt was also unsuccessful. Later in the year, Britain accepted a 12-mile fishing 
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limit off Norway, with rights to work inside the outer six-mile zone for the next ten 
years. 
A settlement was also reached with Iceland the following year, on March 11, 
1961. The phase-out period for fishing inside the limit was only three years and wider 
baselines were introduced. Furthermore, the agreement contained a clause on the 
referral of further disputes to the International Court. Finally, in 1962, all fishing rights 
inside the Soviet 12-mile limit expired and in 1964 around the Faroe Islands. What was 
considered impossible in 1948 had become real. The three-mile rule, Britain's 'vital 
interest', had all but disappeared. 
The Five 'Ps' 
These were the principal events, and the central conclusion can only be that Britain lost, 
while the others won. Moving from facts to interpretations-or from explaining to 
understanding-the thesis has demonstrated that the main determinants of British 
policy-the five 'p's' of pressure, precedence, principle, prestige and power-all 
contributed to the fault of fighting repeatedly for a lost cause. 
First, the trawling industry was always able to exert too much pressure on 
British decision-makers. Throughout the fishing disputes, it is almost as if we can hear 
the statesmen in London echo Herbert Morrison's famous rejection of the European 
Coal and Steel Community in 1950, and eliminate an acceptance of inevitable 
extensions by saying: 'It's no good, we cannot do it. The trawler owners won't wear 
it'. ' The dire warnings about 'unbearable' extensions should have been taken with a 
grain of salt. Despite the repeated warnings about 'unbearable' setbacks in Northern 
waters in the 1950s, that decade was a 'golden age' for the trawling industry. 2 In 
addition, the fateful miscalculation that what was good for the BTF was good for Britain 
not only meant that a single retreat was impossible, but also that the danger of adverse 
precedence aggravated the error yet further. A 'domino-theory' was clearly in the minds 
of British decision-makers. It is here that the merits of the comparative, multi-archival 
approach of the thesis are best visible. A focus on the Icelandic dispute, for instance. has 
led to the incomplete conclusion that economic interests were almost the sole reason for 
' Morrison said: 'It's no good, we cannot do it. The Durham miners won't wear it'. See Bernard 
Donoughue and G. W. Jones, Herbert Morrison (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1973), 48 1. 
2 Charles Ekberg, Grimsby Fish. The Story of the Port and the Decline and Fall of the Deep Water 
Industry (Buckingham: Barracuda Books, 1984), 82. Also Robinson, Tr", Iing, 208-223. 
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Britain's flawed policy. 3 Comparison, it has been said, 'can have a de-provinciali sing, a 
liberating, an eye-opening effect'. 4 
Further on these lines, Britain's concern for the principle of narrow territorial 
waters must be kept in mind. On the one hand, it was inspired by the mistaken 
assumption that the law of the sea was fair and should more or less be maintained as it 
had been. Too rarely did British decision-makers admit what Thyne Henderson once 
wrote from Reykjavik, that the preferred three-mile rule was 'the result of Britain's 
dominance of the sea for the last two hundred years'. 5 On the other hand, the principle 
of the narrowest limits was mistakenly defended because of that illusive concept, 
prestige. All through the fishing disputes, the rulers in London emphasised that Britain 
was, to mention one expression near the end of the period, 'to a great extent a naval and 
maritime power'. 6A state of that stature should not tolerate 'illegal' encroachments on 
the oceans by small states like Iceland or the Faroe Islands. Were it done, the prestige 
would vanish. The trouble for Britain, however, was that merely the decision of such 
minnows to go against her will indicated that the prestige was decreasing. In the words 
of E. H. Carr: 'Prestige means the recognition by other people of your strength ... 
if your 
strength is recognised, you can generally achieve your aims without having to use it'. 7 
Since the amount of prestige was clearly insufficient to avert conflicts, the 
apparent possession of adequate economic and military power led British decision- 
makers to believe that they could, and should, use it. But as with the prestige, the power 
had diminished. In a world of increased interdependence, military or economic 
superiority did not count as much as before. This thesis has underscored the contention 
that in the post-war period 'the conversion of the base metal of military force into 
diplomatic gold has been akin to the alchemist's frustrating search for the Philosopher's 
Stone'. 8 Moreover, the history of the maritime disputes in 1948-64 is a fine aspect of the 
particular decrease in British power after the Second World War. True, the legendary 
'decline' has sometimes been overstated. '[W]e have certainly learned to wallow in it', 
complain the critics of such excesses. 9 Yet it would be equally unjustifiable to go to the 
other extreme and assert, as some historians would like to do, that "'Declinism" is 
3 See J6nsson, Friends, 96-97, and Th6r, British Trawlers, 186-187. 
4 JUrgen Kocka, 'Comparison and Beyond', History and Theory, Vol. 42, No. 1,2003,41. 
5 PRO: F0371/111531/NLI351/52, Henderson to Hohler, 24.6.1952. 
6 PRO: CAB21/476 1, Kilmuir memorandum, undated but ftorn late 1962. 
7 Quoted in Martin Wight (Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad eds), Power Politics (London: Penguin for 
the RIIA, 2 nd ed., 1986), 96. 
8 Booth, Navies, 29. 
9 Andrew Neil, 'A very British success story', Daily Mail, 15.3.2000. 
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dead'. 10 It is a fact that Britain's previous prestige and power had decreased. This 
research is an indisputable, if small, confirmation of that change. 
The Six 'Cs ' 
The decline was of course relative. Thus, it can only be properly understood by an 
equally detailed research into the opponents' increased strength. The focus here has 
logically been on the Icelanders, the main adversary, and the work has revealed how 
they were stronger than Britain because of the six Vs' which determined their policy on 
fishing limits: the code of law, Cold War, cynicism, conservation, commitment and 
compassion. 
The development of the code of law aided the 'extensionists' on the oceans, 
especially because of the inclination in London to cite legal theories in support of 
British views. When speaking on the law of the sea in 1951, a Chilean judge at the 
International Court of Justice referred to a new 'law of social interdependence' which 
would correspond 'to the new conditions of the life of peoples'. An English lawyer 
could only comment that he felt as if he had 'moved into a different world'. I' Later in 
the 1950s and into the next decade, 'decolonisation' could be detected at sea as on land, 
with former colonies laying claim to the riches of the oceans and the seabed adjoining 
their shores. It has indeed been said of the Icelanders that 'without the worldwide trend 
towards recognising the rights of coastal states, they would not have got very far with 
their claims'. ' 2 
More important, still, was the Cold War. In a flippant manner, it could be argued 
that if Communism had not existed, the Icelanders would have invented it. So much did 
they benefit from the strategic importance of Iceland in the struggle between East and 
West. A self-interested Soviet Union was willing to help them and while pro-Western 
politicians in Reykjavik were certainly right in warning London and Washington that 
opposition to moves on the fishing limits could strengthen the anti-Western camp, they 
consciously (ab)used the 'Communist' fear as well. 'We used NATO to the death', an 
influential member of the Conservative Party was to acknowledge. 13 Icelandic power in 
10 See 'What does the end of "Declinism" mean for the writing of contemporary British history? ' Seminar 
at the Institute of Contemporary British History, London. 27.11.2002. For a critique of 'Declinism', see 
also Alan Sked, An Intelligent Person's Guide to Post- War Britain (London: Duckworth, 1997). 
'1D. H. N. Johnson, 'The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case', International and Comparative Law 
Quarterl 
, v, 
Vol. 1, Pt. 2,1952,172-177. 
12 R6g-nvaldur Hannesson, Fisheries Mismanagement: The Case of the NorthAtlantic Cod (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1996), 68. The statement also covered Iceland's successful limit extensions in the 1970s. 
13 Matthias Johannessen, in Arrýi Snacvarr and Valur Ingimundarson, Kalda stridid. TV documentary, 
Icelandic State Broadcasting Corporation, 15.5.2000. Also Valur Ingimundarson, 'Vidhorf Bandarikjanna 
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the fishing disputes would have diminished considerably if the authorities in London 
had realised what E. B. Boothby, the Ambassador in Reykjavik, asserted at the end of 
1962, that JI]t is virtually impossible to see how the Communist Party could seize 
power in this country'. 14 
Naturally, British decision-makers were not mainly responsible for the 
strategically inspired increase in Icelandic power. In Reykjavik, the 'million dollar 
question' was always which would weigh more in American minds: the three-mile 
principle or Icelandic contentment during the Cold War. It was a tough choice and as 
John Muccio said in the summer of 1958, the United States position was 'that of an 
interested friend, with no direct involvement'. 15 But while the strategic preference for 
narrow limits prevented decision-makers in Washington from backing Iceland 
unreservedly, they were more willing to put great pressure on Britain than the 
Icelanders. A brilliant example was President's Eisenhower's readiness to become the 
world's greatest fishmonger and buy all of Iceland's catches in the mid-1950s, at a time 
when the authorities in London were not too displeased about the trawling industry's 
ban on the landings of Icelandic catches. It could in fact be said that Britain suffered 
from the fact that Iceland enjoyed a 'special relationship' with the United States. More 
generally, Britain also suffered from the American inclination to sacrifice fish for 
security; or the inclination to protect the three-mile limit of territorial waters by 
accepting extended fishing rights for coastal states. 
Cynicism also influenced the Icelandic stand. British intransigence encouraged 
the conviction that unilateral action would yield better results than negotiations and 
compromises. When this calculation was confirmed, more moderate parties to the 
fishing disputes were understandably annoyed. For instance, the settlement of the 
Anglo-Icelandic four-mile conflict on better terms than the Danes had secured for the 
Faroe Islands made the authorities in Copenhagen wonder, as Ambassador Barclay 
wrote, whether the only way to get true concessions from Britain was 'by dint of being 
thoroughly tiresome'. 16 Likewise, the unavoidable retreat in Soviet waters damaged the 
British contention about the universality of narrow limits and increased the resentment 
over Britain's uncompromising policy elsewhere. As one Whitehall official confessed: 
til islenskrar hagstj6mar d 5. og 6. dratugnum', in J6nas H. Haralz (ed. ), Frd kreppu til vidreisnar 
(Reykjavik: Hid islenska b6kinerintafflag, 2002), 329. 
14 PRO: F0371/166064/NLI015/13, Boothby to Home, 7.12.1962. 
15 CUL: 4100, Box 85, Muccio to Moore, 28.7.1958. 
16 PRO: F0371/128562/NDI 351/37, Barclay to Brimelow, 10.7.1957. After the Icelandic settlement in 
196 1, the Daily Telegraph also lamented that it showed how 'Icelandic intransigence has paid better than 
Norwegian reasonableness'. Daily Delegraph, 1.3.1961 (leading article). 
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we acquiesce in the 12-mile limit off Russia and then protect our ships off Iceland 
we shall be open to the charge that our policy is one of parcere superbis et debellare 
subjectos'. " 
Furthermore, the clear need to conserve fish stocks could not but encourage the 
4extensionists', with the Icelanders in the forefront. They were sometimes tempted to 
exaggerate the threat of depletion. 18 Even so, Britain usually acknowledged the need for 
protective measures. She wanted it done at international level, however, and with the 
division of the fishing effort mostly unchanged. This the Icelanders, the Faroese and the 
fishennen of North Norway would never accept. They unashamedly wanted a bigger 
slice of the cake in order to grow and prosper. Hence, their commitment was greater, 
and it is a truism in all disputes that commitment increases power. The Vietnam War is 
probably the best illustration of a conflict after the Second World War where the 
superior side was never determined or united enough to use its full strength, while the 
materially weaker opponent 'equated compromise with defeat'. 19 
Similarly, the smallness of the North Atlantic opponents and their obvious 
reliance on the riches of the sea worked against Britain. References to Bismarck's 
expression about the 'tyranny of the weak' were most fitting indeed. The Icelanders 
'have the greatest faith in the strength of their bargaining position as one of the world's 
weakest nations', wrote Henderson from Reykjavik in 1955.20 Both then and on other 
occasions were they more responsible than Britain for the 'absence of diplomacy', i. e. 
the long periods without sincere efforts to solve the disputes. It is only fair, therefore, to 
ask how Britain could have been expected to avoid conflicts with such an intransigent 
and determined adversary? 
Intransigence, "Pragmatism', Power and Interests 
In the midst of the four-mile dispute, 61afur Thors met with Anthony Nutting who 
noted that the conversation 'covered nothing but the old familiar ground'. Thors 
reiterated 'that he would never give way, his government would never give way'. 
21 
During the next conflict with Iceland, the 'cod war', Gudmundur 
i. Gudmundsson told a 
17 PRO: NIAF209/1483, Hetherington to Huntley, 18.8.1955. The Latin translates as 'spare the tough but 
fight the weak'. 
'8 This argument was a 'red herring', as C. G. Trout maintained in the Fisheries Laboratory in Lowestoft. 
PRO: MAF209/753, Trout note, 17.10.1951 
'9 Kissinger, Diplomacy, 660. Also Lebow, Art, 101. 
20 PRO: F0371/116446/NLI351/188, Henderson to Hohler, 5.9.1955. 
21 PRO: F0371/11153 I/NLI351/71, Nutting minute, 26.8.1954. 
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NATO official that the Royal Navy must withdraw from the 12-mile zone in order to 
facilitate a solution. And what would Iceland do in turn? 'Nothing', was the reply. 22 
The intransigence was infuriating, and it contrasted sharply with the more 
conciliatory attitude of the Danes and the Norwegians. But they were not tiny, newly 
independent one-industry nations. Moreover, the authorities in Copenhagen and Oslo 
tended to use the Icelanders as 'icebreakers' who cleared the way for them. And, 
crucially, getting infuriated rarely leads to a level-headed policy. British decision- 
makers ought to have realised the unfavourable correlation of forces in the North 
Atlantic-the supremacy of the six 'c's' over the five 'p's'. In short, Iceland was 
stronger. In the autumn of 1960, when Sir Patrick Reilly had just left Moscow and was 
about to enter battle with Hans G. Andersen and the other intransigent Icelanders, he 
wrote that Jon] the little I have been able to learn about the subject so far, it looks as if 
dealing with the Icelanders will be terribly like dealing with the Russians'. 23 The 
comparison is fair, and may be elaborated. 'The Russians are not to be persuaded by 
eloquence or convinced by reasoned arguments', wrote Sir William Hayter: 
They rely on what Stalin used to call the proper basis of international policy, the 
calculation of forces. So no case, however skilfully deployed, however clearly 
demonstrated as irrefutable, will move them from doing what they have 
previously decided to do; the only way of changing their purpose is to 
demonstrate that they have no advantageous alternative, that what they want to 
do is not possible. 24 
In the fishing disputes, Britain could never convince the Icelanders that what they 
wanted to do was not possible. Also, the British decision-makers ought to have realised 
that, actually, narrow territorial waters and fishing limits were not a 'vital national 
interest'. 25 It must be remembered that trawling in distant waters accounted for less than 
1% of Britain's gross national product, 26 and narrow territorial waters were not essential 
for Britain's well-being. The Empire was disappearing and although outposts like Aden, 
Hong Kong and Singapore lasted a little longer, they would go as well. 'If there was not 
to be a British presence east of Suez', as J. Gallagher explained afterwards, 'then there 
22 PRO: F0371/143108/NLI351/122, FO to Reykjavik, 2.6.1959. 
23 BOD: Reilly Papers, Ms. Eng. c. 6872, fol. 2, Reilly to Barker, 29.9.1960. 
24 Quoted in Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: 
Norton, 1969), 275. 
25 Martin Wight's definition of 'vital interests' is as follows: 'There are certain things that a power deerns 
essential to its continued independence; these are its vital interests, which it will go to war to defend'. 
Wight, Power Politics, 95. 
26 J6nsson, Friends, 7. 
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was precious little point in holding bastions and staging-posts'. 27 And if there was no 
need for these stations, there was no need for the unchanged status of the sea lanes 
towards them. 
The illusion of 'vital interests' meant that British actions in the maritime 
disputes were inconsistent and contradictory. The thesis has confirmed the hypothesis 
which was put forward at the onset, of a vacillation between idealism and 
interdependence on the one hand, and Realpolitik and 'gunboat diplomacy' on the other. 
The four-mile dispute is a good case in point. At the start of the landing ban by the 
trawling industry, an Iceland-sympathiser at the Bank of England lamented that 'a small 
and vulnerable country is being bludgeoned by the powerful private interests of a big 
neighbour'. 28 The authorities in London knew that after the judgement in the Anglo- 
Norwegian dispute, Iceland had a compelling right to extend the limits. Yet they could 
not resist the shrewd calculation that coercion would force the Icelanders to back down. 
But when they were proved wrong, they would not escalate British commitment. Thus, 
the decision-makers in London broke a cardinal rule of 'coercive diplomacy': 'The 
adversary must be made to believe not only that one is unwilling to give way at the 
present level of conflict, but that one is ready and able to go even ftirther if necessary'. 29 
The same indecisiveness took place during the 'cod war'. 'Hawks' like Dennis 
Welch in Grimsby complained about 'appeasement' and in his militant mood, Andrew 
Gilchrist would question 'whether we ought to be deterred by fear of a little 
bloodshed' 
. 
30 Britain had gone in, but she neither would nor could go all the way. A 
comparison with Suez immediately springs to mind. 'Sound policy or not', one observer 
wrote on that catastrophe, 'the British government had lacked the nerve to see it 
31 through'. Off Iceland as in Egypt, Britain got the worst of both worlds; condem nation 
for aggression yet not the spoils of victory. But although the policy was foolish, we 
must acknowledge the environment of the time, and the mindset and upbringing of the 
men in power. 32 As a sailor who saw 'cod war' duty later described his Commanding 
Officer: 'He would have entered the service as a Boy in the late twenties or early thirties 
27 J. Gallagher, (Anil Seal ed. ), The Decline, Revival and Fall o the British Empire (Cambridge: If 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 152. 
28 BEA: OV35/9, Overseas and Foreign Office note, 14.1-1953. 
29 Paul Gordon Lauren, 'Theories of Bargaining with Threats of Force: Deterrence and Coercive 
Diplomacy', in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed. ), Diplomacy. New Approaches in Histolý,, Theory, and Policy 
(New York: The Free Press, 1979), 193. 
30 PRO: F0371/134985/NLI351/803, Gilchrist to FO, 5.9.1958, and F0371/150833/GW12/5 1, Dennis 
report, 4.2.1960. 
31 Sharp, Thatcher's Diplomacy, 10. Also Hennessy, Muddling Through, 148. 
32 On this point in general, see Peter Hennessy, Never Again. Britain 1945-51 (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1992), xiv, 431-432. 
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and would have been indoctrinated on Nelsonia-Britain rules the waves and all that 
jazz'. 33 In other words, British policy-makers were not stupid or incompetent. It simply 
would have taken an almost extraordinary psychological effort to agree that suddenly 
the old naval power should acquiesce in adverse decisions on maritime affairs, taken in 
tiny places like Reykjavik or T6rshavn. 
Then again, the deterministic view that what happened had to happen must also 
be avoided. Options were always open and, what is more, participants in the story knew 
this very well. Sympathetic outsiders noticed that Britain habitually lagged a step or two 
behind events. 34 In London itself, this unfortunate trait was also admitted at times, as 
has been seen. In 1960, to take one more example, Lord Kilmuir wrote: 'I have now had 
years of experience of seeing the failure to attain an agreement when, if we had been 
ready earlier to pay the price ultimately accepted by us, it might have been obtained'. 35 
A skipper who retired that year also insisted that the industry needed to ignore 'the old- 
timer who cannot get the limit line chip off his shoulder', 36 and when Harold Macmillan 
was trying in vain to rush through a decision on 12 miles off Britain, he stated that 
'[w]hatever the Admiralty may say, there is really nothing in the defence point'. 37 But if 
only he had realised this a few years before. As Kilmuir's grievance and Macmillan's 
failed and overdue conversion bear out, a frank, progressive reconsideration of British 
interests and capabilities never took place. The inclination to 'wait and see' was always 
stronger. And here the decision-making machine itself was at fault as well. Often the 
influence on action seemed to decrease in inverse proportion to knowledge of the issue. 
The almost constant ignorance of the input from diplomats 'on the spot' was highlighted 
in the thesis, as was the dismissal of advice from the most knowledgeable officials in 
London or at the international conferences in Geneva. Departmental divisions also made 
matters worse. For the bureaucrats, victory in Whitehall often seemed more important 
than a realistic policy in the outside world. 
All these flaws in the decision-making process, as well as the equally defective 
results, make a mockery of the rather popular description of British policy as being 
4pragmatic% at least if it is defined in terms of adaptability and foresight. There was no 
strategy, only stubbornness. A final lament from Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, the 
comparatively farsighted Legal Adviser whose advice was so often ignored, is worth 
" Baker to author, 5.4.2002. 
34 UD: 26.11/23/XIV, Seyersted to Stabell, 18.10-1958, and RA-DEN: 55. DAN. 3 I/XVI, Sorensen to 
Borch, 27.12.1961. 
35 PRO: CAB21/432 1, Kilmuir to Heath, 19.9.1960. 
36 Financial Times, 24.5.1963 
37 PRO: CAB21/4761, Macmillan minute, 7.5.1962. 
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quoting: 'Ministers have never been prepared with this subject to take a decision in 
advance of it being forced upon them by events'. 38 So determined were British decision- 
makers not to cross a bridge until they came to it that they lagged behind others until 
they came to a watershed. Then, at last, would they wonder whether to cross, only to 
find out that the current had changed and the necessary bridge would have to be built 
elsewhere. 
The fairly long-term approach of the thesis underlines further this un-pragmatic 
nature of British policy and decision-making. By examining the process rather than a 
single episode, we see that Britain repeated the same mistakes. The 'issue-leaming 
curve' was disappointingly flat, and the 're-representation of problems' rarely led to a 
fundamental change in policy. In addition, other developments support this observation. 
We have corroborative evidence, as it were. In this work, references to Messina in 1955 
or Suez in 1956 are not simplistic historical analogies. British attitudes on fishing limits 
and the law of the sea have to be placed in the context of the period. Two of the most 
important aspects of Britain's foreign policy-decolonisation and European 
integration-have of course been thoroughly examined . 
39 At the risk of 
oversimplification, the broad consensus among the students of Empire and Europe is 
strikingly similar to the main conclusions here. On the end of Britain's imperial role, it 
has for instance been argued that British decision-makers could have shown more 
foresight. They knew that things would inevitably change and repeatedly reviewed the 
situation, but as one observer summarised their efforts, '[t]he outcome of each passing 
review, in short, was the conclusion that something would have to be done-but not 
yet'. 40 As for Europe, it has been said that Britain always lagged behind. 'I've often 
thought the patron saint of British European policy was Ethelred the Unready', said Sir 
Oliver Wright in a particularly colourftil critique: 
At key moments, we've always been unready, including the first key moment. 
We have always been unready to take decisions from which we could have 
derived maximum advantage instead of which so far, like Johnny come lately, 
we've had to run and catch up and accept what the others have already decided 
and in a sense got very little advantage from it. But if you adopt a permanent 
38 PRO: F0371/143107/NLI351/87, Fitzmaurice minute, 20.3.1959. 
39 For a recent combination of the two, see Alex May (ed. ), Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe. The 
Commonwealth and Britain's Applications tojoin the European Communities (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2001). 
40 David Goldsworthy, 'Frank Heinlein, British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945-1963' 
(book review), International History Review, Vol. 25, No. 1,2003,205. Also Frank Heinlein, British 
Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945-1963: Scrutinising the Official Mind (London: Frank Cass, 
2002), Butler, Britain and Empire, and Young, Britain and the World, 142. 
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policy of Ethelred the Unready you've only got yourself to blame, haven't 
YOU? 
41 
This credible complaint about shortsightedness on Europe involves fish as well. At the 
start of the 1970s, Britain was negotiating an entry to the European Economic 
Community and decided to accept the unfavourable Common Fisheries Policy. 42 In the 
words of Sir David Hannay, one of the officials who took part in the negotiations, 
fisheries is a bit of a black spot in my view and I couldn't put my hand on my 
heart and say we did a brilliant job. ... 
One of the reasons why we didn't do 
terribly well is that we failed to spot that there were a whole number of 
developments in the fisheries field which were going to change all the rules of 
the game. 43 
Moreover, after the developments of fishing limits and territorial waters which have 
been described in the thesis, the miscalculations on the law of the sea were to continue. 
In 1971, a new centre-left coalition in Iceland declared a 50-mile fishing limit, imposing 
it the following year. The regime shrewdly ignored Britain's references to the 
agreement of 196 1, and then a ruling against the new limit by the International Court of 
Justice. 'What law? They don't exist, said L6dvik J6sepsson, back at the Fisheries 
Ministry, when British journalists asked about Iceland's legal obligations. 44 Again, the 
intransigence was infuriating but Britain was still in the same position of apparent 
powerlessness. In late 1972, the Research Department of the FCO pointed out in a 
paper, 'The Lessons of the First "Cod War"', that '[c]onfrontation between the Royal 
Navy and the Icelandic coastguards is likely to be disastrous to efforts to reach 
agreement'. Iceland would use both her smallness and strategic importance, and a 
solution 'is likely to involve substantial concessions on our part. Delay in making them 
will only make the price of agreement higher'. 45 
Nonetheless, Britain did not yield, fighting another 'cod war' in 1972-73 and 
again in 1975-76, when Iceland extended the limit to 200 miles. 46 In both cases, defeat 
was inevitable and as Sir Andrew Gilchrist wrote after the final conflict: 
41 CC: BDOHP, Wright interview, 18.9.1996. Also Ellison, Threatening Europe, and Young, Britain and 
European Unity, 52-54. 
42 For an overview, see Michael Leigh, European Integration and the Common Fisheries Policy (London: 
Croom Helm, 1983). 
43 CC: BDOHP: Hannay interview, 22.7.1999. On this subject, a great Eurosceptic like Margaret Thatcher 
would later write that Britain should 'exert its parliamentary sovereignty and take back control of its 
waters within the 200-mile limit'. Margaret Thatcher, Statecraft. Strategiesfor a Changing World 
(London: HarperCollins, 2002), 399. 
44 Guardian, 18.7.1972. 
45 PRO: FC051/274, Caie memorandum, 27.10.1972. Also NARA: RG59 POL-33-4-ICE, Box 2355, 
London to Rogers, 6.9.1972. 
46 For an overview, see Th6r, British Trawlers, 198-224. 
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If some reasonable degree of excuse and explanation can be offered for the 
British government's actions in ... 1958, surely it passes comprehension that 
when confronted by an identical problem in 1972 and 1975, the government 
should have had recourse to the same measures which had proved so ineffective 
and counterproductive on the earlier occasion. 47 
But what was the alternative? Commenting on the 'Lessons of the first "Cod War"", 
Anthony Royle, Minister of State at the FCO, could not but complain that it 'seems to 
be a prescription for throwing our hands in the air and giving in to the Icelanders! 48 
And could it perhaps be argued that a fighting retreat was better than an abject 
surrender? In the opinion of Ian Graham at the Fisheries Department, the policy of 
constant resistance was sensible because 'if you're going to be hanged that's no reason 
to be rushing to the gallows. If you can put the day off, it's worth putting it off, and one 
never knows what the ftiture will hold' . 
49 However, the case being made here is that if 
another route had been taken in 1948-64, Britain would not have entered troubled 
waters time after time. In the long run, an alternative path of voluntary concessions and 
compromises would have been more beneficial than the questionable short-term 
advantages of stubborn resistance. To sum up, this has therefore been a story of British 
miscalculations about interests and capabilities. In light of the opponents' irritating 
intransigence and the somewhat indistinct nature of the decline in Britain's power, the 
error was understandable. Yet it was always avoidable, and certainly regrettable. 
47 Gilchrist, Cod Wars, 109-110. For this argument, see also Valur Ingimundarson, 'Fighting the Cod 
Wars in the Cold War: Iceland's Challenge to the Western Alliance in the 1970s', RUSIJournal, Vol. 
148, No. 3,2003,88-94. 
48 PRO: FC076/554, Royle minute, undated but on orjust after 30.10.1972. 
49 Graham interview, 28.2.2002. 
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